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INTRODUCTION
Fritz Plasser and Günter Bischof
The seven years of Wolfgang Schüssel’s chancellorship (2000-2007)
represent a departure from traditional policies and governmental style in
Austria. They are also characterized by passing a reform agenda that will
have lasting impact. As a consequence of his governing style, Schüssel
was prepared to accept a greater intensity in domestic political conflict
and policy innovations. He cast aside long-standing traditions in the
formation of post-World War II national governments when he took
office in February 2000. First, the “Schüssel era” ended the reign of
grand coalition governments that had dominated Austrian national
politics since 1987 (following in the postwar tradition of such grand
coalition governments from 1945 to 1966). Second, in spite of massive
and unprecedented resistance from Thomas Klestil, Austria’s president
in 2000 when the Schüssel government was formed, Schüssel launched
a coalition government with Jörg Haider’s Freiheitliche Partei
Österreichs (FPÖ), the right-wing populist and enfante terrible in the
Austrian political arena since the mid-1980s. 
A reluctant President Klestil appointed Schüssel chancellor of an
ÖVP/FPÖ “small” coalition government. Although the Österreichische
Volkspartei (ÖVP) had suffered a severe defeat at the polls in the fall
1999 national elections—placing third behind the FPÖ for the first time
in postwar political history—the shrewd political negotiator Schüssel
managed to finagle himself into the position of chancellor. For the first
time since 1970 when the Josef Klaus government was voted out of
office, the ÖVP seized the Federal Chancellor’s office on the
Ballhausplatz again. Managing to become chancellor in 2000 was
Schüssel’s strategic masterpiece of sorts. It showed his readiness to take
political risks and demonstrated his superb tactical skills in the minefield
of Austria’s quotidian contentious political infighting. 
None of Schüssel’s predecessors at the helm of Austrian politics
entered office under comparably dramatic circumstances. Daily protests
and demonstrations by his numerous detractors on the Left
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overshadowed the first weeks of his government’s activities. Critical
pundits and commentators described his chancellorship as a definite
break with the consensual tradition of Austrian politics. A stubborn
Schüssel did not budge, even though he found himself confronted
domestically by the stubborn resistance of the Sozialdemokratische
Partei Österreichs (SPÖ), which emerged as the strongest party on the
polls in 1999, but was not successful in finding coalition partners. The
SPÖ found itself ill-suited for the oppositional role it undertook for the
first time in thirty years. Internationally, the new Schüssel government
found itself utterly isolated for a few months by the novel sanctions
launched by the governments of the fourteen remaining states of the
European Union. 
The EU-14 sanctions actually represented an embargo of
communications and the end of direct talks and negotiations with the
chancellor of the ÖVP/FPÖ-government. Schüssel was treated as a leper
and outcast in the European political arena. These sanctions were
rescinded in the fall of 2000 when relations between the heads of
governments of the fourteen states of the European Union and the
Schüssel government were normalized. During this phase, another
defining character trait of Wolfgang Schüssel’s became visible: his
ability to cope with extraordinary stress and his iron will to stand up to
political pressure coming from outside the country. 
In spite of this turbulent start to his chancellorship, Schüssel
remained  extremely active in domestic politics. Under the motto “speed
kills,” he launched a host of political reform projects during his first year
in office. He immediately set up special commissions to deal with
restitution issues regarding former slave laborers exploited by the Nazis
on Austrian terrain during World War II and Jewish victims whose
property had been aryanized. Chancellor Schüssel was eager to remove
unacceptable old blockages of economic and social policies; he was
fighting political gridlock Austrian style. This brought out an additional
trait of Schüssel’s political leadership style: his determination to forge
ahead actively with new policies and bring about political change.
Schüssel felt that the chancellor’s office offered a much broader range of
executive leadership potential than his cautious predecessors had
practiced. 
The first coalition with the FPÖ was short-lived. Tensions and
strategic disagreements quickly escalated in the coalition. Personnel
conflicts proliferated within the FPÖ primarily because the FPÖ did not
have a sufficient pool of politically experienced people to fill its
ministerial assignments in the coalition. This caused Schüssel in the
summer of 2002 to end prematurely the coalition government with the
FPÖ. During the following parliamentary elections, Schüssel’s ÖVP was
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triumphant in the polls. Voters catapulted the ÖVP from 26.9 percent to
42.3 percent of the vote, while the FPÖ ignominiously sank from 26.9
percent back to 10.0 percent. Coalition negotiations with the Green Party
collapsed quickly, not the least due to Schüssel’s half-hearted
negotiations. Instead, Schüssel formed a new coalition government with
the substantially weakened FPÖ in January 2003. No longer the junior
partner, he naturally was in a much stronger position now.
As chancellor of a coalition, which political pundits have described
as a quasi-single party government, Schüssel in record time succeeded
in speeding up his reform agenda. He launched a decisive reform of the
Austrian pension system. Some constituencies in his own electorate felt
that this pension reform was too radical. In retrospect, this 2003 pension
reform marks a turning point in the chancellorship of Wolfgang
Schüssel. Critiques of his governing style became shriller, general
discontent with his governing activities increased, and losses during
regional elections showed that unfavorable attitudes towards the ÖVP
were emerging across the country. The controversial pension reform of
2003 showed a further trait of Schüssel’s governing style: his tendency
for stubbornness and underestimating public moods and attitudes that
were critical and leery of his ambitious reform agenda. 
In the 2006 parliamentary elections, Schüssel paid the price for his
overreaching reform agenda that was considered too ambitious in large
parts of the electorate. Losing 8 percent of its 2002 supporters, the ÖVP
slipped back into second place behind the SPÖ. Schüssel again
conducted the tough coalition negotiations. A new grand coalition
government emerged between the SPÖ and the ÖVP, but with a Social
Democratic chancellor. Chancellor Alfred Gusenbauer’s new
government only lasted for two years. While in 2007 Schüssel was
forced to relinquish his chancellorship, he did not withdraw from the
political arena altogether. In 2007/2008 he led the ÖVP faction in the
Austrian Parliament. Once more, he exerted great influence in the
SPÖ/ÖVP coalition government, but this time not as an executive leader
in the Ballhausplatz but as a legislative whip on the Ring. Schüssel
hereby revealed another remarkable character trait: his stoic ability to
accept personal defeats and political backlashes unperturbed. 
The Schüssel era in Austria represents a remarkable time-span
regarding recent Austrian history. The lasting changes and innovations
in domestic and foreign policies directed by Schüssel’s personal and
executive leadership style are under scrutiny in these scholarly essays. It
is too early to tell how far Austria changed politically, socially, and
culturally under Schüssel’s chancellorship. Yet the constraints and
contradictions of his government’s activities are analyzed in the present
volume from different perspectives and disciplines. These essays are
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designed to be a first draft of recent history and start the debate on
Wolfgang Schüssel’s place in the post-World War II political arena.
These essays’ goal is to frame the historiographical agenda of the
Schüssel era and to initiate the conversation on Schüssel’s place in
postwar Austrian politics beyond the chatter of the pundits in the news
media. The volume is designed to offer a first assessment of Schüssel as
chancellor like earlier volumes of Contemporary Austrian Studies  (CAS)
did for Chancellors Bruno Kreisky and Franz Vranitzky. 
The editors have divided the fourteen essays into two sections. The
contributions in the first section deal with Wolfgang Schüssel’s political
personality and leadership style. Specific policies and policy changes are
the focus of the contributions in the second section. The legacies of the
Schüssel years are placed in context in a concluding chapter. 
A special Forum on Austrian Studies Today complements the topical
essays in this volume. The Forum essays were delivered as papers at the
2008 German Studies Association meeting in St. Paul, Minnesota, in
memory of the deceased great Austrian Germanist Wendelin Schmidt-
Dengler, who had passed away in Vienna only weeks before the meeting
and who was scheduled to sit on the panel to discuss the “disturbing
creativity” in recent Austrian literature; this was the hallmark of some of
Austria’s most famous artists and writers—their inclination to irritate the
public and produce scandals. The historian Ernst Hanisch once called
this phenomenon a streak of self-hatred among Austrian intellectuals and
writers. Other essays assess the state of Austrian-Jewish studies and the
need “to reimagine Jewishness as an integral part of Austrianness and to
reimagine Austrianness as the partial product and reflection of
specifically Jewish contributions,” as Leslie Morris writes. The lively
state of Austrian literature and cultural studies in the United States,
especially as seen through the journal Modern Austrian Literature, is the
focus of another Forum essay. Yet another contribution assesses the
Austrian intellectual tradition by looking at both the relationships of
today’s little Austria to the larger historical Austria as well as Austria’s
relationship with German language and culture. As in every CAS annual
publication, book reviews and a review of Austrian politics in the year
2008 complete the volume.
Finally, we treasure the opportunity to thank the people who have
made this volume possible, first and foremost our contributors with the
timely submission of their manuscripts and their good cheer in suffering
through the extensive copy-editing process with us. Fritz Plasser has
commissioned the bulk of the topical essays. In New Orleans and at
UNO, Michael Maier from the University of Vienna, the 2008/2009
Austrian Ministry of Science dissertation fellow at CenterAustria,
addressed the daily tracking of manuscripts with wonderful efficiency
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and aplomb. We hope his own dissertation research on the challenges of
integrating returning Austrian Wehrmacht soldiers after World War II
back into Austrian society did not suffer too much from the demands of
his job as assistant to the editors. Jennifer Shimek at Loyola University
of New Orleans performed the demanding work of copy-editing the
essays and stream-lining them to our style-sheet in a timely fashion and
with her usual superb skill and good cheer. Gertraud Griessner was
pinch-hitting when needed. In Innsbruck, Ellen Palli has produced photo-
ready copy of the final manuscripts with her usual professional skill in
spite of the numerous tables in the topical essays. Franz Mathis has
supported out endeavours when and wherever needed. Franz Mathis is
retiring from the University of Innsbruck and his job as Senate
Representative of the University of Innsbruck for the UNO partnership
treaty. He has been the most professional and helpful of colleagues. He
also helped to shepherd the publication of the volume to a new publisher
after seventeen years of publishing CAS with Transaction Publishers.
Funding for the publication of this volume has come from the
Universities of New Orleans and Innsbruck through their partnership
agreement, as well as from the Austrian Foreign Ministry through the
Austrian Cultural Forum in New York and the Marshall Plan
Anniversary Foundation in Vienna as a generous institutional supporter
of CenterAustria. Martin Rauchbauer in New York has been kind in
being our liaison with the Ministry for European and International
Affairs in Vienna and Ambassador Emil Brix.
Innsbruck/Larose, June 2009 
I. PERSONALITY AND LEADERSHIP
The Political Personality of Wolfgang Schüssel
Peter Gerlich
If you cannot clothe yourself in lionskin use foxpelt.
– Gracian 
Introduction
The public image of Wolfgang Schüssel is shrouded in controversy.
To some extent, this is not surprising; each and every politician, parti-
cularly if still active, has supporters and opponents. But his case seems
nevertheless a special one. As federal chancellor, he broke taboos of
traditional politics and tried to introduce change to Austrian political
culture: for many observers, patterns of far too much consensus were
replaced by controversy and even conflict in a quite unprecedented way.
Sometimes one had the impression that consociational democracy was
not so much replaced by mere political competition—which would have
been the generally more accepted mode of democratic rule—but rather,
at least as far as public debates were concerned, with something almost
approaching civil war. All that was also a consequence of a process of
transition which has not only affected the former socialist countries in
Eastern Europe, but Western and Central Europe as well. 
As Wolfgang Schüssel stepped down from his last position of
power, the chair of the parliamentary caucus of the People’s Party
(Österreichische Volkspartei, or ÖVP), and took his seat among the
parliamentary backbenchers, Hans Rauscher, the dean of Austrian
journalism, attempted in a brief comment to sum up the pros and cons
of the previous chancellor’s personality. According to Rauscher,
Schüssel merited a differentiated appraisal. He could on the one hand be
considered a rare politician: very intelligent, determined, even bold. On
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the other hand a certain intellectual hubris had to be noted. Schüssel had
started as a modernizer—rising up to the challenges of transition—at the
beginning by rightly privatizing the nationalized industries. He pro-
ceeded from a clearly defined vision, namely to create an Austria that
was more competitive and effective, less controlled by political officials
and big economic interest groups. However, he failed to effectively
challenge the costly governmental bureaucracy. To try to carry out re-
forms with the help of the extreme right proved, according to Rauscher,
not only a moral but also a practical impossibility and led to a cynicism
on Schüssel’s part which strongly contrasted with his more upbeat
beginnings.1 
While it is certainly too early to describe and judge with anything
approaching a definitive portrait the political personality of somebody
who only recently left his high executive office and who might still
provide some political surprises, one could nevertheless contribute
towards such a picture. This article focuses on the public image of the
former chancellor in terms of the way in which he was perceived by
commentators and the general public. Therefore, after a brief summary
of Schüssel’s career, it seems appropriate to place it into the context of
experiences and challenges to which he was exposed and which to some
extent influenced his political behavior as well as to introduce some
theoretical perspectives, placing his performance into a more general
framework. Finally, a provisional scoreboard of achievements and
failures and of the contradictory judgments by which his performance
has been evaluated will be attempted.
Three main questions about Schüssel’s time in politics can be
posed. First to what extent did Schüssel succeed as a politician and to
what extent did he fail and for which reasons? Second, did he manage
during his period in office to introduce major changes in Austria? Third,
what does his experience reveal about the characteristics of the Austrian
political system in view of possible strategies for constitutional change?
An Overiew of Schüssel’s Career
With the benefit of hindsight, Wolfgang Schüssel’s political career
appears almost typical, a slow rising through the ranks. If one looks
more closely, some aspects appear rather remarkable, however.2 
What might be termed his political apprenticeship started in 1968
when, after finishing the study of law, he joined the staff of the People’s
Party parliamentary party. He was just twenty-three years old and at that
time considered a bright and promising young man with considerable
intellectual capacities. Those who founded the academic discipline of
political science in Austria at that time remember that he and his
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counterpart Heinz Fischer of the Social Democrats, who worked in a
similar parliamentary role, were asked to join this effort as represen-
tatives of the two then relevant political parties.3 
In 1975, Schüssel was recruited by the powerful interest represen-
tative Rudolf Sallinger as secretary general of his Business League, the
very influential representative of economic interests in the People’s
Party. This choice was unusual for several reasons. First Schüssel had
no business background, second he was at thirty-four which was quite
young for such an important position, and third he appeared if anything
relatively critical of the corporatist mentality of social partnership of
which Sallinger was an essential representative. Sallinger, however,
wanted “fresh blood” in his organization, and the two got along very
well, Sallinger serving as a kind of benevolent father figure for the
somewhat unruly younger man.4  During this time, Schüssel’s political
convictions, the belief in a slim if strong state, not quite in line with
traditional corporatist concepts, was consolidated and often publicly
expressed.5
In 1979, Schüssel became a member of the Austrian Parliament, a
return to his previous place of work in a now more elevated position. He
was a devoted and very active parliamentarian and supposedly men-
tioned at some later point that the only position he ever coveted was that
of a chairman of the People’s Party parliamentary group. Party politi-
cians in Austria are culturally not supposed to show signs of ambition;
this admission on Schüssel’s part sounds a little daring in the local
context. At thirty-four, Schüssel was once again quite young to hold a
position normally only reached about a dozen or so years later.6
The next essential step up the political ladder happened in 1989
when he was at age forty-four elevated to the position of a member of
the cabinet. He served first as Federal Minister of Economic Affairs,
later as Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs and as Vice-Chancellor. In
these capacities, he played a decisive role in first preparing Austria for
EU membership and then actually leading it into the Union as well as
chairing the Ministerial Council during Austria’s first EU presidency in
1998. During this time, his international reputation, which may still be
considered remarkable even today, was built up. The only slight
irritation which occurred during this time was the so-called “breakfast
affair” which consisted of a journalist publishing negative remarks about
leading German and Danish officials which Schüssel had confided to
him off the record.7 It is quite possible that his earlier easygoing re-
lationship with the media suffered because of this experience. Schüssel
became more careful and maybe even taciturn.
In 1995 during one of the People’s Party’s recurrent leadership
crises, Schüssel was, at age fifty, elected chairman of the party. It was
10 The Schüssel Era in Austria
obvious that the party was, as usual, quite divided. Before his election
there was, as Franz Fischler recounts, not much of a discussion, “As so
often, what was not said was almost more important than what was
said,”8 but afterwards Schüssel managed to consolidate the party with a
very emotional and effective speech to the nominating convention. Yet
Schüssel even joked, although more in private, that he would also soon
be thrown out again as many of his predecessors had been. Ultimately,
he would remain chairman for a record eleven years and retreat only
after losing the 2006 election and, therefore, also the position of
chancellor.
This position he reached in 2000 after actually coming in only as a
narrow third in the election of 1999. In spite of the protests of the Social
Democrats and of Federal President Thomas Klestil, who would have
preferred a continuation of grand coalition government to an uproar
among the governments of the European Union, Schüssel formed a
center right coalition with the controversial Jörg Haider of the radical
right Freedom Party (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, or FPÖ). Haider
himself did not enter the cabinet and remained in his position as
governor of the state of Carinthia. The other EU governments imposed
so-called “sanctions” on Austria, a policy of socially isolating its repre-
sentatives, measures which ultimately only strengthened the new
government at home, even if its domestic critics continuously de-
monstrated against the new “black-blue” cabinet. President Klestil
remained critical and demonstrated this by a stern demeanor when
swearing in the cabinet. As Manfried Welan has correctly noted,
something akin to an Austrian cohabitation regime was initiated when
a government was instituted on the basis of a parliamentary majority
against the explicit wishes of the president.9
By forming this controversial coalition, Schüssel certainly hoped to
be able to realize his long-standing program of reform which would not
have been possible in a traditional grand coalition. The achievement of
his strategy, first negotiating with the Social Democrats until they gave
up and then concluding an agreement with the Freedomites and forcing
a reluctant president to appoint this government, was generally con-
sidered Schüssel’s tactical masterpiece. The high ranking American
diplomat Stuart Eizenstat, who at that time negotiated with Schüssel a
resolution to the question of restitution for Jewish victims of Austrian
Nazism, expressed understanding for Schüssel’s tactics which he saw as
a means of reaching reasonable goals, “I had been in politics long
enough to know that the thirst for power at the top all too often produces
unpalatable relationships.”10
In 2002, the black-blue coalition broke up, mainly because Jörg
Haider, who had not joined the cabinet, became jealous of the relatively
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popular representatives of his party in the government. In the following
election, Schüssel managed to achieve a resounding electoral victory. As
clear winner, he had a choice of three options for forming a government
by joining with the Social Democrats, the Greens, or the FPÖ. To the
surprise of many including the Greens themselves, he started to
negotiate with this party. “Black-green” would have been an un-
precedented arrangement, at least on the national level. The negotiations
were taken relatively seriously, but ultimately foundered, probably
because more radical elements of the Greens did not want to com-
promise themselves. After rather perfunctory talks with the Social
Democrats, Schüssel returned to the much weakened FPÖ and formed
a “black-blue” coalition again, which allowed him to govern the country
until the next regularly scheduled elections in 2006.11 
In 2004, the FPÖ broke up. Haider founded a party of his own, the
Alliance for the Future of Austria (Bündnis Zukunft Österreich, or
BZÖ), which remained in the government, while the remnant FPÖ went
into opposition. During Schüssel’s time in office, a number of reform
measures mainly of a neoliberal orientation, especially pension reform
and the introduction of university tuition fees, were carried out. At the
same time, the Chancellor appeared to become more and more reluctant
to engage in much publicity and acquired the epithet of the “silent
chancellor” (Schweigekanzler).12 
Maybe for these but also for more general reasons, Schüssel lost the
election in 2006 and stepped down both as chancellor and party
chairman, retreating to the position of chairman of the parliamentary
party.13 After Jörg Haider’s death in an automobile accident, the last
hope for a possible reunification of the right-wing parties, a return to
power, and, thus, keeping his own party together vanished for Schüssel,
and he withdrew to a mere backbencher position in the Peoples Party’s
parliamentary group.
The ups and downs of Schüssel’s career can be summed up fairly
succinctly: a relatively quick rise to the top, a masterly negotiation
achievement from a position of weakness in 2000, an electoral victory
in 2002 (the meaning of which he probably overestimated), and an
electoral and political defeat in 2007 which ended the political era of
Schüssel if, indeed, it may be called an era.
Personal Character and Life Experiences
Some of Schüssel’s personality traits stand out and certainly
distinguish him from average Austrian politicians. Many observers and
commentators have noted his enormous intellectual capacities, the
tactician’s quick ability to recognize opportunities and display tenacity
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in pursuing negotiations, which often led opposition negotiators ulti-
mately to capitulate. In this, his tactical finesse appeared remarkable.14
But in addition he was also a successful team player, organizing his
colleagues and supporters well, keeping a notoriously contentious party
together for a relatively long time, and demonstrating, particularly in his
earlier phases, a remarkable ability for interpersonal empathy.
At the same time, he always remained true to his convictions.
Unlike other politicians for whom it is often difficult to define what they
really believe, he always stuck to his political goal of making Austria fit
for a more competitive international environment without forgetting in
the process some of his basic conservative and Catholic values.
Schüssel could be very articulate if he chose to do so, but increa-
singly withdrew from the glare of the public limelight. To some extent,
this coincided with a very unpretentious, even lighthearted, lifestyle.
Some establishment observers noted with disdain how Schüssel would
appear without any pretensions at semiofficial occasions and how he
preserved the privacy of his family. Non-conservative commentators
remarked how Schüssel differed from many of his party colleagues: he
did not drink, did not engage in manly activities like deer hunting, and
scorned the male bonding quite usual in conservative political circles.15
Speculatively, some of these traits could be seen in connection with
the milieus and experiences Schüssel went through in his youth. His
mother experienced the wages of war very intensely when she, while
being pregnant with her son, was buried for two days under the rubble
in the basement of a heavily bombed house in Vienna.16 
Schüssel’s firm European convictions as a means to establish a zone
and period of peace have to be seen in this context. Schüssel’s father,
who was divorced from his mother and somewhat distant from his
family, was even further estranged from his son after the son found out
only at age sixteen that the father had been close to the Nazi party during
the war.17 
This also explains Schüssel’s intense involvement with questions of
restitution and compensation for Nazi victims which had been rather
neglected by earlier governments. The lack of a father figure might also
explain his relationship with Sallinger as well as a certain reluctance to
play a national father figure himself, a temptation to which some of his
predecessors had more easily succumbed. However, Schüssel certainly
is, even if this did not become obvious to the general public, a family
man, understanding women and children and working extremely well
with female collaborators and even authoring children’s books.
Education in the famous Schottengymnasium, a Catholic institution
with a liberal reputation, certainly provided an opportunity for Schüssel
to develop intellectual and organizational capacities and also provided
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a firm ideological foundation grounded in the Benedictine tradition of
this establishment. Schüssel always maintained this connection and even
periodically attended religious and spiritual seminars together with his
governmental colleagues and collaborators.18
Schüssel’s training at the University of Vienna Law School did not
lead, as in so many other cases, to traditional authoritarian attitudes.
Rather, they gave Schüssel an understanding of legal instruments and
their limits for politics, which top politicians who have a business school
background, for example, often sadly lack. 
Of great influence must also have been Catholic youth and student
organizations, which in the late 1960s, following the spirit of the time,
became quite liberal, allowing Schüssel to playact, perform as a musi-
cian, and even work as a radio commentator. These experiences were,
of course, also essential for networking on the one hand and for forming
firm political convictions on the other.19
His political career provided from the very beginning opportunities
to study different milieus and become a tactician and power broker. He
had the chance to experience, intensely study, and understand parlia-
ment, bureaucracy, political parties, and interest groups. His involve-
ment in European affairs opened his political horizon to an extent that
other national politicians maybe increasingly lack.
Some of these assumptions about personal experiences remain, of
course, speculation. Experiences form a personality only to some extent.
Any person’s character is, in a sense, a law unto itself. Schüssel’s posi-
tive personality traits can be seen in this light, just like those which led
him to make political mistakes, overestimate his own capacity and,
ultimately, face political failure.20 
Professional Achievements and Failures
As head of government, Schüssel faced a considerable array of
problems and challenges. Some of them were the result of specific
Austrian traditions; others followed from the fact that the country, like
all of Europe, East and West alike, experienced (and still experience) a
period of rapid transition.
The new problems were not only the consequences of economic
globalization and international competition, but also of technological
and demographic change. Questions of regulation in fields of technolo-
gical innovation as well as problems of financing the increasing costs of
the welfare state with an aging population complicated the social
agenda. More specifically, Austria had to accommodate itself to the new
role of a member state of the European Union. The somewhat ill-advised
and also misplaced sanctions of the other EU governments did not make
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this task easier for a devoted European like Wolfgang Schüssel. The EU
sanctions had to be lifted after several months when a committee of wise
men concluded that the FPÖ, while not to everybody’s liking, was not
a neo-Fascist party after all. The other EU governments had to accept
that their action, even if well intentioned, had certainly not been well
informed. This was underscored the fact that of all postwar Austrian
governments, it was precisely the one suspected of neo-Fascist tenden-
cies which concluded a relatively generous program of restitution and
compensation for Austrian Nazi victims.21
Some say Schüssel had to prove his democratic credentials and that
was certainly true, but he nevertheless indeed did attempt to rectify old
injustices. The Austrian government also performed well during its
second European presidency in 2006 and helped to take up the oppor-
tunities provided by the Union’s eastern enlargement. Likewise, the
Schüssel government at last attempted to come to grips with some of the
challenges of technological and demographical change. Wherever the
chancellor had to negotiate internationally as well as nationally, he was
often quite successful, while his appeals to the general public did not
always succeed to the same extent, if one disregards the one big elec-
toral success in 2004 which was, perhaps, more a defeat of his oppo-
nents than his own victory.
Specific traditions that party and government chairman Schüssel
had to face were the conflicts inside his own party between represen-
tatives of different interest groups or different bureaucratic departments.
Given this, he achieved a remarkably successful record. The record vis-
à-vis the other parties was much more ambivalent. Schüssel dared to
break old traditions and even taboos in attempting a different govern-
mental strategy, antagonizing not only a traditional Austrian hegemonic
alliance of social partners (the federal president and the powerful
Kronenzeitung),22 but also alienating the general public who would not
follow him down these new avenues. To an extent which was surprising
to many outside observers, large sections of the public were mobilized
by his opponents to protest the legitimacy of his admittedly legal and
constitutional actions. For many Austrians, who used to equate demo-
cracy with consociationalism, Schüssel’s competitive democracy strate-
gy appeared unacceptable. In addition, this criticism implied that the
competitive democratic system of Austria’s written constitution should
be replaced by a kind of Konkordanzdemokratie, a consociational
pattern of Austria’s unwritten “real” constitution in which all relevant
political parties should by law be represented in the government. 
Schüssel did not have the strength to convince critics to follow him
in his attempt to reform the country in view of changed conditions. This
became particularly obvious as regards the accusation that the new
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government advocated policies which supposedly made Austria a “so-
cially chilly” place. Austrians, used to a relatively generous welfare
system, did not appreciate losing some of their perks, even if they were
difficult to finance. Once again, Schüssel did not successfully manage
to convince the public of the long-term reasonableness of his fiscal
measures.
An interesting question is whether Schüssel, by taking them into his
government, did “domesticate” Haider and the FPÖ. In the short run, he
succeeded up to a point; in a longer perspective, however, he did not,
and it remained to Haider himself to ultimately take himself—if not his
party (or even parties)—out of the game. Strangely enough, in doing so
he (probably) also ended the career of his supposed domesticator.
So, again, the record is a mixed one. Schüssel’s challenges were
many. In some respects, Schüssel succeeded; in others, he failed. In a
democratic environment, all politicians will lose the support of the
voters sooner or later. But to have tried something new before being
replaced or even having introduced a greater change of policy distin-
guishes the more successful political leader from the less successful one.
Evaluating Schüssel’s Achievements and Failures
Political theory has from its very beginnings speculated about the
qualities and requirements of the good political leader.23 Max Weber in
his classical lecture of 1919 “Politics as a Vocation”24 specifically de-
manded of politicians a sense of vision, a recognition of ethical respon-
sibility, and a sense of tactical proportion, “the slow drilling of heavy
logs.”25 It is probable that to a great extent Wolfgang Schüssel fulfilled
these requirements.26
Recent critics of Weber have, however, pointed out that his analysis
was based on the experiences of an era which was not yet characterized
by modern mass media and a consumer oriented society. A leader
nowadays also has to define political goals, communicate with suppor-
ters and opponents, and convince others and inspire passions in order to
have a majority accept his leadership and be willing to support him or
her.27 As one political scientist has noted, a precondition for electoral
success today is that politicians have to demonstrate charisma, not
necessarily to have it, but to act convincingly as if they had.28 These
requirements were only partially fulfilled by Wolfgang Schüssel.
A study of the role of heads of government in Europe after the
Second World War showed that leaders who were considered not only
mere politicians but also statesmen were both able to organize and
negotiate (often behind closed doors) and also to appeal successfully to
the public and to convince them to accept the policies thus organized
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and negotiated.29 Statesmen who exercise effective leadership30 in
contrast to mere politicians have to play two roles; they have to be both
chairmen and chieftains, or to use a very traditional metaphor, foxes as
well as lions.31 To be only one or the other means not to rise to great-
ness. In all countries, one does find mere chairmen, but also mere chief-
tains. But in every country, politicians who were considered the most
successful leaders were also considered effective in both respects.
Schüssel certainly has been a remarkable organizer and an even more
remarkable negotiator. His tactical skill in his role of chief executive
was surprising, but he lacked or maybe chose to lack the capacity to
lead, to convince, to mobilize the passions of his fellow citizens. He did
this even less toward the end of his term of office, maybe more at the
beginning. He seemed to have been convinced, especially after his elec-
toral success in 2002, that the public would trust him and follow him not
matter what. But it did not work out like that.
One should, however, not underestimate the achievement of being
a good chairman under present day political conditions in Europe where,
according to many observers, government is replaced by governance.32
Traditional forms of top-down decision making, even inside the govern-
ment, no longer work. Governmental institutions have to be continuous-
ly reformed and made more efficient. Multilevel politics means that
politicians have to coordinate different levels of formulating and
implementing policies, especially on both the European and the do-
mestic level. The state has to slim down and allow market forces to
work—an assumption that more recently has been somewhat called into
question. Additionally, modern techniques of political management have
to be applied. In all these respects, Wolfgang Schüssel was rather
successful. In particular, his capacity to succeed in multilevel gover-
nance was considerable and is illustrated by the fact that his interna-
tional reputation, even today, remains high.
So why did he ultimately fail in the sense of not inspiring the
Austrian electorate to further support his successful achievements in
organizing and managing the complex governance process? One should
not underestimate the strength of the resistance to change in a very
traditional society such as Austria. The long-lasting practice of
consociational and corporatist politics does not easily allow politicians
to mobilize a majority as happens in other Western democracies that
have practiced competitive democracy and applied a different electoral
system for a longer time. A majority electoral system instead of propor-
tional representation might have provided the kind of clear support and
mandate for the chief executive that would have been needed in order to
successfully carry out far-reaching plans of reform. Moreover, as has
been pointed out above, to be in office means sooner or later creating a
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negative majority of voters dissatisfied by one measure or the other.
There is a political shelf-life to every government. Comprehensive com-
parative studies of Western democracies have shown that the chances of
reelection have, on the average, been reduced over time. Voters have
become more critical, more volatile, and expect change almost for
change’s sake.33 Finally, close observers of Schüssel have noted that
being successful in 2002 had set in motion an overestimation of his own
capacities, a certain form of hubris.34 Power corrupts, even if it’s not
absolute.35 Even a modest and intellectually capable person like
Wolfgang Schüssel may have fallen prey to that tendency, not having
tried hard enough and likewise not having changed his somewhat
exhausted team before the 2006 showdown.36 
To sum up the achievements and the failures of Wolfgang Schüssel,
on the positive side one can say that he pursued with tenacity a political
program of consequence which seemed reasonable to many observers
and stuck to it even against the feelings of vocal sectors of the public
and even against the powerful rainbow press37—something that cannot
be said about some of his successors. He proved a superior tactician and
negotiator, especially on the European level. He exhibited an unusual
amount of political spontaneity and, at the same time, personal modesty.
Stuart Eizenstat came to appreciate him: “Despite his slight build his
energy, intelligence and intensity made him a significant presence.”38
About the restitution negotiations, Eizenstat testifies, “He truly wanted
a solution and was acting in a political environment that was (very)
difficult.”39
On the other hand, Schüssel broke a political taboo by governing
with political outsiders which ultimately did lead to his downfall. But he
tried to do something new, to introduce change in a very inflexible
political environment. He failed to communicate successfully with the
public, or out of a certain sense of hubris choose not to do so. In addi-
tion, he could not really overcome the opposition to his policy goals at
home. 
Has Schüssel succeeded in changing Austria? To some extent, yes.
His policies and the forces mobilized by EU membership and increased
internationalization have changed structures and attitudes. Privatization
has progressed even if presently, under the impression of the economic
crises, the clock may, as in other sectors, be turned back. The pension
system has been reformed up to a point. But many areas still remain
resistant to change. Constitutional reform and the reorganization of fe-
deralism and of certain sectors of the state bureaucracy have not
succeeded. No effective new start has been possible in the education
system or as regards research and development.40 On the political level,
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Austria has returned to a grand coalition government which to an almost
absurd extent woos the rainbow press and is supported by it.
In a recent essay, Manfried Welan has in comparative perspective
reflected about possible alternative major reforms of the Austrian
constitutional system which certainly relate to Schüssel’s successes and
failures as chief executive.41 He made clear that Schüssel proved, as had
been shown in France twenty years before, that in a semipresidential
system, a parliamentary majority can overrule an unwilling president
and establish a regime of cohabitation. So semipresidentialism works
and need not be changed. However, it is also obvious that the introduc-
tion of a majority electoral system such as in the United Kingdom would
make it much easier to give a chief executive a clear mandate to
introduce reforms (which Schüssel never received), but also allow voters
to hold the chief executive fully responsible at the next elections.
Finally, if, on the other hand, a Konkordanzsystem, a consociational
constitution as in Switzerland, would be introduced (because as the
strong opposition to Schüssel has demonstrated, this corresponds to a
strongly held conviction in Austrian political culture) then, of course, the
other aspect of the Swiss system such as the intensive emphasis on
referendums would be necessary in order to keep the government
democratically responsible. For all this finesse in short-term tactical
matters, Schüssel did not take up these reforms which, in a long-term
perspective, would have made the political system much more efficient
and more democratic at the same time.
The problem is, however, that under the new situation of global
economic crisis conditions have not become easier, but more difficult.
International competition will not decrease, but increase.42 Austria will
need political leadership and ingenuity even more than before, maybe
more than Wolfgang Schüssel could provide, but certainly not less.
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Rollercoaster: Schüssels’ Electoral
(Mis)fortunes and the Dynamics
of Public Approval
Fritz Plasser and Peter A. Ulram
Wolfgang Schüssel’s political career and the electoral performance
of the Austrian People’s Party (Österreichische Volkspartei, or ÖVP)
between 1995, the year in which Schüssel took over the party chair, and
2006, the year when an electoral defeat ended his chancellorship,
compare to a political rollercoaster ride. Under Schüssel’s leadership,
the ÖVP fell to third place among Austria’s major political parties for
the first time in 1999, rose in 2002 after a fulminant election victory to
become the strongest party by far, and fell again back to the second
place behind the Social Democratic Party of Austria (Sozialdemo-
kratische Partei Österreichs, or SPÖ) in 2006.1 Twice Schüssel termi-
nated the government coalition prematurely. In 1995, he canceled the
great coalition with the SPÖ on short notice, thereby provoking early
elections which, however, did not bring the expected gains for the ÖVP.
In 2002, he terminated the coalition partnership again in face of chaotic
controversies within the Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei
Österreichs, or FPÖ) and called for new elections which brought
him—in contrast to the year 1995—a triumphal election victory. 
After the parliamentary elections of 1999 that ended with an
electoral disaster for both the SPÖ and ÖVP, Schüssel decided to form
a coalition government with Jörg Haider’s FPÖ and took over the
chancellorship in 2000. After thirty years, the ÖVP became the
chancellor party again due to Schüssel. In May 1995, when Schüssel
took over the party chair of the ÖVP, the party had a voting share of
27.7 percent according to the results of the elections in 1994. In 1995,
this share rose slightly to 28.3 percent.2 In 1999, the ÖVP fell back again
to 26.9 percent.3 In 2002, the ÖVP rose again under Chancellor Schüssel
to a share of 42.3 percent and became the clearly strongest parliamentary
party.4 In 2006, after a loss of 8.0 percent of the votes, the party fell back
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again to 34.3 percent and landed slightly behind the SPÖ (35.3 percent),
which now placed the chancellorship in the SPÖ’s hands.5 
Between 1995 and 2006, Schüssel had three SPÖ chairs as his
competitors: Chancellor Franz Vranitzky (1995-1997), Chancellor
Viktor Klima (1997-1999), and chair of the oppositional SPÖ Alfred
Gusenbauer (2000-2006). As vice-chancellor and chancellor, Schüssel
has been part of three coalition governments. As vice-chancellor, he
governed between 1995 and 1999 in a grand coalition government with
the SPÖ. As chancellor, he led a coalition with the FPÖ from 2000 to
2002, which he continued until 2006, although he was forced to base this
coalition between 2005 and 2006 on the Alliance for the Future of
Austria (Bündnis Zukunft Österreich, or BZÖ), an offshoot party
founded by Haider after the break-up of the FPÖ. 
His relationship to the European Union was also characterized by
several ups and downs. In 1994, Schüssel belonged to the core of the
team negotiating the modalities of Austria’s admission to the European
Union (EU) and was highly engaged in the accession which occurred in
1995. In 2000, being chancellor of a coalition government between the
ÖVP and FPÖ, he had to cope with the sanctions imposed by the EU14
and the break-up of communication with the EU elites. After the
termination of the sanctions, Schüssel not only returned as chief of
government to the circle of the EU elites, but also engaged himself anew
in a deepening of European integration and the enlargement of the
European Union. Political, personal, and electoral (mis)fortunes charac-
terize the Schüssel years in Austria. In the center of this essay stands the
public perception of Schüssel, the dynamics and the cycles of public
approval, and his image with the Austrian voters. How did the approval
ratings for Schüssel change over the course of time, how satisfied was
the population with his government’s activity, which attributes primarily
determined Schüssel’s public persona, and what did the image of
Chancellor Schüssel mean for the election successes and defeats—those
are the central questions to be analyzed in the following sections.
 
Schüssel’s Public Approval
Schüssel started his political career as secretary general of the
Österreichische Wirtschaftsbund (the representation of business in the
ÖVP) and was elected a member of parliament in 1979. He became well
known in the party and by a wider public for his innovative approach to
economic policy, in particular, by asking for economic liberalization and
a re-dimensioning of state interventionism. Thus he was considered a
politician who challenged traditional concepts albeit doing so while
being firmly rooted within the established party structure. At a time of
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severe problems in the state-owned industries and growing dissatis-
faction with the increasing burden of taxation as well as the distribution
of taxpayer’s money,6 this image contributed to his enjoying a high
degree of public approval. During his time as minister of economics and
trade, nearly six out of ten respondents had a good opinion of Schüssel,
while only about one-quarter held a bad one. However, the premature
elections of 1995 did not result in the lead that the ÖVP desired, and his
previous election as party chairman had been accompanied by con-
siderable internal conflicts. His public rating then declined sharply,
never again to reach the positive levels of the previous years.
The late 1990s were characterized by the rise of the right-wing
populist FPÖ under Haider and of oppositional parties in general which
meant a sound electoral defeat of both the SPÖ and the ÖVP in 1999,
catapulting the FPÖ to the position of the second largest party. Schüssel
responded to this challenge which came as a shock to the great majority
of the party leadership – in an active, if controversial, way—by forming
a coalition with the FPÖ and taking over the position of federal chancel-
Table 1
Schüssel’s Public Rating, 1989-2006, in Percentage and 
Percentage Point Difference (PPD)*
Year Good Opinion No Good Opinion PPD
1989 49 24 25                
1990 50 28 22                
1991 57 26 31                
1992 58 24 34                
1993 59 26 33                
1994 60 26 34                
1996 50 50 ±0                
1997 56 40 16                
1998 50 40 10                
2000 49 42 7                
2001 45 41 4                
2002 43 46 -3                
2003 33 55 -22                
2004 42 44 -2                
2005 44 47 -3                
2006 53 41 12                
*Average values per year.
Source: GfK Austria, National Surveys (1989-2006). 
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lor. As a consequence, neither the electoral misfortune nor the following
sanctions of the EU 14 which had to be abandoned after a few months
left a lasting impact on his public approval. Actually the latter might
have proven helpful for the chancellor who presented himself as a strong
and tough national leader keeping at bay overly nationalistic outbreaks
(of the FPÖ).
Contrary to a rather agitated media and intellectual discourse in
Austria and abroad and a series of protest activities organized mostly by
the (now oppositional) SPÖ and smaller left-wing groups, the majority
of the electorate responded to the formation of the ÖVP-FPÖ coalition
in a moderate way. The predominant wait-and-see attribute7 was also
reflected in a slightly positive evaluation of the new government in its
first year: 52 percent declared satisfaction with the performance of the
coalition, while 46 percent took a negative view. Conflicts within the
government as well as in the FPÖ led to an erosion of consensus, but the
opposition parties could not take full advantage of this because these
parties, especially the Social Democrats, had great difficulties coming
to terms with the new political situation. As a matter of fact, the great
bulk of irritated FPÖ voters (who had voted for political change in 1999
but not for continuous strife and often inexperienced and unprepared
FPÖ ministers) deserted their former party for the ÖVP rather than the
SPÖ in the 2002 elections. Nevertheless, many people had looked for
something else and when—after the failure of the negotiations with the
Greens—the old coalition was installed again, these expectations
remained disappointed.
More important, however, were the effects of a restrictive budgetary
politics, cuts in social welfare, and, most of all, the pension reform of
2003. The latter was not only badly communicated, but the initial pro-
posals were also generally seen as causing unacceptable social hard-
ships. Not surprisingly, the public reaction proved to be overly critical,
and the country witnessed its first large-scale strike in many years.
Subsequent modifications smothered many of the measures, but not the
negative impact on the popularity of the government. Satisfaction with
the government fell to a (up to then) historical low of 32 percent with 67
percent expressing dissatisfaction.
Even though there was an improvement in the following years—
also partly due to the economic recovery—negative votes outweighed
positive ones at the eve of the 2006 elections.
These developments also overshadowed Schüssel’s personal ratings.
In 2003, the share of “good opinion” fell to a mere 33 percent with a
slow upward trend thereafter. The year 2006 saw a further increase of
good opinions about the chancellor and a concomitant decrease of bad
opinions, but the ground for the electoral misfortune of the coming
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autumn had already been laid. The elections of 2006 were much less a
plebiscite about the person of the chancellor than an expression of
diffuse discomfort with the main governing party, the ÖVP.
Table 2
Satisfaction with Government Coalition (ÖVP-FPÖ/BZÖ), 2000-2006, 
in Percentage and Percentage Point Difference (PPD)*
Year Satisfied Not Satisfied PPD
2000 52 46  +6
2001 48 49   -1
2002 46 51   -5
2003 32 67 -45
2004 37 59 -22
2005 36 61 -25
2006/1st quarter 38 58 -18
2006/2nd quarter 42 54 -12
*Annual or quarterly averages
Source: GfK Austria, National Surveys (2000-2006). 
Candidate Image: Schüssel’s Public Persona
Only a few voters get an opportunity to meet their party’s top
candidate personally. The great majority of voters gains their picture of
the top candidate from information and impressions communicated via
the mass media. These perceptions of the chancellor candidates are
called candidate images. They are multi-dimensional concepts including
evaluative components both on the cognitive and affective level.
According to Oscar Gabriel and Katja Neller,8 candidate images relate
to three aspects on which voters judge them: the overall judgment about
the candidates, the evaluation of their personality characteristics, and an
evaluation of their political competence or politically relevant attributes.
Generally, candidate images refer to “issue positions, character traits and
are likely to include psychical appearance, style of communication, and
nonverbal behavior.”9 For Anthony King, candidate images are a re-
ference to four attributes of party leaders or presidential candidates:
“their physical appearance, their native intelligence, their character or
temperament, and their political style.”10 
While King reduces the concept of candidate image mostly to per-
sonal traits, character, integrity, and personal qualities and style, Frank
Brettschneider and Kenneth Hacker also consider perceptions of issue-
related competence of a leader as central components of candidate
image.11 In fact, numerous studies point to considerable message-image
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interactions,12 just as candidate images and party images affect each
other. Brettschneider differentiates between four dimensions of candi-
date image: the evaluation of political viewpoints and the ability for the
solution of concrete problems, the qualities of leadership (leadership
strength, decision making, and power to act and persuade), personal
integrity (honesty, reliability, trustworthiness) and non-political attri-
butes (looks, charisma, age, and social background).13 Table 3 is based
on this typology and presents the public perception of Wolfgang
Schüssel from his time as vice-chancellor in a grand coalition under
Chancellor Vranitzky (1996) and Chancellor Klima (1998) as well as
Schüssel’s image as chancellor in a small coalition with the FPÖ (2000-
2004). 
In 1996, primarily three attributes defined the public image of
Schüssel: his competence in economic questions, his ability to represent
Austria’s interests in Europe, and the courage to make unpopular
decisions which was credited to him. At that time, Schüssel was res-
ponsible for the Department of Economy and Trade and had only in
1995 taken over the ÖVP party chair and, succeeding Erhard Busek, also
the position of vice-chancellor in the grand coalition. Only few months
later, he canceled the cooperation with the SPÖ on account of
considerable disagreements in budgetary policies and called for new
elections which, however, did not result in the hoped for gains. Schüssel
had to accept a meager increase of only 0.5 percent, while the SPÖ and
Chancellor Vranitzky gained 3.2 percent. Two years later, the image of
Schüssel in the perception of the public had not essentially changed.
Competence in matters of economy as well as the representation of
Austrian interests in Europe were central image qualities of the ÖVP
vice-chancellor, who in the meantime had changed from the Department
of Economic Affairs to the Department of Foreign Affairs in 1998.
Leadership qualities were less ascribed to him in 1998 than only two
years earlier. His public appearance in the dimensions of integrity and
trustworthiness as well as personal qualities and style continued to be
less pronounced characteristics. 
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Table 3















Knows a lot about the economy 44 41 30 29
Represents Austria’s interests in
Europe well
39 35 33 23
Is able to cope with serious
problems
18 7 24 21
Takes care that Austria is well
governed
NA NA 24 18
Dimension: Leadership qualities
Has the courage for unpopular
decisions
37 16 41 36
Gives clear directions 25 11 21 22
Has real leadership qualities 17 5 18 14
Has a forceful impact 17 22 21 26
Dimension: Integrity, trustworthiness
Stands up for what he says 19 13 18 15
Trustworthy 18 12 18 15
Understands people’s problems 13 13 17 8
Dimension: Personal attributes
Makes an appealing impression 18 18 23 18
Looks good on TV 23 23 23 26
NA: not applicable
Source: GfK Austria, National Surveys (1995-2004). 
Leadership and his somehow less prominent competence cha-
racterized Schüssel’s public image in 2004, too. Attributes relating to
trustworthiness and understanding of people’s problems continued to be
less pronounced. Schüssel was perceived as a leading chancellor, but not
as a caring leader. In 2002, Schüssel celebrated an overwhelming
electoral success and led the ÖVP to first place with a gain of 15.4
percent which led to a further rise of his leadership image. However, the
forceful course of reforms and partially drastic changes in pension
policies and the social system left its traces on the public’s perception
of Schüssel.14 In 2004, only 8 percent of interviewed persons believed
that Schüssel was able to understand the needs and problems of the
people. His leadership by conviction was opposed by a deficit of caring
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compassion, which was to contribute to his loss of votes and the end of
his chancellorship in the campaign of 2006. 
During the campaign of 2006, the ÖVP and SPÖ not only competed
with different issues and profiles of competence regarding voter-relevant
problems, but also with chancellor candidates whose images were
defined by different strengths. These differences in the appearance of the
two chancellor candidates become visible in their evaluations. Schüssel
was, compared to Gusenbauer, perceived as politically more experienced
by far, a person who knows his way in European politics, has the
required strength of leadership, and keeps a clear head, even in difficult
situations. He was seen as considerably more powerful than Gusenbauer,
was believed to make a much better appearance on television, and
signaled the courage for decisive actions. While the public image of the
acting chancellor focused upon leadership, strength, competence, and
resilience in crises, so was the image of Gusenbauer primarily cha-
racterized by social competence (strives for social balance, meets the
needs of people, and understands their problems). Apart from this social
competence and affinity to the citizens, which harmonized with public
opinion and appealed to the large-scale expectations of the population,
the data also points out pronounced deficits in all dimensions relating to
leadership strength and competence of decision making and crisis
management. A strong leadership personality—the acting chancellor—
was therefore confronted with a challenger who was reflecting social
expectations, promising not primarily leadership, but caring understan-
ding. This was the central polarity of the campaign for chancellor and
the choice given to primarily personality-oriented voters. 
The relevance of the polarity of the two chancellor images is clearer
if a closer look is taken at the changes in the appearance of both candi-
dates. In January 2006, 59 percent were under the impression that Gu-
senbauer cared about the needs of people. Four years earlier, only 41
percent had this impression. On the other hand, only 32 percent still
believed that Schüssel met the needs of the people. During the campaign
of 2002, this was still the opinion of 48 percent of voters. In the
estimation of the electorate, a chancellor in a leading role had apparently
distanced himself too much from the emotional needs of the people,
while his challenger signaled—despite having less leadership strength,













Has political experience 85 81 11 14
Has better appearance on TV 70 67 18 24
Keeps a clear head in difficult
situations
70 70 19 22
Able to represent Austria’s
interests in Europe well
68 67 24 23
Has a strong, forceful impact 61 68 28 25
Has courage to decisive
action
57 61 31 33
Presents clear goals for
Austria
56 58 32 32
Can be trusted 51 43 31 40
Meets the needs of people 48 32 41 59
Understands people’s
problems
NA 23 NA 67
Takes care of social balance NA 21 NA 73
NA: not applicable
Source: GfK Austria, National Surveys (2002-2006). 
The influence of issue-oriented attitudes and expectations on the
images of the candidates makes the quantification of the importance of
candidates’ personalities upon the voting decision quite difficult because
it depends not only on the attractiveness of the preferred candidate but
also on the acceptability of his party. If voters decisively refuse to vote
for a particular party, they also vote against it if they prefer its
candidate.15 This tendency can be seen in the data regarding a (hypo-
thetical) direct vote for a chancellor. If it had been possible to vote for
a chancellor directly, 49 percent would have chosen Schüssel and only
40 percent Gusenbauer. However, taking a closer look, Schüssel’s
chancellor-bonus has to be differentiated by party defectors and
newcomers. 
Every second party defector from the ÖVP or from the SPÖ
preferred as chancellor not the candidate of the party for which the
person actually voted, but the chancellor-candidate of the party he or she
voted against. As much as 7 percent of the SPÖ voters would not have
elected the chancellor candidate of their own party if they could have
voted directly for the chancellor. However, it was not the chancellor
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candidates but the parties with issue-oriented profiles of achievement
and competence that were up for election, and they finally determined
the results. The strength in Schüssel’s image for the voting decision of
ÖVP voters were clearly more relevant than the strength in Gusen-
bauer’s image for SPÖ voters. While 24 percent of the ÖVP voters
primarily oriented themselves on the personality of the ÖVP chancellor
candidate, the same was only true for 8 percent of the SPÖ voters. SPÖ
voters obviously placed more importance on their expectations of issue
competence regarding problems of high importance to them, rather than
on the personality of the top candidate. Therefore, the highest share of
issue-oriented voters can be found among SPÖ voters, while ÖVP voters
by comparison have the lowest share of primarily issue-oriented voters.
The Chancellor’s lack of sensibility for everyday social problems,
support of drastic reform measures, and projection of a leadership style
which was interpreted as aloof led to a loss of 8 percent for the ÖVP, a
loss of first place, and the end of the six-year chancellorship of
Wolfgang Schüssel. This defeat did not come as a surprise. Prior to the
campaign, 80 percent of the people interviewed had mentioned
Schüssel’s lack of concern for the socially underprivileged as a reason
for ending his chancellorship, 69 percent referred to his tendency to
make decisions alone, and 67 percent to his readiness to make deep cuts
in social payments; considerable groups of ÖVP voters agreed with this
criticism of the content and style of Schüssel’s chancellorship. In 2006,
Schüssel’s leadership strength could no longer compensate for these
weaknesses in his image as had been the case in 2002. Policy-related
image traits played a more important role for the evaluation of candidate
images than questions of style, personal qualities, and performance on
TV. The dynamics and trends of Schüssel’s public perception confirm
the evidence from several studies which conclude “that issues of
performance and issues of policy loom much larger in most voters’
minds than do issues of personality.”16
Candidate Voting: Personalization of the Voting Decision
The concentration of election campaigns on the image and
performance of top candidates, increasing personalization of campaign
reporting in the mass media, and higher importance of candidate-
centered motives for voting decisions are part of the standard diagnoses
of a progressive Americanization of the political competition in
Austria.17 In fact, campaign strategists tend to stress factors like their
candidates’ image, credibility, and strength in decision making. These
election campaigns concentrate on the personality and image of top
candidates not only in the United States, but also in countries with party-
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list voting systems as in the majority of Western European states.
Attentive observers of the campaign practices in Western Europe, where
proportional representation is the predominant election formula and the
decisive vote is given to the party, speak of a trend of presidentialization
of European parliamentary campaigns in the sense of moving away from
party-centered election campaigns toward media-centered personality
campaigns.18 
Far more differentiation is applied by election research toward the
value and importance of candidate-oriented election motives. Contro-
versy exists among election researchers about whether the share of
personality voters actually increased during the past years and whether
personality attributes of candidates have gained importance in voters’
decisions; most researchers warn against an overestimation of candidate-
oriented election motives.19 The cautious restraint of election research
toward the actual importance of candidate voting also becomes under-
standable in the light of trends in Austrian election studies. Since the
middle of the 1980s, the share of primarily candidate-motivated voters
did not rise, but drop. While in 1986, 45 percent of the voters still
mostly named the image and personality of the top candidates of the
chosen party as the main cause for their voting decision; in 2002, such
voters amounted to only 30 percent of the electorate and in 2006 only 16
percent.20 
Apparently the trend to candidate voting depends upon the per-
sonalities offered by political parties; the attraction, competence, and
credibility of individual top candidates; and the degree of perso-
nalization of the strategies of communication and election campaigning.
If several parties have politically attractive top candidates and focus
their campaign strategies primarily upon the public image of their top
candidates, the share of candidate-oriented voters increases, too. If,
however, there is a lack of candidates who are convincing via the mass
media and if controversial issues and policies are at the center of the
campaign with individual parties placing more importance upon the
problem solving competence assigned to their parties, then the share of
candidate-motivated voters will subsequently be lower. As a conse-
quence, the shares of candidate-motivated voters will vary between the
party electorates depending upon their current strategic competitive
position. In 1986, the SPÖ focused its campaign primarily on the image
and alleged competence of Chancellor Vranitzky who had only been in
office for four months. At that time, for 61 percent of the SPÖ voters the
personality of the SPÖ top candidate was the primary reason for their
personal voting decision, while only 28 percent of the ÖVP voters
pointed out that the ÖVP top candidate had been the reason for their
choice of party. In 1986, 71 percent of those voting for the FPÖ referred
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to Haider, who had only taken over the party chair a few weeks prior to
election day; he was to shape decisively the image and appearance of the
newly formed FPÖ regarding strategy and style in the following election
campaigns, too. 
The growth of candidate voting can also be seen as an indicator for
cycles of the elective attraction of individual candidates. While in 1986
61 percent of the SPÖ voters primarily gave the personality of Vranitzky
as the main reason for their choice, in 1995—in spite of additional gains
for the SPÖ—only 37 percent of SPÖ voters could be classified as
candidate-motivated voters. In 2002, only 23 percent of SPÖ voters
stated that the personality of their top candidate, Gusenbauer, had been
the decisive reason for their choice.21 Issue- and party-competence (70
percent), factors guided by traditions and interests (56 percent), and
tactical considerations regarding coalitions (38 percent) were more
relevant for the SPÖ voters in 2002 than factors referring to the per-
sonality of the candidate. In 2006, only 8 percent of the SPÖ voters
named the chancellor candidate of the SPÖ, Alfred Gusenbauer, as a
central election motive, but 53 percent of the SPÖ voters mentioned
current issues as main reason for their voting decision. 
The development of candidate-motivated voting took a different
course within the ÖVP electorate. In 1990 under Josef Riegler, only 19
percent of the ÖVP voters referred to the personality of the top candidate
as reason for their choice, and this share of candidate-motivated ÖVP
voters reached an even lower value with Busek as the top candidate in
1994; however, the share of ÖVP candidate voters reached the highest
value up to that date under Schüssel with 37 percent in 1995. During the
election of 1999 when the ÖVP received its worst result to date with a
share of only 26.9 percent, only 22 percent of ÖVP voters could still be
classified as Schüssel voters. In 2002, 36 percent of the ÖVP voters
referred to the personality of the ÖVP chancellor as the reason for their
party choice. Although the ÖVP campaign had almost exclusively
focused upon the image of the chancellor, issues and party competences
(62 percent) and traditional party allegiance and interests (55 percent)
still were more widespread reasons for the election decision of ÖVP
voters than primarily personality-oriented factors. This does not lower
the factual communicative and mobilizing effect of the personality of
the chancellor as represented in the mass media, but relativizes simple
explanations about the voter decision in 2002 as exclusively personality-
related. Also in 2006, the ÖVP campaign was focused upon the image
and leadership qualities of Schüssel with the candidate standing in the
center of the election campaign. Yet the image and personality of
Schüssel only turned out to be the central election motive for 24 percent
of the ÖVP voters. 
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The available data trends also relativize the widespread assumption
that non-party-affiliated swing-voters orient themselves more strongly
on the profiles of candidates and personality attributes than party-
affiliated core voters.22 With 30 percent, the share of candidate-moti-
vated voters among swing-voters is congruent with the share of
candidate voters among core-voters, whereby ÖVP newcomers oriented
themselves tendentially more on the personality of Schüssel than did
SPÖ newcomers on the personality of the top candidate Gusenbauer. In
2006, 51 percent of the candidate voters elected the ÖVP, only 18
percent the SPÖ, 14 percent the Greens, and only 8 percent the FPÖ. At
the parliamentary election in 1999, however, 31 percent of the
candidate-motivated voters had chosen the FPÖ, 34 percent the SPÖ,
and only 17 percent the ÖVP. 
In 2006, the issue-oriented voter was the most represented type of
voter by far. At that time, 47 percent could be classified as primarily
oriented on issue competence of the chosen party. With a share of 37
percent, traditional voters, for whom the party’s affinity to the past and
group-specific identities determined the election decision, were the next
largest group of voters. The type of the personality-oriented voter
followed in third place with a share of 16 percent. Three-quarters of the
personality-oriented voters were party-affiliated core voters of a parti-
cular party. Among the swing-voters, only 14 percent of candidate-
oriented voters primarily felt attracted by the top candidate of their
chosen party at the parliamentary elections in 2006, but more than 20
percent mentioned criticism of leading politicians of the parties for
which they declined to vote.23 The personality of both chancellor
candidates undoubtedly influenced the voting decision in 2006 and
favored more strongly the chances for electing the ÖVP rather than the
SPÖ. However, the more issue orientations and expectations of content
gained importance for voters’ party choice, the weaker the influence of
personality and chancellor preference became upon the final voting
decision. 
Conclusion
The last two decades saw profound changes of the Austrian party
system. Structural and affective ties between voters and parties
weakened and were accompanied by a considerable confidence gap.24
Voters began to strengthen new parties like the Greens or old parties
which had adapted a populist style (FPÖ, BZÖ). Although both
traditional parties suffered from these developments, the ÖVP was more
vulnerable since it was hampered by its difficult position as the minor
partner in the “grand” (SPÖ-ÖVP) coalition—getting most of the blame
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but little of the praise—and the dominance of corporatist and regional
interests in the party organization.
Table 5
Indications of Political Change in Austria, 1979-2008, in Percent





Traditional Voters* 56 39 34 31 26 25 24 18
Party Members 23 23 18 13 n.a. 15 12 12
Mobile Voters** 16 18 26 44 46 53 60 n.a.
Party Changers** 7 16 17 19 18 24 25 28
ÖVP Share of Valid
Vote****
41.9 41.3 32.1 27.7 26.9 42.3 34.3 26.0
ÖVP and SPÖ Share 
of Valid Vote****
92.9 84.4 74.9 62.6 60.1 78.7 69.6 55.3
FPÖ and BZÖ Share 
of Valid Vote****
6.1 9.7 16.6 22.5 26.9 10.0 16.1 28.2
Other Parties’ Share 
of Valid Vote****
1.0 5.8 8.7 15.0 13.1 11.1 15.2 16.5
*voters who always vote for the same party even if they sometimes do not agree with the
party’s position or actions; **voters who have already shifted from one party to another
in national or regional elections; ***national elections 1979, 1986, 1994, 1999, 2002,
2006, 2008; ****voters who changed their vote with respect to the prior national
election 
Source: GfK Austria, Representative Surveys or Exit Polls (1979-2008). 
Schüssel, who had started his political career as an advocate for
sectoral reforms and a supporter of the grand coalition evidently became
aware of the restrictions inherent in these positions and looked for new
options. His first try did not bring the desired results and led to a
deterioration of his formerly high sympathy ratings. Four years later, the
move to form a coalition with the FPÖ proved more successful. It made
him chancellor and brought the ÖVP into a much better strategic
position, especially since the FPÖ once in government could not deliver
what it had promised when in opposition. Yet what the chancellor lost
in popularity, he gained in leadership. His second term in office after the
landslide victory of 2002 was characterized by a strong emphasis on
reform politics and a pointed pro-European agenda. This focus, how-
ever, came with a price: real or imagined losers of cuts in the social
welfare and pension system deserted the ÖVP, first in the polls and later
in the polling booths. Furthermore, Schüssel’s personal leadership style
led to friction with some of the “big players” in the party, and his
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relationship with the media was anything but a close one. Schüssel was
considered a strong and determined political leader, but not a “com-
passionate conservative.” Even though he passed the party leadership to
Wilhelm Molterer after the electoral misfortune of 2006, he remained an
important figure in the ÖVP until the party’s even greater defeat in
2008.
Considering the political developments prior to, during, and after
Schüssel’s leadership, “rollercoaster” is more than a description of his
personal fortunes and misfortunes, but a general characteristic of
Austrian politics in the recent past (and probably the near future). 
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Schüssel and the Media:
An Ambivalent Relationship
Günther Lengauer
The first televised pictures of the new coalition government
between the conservative Austrian People’s Party (Österreichische
Volkspartei, or ÖVP) and the right-wing populist Austrian Freedom
Party (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, or FPÖ) headed by Chancellor
Wolfgang Schüssel on 4 February 2000 were more than critical and
anything but a good start. In front of the Office of the Chancellor, on the
Ballhausplatz in Vienna, thousands of strident demonstrators gathered
to protest the swearing-in of the ÖVP-FPÖ coalition. Consequently, the
designated members of the new government had to take a subterranean
passage to get to the inauguration ceremony at the president’s residence,
the Hofburg. Additionally, during the preceding weeks the largest
Austrian newspaper, Neue Kronen Zeitung, with a daily readership of
about three million people and, thus, more than 40 percent of the
population at that time, had heavily criticized Wolfgang Schüssel for
planning this coalition between Schwarz and Blau1 with headlines such
as “Public Anger Hits Schüssel”2 (26 January 2000). On 13 January, the
chief editor of the Neue Kronen Zeitung, Hans Dichand, wrote an
editorial under the pseudonym CATO: “The majority of the population
that opposes the ÖVP-FPÖ coalition is disregarded by Schüssel. How
can this thrive?”
Not only CATO and his Kronen Zeitung journalists cultivated a
distant relationship with Chancellor Schüssel in their journalistic
treatment of him. During his chancellorship, Wolfgang Schüssel was
also disparagingly labeled (ambiguously referring both to the title of his
favorite book as well as his shortness) as “The Little Prince” (der kleine
Prinz) as many as ninety times in the Austrian media (newspapers,
magazines, radio, and television). Moreover, Chancellor Schüssel’s
relationship with the Austrian media faced an acid test and was seriously
dulled even before the pictures of the demonstrations where aired; in
fact, this occurred years before he became chancellor. On 3 July 1997,
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the daily quality paper Salzburger Nachrichten ran “Wolfgang Schüssel
Lies” as its editorial headline on the front page referring to the so-called
“breakfast affair” (Frühstücksaffäre). At that time, he was state secretary
and was accused of having seriously insulted the president of the
German Central Bank, Hans Thietmeyer, and Danish Prime Minister
Poul Nyrup Rasmussen during an off-the-record breakfast conversation
with journalists on the sidelines of the European Union Summit in
Amsterdam. Initially, the Austrian journalists and witnesses of
Schüssel’s verbal slander intended not to publish the story. The German
news magazine Focus, however, reported the breakfast affair. Wolfgang
Schüssel persistently denied the accusation, and Ronald Barazon, chief
editor of the Salzburger Nachrichten, countered with his editorial as
other Austrian journalists subsequently did. In an early biography of
Wolfgang Schüssel, author Peter Pelinka states, when referring to this
incident, that Schüssel’s relationship with the media consequently “was
clouded for a long time.”3 This early dispute may partially account for
further developments in his personal ambivalence to the media and his
accented guardedness with respect to journalists. Possibly the breakfast
affair also contributed to the nickname Schüssel was given by his
political opponents as well as by Austrian journalists: “The Silent
Chancellor” (Der Schweigekanzler). First, Eva Glawischnig, a Green
Party (Die Grünen) member of parliament (MP), used this term in a
parliamentary session on 29 March 2001 in reference to Chancellor
Schüssel’s silence concerning recurrent breakdowns in the nearby Czech
nuclear power plant in Temelin, which was cited in a report of the
Austrian Press Agency.4 As a point of culmination, the term “Silent
Chancellor” was selected as the “Word of the Year” in 2005 by a
scientific jury and thereby outperformed expressions such as “bird flu”
or “tsunami.” It became a well-known saying and an often cited short-
cut for Chancellor Schüssel’s communication strategy that was alleged
by journalists as well as political opponents to be defensive. The
linguistic jury substantiated its choice with “the contradiction between
the communicative expectancy of the chancellorship and the reversed
public impression referring to the apparent incommunicative attitude of
the head of the government.”5
During the nearly seven years of Schüssel’s era as chancellor, he
was called Schweigekanzler no less than 472 times in the Austrian
media: 303 times in newspapers, 89 times in news magazines, 37 times
by the Austrian Press Agency, 28 times in special interest magazines,
and only 15 times on ORF, the Austrian public broadcasting corporation.
The critical connotation of Schweigekanzler primarily referred to his
reluctance to discuss friction with and turbulence caused by his coalition
partner, the FPÖ, and by provocative statements of namable represen-
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tatives of the FPÖ. For instance, he did not comment on Jörg Haider’s
visit to Saddam Hussein in Bagdad in 2002 and did not take a direct
stand on the uprising within the FPÖ in March 2005. At that time,
Schüssel refused invitations to political TV programs and interviews to
discuss this coalition crisis; instead, he attended the non-political talk
show Vera on 17 March, speaking with the host about his private life,
his sixtieth birthday, and sports.6 Two weeks later, the crisis of the FPÖ,
Schüssel’s coalition partner, escalated and cumulated in the secessional
foundation of the Alliance for the Future of Austria (Bündnis Zukunft
Österreich, or BZÖ) by Jörg Haider.
Additionally, during his chancellorship Schüssel was repeatedly
criticized for not commenting on incidents in the nearby Czech nuclear
power plant in Temelin or troubling statements made by members of
parliament from his subsequent coalition partner, the BZÖ (namely
Siegfried Kampl and John Gudenus), referring to the alleged
“prosecution of Nazis after World War II,” the Holocaust, and the exi-
stence of gas chambers. Throughout his political career, Schüssel has
mostly been characterized as a tight-lipped but philosophic and excellent
maneuverer of power as well as a “Teflon chancellor” by journalists,
pundits, and even by some of his political allies. The last negative
climax of the journalistic contest with Chancellor Schüssel happened
during the 2006 electoral campaign. In the course of a broad nursing
policy debate in Austria, on 19 August 2006 journalist Hans Weiss
accused Chancellor Schüssel of having employed an illegal foreign
nurse for his mother-in-law. Thus the journalist laconically wrote in a
letter to the editor of the newspaper Der Standard: “She was good and
friendly as well as cheap (about Euro 2 per hour). Probably not quite
legal, but, well, let’s forget it!”7 An inglorious culmination and absolute
low-point of this discussion was a fake interview with “Mrs. Maria,” the
alleged illegal nurse in Schüssel’s home, in the Austrian news magazine
News on 14 September 2006.8 This supposed investigative interview
turned out to be a complete hoax. “Mrs. Maria” turned out not to be the
actual nurse employed for Schüssel’s mother-in-law, and finally all
allegations had to be dropped.
Despite Schüssel’s negative and conflictual experiences with the
media, he is closely bound to journalism, which becomes clear when we
look at his biography. Schüssel’s father Ludwig was a sports journalist
for the Neue Freie Presse,9 and Wolfgang Schüssel himself gained
professional experience in journalism. During his study of law, he
worked for the Austrian public radio station Ö3.10 Consequently, Wolf-
gang Schüssel cannot only be characterized as a victim of investigative
and critical political journalism, for he also had insight into the media’s
logic and knew how to utilize the media and journalists for his political
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objectives. His alleged defensive communication strategy may more
accurately be characterized as selective and strategically calculated.
During the 1999 election campaign which led to his chancellorship, the
musically talented Wolfgang Schüssel presented a traditional songbook
in a very media-effective way by singing and playing with his party
colleagues.11 In order to demonstrate solidarity with his coalition
partners, he organized non-political events such as a pilgrimage to
Mariazell, a cycling tour with his government team, and a trip to the
zoological garden to which he also invited journalists. In a political
context, he implemented a regular meeting with the press after the
weekly council. There the chancellor and the vice-chancellor presented
themselves behind glass lecterns demonstrating their effectiveness and
openness and the unity of the coalition. At his first appearance at the
European Union Council after the Union had imposed diplomatic
sanctions on Austria due to the government participation of the right-
wing, populist FPÖ, Chancellor Schüssel drew the media attention only
negligibly: for the first time, he wore a tie instead of a bow tie which had
been his trademark until then. By doing so, he drew the media attention
away from protests and the critical situation of the EU sanctions. During
the 2002 election campaign, he presented himself as a cellist and pianist
or even as an iceman. Additionally, the ORF public broadcasting station
came under fire because the chief editor of the ORF-Sommergespräche,
an interview program with party leaders, even brought the guest’s chair
for a fitting to the office of the chancellor before the program was aired.
Chancellor Schüssel also published a gardening guide that was presented
in a well-attended press conference. To summarize, Chancellor Schüssel
was not only in the crosshairs of the media, he and his spokeswoman
Heidi Glück also knew how to exploit and utilize the Austrian media for
his personal and political image-building.
The following discussion not only gets to the bottom of the myth of
the Schweigekanzler and his image performance in the media during his
chancellorship, but also focuses on his policy performance for the
media. Thus Schüssel’s relationship with the media is not solely based
on informal and personal experiences and irritations, but is also
grounded in a very professional context referring to the media policy
that was pursued, implemented, and also unregarded by the government
during Schüssel’s chancellorship. However, first we draw our attention
to the media portrayal of Chancellor Schüssel. Was it all as critical as
his experience with journalists and the media may suggest? Did Schüssel
really live up to his reputation of being a Schweigekanzler? Was the
portrayal of the chancellor in the largest newspaper, Neue Kronen
Zeitung, really highly critical and oppositional? These questions will be
answered in the following sections of this article.
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Chancellor Schüssel in the Austrian Media
As we have already learned, Chancellor Schüssel was frequently
labeled as Schweigekanzler. However, the empirical evidence tells
another story. When we look at the sound bites of politicians in the
Austrian TV newscast Zeit im Bild 112 with the largest audience share
during his chancellorship (a regular viewership of about 20 percent), we
can conclude that Wolfgang Schüssel was the political actor given the
most time to speak for himself on the prime time news. During the seven
years of his terms in office, he spoke for no less than five hours and
fifteen minutes, which is equivalent to the total length of about nineteen
editions of the Austrian prime time news Zeit im Bild 1. In 2000 and
2001, he started with a significant “chancellor bonus” (Kanzlerbonus)13
as far as his speech time on Austrian television is concerned (see Figure
1).
Figure 1
Airtime of Party Chairmen in the Zeit im Bild 1, Sound Bites in Seconds, 
2000-2006
Source: Author’s own compilation and calculation on the basis of APA-MediaWatch
data.
Throughout the period of his chancellorship, Schüssel was the party
chairman with the longest sound bites on the prime time news of the
ORF. In total, Schüssel was able to claim 0.7 percent of the total airtime
of the news outlets for himself throughout his seven years of chan-
cellorship. The Chancellor concentrated 7.1 percent of all sound bites of
all public actors (politicians, experts, and so forth, but excluding ORF
42 The Schüssel Era in Austria
journalists) on himself. Schüssel talked about 60 percent longer than the
second most present Austrian politician, Alfred Gusenbauer, who was
also in power as SPÖ chairman for the whole period under examination.
The sound bites of Schüssel’s junior coalition partner (the current
chairman of the FPÖ or BZÖ) were significantly shorter during the
whole period of his chancellorship. However, towards the end of his
chancellorship in 2006, Schüssel’s sound bite advantage eroded signi-
ficantly.
Table 1
Top Ten Ranking of Politicians in the Prime Time News Show Zeit im Bild 1, 










1 Wolfgang Schüssel (Chancellor, ÖVP) 5.2 7.1
2 Alfred Gusenbauer (Chairman, SPÖ) 3.3 4.5
3 Heinz Fischer (President since 2004) 2.5 3.4
4 Alexander Van der Bellen (Chairman,
The Greens)
2.0 2.7
5 Jörg Haider (Founder, BZÖ) 1.9 2.6
6 Karl-Heinz Grasser (non-party Treasury
Secretary)
1.8 2.4
7 Susanne Riess-Passer (Chairman, FPÖ
2000-2002)
1.6 2.1
8 Thomas Klestil (President until 2004) 1.3 1.8
9 Peter Westenthaler (Chairman, BZÖ
since 2006)
1.1 1.5
10 Herbert Haupt (Chairman, FPÖ 2002-
2003)
1.1 1.5
* Statements of the anchors and sound bites from other Zeit im Bild 1 journalists are
excluded.
Source: Author’s own compilation and calculation on the basis of APA-MediaWatch
data.
Between his inauguration on 4 February 2000 and his retirement on
11 January 2007, Chancellor Schüssel was allowed and willing to speak
as long as both SPÖ Chairman Gusenbauer and Greens Chairman Van
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Wolfgang Schüssel clearly dominated the Austrian prime time news on
television throughout his chancellorship, even though he lost some of his
early advantage by the end of his second term in office. By 2006, his
leading position was significantly diminishing, and his party, the ÖVP,
additionally fell from favor with the voters in the 2006 elections and lost
its number one position in parliament. However, not only Schüssel
himself lost ground in terms of the share of airtime on television news,
but all members of his party, and his governmental coalition lost in
terms of media presence measured in aired sound bites. Especially
during the second term of Schüssel’s chancellery, the representatives of
the opposition caught up significantly on airtime (see Figure 2).
Figure 2
Airtime of Austrian Party Politicians in the Prime Time News Show 
Zeit im Bild 1, 4 February 2000-11 January 2007, 
in Percentage of Cumulative Airtime of Party Politicians
Source: Author’s own compilation and calculation on the basis of APA-MediaWatch
data.
At the beginning of Schüssel’s chancellorship, his coalition gained
no less than about 70 percent of all political sound bites in the Zeit im
Bild 1 on ORF. This ratio almost balanced out at the end of his term.
This decrease in media presence and agenda-setting power is not so
much solely due to a drop in Schüssel’s media appeal, but to the whole
coalition’s appeal which was becoming more passive in terms of media
presence. Nonetheless, the government as well as Chancellor Schüssel
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obviously lost media charisma, especially during the second term of
Schüssel’s chancellorship. The Kanzlerbonus in the Zeit im Bild 1
diminished. These sound bite rankings published by the Austrian media
analysis institute APA-MediaWatch regularly bring the political parties
and actors to the scene that seemingly missed out on television presence,
regardless of the actual composition of the governmental coalition.
Consequently, the underdogs regularly protest against an alleged
governmental bias and political imbalance in the ORF coverage via
press releases.14 Additionally, the ORF is constantly under political
pressure and has to deal with protests relating to its policy regarding
whom it invites to participate in political talk shows or interviews. The
dimension of political intervention on the public service broadcaster will
be discussed in detail in a subsequent section of this article. However,
what can be stated here is that this accusation of political imbalance of
the ORF with regard to the airtime of politicians is analytically short-
sighted. Figure 3 illustrates that the dominance of Chancellor Schüssel’s
media presence was even higher in the almost exclusively private-owned
newspapers than on the public broadcasting network.
Figure 3
Austrian Party Chairmen in the Press, Number of Mentions, 2000-2006
Source: Author’s own compilation and calculation on the basis of APA-MediaWatch
data.
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Similar to the airtime ranking on television news, Chancellor
Schüssel also was the most dominant political actor in Austrian
newspapers during both his terms in government. Schüssel is almost as
present as all other party leaders taken together. He is twice as visible in
the newspaper coverage as the changing FPÖ chairmen and SPÖ
Chairman Gusenbauer, who are second and third in this long-term
ranking. Just as on television, in newspapers we can observe a signi-
ficant and stable Kanzlerbonus referring to the chancellor’s presence
within the political coverage. Schüssel was anything but an “invisible”
or “silent” player in the media. He was by far the most visible and most
cited political actor in the political coverage between 2000 and 2006.
As far as Schüssel’s media agenda-setting strategy on issues is
concerned, we can confirm that he lived up his reputation as a politician
who does not want to face the domestic lows in politics.15 Schüssel’s
sound bites in the Zeit im Bild 1 mostly referred to European Union
policies (19 percent of his sound bites) which equals about one hour of
airtime. Second, he also referred to election campaigning issues (8
percent of his airtime). The domestic policy issue Schüssel talked about
the most on Austrian TV was fiscal policy (budget and tax reform)
occupying 4 percent of Schüssel’s total airtime (23 minutes). Contra-
stingly, he publicly avoided extensive statements about critical domestic
issues such as neutrality (Neutralität) (only 0.7 percent of his airtime),
the Eurofighter jet controversy (0.7 percent) or the sign dispute
(Ortstafelstreit) (1 percent). Thus, in his total period of chancellorship
he only spent two minutes talking and answering questions about
Austrian perpetual neutrality (Neutralität) or the disputed purchase of
jet fighters (Eurofighter) and three minutes talking about the question of
bilingual place-name signs in the Austrian province of Carinthia
(Ortstafelstreit) on television news. 
The beginning of his chancellorship in the year 2000 had been
considered the most critical in terms of his media portrayal and the
journalistic evaluation of the coalition with the FPÖ. However, this
supposedly above-average critical image of Chancellor Schüssel in 2000
cannot be empirically proven for the ORF’s Zeit im Bild 1. There
Schüssel was portrayed slightly more negatively than positively, but his
image on television news was similar to Alexander Van der Bellen’s, the
Greens chairman, and even considerably better than Alfred Gusen-
bauer’s image.16 Similar are findings referring to Schüssel’s coverage on
the front page of the Neue Kronen Zeitung. Earlier analyses of pundits
repeatedly concluded that Schüssel was governing against the back-
ground of a severe critique of the coalition with the right-wing, populist
FPÖ by the Neue Kronen Zeitung. This might hold true for the election
campaign in 1999 and the period of the coalition talks in early 2000, but
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as the following empirical evidence outlines, it cannot be asserted for the
terms of his chancellorship. 
Initially, the Neue Kronen Zeitung heavily and outspokenly criti-
cized Schüssel’s strategy to revoke the long lasting Grand Coalition
(Große Koalition) between the ÖVP and SPÖ and to find a coalition
agreement with the FPÖ. During his chancellorship, the Neue Kronen
Zeitung altered its course and portrayed the chancellor in a more
moderate and even favorable way. As we have already concluded for all
newspapers and the television news, Schüssel also was the most
prominent political actor on the front page of the Neue Kronen Zeitung
during his terms as chancellor. During the seven years, he was men-
tioned ninety-two times in the main headline on the front page of the
Neue Kronen Zeitung. His main political opponents, SPÖ Chairman
Gusenbauer or Jörg Haider, were mentioned only half the time in the
main headlines of the paper during the same period. Hence, a distinctive
Kanzlerbonus on this quantitative level can also be diagnosed for the
coverage of the Neue Kronen Zeitung. On a qualitative level, we can also
see that Schüssel’s portrayal in the largest Austrian paper was far from
being hyper-critical. A quarter of all references to Schüssel in the front
page headlines were positive, and only a tenth of all Schüssel headlines
were negative in tone. Thus, positive evaluations clearly outnumbered
critical statements referring to the chancellor on the front page of the
Neue Kronen Zeitung. In nearly 20 percent of all headlines, Schüssel
was mentioned in non-political and, consequently, less critical settings
(playing soccer, attending high-society events, and so forth) with mostly
favorable pictures. Additionally, he was often portrayed as a vigorous
statesman representing Austria in state visits. 
A closing of the ranks between Schüssel and the Neue Kronen
Zeitung occurred in the course of the European Union sanctions against
Austria resulting from the coalition between the ÖVP and FPÖ. The
Neue Kronen Zeitung showed solidarity and supported Schüssel’s rigid
standpoint on the EU sanctions or the discussion about the EU mem-
bership of Turkey and criticized the European Union. Schüssel was only
criticized for his positions on Neutralität, the Eurofighter deal, the
Temelin question, and, in the beginning, for the coalition with the FPÖ.
Schüssel’s media performance during the most recent election
campaign in 2006 was also characterized by a significant Kanzlerbonus
in terms of the visibility of the party front runners. Schüssel was
mentioned and portrayed in 24 percent of all politically relevant reports
during the final six weeks of the election campaign in newspapers, news
magazines, and the Zeit im Bild 1. In second place were his challenger
Alfred Gusenbauer and BZÖ front runner Peter Westenthaler with a
visibility rate of 15 percent each. FPÖ party leader Heinz-Christian
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Strache was mentioned in 11 percent of all reports, and the Greens
chairman Van der Bellen in 7 percent.17
Chancellor Schüssel’s Media Relationship
In a study by Fritz Plasser et al. that investigated the relationship
between journalism and politics in Austria, journalists were asked in
2003 how they assessed the development of the relationship between
politics and journalism.18 More than seven out of ten leading Austrian
journalists answered that the relationship has become more conflictual
over the last few years, and only 7 percent noticed a more cooperative
relationship between journalists and politicians in Austria.19
Table 2
Relationship between Journalists and Politicians in Austria, 
in Percentage of Respondents (n=95)
Over the last few years, the
relationship between
journalists and politicians








more conflictual 73 71 69
Unchanged 18 20 19
more harmonious   5   9   8
don’t know   4   0   4
Source: Source: Plasser et al.20
This perceived trend of an intensifying conflict between journalists
and politicians (from the journalistic perspective) is similarly confirmed
by newspaper, magazine, television, and radio journalists. The most
pessimistic are chief editors and department heads. More than 90 percent
of these leading Austrian journalists diagnose an intensifying conflictual
relationship with political actors over the last few years. This may be
partly due to the fact that these leading figures most frequently are the
addressees of political complaints and intervention. Additionally, for
Austrian journalists this pessimistic evaluation is also linked to a deficit
in the culture of debate of political elites. Their refusal to accept
criticism, their reluctance to respect critical journalistic inquiry, and
their uncooperative behavior towards the media are the most often cited
problems that journalists identify. A notable reason for this adversarial
behavior is that journalists not only recognize a tendency towards
professionalization of public relations (PR) instruments, spin doctoring,
and control from the political side, but also the political and govern-
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mental turnaround in the year 2000 with the governmental inauguration
of the right-wing populist FPÖ and Jörg Haider. As many as 45 percent
of the interviewed Austrian journalists identified the governmental
change in the year 2000 as a main reason for increasing tensions.
Additionally, more than one-quarter (26 percent) of all journalists also
diagnosed the negative attitude of the FPÖ toward the media.21 From the
journalists’ perspective, this “atmospheric caesura”22 between journalists
and governmental elites led to a highly polarizing friend-or-foe schema
in the government’s approach to the media. In the journalists’ per-
ception, Schüssel’s government brought a more adversarial and a more
conflictual spirit into the relationship between politics and journalism in
Austria. Intensifying atmospheric disruptions can also be identified—
from the journalistic perspective—on the level of perceived political
intervention and attempted exploitation. Every fourth journalist assessed
intensified attempts of political interference as a significant atmospheric
disturbance of the professional relationship between media and
politicians.
Table 3
Attempts of Politicians to Exert Influence on Journalism (n=95) 
Over the last few years, attempts to exert
influence on Austrian journalism by politicians
have been . . .
Percentage of Journalists
on the increase 62
Unchanged 30
on the decline 6
don’t know 2
Source: Plasser et al.23
Almost two-thirds of all interviewed journalists attested to an
increasing level of political interference and political pressure over the
last few years. Only 6 percent diagnosed a decline of political exertion
of influence on Austrian journalists. In the perception of the interviewed
journalists, a relevant point of origin for this increase was also the
governmental change in the year 2000. The discussion about political
influence and intervention on journalism mainly concentrated on public
service television broadcasting and radio stations of the ORF. A broad
and lasting public discussion about media politics and political influence
on the ORF has been provoked by Armin Wolf, the late news anchorman
of the ORF’s Zeit im Bild 2, in May 2006. In his acceptance speech for
a journalism award, he denounced “nearly unrestrained exertion of
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political influence on the ORF.” After the governmental change in the
year 2000 from the “balance of horror” (referring to the political in-
fluence of both Grand Coalition partners, the SPÖ and ÖVP), “only the
horror remained” (referring to the ÖVP).24 Subsequently, both ORF
internal and ORF external circles (platform “SOS ORF,” initiative
“derFreiRaum,” ex- and opposition politicians, journalists, media
experts, and so forth) voiced public criticism on political pressure and
intervention by the ORF. Right at the outset of the ÖVP-FPÖ coalition,
Gisela Hopfmüller, a prominent and experienced political journalist at
the ORF, concluded that “the current political pressure on the ORF is
‘very intense.’ It ranks among the most acute phases I have experienced
so far.”25 On a single Sunday, the editorial teams of the ORF listed no
less than twenty-two phone calls from FPÖ chairman Peter Westen-
thaler.26 The former ÖVP politician and political scientist Heinrich
Neisser concluded in a recent analysis that “unprecedentedly, political
claims to power referring to the ORF have been articulated blatantly
[…]. The ORF is regarded as a political domain and politicians envision
themselves as hosts.”27
Consequently, journalists also diagnosed an increasing level of
tension and political pressure since Schüssel’s inauguration, particularly
since the participation of the FPÖ in the governing coalition. In this
context, journalists mainly state two strategies that political actors
employ to put pressure on the media. The first is a defensive and passive
strategy to control the news and involves the refusal of commenting on
unwelcome issues and claiming the right to authorize print interviews or
to dismiss invitations to live studio interviews. The journalists most
strongly associated Schüssel and Haider’s teams with these strategies.
“In this manner fresh quotes are eliminated, questions are discarded and
others are replaced—from the press officers and politicians, not from the
journalists!”28 Almost half of the Austrian journalists identify such a
strategy as one of the main practices for putting pressure on the media.29
Second, journalists also identify more active and offensive forms of
political interference (for example, phone calls with complaints about
the coverage or threats of lawsuits or other severe consequences). About
three out of ten journalists regard this strategy as frequently applied by
political elites.
Against this background, Austria’s freedom of the press was ranked
sixteenth on a worldwide scale of countries by Reporters Without
Borders in 2006.30 Accordingly, the level of press freedom in Austria is
comparable to countries like Spain or Hungary from a transnational and
comparative perspective. In the early years of Schüssel’s chancellorship
in 2002, Austria was only ranked twenty-sixth. Another international
organization that monitors the levels of press freedom in the world
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(Freedomhouse) also confirms a moderate improvement of press
freedom throughout Schüssel’s chancellorship; however, it also recur-
rently laments the high concentration on the Austrian press market and
number of lawsuits against journalists.31
Chancellor Schüssel’s Media Policy
Similar to his relationship to journalism, Chancellor Schüssel’s
record of media policy between 2000 and 2006 may be characterized as
ambivalent. Regulatory initiatives also encountered a policy of non-
decisions and non-interference. The Schüssel era with regard to media
policy mainly concentrated on establishing a framework supportive of
competition in the Austrian media landscape.32 The central instruments
were efforts to continue the deregulation of the media markets and
prevailing maxims of an economic-technical view on the media and their
policy.33 Privatization and the creation of a dual broadcasting market
were central objectives of the government between 2000 and 2006.
During the years of the consensual Grand Coalitions between the SPÖ
and ÖVP in the 1980s and 1990s, indecisions was interpreted as a
specific and dominant feature of Austrian media policy.34 This may be
mainly due to the fact that media policy decisions were conditional on
the consensus among the social partners.35 “Consequently and against
this background, Austrian media policy is impeded, and political actors
appear more reactive than actively formative.”36 This led to a tradition
of non-decisions attributed to the avoidance of conflicts. From this
typically Austrian perspective, the Schüssel years in the chancellery
were relatively active years of media policy. After years of stagnation
regarding Austrian media policy, the Schüssel government caught up on
decisions in the year 2001.37 On 5 July 2001, Parliament passed a
resolution (“media package”) including the ORF Act, the implementa-
tion of a broadcasting regulatory and supervisory body (KommAustria),
the Private TV Act, and the amendment of the Private Radio Act. The
ORF Act contained its re-organization as a foundation regulated by
public law and specifications of the public value, whereas the Private
TV Act and the Private Radio Act established a basis for nationwide
private terrestrial television and radio stations in Austria. Austria was
the last European broadcasting market that was opened to private
stations. In February 2002, the first private license for nationwide
terrestrial TV was assigned to the ATV Privatfernseh GmbH.
Both coalition partners (the ÖVP and FPÖ/BZÖ) were cardinally
supportive of the commercialization of the television and radio markets
in Austria. “In their basic approaches to an intensified deregulation and
broader market liberalization of television and radio, there dominated
more ideological conformity between the ÖVP and FPÖ than between
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earlier coalitions of the ÖVP and SPÖ.”38 However, deregulation does
not necessarily mean depoliticization. The ORF Act of 2001 was
announced as a step to depoliticizing the Austrian public service broad-
caster. It contains a clause that no political mandataries or party
employees are allowed to become members of the foundation council.
Austrian media analyst Andy Kaltenbrunner states that this is only a
“quasi depoliticization” of the ORF: “More than ever the ORF Act 2001
benefits […] the [actual] government.”39 Additionally, the implementa-
tion of the generally acclaimed KommAustria, the regulatory and
supervisory body of the Austrian broadcasting, was criticized because
it is still subordinated to the Office of the Chancellor and the Ministry
of Infrastructure and, thus, potentially bound by governmental and
political instructions. Another political instrument of media policy is the
public media funding (Presseförderung), which had also been reformed
in 2004 under Schüssel’s tenure. The Presseförderung is an instrument
enabling the viability of non-profitable papers, thus ensuring a high level
of plurality on the press market. However, the Schüssel government
decreased the funding by 8 percent between 2002 and 2006.40
Besides these media policy decisions, the Schüssel era in terms of
media politics is also characterized by a number of non-decisions.
Above all, the Schüssel government waived the right to restrict press
mergers and to prevent further market concentration. Austria remains the
European country with the highest press market concentration.41 In 2001,
the Antitrust Court approved the merger of the News and trend/profil
publishing houses that ran (and run) established and competing Austrian
news magazines. In the radio market, the Schüssel government facili-
tated further concentration by softening restrictions on cross-media
ownership of private radio stations. On this, Kaltenbrunner concludes:
“The new governmental constellation between the ÖVP and FPÖ has not
hindered this development anyhow […].”42
Finally, effective media policy applied by the Schüssel government
in particular and Austrian governments in general is not only limited to
formal channels. On this issue, Kaltenbrunner assesses: “It seems that
media policy is also personnel policy.”43 Throughout Schüssel’s chan-
cellorship, personnel decisions in the ORF also played—as throughout
former coalitions—a significant role, and critics charged that the ORF
was politically “redyed” (Umfärbung) by the ÖVP-FPÖ/BZÖ coalition.
In a number of key journalistic positions, ÖVP or FPÖ/BZÖ affiliated
persons served. In December 2001, at the outset of Schüssel’s chan-
cellorship, Monika Lindner, the candidate supported by the ÖVP, was
elected as director general of ORF and the conservative Werner Mück
became ORF chief editor with far-reaching authority to set the agendas
of the ORF’s news programs. An associate of the FPÖ, Walter Seledec,
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was also appointed as an ORF chief editor in 2002. Additionally, in 2005
the conservative journalist Andreas Unterberger was appointed chief
editor of the official government newspaper Wiener Zeitung. In this
regard, Schüssel’s media policy was not significantly different than that
of his predecessors.
Conclusion
The relationship between Chancellor Schüssel and the Austrian
media and their journalists is mainly characterized by ambivalence in
many respects and by distanced skepticism on both sides. His relation-
ship to journalism was highly disrupted by a series of unfavorable
assessments and alleged affairs. This resulted in a distant relationship
right from the start of his chancellorship.
First, the essence of his media policy has to be characterized and
summarized as highly ambivalent. On the one hand, regulatory initia-
tives such as the ORF Act or the Private TV Act, the amendment of the
Private Radio Act, or the implementation of the supervisory board
KommAustria signaled a comparably active role in political decision
making during his era. On the other hand, Schüssel’s media policy is
also appropriately characterized by the term “deregulation” instead of
“de-politicization.” The de-politicization of the Austrian media land-
scape was postulated by Schüssel’s government; however, the ORF Act
of 2001 and the creation of KommAustria did not bring political
influence and greediness to an end, and Schüssel’s personnel policy also
did not foster and signal an extensive process of de-politicization.
Schüssel’s media policy mainly concentrated on deregulation by
establishing a competition framework supportive of the Austrian media
landscape.
The relationship between journalists and Chancellor Schüssel was
dominated by mutual suspiciousness and skepticism. Journalists were
not friendly with Chancellor Schüssel, for he seemed inapproachable.
However, Chancellor Schüssel was not just in the crosshairs of the
media; he also knew how to exploit and utilize the Austrian media for
his efficient public image-building. Schüssel’s allegedly defensive
communication strategy has to be interpreted more precisely as a cal-
culatedly selective and strategic attitude towards the media. Partly as a
result of this strategy, journalists recognize an increasingly conflictual
relationship between journalists and politics during Schüssel’s chan-
cellorship. The media elites identify a tendency of political parties to
professionalize PR as well as an “atmospheric caesura” leading to a
highly polarizing friend-or-foe schema triggered by the governmental
turnaround in 2000. Consequently, Chancellor Schüssel was repeatedly
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as well as disdainfully labeled Schweigekanzler, Teflon Chancellor, or
the Little Prince in the media. However, the empirical evidence presen-
ted in this article conveys a more ambivalent picture and exposes some
of these labels as myths. The image of Schweigekanzler cannot be
sustained as far as Chancellor Schüssel’s media presence is concerned.
Over the course of the two terms of his chancellorship, he was the most
visible political actor in the press as well as on TV. Hence he was
anything but an “invisible” or “silent” player in the media coverage.
Before the coalition between the ÖVP and FPÖ was sworn in, the Neue
Kronen Zeitung heavily opposed this change in government. In this
context, it was repeatedly said that Schüssel was successfully governing
against the resistance of the Neue Kronen Zeitung. This is not supported
by the empirical findings. In the course of the EU sanctions against
Austria in 2000, the Neue Kronen Zeitung had started to report in a more
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supported his policies. Schüssel, his government, and the media
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schema in the game of published and public political discourse—
obviously and at least partially for the benefit of both.
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Making Omelets and Breaking Eggs?
Schüssel’s Leadership in Government and Party
David Wineroither
Introduction: Governmental Influence 
and Prime Ministerial Power
Both the range of governmental influence and the level of prime
ministerial power in Austria have been described as low. The
government’s ability to govern is limited by a remarkable number of
veto players in the political system.1 Furthermore, a recent survey
revealed that the chancellor was considered a rather weak political
leader, ranking nineteenth out of twenty-two countries that were
compared.2 In fact, such “results” reflect some long-standing patterns in
Austria, which is a country governed by many grand coalitions with a
consociational political culture and strong networks of neo-corporatism
(Sozialpartnerschaft). However, the creation of the coalition government
between the Austrian People’s Party (Österreichische Volkspartei, or
ÖVP) and Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs,
or FPÖ) in February 2000 meant the end of this system. Austria saw a
sharp turn towards a majoritarian democracy. Tellingly, the expert
survey mentioned above did not include Wolfgang Schüssel’s term from
2000 to 2007. 
In light of the context just decribed, this article has two aims: to
investigate the development of governmental influence and power of the
chancellor during the Schüssel years, and to reveal the relationship
between the two as the outcome of Schüssel’s political leadership style,
or more precisely, his personal ambitions.
Alleviating the Problem of Perceptibility in Studies 
of Executive Leadership
While the strengthening of competition and conflict significantly
contributes to the clarification of power relations between political
players/actors as observed by voters, the power of prime ministers can
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remain obscure. If we explore the Schüssel chancellory under the aspect
of power and influence, we are confronted with two sorts of knowledge
deficits: a general deficit that pertains to the difficulties of cabinet
studies internationally and a specifically Austrian one that was attached
to the dominant features of party state and consociationalism in the
Second Republic’s political life up until 2000. The general deficit
implies two challenges. First, despite major efforts, there is still a lack
of knowledge about the decision-making process in the core executive
(“black box”3), especially in the cabinet; the secret nature of the most
important forums of decision making (council of ministers, intra-party
and intra-coalition committees)4 is also problematic. The second
challenge has three indirect aspects that restrict a flow of valuable
information. Because of factionalization, the ÖVP learned how to
amalgamate antagonistic interests internally, and the negative electoral
consequences that were caused by insufficient teamwork among party
leaders between 1987 and 1995 increased internal loyalty and reduced
overt disagreement. Next, in contrast to Margaret Thatcher and
divergent from Gerhard Schröder’s case, Schüssel incarnates the
antithesis of “spatial leadership” and “outsider” images.5 Finally, the
legendary Austrian discrepancy between powers distributed by the
constitution and those performed in actual politics distorts political
responsibilities. 
Studies of the political executive branch reveal it has followed
different paths in its attempt to overcome these restrictions. What they
have in common is their assumption that prime ministers act to remain
in office. Four analytical strands can be distinguished. First is the neo-
institutional context. Prime ministerial ability to effect resolution is
measured against the reluctant potential of veto players. Studies analyze
the effects of personal reputation and negotiating skills (for example,
through a manipulative setting of choices).6 Second, rational choice
approaches work under the premises of methodological individualism
and self-interested utility-maximization. They generate cooperative and
non-cooperative game-theoretic applications.7 This field of study creates
formal models of coalition building and termination.8 Special attention
is given to the agenda setting potential of political actors.9 Third,
principal agent models open a dual perspective insofar as individual and
collective political actors (head of state, prime minister, cabinet) may be
representing a principal and an agent at the same time.10 Research
inspired by principal-agent or accountability design occasionally per-
form systematic analysis of dependences, loyalties, and self-determi-
nation at different places in the scheme of political representation.11
Fourth are expert and elite interviews biased by subjective interpretation
and selective remembrance.12 None of these attempts, though, puts a
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premium on explaining variation in prime ministerial power over time.
This article proceeds by searching for those mechanisms that define how
Schüssel’s leadership style influenced his power as chancellor through
political polarization.
Shifts from Consensus to Majoritarian Democracy
The Majoritarian Turn in the Year 2000: 
Schüssel’s Targets and Policy Consequences
As a valid frame for the government’s policy, the coalition agree-
ment of the ÖVP and FPÖ in the beginning of 2000 symbolized a
“rejection of the old consociational democracy.”13 Although Schüssel
became politically socialized as chief secretary of the ÖVP’s League of
Austrian Business (Wirtschaftsbund), he opposed “big government” and
was only cursorily rooted in the realm of social partnership14; he rejected
“big spending” as an unjustified burden to subsequent generations. As
chancellor, and with more success in his first term (2000-2003), he gave
priority to a balanced budget over lowered taxes. Last but not least,
allowing the right-wing populist FPÖ under Jörg Haider to enter the
government was his only option to secure his position as party chairman.
Thus the formation of the new coalition in February 2000 corresponded
to Schüssel’s preferences in the polity, policy, and, as will be pointed
out later in this article, also in the politics dimension. According to some
party leader’s involved in the coalition negotiations after the ÖVP’s
triumphal victory in the 2002 general elections, Schüssel showed no
clear predisposition towards any of the three possible partners—the
Social Democratic Party of Austria (Sozialdemokratische Partei Öster-
reichs, or SPÖ), the FPÖ, the Greens (Die Grünen)—but eventually
favored maintaining the ÖVP-FPÖ coalition for policy reasons.15
The rise of conflict democracy strengthened the executive branch.
In the words of Arend Lijphart, “The prime characteristic of the
majoritarian model of democracy […] is concentration of power in the
hands of the majority. The consensus model is characterized by non-
concentration of power, which can take the two basic forms of sharing
of power and division of power.”16 Veto player analysis with reference
to the post-2000 years shows that power sharing and the dispersion of
power in Austrian consensual democracy had relied almost solely on
inter-party negotiation, mostly between the SPÖ und ÖVP camps.17
However, under the new absence of consociationalism, most of their
potential vanished. This development was demonstrated by Herbert
Obinger for economic and social policy, Emmerich Tálos and Bernhard
Kittel for social policy, and Marius Busemeyer on the basis of the
pension reform(s).18 The “Myth of Sozialpartnerschaft” had been
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replaced by a “multiformity of political networks, actor set-ups and
modes of interaction of various interest groups.”19 
Schüssel did not show any ambition to copy the electoral formula
of success utilized by Bruno Kreisky,20 chancellor from 1970 to 1983,
which was to send distinct signals to centrist swing voters, including
policy favoring a limitation on the scope of political reforms. However,
there is some evidence of response to the veto power of voters, manifest
in the almost lightning speed with which reforms were implemented at
the beginning of the legislative turn (Andreas Khol’s “culture of
timeliness”21), though there were far fewer reforms in the year of a
general election (Finance Minister Karl-Heinz Grasser’s “time of harvest
has come”22). These “electoral cycles” ought to be classified as moderate
overall and were focused on the federal level; anticipated or suffered
losses in provincial elections were put aside. Indeed, the unpopularity of
welfare retrenchment imposed by the federal government could neither
be made responsible for the devastating defeat in the Carinthian
provincial election (2004), nor for the loss of the status as strongest
party in Salzburg (2004)23 and Styria (2005), which was caused by
incompetence and scandals in each area’s Land organizations. On the
contrary, the disastrous losses of its coalition partner FPÖ (2000-2005)
in regional and local elections contributed to bitter internal disputes and
accelerated the process that led to the resignation of Vice-Chancellor
and FPÖ chairwoman Susanne Riess-Passer and others in the summer
of 2002 as well as the split with Haider and his supporters in the spring
of 2005. 
The Philosophy of “Change”: Blaming SPÖ-Led Governments
Reversal of its coalition partner, the course of majoritarian
democracy, and a comprehensive reform agenda provided substantial
ground for the ÖVP effectively to put the blame on the SPÖ for the
performance of past governments. Attacks centered on the issue of
former deficit spending and claims that the SPÖ was incapable of
cooperating in government. For Khol, a former leader of the ÖVP’s
parliamentary group, the attainment of a balanced state budget served as
justification for the existence of the FPÖ experiment.24 As a conse-
quence of the role change from governing party to opposition as well as
adverse public sentiments in domestic and foreign policy (the so-called
“sanction” of the other fourteen European Union [EU] member states),
voters’ belief in the SPÖ’s ability to solve problems declined sub-
stantially on a number of important issues, which were paralleled by
gains of the ÖVP.25 
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Demoscopic studies that were conducted during the time of
coalition bargaining in 1999-2000 reveal major dissatisfaction on the
part of many Austrians with the performance of the “grand coalition”
(1987-2000). Public critique paid modest attention to the (high) level of
influence exerted by the trade unions, the chambers of employees and
commerce, and their obstructive effect on political reforms. Instead,
public attention was fixed on quarrels between the coalition partners,
nepotism (Postenschacher), and reform gridlock.26 Whereas Khol’s
“speed kills” philosophy showed the will of the new government to
dissolve reform deadlock (efficiency argument), competent handling  of
the “smaller” coalition partner fell to the chancellor himself (stability
argument).27 Schüssel’s attitude towards other political leaders in the
government and the coalition parties was characterized by two aspects:
loyalty and collegiality. With respect to the former, Schüssel relied on
an established team, defended troubled ministers relentlessly, and
supported them in times of crisis (especially Education Minister
Elisabeth Gehrer). His behavior was opposite that of Haider, who rarely
backed his colleagues in the cabinet against harsh criticism from within
his own party. Indeed, the number of disgraced FPÖ ministers reached
a historic high. With respect to collegiality, though Schüssel displayed
polarizing leadership on policy, he acted carefully within the cabinet to
foster collegiality and even harmony. The chancellor “invested a lot in
establishing and maintaining personal relations,” remembers Riess-
Passer.28 This portrayal of harmony was not supposed to be disturbed by
public disagreement, and the two coalition leaders remained silent on
their current political intentions during their joint appearances at the so-
called Pressefoyer (their regular meetings with the media) if they
conflicted over the basics of an issue.29
Control over the new, unfamiliar, and partly unstable coalition
partner was mediated through the official coalition agreement that both
parties had signed. Supervision and control through the mutual
appointment of junior ministers, which used to be a common procedure
during the grand coalition era in Austria and in many German
governments, were widely omitted (one for each party in the Ministry
of Finance and Economics in the cabinet Schüssel I).30 The climate in
the coalition differed remarkably from—in the words of Khol again—
the “icy atmosphere” and “frightening disputes over minutes” during the
“grand coalition” period.31 
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The Distribution of Power in the Executive Branch
Schüssel and the ÖVP
Ever since it was founded in April 1945, the ÖVP had been one of
the most factionalized parties in Western Europe.32 However, the slightly
less traditional component of oligarchic structure began to overlay the
influence attached to the three main leagues and the provincial party
organizations.33 When Schüssel was first elected ÖVP chairman in April
1995, he could finally profit from the harmful effects of the lack of
cohesion and solidarity in the 1987-1995 years.34  
Party heavyweights developed more realistic expectations of their
party chairman and closed ranks against the then coalition partner SPÖ.
Schüssel’s reasonable competence as a campaigner and his brilliant
qualities as a bargainer helped him consolidate his leadership. The time
of intrigues and indiscretions, even among the party’s key figures, had
gone.35 The tight relationship between former party whip Khol and
Schüssel is particularly notable because the former had aspirations to
assume the leadership of the party. He was “today a rival, tomorrow a
loyal follower.”36 Yet the intra-party standing of the party headquarter’s
general secretariat did not improve significantly until Schüssel became
chancellor.37 To sum up, a trend of reinforced oligarchization, coope-
ration, and loyalty combined with his success in the 2002 general
elections to give Schüssel “more intra-party power than any of his
predecessors since the 1950s,”38 at least in his second term as chancellor
(2003-2007). This includes Josef Klaus, who was chancellor between
1964 and 1970 and who presided for four years over a single-party
majority government.
Collective party leadership dominates coalition negotiations. Only
divisive issues such as distribution of portfolios, the operating principles
of the cabinet, and personnel decisions were resolved by the respective
party chairman in face-to-face talks.39 The bulk of previous decisions
were made in a negotiation round whose participation did not reflect any
party statutes. Membership was given to the leaders of the provincial
Land organizations, the chairmen of the six leagues, the president of the
parliament, the party whip, and the party chairman. As Khol noticed, this
particular composition depicted the party’s “old party executive before
the reform of party regulations.” Eventually, all decisions taken in-
variably were endorsed in the official executive body.40
The polarization of domestic politics between government and
parliamentary opposition (SPÖ and Greens) facilitated the retention of
voting discipline within the ÖVP’s parliamentary group.41 Party dis-
cipline during the Schüssel years reflected a dominant influence of party
group leadership and cabinet members and left little room to maneuver
for ordinary Ministers of Parliament (MPs).42 Party leadership could rely
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on manifold ex-ante screening and ex post monitoring tools in order to
establish and maintain desired voting behavior. Above all, it was the
prime source for the proliferation of secured mandates.43 The authority
of party whips vis-à-vis MPs was described as generally ample.44 Khol,
who was leader of the parliamentary group from 1994 to 2003, served
the ÖVP as ideological “mastermind” (evidenced by his contributions
to the concept of civic society, Bürgergesellschaft, and the new ÖVP-
FPÖ-government, the Wenderegierung). His successor Wilhelm Mol-
terer, the vice-chancellor, minister of finance, and party chairman (2006-
2008), had held the post of general secretary (1993-1994) and was a
cabinet member for almost a decade (1994-2003). Both were long-term
confidantes of Schüssel, belonged to the inner leadership circle, and
were always inclined to support their party chairman. Schüssel’s good
relationship with Khol was undiminished when Schüssel declined
Khol’s request to take over the Department of the Interior in 2000. The
chancellor did not want to lose his superb leader of the parliamentary
group.45 Indeed, Khol wore his nickname “taskmaster” with pride. After
the end of the Schüssel chancellory, MP Ferry Maier in a much-noticed
and telling phrase, expressed his criticism of the imposition of
leadership mentality in the parliamentary group: “Fold your hands and
keep your trap shut!”
More streams of opposing voices came from the Land organizations
and a number of powerful governors, albeit accentuation of political
competition in federal politics did not make entering the national stage
of politics more attractive. A governor’s power surpasses a chancellor’s
power and is usually more secure.46 Lower Austria’s Erwin Pröll, who
was very influential in the federal party and all powerful in his
provincial party organization with its nearly quarter of a million
members, looked at the election of Schüssel as party chairman skep-
tically. For many years, the media presented him as a potential and
promising candidate for the party chair or—until 2004—the Austrian
presidency. However, in 2008, Pröll is still governor. After 2000, he was
occasionally a scathing reviewer of governmental policy, but never acted
as the chancellor’s rival. The governor’s public critique of Chancellor
Schüssel was less boisterous than the one provincial party leaders in the
SPÖ had addressed to their chancellors in the 1987-2000 period.47 In
return, in a quid pro quo, Schüssel limited use of his authority to the
challenge of consolidating his position on the top of the federal party
organization. He consistently refrained from interference in any regional
party matters such as the leadership conflict in the Tyrolean branch in
2001.48
However, regional party leaders were informed and consulted early
at all times. The usual method of communication was the telephone.
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Former FPÖ party leader and Vice-Chancellor Riess-Passer admired the
fact that her ÖVP counterpart could put down the receiver and knew he
would “get it done at the right time.”49 Even so, many decisions mirrored
hierarchies in influence between the federal and Land organizations and
among the latter as well. For instance, Reinhold Lopatka from Styria
managed the 2002 election campaign and, as the federal party’s general
secretary, the 2006 election campaign both times together with his
colleagues from Upper and Lower Austria, thereby representing the
three most powerful Land organizations. Briefing and, if necessary,
persuasion of other party heavyweights was carried out by Schüssel
along with Khol, Wilhelm Molterer, Elisabeth Gehrer, and Reinhold
Lopatka. This small panel was a forum for sometimes controversial
discussions. As a former general secretary, Lopatka recalls that an
allocation of responsibilities in this circle could be assessed within a few
minutes.50 Khol describes Schüssel as a “great team player” who was
well aware he could not govern without support of the leaders of the
Land party organizations and those of the party leagues.51 
Schüssel made a few extremely important decisions. He pursued a
call for early elections in autumn 1995; in the middle of the 1999
general election campaign, in order to mobilize hesitating sympathizers
to vote for the ÖVP, he announced that his party would refuse to enter
any government if it were taken over by the FPÖ on election day (for
Khol it is the “privilege of the party chairman” to declare such matters).
The Grasser Coup 2002 (the FPÖ finance minister was offered this post
in a future ÖVP-led government), again during the election campaign,
was the “the best guarded secret in the party,” and nobody else was
consulted. It was not until January 2007, after the electoral defeat in
October 2006 and in the final days of coalition negotiations with the
SPÖ, that Schüssel failed in a similar attempt: the single-handed issue
of presenting Grasser as forthcoming vice-chancellor, prolonging his
term as finance minister, and implicitly, the ÖVP’s front-runner for the
next general elections was declined by at least eight members of the
party executive committee.52 Unusually, the proposal was not approved
by the quartet of Schüssel, Molterer, Gehrer, and Khol. Rather, it was
the result of face-to-face talks between Schüssel and Molterer. Only
Governors Pröll and Josef Pühringer (Upper Austria) were informed
before the decisive meeting of the party executive.53
The FPÖ in 2000: An Attractive Coalition “Bride”
Once in government, the FPÖ experienced a series of difficulties
typical of right-wing populist parties. This includes a thin staffing
level,54 disclosure to the public of programmatic inconsistence, and the
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formation of increasingly antagonistic party wings (party in office
versus party on the ground). A comparative view across Europe shows
that this kind of party often self destructs after elections, especially in
coalitions with conservative partners who adopt right-wing paroles and
policies.55 Moreover, the often authoritarian and charismatic party
leadership blocks the ability of party committees to resolve intra-party
conflict. After February 2000, “scapegoating” increasingly focused on
the party’s own cabinet members. Finally, the vast majority of
functionaries and voters shared unrealistic expectations for electoral
rebound and policy performance.56 Somewhat paradoxically, these
expectations had to be disappointed, in part, because the FPÖ in
opposition was successful in influencing government policies in some
areas and shaping political discourse during the 1990s.57 The FPÖ’s
electoral alliance, consisting of heterogeneous voter groups, was loosely
constituted.58 Tendencies for structural “realignment” favoring the FPÖ
in the long run could neither be reinforced nor preserved while the party
was in office.59 Haider himself did not close his eyes to the electoral
risks of entering a coalition, but at the same time, as Riess-Passer put it,
was “the biggest stickler of being in the government,” for he feared a
continuing decline in support for the ÖVP would cost the party a
common majority.60
The content of the manifestos of the two parties was highly
compatible in the 1990s. This was particularly true for the important
area of social and economic policy.61 Having said that, nevertheless, the
rising popularity of Haider among blue-collar voters in the 1999 election
culminated in the FPÖ’s superseding the Social Democrats in this group
of voters. The FPÖ’s attraction for the working class helped to sustain
and enlarge the majority the ÖVP and FPÖ held together in the national
assembly (Nationalrat) since 1983. “[N]eocapitalist principles,” on the
other hand, “do not conflict with nationalist feelings,” and the same was
true for attitudes of hostility towards foreigners and minorities.62 The
ÖVP and FPÖ’s plans to devote more money to support families were
congruent as well (see the introduction of Kinderbetreuungsgeld on 1
January 2002). 
The great exception to all this compatibility existed in matters of
European affairs, especially efforts that intended to strengthen EU
integration (for example, the Nice Treaty) and the ongoing project of the
EU’s (eastern) enlargement. However, the content of the coalition
agreement was instructive in that the FPÖ “apparently had subordinated
its policy goals to office-seeking ambitions.”63 In the scenario of
intensifying conflict over European matters, Schüssel ultimately acted
intransigently. Like Scandinavian prime ministers in confrontation with
their EU coalition partners, the Austrian chancellor was willing to take
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manifest risks of a coalition break-up in order to see the “centerpiece”
of EU enlargement protected.64 
The Chancellor’s Role in the Cabinet
The Austrian chancellor’s role in the cabinet was predominantly
described as “primus inter pares,”65 while only Kreisky was acknow-
ledged to have represented a “chancellor democracy.”66 Official duties
granted to the position in the Austrian constitution are chairmanship of
cabinet meetings (Art. 69) and a right of ministerial nomination and
dismissal (Art. 70). There is no general competence to set the guidelines
of governing. However, as in Germany, where a chancellor possesses
such formal competence (Richtlinienkompetenz), it may not be adequate
for the level of power he exerts over his cabinet. In a similar fashion,
Wolfgang C. Müller found Austrian evidence for “prime ministerial” as
well as “cabinet” and “party government.”67 
As mentioned earlier in this article, Schüssel was a dedicated
practitioner of a cooperative style of governance. Indeed, in the first
cabinet formed after the 1999 general elections, both parties had equal
ministerial representation, whereas the 2002 Peoples Party’s triumph
and the FPÖ’s fiasco changed the proportion to three to one. The FPÖ’s
“annus horribilis” in 2005, when the party split and the smaller faction
(Bündnis Zukunft Österreich, or BZÖ) continued its role in the govern-
ment,68 further cheapened the ÖVP’s coalition partner.
“Inner cabinets,” which in some countries (such as the Federal
Republic of Germany and Great Britain) reinforce prime ministerial
power while in others (such as Belgium) exert an oppositional effect,
seemed to have been absent under Schüssel’s leadership.69 The appoint-
ment of ministers and junior ministers from different parties, a widely
used device of mutually controlling Austria’s grand coalitions, almost
entirely disappeared in the Schüssel I cabinet and enjoyed confined
revitalization in the 2003 remake.70 Ministerial autonomy was recog-
nized on the basis of principles and content as stipulated in the coalition
agreement. According to the Austrian tradition, the agreement of the
year 2000 presented a comprehensive document, but dedicated above-
average room to policy intentions. It concomitantly reduced the chan-
cellor and his ministers’ room to maneuver.71 Lopatka confirms that
ministerial autonomy, which is sufficiently appreciated in the Austrian
constitution, is “very respected” in the ÖVP and “was always respected
by the chancellor.”72 A statement by Riess-Passer, however, signals the
borders of ministerial autonomy: in case of severe disagreement between
ministers, she says, Schüssel and she did not hesitate to intervene.73 
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The sequences of governing coordination differed substantially
from those of the Helmut Kohl era in Germany. The Austrian process
could be characterized by a lower degree of informality. Negotiation
rounds of frequently altered composition, so central to the Kohl system,
played no role.74 According to Austria’s Andreas Khol, the two leaders
of the coalition parties created the agenda of the upcoming cabinet
meeting, thereby starting the process of subsequent coordination: “Still,
during the term of the grand coalition the chancellor alone decided the
agenda which always led to conflicts because the smaller partner de-
pended on his good will to have petitions discussed in the cabinet
meeting.”75 In coordinating governmental politics, Schüssel relied on a
small circle of party heavyweights that merged into a bigger, but
accessible, round in the preliminary discussions of the cabinet meetings,
which broadly overlapped with the party’s executive committee. The
“Monday round” assembled Khol (first president of the Nationalrat
since 2003), Lopatka (since 2003), Gehrer, the so-called “coordination
minister” at the time, and probably also Molterer: “That was the circle—
a reduced party executive committee.”76 These talks were paralleled by
an increasing number of bilateral contacts between cabinet members.77
The coordination session of the government was preceded by the
preliminary discussion of each coalition partner. It was attended by all
cabinet members, the party whip and president of the Nationalrat, and
the general secretary of the federal party and those of the six leagues, as
well as the leagues’ chairmen.78 For Lopatka, the institutionalized preli-
minary discussion of cabinet meetings in the ÖVP witnessed many
debates and, therefore, accomplished an “integral function” of coordi-
nating executive politics.79 The sessions of the coordination committee
took place on the day before the formal cabinet meeting and represented
the “actual council of ministers where discussions are still taking place,
questions are still being asked, where one minister or another still admits
that she or he is not convinced about something.”80 Participants included
not only cabinet members, but also party whips, chiefs of cabinet, and
the administrative directors of the parliamentary group. In the official
cabinet meeting, in a procedure that deviates from the practice of the
Franz Vranitzky cabinets (chancellor between 1986 and 1997), both
chancellor and vice-chancellor began with a political address that
summarized the coordination session and ended with in the request of
ministerial statements outside the agenda.81 Any ambiguities or
unresolved issues were discussed in Tuesday morning’s “chancellor
breakfast” (Kanzlerfrühstück), where chancellor and vice-chancellor
tried to revise the agenda eye to eye, sometimes consulting the ministers
involved.82 
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In 2000, the ÖVP-FPÖ government distinguished itself from
previous cabinets in that the coalition committee no longer “above all
was designed in setting emergencies but served as a coordinating and
controlling institution.”83 Khol counts ten to fifteen meetings taking
place between 2000-2002. These were kept secret. The party whips,
general secretaries, and chairman assembled at Khol’s home at meetings
conceived as a means to neutralize Haider.84 The informal FPÖ leader,
however, had refrained from attending meetings long before the summer
of 2002. 
With the important exception of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the
ÖVP in 2000 extended its ministries and most portfolios from the grand
coalition period. The FPÖ ministers, on the contrary, struggled to
establish themselves in traditional SPÖ departments.85 This distribution
basically followed the suggestions of the “portfolio allocation model”
(parties claim portfolios to facilitate clientelism). The one significant
exception related to the chancellor’s “blame avoidance” strategy: FPÖ
Chairwoman Riess-Passer was given responsibility for administration
and civil service and was the prime counterpart for the influential union
of civil servants (GÖD), which is dominated by the ÖVP-affiliated
Group of Christian Unionists (FCG).86 At the final stage of wage
bargaining, the FCG chairman, according to a tried and true pattern,
sought to get his opponent’s resistance overruled by the chancellor’s
support. Schüssel declined by noting his lack of a constitutional com-
petence.87 
Conclusion: Chancellor Democrat, Premier-President, 
or Indispensable Coordinator?
A final assessment of the relationship between the power of the
Austrian government and the influence of Chancellor Schüssel is
provided by a comparison between the concepts of chancellor democra-
cy and coordination democracy in the light of the “presidentialization”
hypothesis. 
Chancellor democrats and “presidentialized” premiers are portrayed
by definition as exceptionally strong political leaders. The process of
“presidentialization” is driven by the growing informal quality of
executive politics and by direct communication between leaders and
voters through the media. This is less central to the concept of
chancellor democracy. The “presidentialized” type often seeks to build
alliances across party political frontiers, and some try to avoid polari-
zation.88 This is not a feature of “chancellor democracy.” One’s relation-
ship with one’s own party typifies the one real drastic difference with
the heirs of Germany’s Konrad Adenauer, the progenitor of all
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chancellor democrats, who valued tight control instead of independence
and strategic flexibility. Advocates of coordination democracy argue
that increasing fragmentation and complexity of decision-making and
implementation processes have produced or made necessary a certain
form of leadership. Unlike the two other approaches, coordination
democracy considers governmental activism as part of the wider politi-
cal system: the chancellor, then, appears to lead surrounded by veto
players (Mitregenten), is forced into joint decision making (Politikver-
flechtung), and is restricted by “path dependency.” Securing effective
and efficient governing, therefore, requires more or less permanent
coordination and cooperation.89 (See Table 1.) 
How can we describe Schüssel’s executive leadership? Let’s start
with the concept of “chancellor democracy.” Notable, first, is the
ambivalent quality of his power in his party: on the one hand, he was
unrivaled and, no doubt, played a leadership role on the terrain of EU
politics; in a “strategic masterly performance” (Khol) he ended thirty
years of “red” chancellors, and he made few but very important
decisions (see the list mentioned before). Bids for election dates and
coalition aspects were essential to his style of politics. On the other
hand, his personal popularity as evaluated in opinion polls was low.
Except in 1996 (European parliament elections) and 2002 (general
elections90), all federal elections results were disappointing for the ÖVP;
cooperation in the cabinet was enforced by ministerial autonomy and
equal representation of the FPÖ (2000-2003); demands of Land party
organizations and the six leagues had to be satisfied in the appointment
of cabinet members (except for Plassnik, who became minister for
foreign affairs in 2004 and had been Schüssel’s chief of staff); unlike the
Gusenbauer SPÖ (Alfred Gusenbauer was chairman of the SPÖ since
2000) over the course of the BAWAG-ÖGB scandal in 2006 (BAWAG
was the bank of the Austrian Trade Union, Österreichischer Gewerk-
schaftsbund), the ÖVP under Schüssel did not introduce any incom-
patibility rule (conflict of interest and roles) for being member of the
parliament and top official in chambers and unions. The one important
exception is the president of the chamber of commerce and critic of the
new majoritarian course, Christoph Leitl, who never became a member
of the Nationalrat. He was another candidate for the party chair in 1995
and since then stayed outside Schüssel’s leadership team91; under
Schüssel’s leadership, comprehensive organizational innovations were
never implemented, and programmatic reforms were never initiated. 
Such ambivalence, too, is apparent in the colossal 2002 victory. The
campaign’s central slogan “Wer, wenn nicht er” (“Who else could do the
job?”) was intended to focus voters’ attention on choosing a chancellor.
In the last two months before the election, however, his advantage over
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opposition leader Gusenbauer (SPÖ) dropped some sixteen points,
giving him a lead of no more than 7 percent. A moderate turnaround
favoring Schüssel took place in the final two weeks of the campaign, and
he dominated in the TV debate between the parliamentary parties’ front-
runners a few days before the election.92 Schüssel benefited from what
Scott Feld and Bernard Grofman call the “benefit of the doubt.”93 The
real breakthrough occurred courtesy of the Grasser coup. Again, one
might argue that the young finance minister’s popularity overshadowed
the chancellor’s, though it was the chancellor who took the risk of the
decision to offer this important post to an active politician representing
another party, who had the intra-party authority to make this attractive
offer to Grasser and who succeeded in convincing him. 
Overall, the elections can be characterized as a plebiscite on the
architecture of power relations in the political system, only it was a
mediated one about the fate of individual political leaders and not about
any of the parties’ policy offers.94 The dominant impact of the issue of
power relations would also explain the unique ÖVP gain among blue-
collar voters, although laborers were generally the prime target of
financial cutbacks since 2000. Sensationally, the ÖVP more than
doubled its share of votes.95 For years later, many of them preferred the
SPÖ (minus 12 percent for the ÖVP).96  
Can coordination democracy contribute to our understanding of
Schüssel’s executive leadership? With respect to intra-party and cabinet
leadership, the answer is yes; Schüssel acted according to the premise
of “coordination democracy.” With respect to governmental leadership,
the answer is “no” because the majoritarian track of decision making
attempted to neutralize potential as well as numerous formal and
informal veto players. 
Finally, we incorporate the aspect of “presidentialization.” This
international phenomenon, as pointed out by Thomas Poguntke and Paul
Webb, subsumes a not necessarily simultaneous, but to a high degree
interdependent, increase in the significance of political leaders in the
party (party face), in the government (“executive face” including
cabinet, parliamentary party group, and bureaucratic structures), and in
elections (electoral face).97 Schüssel hardly acted and performed
according to these standards: the personalization strategy in the 2002
campaign was successful, but failed in 2006 (electoral face); there was
no attempt to monopolize communication of governmental politics to
the media. In sharp contrast to the great communicator among Austrian
chancellors, Kreisky, Schüssel’s style provoked critics to label him
“Schweigekanzler”98 (“the silent chancellor”). Also uncommon were the
frequent exchanges and appointments of policy experts, and the same
applies to spontaneous agenda setting for the purpose of weakening the
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position of the cabinet. Eventually, Schüssel rarely presented himself in
the guise of a non-party and nonpartisan “moderator” of politics. The
“presidential” style of organizing majorities by including oppositional
MPs with the purpose of replacing the need to rally his own supporters
was extrinsic to his understanding of politics (executive face). The scope
of organizational reforms in the party was limited, the official executive
committees and boards remained an essential forum of discussion and
decision-making, and his appointment authority stayed restricted by
traditional forces (party face).
As noted above, Schüssel’s relationship to his party marks the
fundamental difference in the concepts of chancellor democracy and
“presidentialization.” Schüssel’s case and examples from Great Britain,
Australia, and Germany indicate a varying extent of openness towards
the evolution of “presidential” features dependent on the party familial
background: prerequisites are more favorable in social democratic
parties (Tony Blair, Gerhard Schröder), have mixed effects in secular-
conservative parties (Margaret Thatcher, John Major, John Howard99),
and are adverse in Christian democratic parties (Kohl, Angela Merkel,
Schüssel).100 Whereas the last repeatedly (Schüssel) and relentlessly
(Kohl) achieved solidarity with their parties and attacked preceding
social democratic administrations, Blair practiced a double “blaming”
of conservative governments and “Old Labour.” Schüssel never used the
threat to resign to steer certain policy-outcomes, unlike Schröder who
did so several times.101 (See Table 1.)   
Table 1



















Despite many similarities between Kohl and Schüssel’s “executive
leadership,” some essential differences exist. Kohl’s systematic and
almost holistic approach in establishing intra-party networks based on
loyalty and dependencies and his offer of protection to allies and
fighting against opponents were entirely absent in the ÖVP. This was
also the case concerning his personal conflicts and feuds with critics (for
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example, former General Secretaries Kurt Biedenkopf and Heiner
Geissler).102 Kohl met open opposition and rivals both as party leader
and Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union of Bavaria
(Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands, or CDU/Christlich-
Soziale Union in Bayern e.V., or CSU) front-runner (CSU chairman
Franz Josef Strauss became candidate in 1980). Under Schüssel, party
management and governmental leadership seemed to be two separate
things.103 
Presidentialized party leaders and premiers face a higher risk of
electoral vulnerability (see Table 2 below.) They typically lack the
ability to celebrate political comebacks (as did Vaclav Klaus in the
Czech Republic and Victor Orban in Hungary), or remain in office
without being an asset for their parties in electoral campaigns
(Germany’s Kohl, with the exception of the 1990 elections). Schüssel’s
personal ratings remained rather poor throughout most of his
chancellorship, and it appears as more than a coincidence that Schüssel’s
incumbency was shorter than that of two other ÖVP chancellors
(Leopold Figl and Julius Raab), while the length of his term on the top
of the party and as a minister rank him first. 
Table 2
















Electoral Vulnerability moderate to high moderate low to moderate
Schüssel is a rare example of a prime minister with a failed re-
election bid who nevertheless stayed in a central political position
(deputy leader in the Nationalrat), though not leader of the opposition.
During the short-lived “grand coalition” in 2007-2008, SPÖ politicians
often accused him of obstructive leadership of the party and of blocking
the SPÖ’s attempt to keep promises it had made in the election
campaign. Whether these reproaches were justified or not shall not be
a matter decided here. In fact, charges of this nature indirectly shed light
on one aspect of the heritage of Schüssel’s dual leadership: his
cooperation in the party and the cabinet on one hand, and conflict in
expanding the decision-making authority against potential veto players
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Governing with Right-Wing Populists and
Managing the Consequences:
Schüssel and the FPÖ
Kurt Richard Luther
Introduction
On 22 April 1995, Wolfgang Schüssel became the third leader in six
years of the Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP). It had a relatively poor
record of achieving its electoral and governmental goals. Since 1970, the
party had come second in all national elections to the Sozialdemokra-
tische Partei Österreichs (SPÖ) and from 1986 had suffered a seemingly
inexorable erosion of its vote share to the benefit of the Freiheitliche
Partei Österreichs (FPÖ). After seventeen years in opposition, it had in
1987 finally returned to government, albeit as the SPÖ’s junior coalition
partner. During Schüssel’s twelve-year leadership—the longest of any
ÖVP chairman—the party obtained 42.3 percent of the vote at the 2002
election, its best result for nearly twenty years. Moreover, by the time
of his resignation on 9 January 2007, Schüssel could look back on
virtually seven years as federal chancellor, towards the end of which the
ÖVP had been able to operate as though it were the sole governing party.
Such success had seemed impossible in the early 1990s, when the
party’s prospects appeared blocked by two significant constraints.
Internally, its exceptionally factionalized structure had long militated
against the kind of organizational adaptation arguably required to
improve the party’s electoral record and thus enhance its potential to win
back the chancellorship. Externally, the pattern of party competition had
severely limited the ÖVP’s coalition options. For one, since Jörg
Haider’s assumption of the FPÖ leadership in 1986, the SPÖ and ÖVP
had operated a policy of Ausgrenzung, that is, excluding the FPÖ from
national office. This meant that, although the ÖVP and FPÖ had a
numerical parliamentary majority throughout this period,1 the ÖVP had
effectively been tied into the role of the SPÖ’s junior coalition partner.
Moreover, the ÖVP’s prime policy goal had since 1987 been EU
accession, which required a two-thirds parliamentary majority, so until
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the requisite legislation was passed (on 11 November 1994), the ÖVP
was doubly dependent on a “grand coalition” with the electorally stron-
ger SPÖ. 
Crucial to Schüssel’s achievement of his office and policy goals was
his willingness to break the mold of the party’s external relations. This
involved adopting a much more confrontational approach to the ÖVP’s
traditional coalition partner, the SPÖ, and to Austria’s neo-corporatist
system of social partnership. Above all, however, it required a willing-
ness to countenance the hitherto excluded option of a coalition with
Haider’s FPÖ. Governing with a party that had since 1986 been pursuing
right-wing populist vote maximization was highly controversial at home
and abroad. Schüssel’s greatest challenge, however, was managing the
consequences of the decision he made to pursue his policy and office
goals in a coalition with the FPÖ. The twin tasks he faced were gover-
ning with such an unpredictable partner and dealing with the tensions
caused by it within his own party. This analysis of how he dealt with
these internal and external pressures will be subdivided into three sec-
tions: the years leading up to the formation of Schüssel’s first govern-
ment on 4 February 2000, the lifetime of that administration, and the
second Schüssel government, which lasted from 28 February 2003 until
11 January 2007.
Preparing to Break the Mold: 1995-1999
Internal Constraints and External Preferences
In 1986, the ÖVP garnered an historic low of 41.3 percent of the
national vote, and at the elections of October 1990 and 1994 that
dropped even further—to 32.1 percent and 27.7 percent respectively—
leaving the ÖVP just five points above the FPÖ. According to Kenneth
Janda, electoral defeat is the “mother of party change,”2 but the ÖVP
failed to respond to any of these losses with significant organizational
reform, limiting itself instead to criticizing frequently and then replacing
its chairmen. Successive ÖVP leaders had been aware that the party’s
peculiar internal structure severely constrained its capacity to respond
to the rapidly changing political environment and thus undermined the
national party’s potential to realize two of the main goals pursued by
political parties, namely vote maximization and office.3 The main
stumbling block to extensive organizational reform has been the en-
trenched power of the three functional Leagues that have together
always not only provided the overwhelming majority of the ÖVP’s
indirect membership, but also been closely linked to Austria’s extensive
system of social partnership: the Austrian Farmers League (Öster-
reichischer Bauernbund, or ÖBB), the Austrian Business League
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(Österreichischer Wirtschaftsbund, or ÖWB) and the Austrian Workers
and Employees League (Österreichischer Arbeiter- und Angestellten-
bund, or ÖAAB).4 As Wolfgang Müller and Barbara Steininger have
argued by reference to George Tsebelis’ nested games theory,5 from the
perspective of the leaders of the Leagues, it was rational to resist
organizational reform. For one, it threatened their intra-party office and
power. Moreover, the Leagues were motivated above all by policy goals,
which could be pursued via Austria’s neo-corporatist channel of decision
making, even in conditions such as those that existed from 1970 to 1987,
when the party was excluded from national office, let alone when it was
the junior coalition partner.
As incoming ÖVP leader, Schüssel had a greater incentive to revive
the ÖVP’s national vote and regain the chancellorship. His policy
priorities included European integration, as well as privatization of state
enterprises and a considerable liberalization of Austria’s economy (no
doubt shaped by having been the ÖWB’s General Secretary from 1975-
1991). Given that major organizational reform of the ÖVP was not an
option, Schüssel’s maximization of his policy, vote, and office goals
relied mainly on altering the party’s external relations. He had two main
strategic alternatives and until 1999 sought to keep both open. The first
was heading up an ÖVP-SPÖ coalition. Even assuming the requisite
electoral plurality could be won, this was unlikely to deliver fully
Schüssel’s economic policy preferences because they were not shared
by the SPÖ and would probably also be undermined by the policy and
procedural constraints of social partnership. A second alternative was
forming a government with Haider’s FPÖ, again on the basis of a
plurality of votes. This appears initially not to have been his preferred
option. Although the FPÖ had long opposed social partnership, it was
markedly Euroskeptic and considered by many both within and without
the ÖVP to be not only an unreliable, opposition-oriented partner, but
also beyond the political pale, not least in view of its xenophobia and
relativization of Austria’s Nazi past.
Yet the ÖVP was never uniformly opposed to governing with the
FPÖ. This had from the outset been favored by former ÖAAB leader
Alois Mock, for example, who had led the ÖVP from 1979 to 1989, and
was probably opposed most consistently by the influential ÖBB. A
coalition with the FPÖ was most clearly ruled out during the leadership
of Schüssel’s predecessor, Erhard Busek, which commenced a fortnight
after Haider’s reference of 13 June 1991 to the “orderly employment
policy of the Third Reich,” as a result of which Haider was forced to
resign the governorship of Carinthia. Shortly after Schüssel became
chairman, his conservative competitor for the leadership and subsequent
close ally, ÖAAB member Andreas Khol, characterized the FPÖ as
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“beyond the constitutional arch” (außerhalb des Verfassungsbogens).6
Yet behind the scenes, there were numerous tentative discussions
between (intermediaries of) the two parties about possible cooperation
and even occasional direct meetings between Schüssel and Haider.7 For
its part, the FPÖ had shortly after the 1994 election secretly decided that
if it were to obtain sufficient votes at the next general election
(scheduled for 1998), it would seek to enter government. It therefore
welcomed Busek’s departure and started to take steps to make itself
appear to be a credible governing party. In August 1995, for example,
Haider publically rejected nostalgic Pan-Germanism (Deutschtümelei),8
and for the first time in ten years, the FPÖ started to develop detailed
position papers, not only on immigration, but also, for example, on
savings, taxation, industrial, and pension policies.9
Schüssel’s First Attempt at the Chancellorship
Within months of becoming party leader and vice-chancellor,
Schüssel started adopting a more confrontational line vis-à-vis the SPÖ.
With the ÖVP now ahead in the polls, in October 1995 he refused to
compromise on his proposed spending cuts and forced a premature
election. It appears Schüssel’s preference was to use the ÖVP’s
predicted plurality to assume the chancellorship in a coalition with the
SPÖ. In a departure from the post-1986 consensus, however, he refused
to rule out a coalition with the FPÖ. The SPÖ’s highlighting of that
possibility and its claims that Schüssel planned to cut pensions helped
ensure that, while the ÖVP’s vote rose marginally (to 28.3 percent) at
the election of 17 December, the SPÖ’s grew by three percentage points
(to 38.1 percent). Assuming he could have wrested the role of govern-
ment formateur from the SPÖ (as he was to do after the 1999 election),
Schüssel could again theoretically have formed a government with the
FPÖ. Such a mold-breaking coalition still lacked political viability,
however. Rather than increasing the ÖVP-FPÖ parliamentary majority
from five to the hoped-for ten, the election has decreased it to three. The
FPÖ had slipped from 22.5 percent to 21.9 percent and as yet had made
little progress with its new strategy of presenting itself as a credible
governing party. Schüssel’s toying with an FPÖ coalition had also
alienated significant numbers of ÖVP partisans and many party
functionaries, with the result that he could not be sure of the requisite
intra-party support.
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Snatching Victory from the Jaws of Defeat
Once the SPÖ-ÖVP coalition had been reconstituted on 12 March
1996, Schüssel persisted with a two-pronged strategy towards the FPÖ.
On the one hand, he continued quietly to encourage it to make changes
that would reduce intra-ÖVP resistance to a possible coalition. The FPÖ
duly adopted a number of market-oriented economic and fiscal policies.
These were reasserted in its 1997 new program, where this traditionally
anti-clerical party also stated “[t]he preservation of the intellectual
foundations of the West necessitates a Christianity that defends its
values” and maintained it was “an ideal partner of the Christian
churches.”10 This went down especially well with the Catholic-conser-
vative wing of the ÖVP, with which Khol had long been associated. On
the other hand, normal competition was maintained. This included
attacking the FPÖ inter alia for its Euroskepticism and demagogy, as
well as trying to undermine its capacity to win votes on the immigration
issue by supporting the 1997 Integration Package and the 1998
Naturalization Act, which tightened up policy in this area. Yet the FPÖ
continued to gain votes, while the ÖVP suffered numerous losses.11 
Schüssel’s leadership predictably came under internal pressure, but
there was no clear alternative. Most in the ÖVP attributed the party’s
ongoing electoral decline in large measure to its junior coalition status
and deeply resented both this and the SPÖ’s alleged high-handedness.
Indeed, in early 1997 an incandescent ÖVP nearly terminated the
coalition after SPÖ Finance Minister Viktor Klima approved not only
the government-agreed privatization of the SPÖ-dominated Bank
Austria, but also the latter’s takeover of the ÖVP-dominated Creditan-
stalt. A few internal voices maintained that the only way out of the
SPÖ’s politically damaging embrace was cooperation with the FPÖ,
which would, they argued, demystify it and thus undercut its electoral
support. Yet most continued to regard the FPÖ as uncoalitionable and
saw no alternative to playing second fiddle to the SPÖ as long as the
ÖVP remained behind it in the polls. Until that changed, Schüssel
clearly had no incentive to precipitate premature elections again.
Instead, he continued to seek to enhance his party’s programmatic
distinctiveness vis-à-vis the SPÖ. The ÖVP increased its emphasis on
neo-liberal economic policy and budget consolidation, confronted SPÖ-
oriented labor organizations, and even challenged Austria’s foreign
policy consensus by questioning the continued relevance of neutrality.
Schüssel also sought to capitalize politically on the role his position as
foreign minister gave him during Austria’s first European Union Presi-
dency (July to December 1998). 
At the election of 3 October 1999, the SPÖ lost 5 percent of the vote
but remained the strongest party (33.2 percent). The FPÖ leapt to 26.9
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percent, while the ÖVP not only recorded another historic low (26.9
percent), but for the first time ever came third, albeit by only 415 votes.
After the September polls predicted an even worse result, Schüssel
sought to rally ÖVP voters by stating that, were the party to come third,
he would lead it into opposition.12 Instead, he now pursued tactics that
were so crucial in making his reputation as a shrewd and ruthless can-do
politician, capable of snatching victory from the jaws of defeat, that it
is worth detailing them here. 
Notwithstanding the ÖVP’s calamitous result, Schüssel had oppor-
tunities he could exploit. Internally, a shell-shocked ÖVP was divided
over its response. Externally, the SPÖ was constrained by its self-
imposed injunction against collaborating with the FPÖ, while Schüssel
was willing to do so and there had already been behind-the-scenes
discussions between the two parties. The political initiative was not
Schüssel’s, however, but the SPÖ’s, which was the party entrusted with
the task of forming a government. The ensuing 124 days constituted the
second-longest period of coalition-building in the Second Republic’s
history.13 
For two months, Schüssel openly engaged in exploratory talks with
both parties. Though he had no intention of allowing the ÖVP to go into
opposition, he had at that stage not identified his preferred coalition,
even to some of his closest allies.14 Uncertainty regarding his intentions
only strengthened his position vis-à-vis his interlocutors. On 13 Decem-
ber, Schüssel obtained a unanimous party executive decision to replace
his pre-election “irrevocable” commitment to opposition with an agree-
ment to enter coalition negotiations with the SPÖ while keeping all
options open.15 The same day, the FPÖ executive committee decided the
FPÖ would in the coming weeks compile its own government program.
By then, ÖVP-FPÖ negotiations were apparently quite advanced.16 As
in 1995, Haider gave a public declaration designed to assuage those
convinced his attitude regarding the Nazi past made his party unfit to
govern,17 and the FPÖ released documents seeking to demonstrate it had
a credible policy agenda.18 Formal SPÖ-ÖVP negotiations started on 17
December, and though both parties agreed to keep them confidential,
enough points of contention leaked out to ensure that by early January
2000 intra-ÖVP opposition to renewing a coalition with the SPÖ grew,
inter alia from the leaders of the provincial parties of Styria, Burgen-
land, and Lower Austria, but also from the ÖWB and ÖAAB. Many
supported the option of going into opposition and allowing the SPÖ to
form a minority government, but some (including the ÖAAB and the
Styrian branch) were openly advocating an ÖVP-FPÖ coalition. Others
(including the Viennese, Tyrolean, and Upper Austrian parties, as well
as most of the ÖBB) were still opposed to that option, and there were
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even murmurings that if such a government were formed, the ÖVP
might split.
Schüssel needed to be seen as giving serious consideration to a
coalition with the SPÖ and on 16 January obtained the approval of the
leaders of the Leagues and of the provincial parties for him to complete
the negotiations, the draft agreement of which was approved on 17
January by the SPÖ executive committee. At the last minute, however,
he made a series of policy, portfolio, and procedural demands of the
SPÖ, almost certainly knowing it would be unable to accept them. On
21 January, the negotiations duly collapsed. Despite having no presi-
dential mandate to do so, on 24 January Schüssel announced he and
Haider would be commencing coalition negotiations. On 1 February, the
day after the Portuguese EU Presidency’s publication of a threat to
impose diplomatic sanctions should the FPÖ enter government, the two
parties revealed they had reached agreement. Extremely important for
Schüssel’s chances of overcoming internal resistance to collaborating
with the FPÖ was that the ÖVP was to regain the chancellorship and
Haider would not enter the government.19 
Viewed as a whole, Schüssel’s post-election behavior lends weight
to the hypothesis that he had by December at the latest decided upon
governmental collaboration with the FPÖ. That would imply that his
brinkmanship vis-à-vis the SPÖ was designed above all to help
overcome internal resistance to that decision. Externally, it served to
present the SPÖ and President Klestil with a fait accompli. These events
also illustrate well two of Schüssel’s main leadership strengths, namely
his capacity to utilize environmental crises to achieve his policy and
office goals and his willingness to employ high-risk tactics to secure
them, even in the face of internal and external resistance.
The First Schüssel Government (2000-2003)
With his government sworn in on 4 February 2000, Schüssel had
achieved his pre-eminent office goal and now needed to manage the
ÖVP’s internal and external relations in a manner that consolidated his
position and realized his policy objectives. That task appeared to have
been complicated by the unforeseen international sanctions against the
new government. At Klestil’s insistence, Schüssel and Haider had on 3
February signed a preamble to their government program, committing
themselves inter alia to European Union membership and to principles
of tolerance, but this could neither avert the sanctions, nor prevent them
from galvanizing mass anti-government demonstrations in Vienna and
elsewhere.
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Internal Relations
The ÖVP was delighted at having regained the chancellorship and
relegated the SPÖ to the opposition for only the second time since 1945.
Yet there was also near universal dismay amongst ÖVP activists that
their party—which they regarded as the embodiment of pro-European
sentiment and governmental responsibility—was being reviled inter-
nationally for having facilitated right-wing extremist entryism. A
significant proportion of the party still regarded collaborating with the
FPÖ as anathema and was unconvinced this coalition could either
reverse the ÖVP’s electoral decline, or realize its various policy pre-
ferences. In the event Schüssel’s determination to face down the
sanctions and his call for a closing of ranks (Schulterschluß) against
allegedly unjustified external intervention into Austria’s domestic affairs
stymied the intra-party criticism he had always expected he would face.
Moreover, the lifting of the sanctions in September 2000 and the ÖVP’s
spectacular eleven percentage point gain at October’s Styrian Landtag
elections appeared to vindicate his position. To be sure, internal distaste
at collaboration with the FPÖ persisted throughout both Schüssel
governments, but he had survived the crucial first few months.
More was, of course, needed to secure long-term support in a party
that has always been extremely decentralized, with resource distribution
weighted in favor of the Leagues and (to a lesser extent) the provincial
parties.20 First, Schüssel needed to ensure an equitable representation of
the Leagues in the key party and governmental posts at his disposal. He
was himself identified with the ÖWB and throughout his chancellorship
had two key ÖWB confidants: Waltraud Klasnic, who was from 1996 to
2005 governor of Styria and leader of the Styrian party, and Martin
Bartenstein, his economics minister and since 1992 Styria’s deputy party
leader.21 The requisite ÖAAB incorporation was undertaken inter alia
by giving the caucus leadership and the position of third president of the
parliament to two of its senior members.22 Former ÖBB Director
Wilhelm Molterer retained the Agriculture Ministry, and Maria Rauch-
Kallat, leader since 1988 of the Women’s League, was appointed the
ÖVP’s general secretary. Second, as the ÖVP’s politically most sensitive
internal decisions typically require ratification by the party executive,
membership of which comprises mainly ex-officio rather than elected
representatives and is thus not within the leader’s gift, Schüssel invested
considerable effort in networking designed to ensure these bodies
returned the decisions he wished. He maintained close contacts with key
provincial party actors, chief among whom was Erwin Pröll, governor
of Lower Austria and leader of its mighty provincial party, who had
initially opposed collaborating with the FPÖ. Moreover, Schüssel made
sure the key component elements of the party were linked to the ÖVP’s
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informal decision-making systems. Foremost amongst these was his
“kitchen cabinet.” Its regular Monday meetings made day-to-day de-
cisions on government business and ensured a two-way information flow
with the Leagues, not least through the caucus, the internal organization
of which is based around League membership. The kitchen cabinet
embraced Schüssel’s two deputies (one each from the ÖBB and
ÖAAB)23 and caucus leader Khol, who were all close confidants, as well
as the general secretary. 
Last but by no means least, Schüssel used such communication
channels to convince in particular the Leagues of the benefits provided
to them by the coalition. Individual functionaries and activists benefited
from selective incentives such as the provision of positions, but also
from the solidary incentive of belonging to the chancellor party.
Moreover, while the pragmatic policy prioritization of the Leagues had
hitherto conflicted with Schüssel’s greater emphasis upon vote
maximization and office holding, they now mainly worked to his
advantage. At the risk of oversimplification, internal support was se-
cured above all by the provision of collective or policy incentives,
though the disparate material interests of the Leagues meant Schüssel
could not satisfy all of them equally. The greatest support came from the
ÖWB, which was enamored of the government’s emphasis on neo-
liberalism, privatization, and achieving a zero budget deficit. Big
business in particular welcomed the coalition’s willingness not only to
ignore the wishes of the social partners—which the ÖWB had long held
to constitute an unacceptable break on necessary reforms—but also to
overrule them, not least since this meant reducing the power of
organized labor.24 Collective incentives in the form of a more generous
subsidy regime were also provided for the ÖBB, which, despite its initial
opposition to collaborating with the FPÖ, was soon on board. 
The situation with the ÖAAB was more difficult. Soon after taking
office, the government started ruthlessly to sideline or remove as many
SPÖ partisans as it could from positions in the state bureaucracy, as well
as in (privatized) state enterprises and other para-state organizations,
such as the Austrian Federal Railways and the Austrian Highways
Agency, ASFINAG. While some such positions went to FPÖ partisans,
the majority were available for those of the ÖVP, many of whom were
ÖAAB members. For the ÖAAB as a whole, however, such selective
incentives were canceled out by negative consequences of the
government’s neo-liberal policies and its pursuit of civil service reform
for workers and salaried employees. Both led to job losses and resent-
ment from within the ÖAAB’s ranks at what was considered the
prioritization of the interests of capital over those of labor. Though these
were policies to which Schüssel was personally committed, it appears he
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used the fact that the relevant portfolios were held by FPÖ ministries to
try to deflect some of the ÖAAB’s criticism onto his coalition partner,
claiming that maintaining the coalition for which the ÖAAB had long
argued required certain policy sacrifices.25 For now, Schüssel appeared
able to keep the ÖAAB more-or-less on board.
External Relations26
The formation and actions of the ÖVP-FPÖ coalition led to a
significant polarization of Austrian politics. The ÖVP’s relationship
with the SPÖ was considerably worse than it had ever been. The SPÖ
still considered the FPÖ beyond the political pale and could not forgive
Schüssel for how he had outmaneuvered the SPÖ to take the chan-
cellorship, to which it felt entitled as the electorally strongest party.
Moreover, in pursuit of its neo-liberal policy agenda, but also in order
to extend its political power, the coalition rode roughshod over Austrian
social partnership and systematically sought to eradicate as much SPÖ
influence as possible from the civil service and state-controlled
economy. Though the international sanctions initially complicated
aspects of day-to-day government business (especially when it pertained
to foreign affairs), their broader impact was to undermine the opposition
parties. Their failure to denounce them permitted Schüssel to accuse
them of national disloyalty and to bind the coalition parties closer
together. Indeed, Schüssel demonstrated his defiant commitment to the
coalition by regular joint appearances with FPÖ Vice-Chancellor
Susanne Riess-Passer.
On paper, the coalition partners appeared fairly evenly matched.
The ÖVP held the ministries of Foreign Affairs, Education, Internal
Affairs, Agriculture, and Economics and Labor. The FPÖ’s portfolios
included those of Finance, Justice, Defense, Social Affairs, and Trans-
port. Yet it very soon became clear to Schüssel that the FPÖ’s
ministerial team was of markedly uneven quality. Within a month, the
Justice Minister resigned, and in October 2000, the widely-ridiculed
Minister of Social Affairs had to be replaced. Four months later, the
Minister for Transport resigned, and his replacement only lasted thirteen
months. This quick turnover appeared to vindicate critics’ assertions that
the FPÖ was unfit to govern, and it created public relations problems for
Schüssel. Within the coalition, however, it strengthened the ÖVP’s
position, bearing out Schüssel’s expectation that the FPÖ would turn out
to be the less effective governing party. The ÖVP had served in govern-
ment for the preceding fourteen years, and its ministers (barring the
interior minister) were able to capitalize upon considerable levels of
civil service support. By contrast, not one FPÖ minister had a prior
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record of holding national executive office and—with the partial excep-
tion of the ministers of Defense and Finance—all found themselves in
charge of ministries staffed by civil servants among whom the number
of FPÖ partisans was vanishingly small. Furthermore, the ÖVP could
draw on the policy expertise of their Leagues and the social partnership
institutions with which they were associated, but the FPÖ had no access
to such support for policy development and implementation.
As stipulated in the coalition agreement, the ultimate forum for
coordinating relations between the governing parties was the coalition
committee. It was here that Schüssel had intended government strategy
be harmonized and the politically most sensitive decisions made, since
Haider’s membership would ensure he share governmental responsi-
bility despite not being a minister himself. However, Haider frequently
absented himself from meetings at which unpopular decisions were
scheduled to be made and in February 2002 finally left the committee
altogether. Notwithstanding the fact that Riess-Passer had in May 2000
formally taken over the FPÖ’s leadership from Haider, the latter
remained its de facto leader. Schüssel’s inability to bind Haider within
the coalition committee made it very difficult for Schüssel to identify
and maintain a consistent coalition line. The main venues for coalition
coordination were now the well-established weekly pre-cabinet meetings
between him and the vice-chancellor and the broader preparatory
meeting (Ministerratsvorbesprechung) including all government mi-
nisters and the caucus leaders that convened shortly thereafter. In
general, these coordination mechanisms operated in quite a businesslike
and efficient manner, and Schüssel made considerable efforts to lavish
praise upon the performance of Riess-Passer and the telegenic Karl-
Heinz Grasser, neither of whom were associated with the FPÖ’s more
right-wing radical elements.
Whether by accident or design, this increased the gap between the
FPÖ government team on the one hand and Haider and the wider FPÖ
on the other. In part, that distance was a function of the fact that only
about half the FPÖ ministers were well-rooted in their party and some
were not even party members. Yet there were more fundamental
problems. For one, the FPÖ never fully mastered the transition from a
party of populist vote maximization to one of governmental respon-
sibility.27 The basic orientation of most grassroots functionaries and even
of some Members of Parliament (MPs) was oppositional, and many were
thus unwilling to accept the exigencies of incumbency. Accordingly,
once the discipline of the international sanctions was gone and Haider
himself started to vacillate between supporting and attacking the govern-
ment, they, too, felt free to voice their dissatisfaction. Second, there
were significant policy differences between Schüssel and the FPÖ. To
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be sure, there was complete agreement on matters such as a fixed child
payment for all parents (the co-called children’s check), the extension
of employee redundancy rights, and circumventing neo-corporatist
decision-making. One area of conflict concerned EU enlargement.
However, the main disagreement (both within the FPÖ and between it
and the ÖVP) was over the government’s economic policy and in parti-
cular over what many considered Schüssel’s excessive pursuit of a zero
budget deficit. Though this necessarily also became closely identified
with Grasser, it was never wholeheartedly endorsed by the FPÖ. Indeed,
this dispute highlighted the extent to which the FPÖ had—in the
interests of coalescing with the ÖVP—adopted a number of neo-liberal
policies fundamentally at odds with other elements of its programmatic
profile, including its emphasis on social policy and tax reform designed
to defend the “little guy.” As economic growth declined, unemployment
increased, and the government’s tax take rose to an all-time high (in part
to secure the zero deficit via increased taxation rather than via spending
cuts), these tensions become more acute. 
The upshot of such policy differences and the FPÖ’s deep internal
divisions over the switch from protest to incumbency was that Schüssel
was confronted by a seemingly unending series of coalition crises. The
tactics he used to deal with them included largely ignoring both the
FPÖ’s dissenting voices and the acts of political provocation by Haider
and others in the FPÖ.28 This response caused critics of the coalition to
describe him as a “silent chancellor” (Schweigekanzler), who chose to
close his eyes to the predictable consequences of his decision to colla-
borate with a right-wing populist party. It also frustrated Haider, who
felt increasingly sidelined, and further alienated many FPÖ dissidents,
for whom Schüssel’s unwillingness to compromise on, in particular, his
economic policy priorities appeared high-handed. 
Matters came to a head in the summer of 2002 in the so-called
“Knittelfeld crisis,” named after a Styrian town in which FPÖ grassroots
functionaries staged a revolt against their ministers.29 The catalyst was
the government’s insistence on sticking to the zero deficit goal and
delaying the planned tax reforms intended to reduce the burden of
taxation on the middle classes, while simultaneously confirming the
purchase of an expensive new generation of interceptor jets. Disavowed
in this way, Riess-Passer and her cabinet team resigned, whereupon
Schüssel promptly terminated the coalition.
At the elections of 24 November 2002, the SPÖ made a modest
recovery (to 36.5 percent) and the Greens also increased their vote share
(from 7.4 percent to 9.5 percent). The greatest beneficiary by far of the
FPÖ’s catastrophic fall to merely 10 percent of the vote was Schüssel’s
ÖVP. Its 42.3 percent share constituted the largest percentage increase
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ever enjoyed by an Austrian party and was the ÖVP’s best result since
1983. This significantly enhanced the reputation as an astute political
operator that Schüssel had acquired after the 1999 election (see above),
not least within the euphoric ÖVP. For one, the FPÖ’s self-destruction
that had triggered the election was regarded by many as a testament to
the efficacy of Schüssel’s strategy of bringing the FPÖ into governmen-
tal responsibility. It had also brought about the ÖVP’s long-awaited
electoral revival. Moreover, the fact that the ÖVP had managed to win
over approximately half of the FPÖ’s 1999 voters was attributed in large
measure to Schüssel’s election campaign, one of the apparently most
successful elements of which was the co-called “Grasser coup,” that is,
his persuading Grasser to agree serve as a non-partisan minister in the
government Schüssel hoped to form after the election.30
The Second Schüssel Government (2003-2007)
Coalition Building
The 2002 election had fundamentally transformed Schüssel’s exter-
nal position. As leader of the largest party he was now in the driver’s
seat of the coalition-building process, was guaranteed the chancellor-
ship, and could in principle form a majority government with any of the
three other parties. Internally, he had been greatly strengthened by the
scale of the party’s victory, but again faced strongly divergent coalition
preferences. Schüssel was committed to continuing to break the mold of
consensual politics, which implied renewed collaboration with the FPÖ.
However, its conduct in the outgoing administration had re-invigorated
internal support for a coalition with the SPÖ. This included the leaders
of the two largest provincial parties (Josef Pühringer of Upper Austria
and Pröll of Lower Austria), as well as ÖWB President Leitl. They were
supported externally by President Klestil and by the social partners, who
wanted neo-corporatist consensualism restored. Schüssel’s need to
balance internal and external considerations helps explain why the
coalition-building process was again unusually long.31 In public, he once
more kept all options open, but a coalition with the SPÖ was never
likely. The last negotiations had left a legacy of very bad blood, and the
parties shared virtually no substantive agreement, especially on econo-
mic and social policy.32 Moreover, an ÖVP-SPÖ coalition implied
reviving the consensual social partnership structures and would also
require the greatest portfolio concessions. Though on 21 January 2003
the SPÖ’s executive committee voted in favor of formal coalition
negotiations, these thus never materialized.
While many had foreseen this outcome, Schüssel retained his
capacity to surprise, offering exploratory talks to the Greens, derided in
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the ÖVP’s campaign as irresponsible lefties. Despite their unprepared-
ness and post-election commitment to stay in opposition, the Greens
attended. On 13 December, their executive approved the talks’ conti-
nuation and on 5 February sanctioned formal negotiations.33 They
ultimately failed (on 16 February), however, inter alia because of
differences on social, pension, education, defense and traffic policy. An
ÖVP-Green coalition had always been unlikely and vehemently opposed
by ÖVP conservatives, including the ÖBB. Some have suggested
Schüssel entered negotiations for tactical reasons, including to put
pressure on other negotiation partners, to be seen as having explored
even the most unlikely options before again collaborating with the FPÖ,
or to set a marker for potential future cooperation. Yet insider reports
suggest the negotiations were serious.34 Moreover, it is worth noting
they were welcomed by many of the ÖVP’s young and educated urban
members, for whom an ÖVP-Green coalition offered the potential for an
intellectually attractive alternative to renewed collaboration with the
FPÖ.
The latter is what eventually emerged, however. As early as 25 No-
vember, the FPÖ executive had voted in support of reviving the
coalition, and at initial soundings on 5 December, the FPÖ immediately
indicated a willingness to make major policy concessions. On 20
December, the ÖVP supported the FPÖ candidate’s election as Third
President of Parliament, and on 28 January, the FPÖ caucus for its part
supported the ÖVP’s provisional budget. Five days after the ÖVP-Green
negotiation failed, the FPÖ’s executive committee voted for formal
negotiations with the ÖVP. These were successfully completed within
a week, and the new government was installed on 28 February 2003.
Internal Relations
Internal resistance to again collaborating with the FPÖ had per-
sisted. Even at the party executive meeting of 20 February approving
Schüssel’s proposal to enter formal negotiations with the FPÖ, for
example, Pröll and Pühringer voted against, while Leitl and Tyrolean
party leader Herwig von Staa abstained. Schüssel’s distribution of the
ÖVP’s cabinet ministries hinted that he wished to build internal bridges.
Tyrolean ÖAAB leader Günther Platter became defense minister and
Josef Pröll, nephew of the Lower Austrian governor and since 2001
director of the ÖBB, became minister of agriculture. However, these
developments also indicate how the 2002 election had enhanced
Schüssel’s intra-party authority. Despite objections, the Finance Mini-
stry went to Grasser, who had resigned from the FPÖ and was now
wholly dependent on Schüssel. Schüssel’s confidants Gehrer and Barten-
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stein remained in post, as did Foreign Minister Benita Ferrero-Waldner,
a faithful Schüssel lieutenant.35 Rauch-Kallat, who had loyally served
Schüssel as general secretary, was promoted to health minister. The new
general secretary was Styrian Reinhold Lopatka, who had won his
national spurs as the aggressive manager of the 2002 election campaign,
while Schüssel loyalist Molterer now chaired the caucus. Molterer
played a key role in the party’s informal internal communication and
decision-making networks, including the kitchen cabinet. Yet the flow
of communication between the ÖVP’s government team and the party’s
constituent units was to be more top-down than it had been hitherto. In
sum, Schüssel enjoyed greater personal political control over the ÖVP’s
now enlarged ministerial team and appeared less willing to allow his
policy preferences to be constrained by the party.
Schüssel’s determination that his new government push forward his
neo-liberal agenda was welcomed by the ÖWB, which supported his
spending cuts, tightening of unemployment benefit rules, and instituting
privatization and reform programs, not least when they pertained to SPÖ
spheres of influence such as the nationalized industries (VOEST) and
the Austrian Federal Railways. Yet there was also unhappiness in some
parts of the ÖVP about the consequences of the government’s confron-
tational style. These included the unusual sight of industrial unrest in
response to the coalition’s 2003 proposals regarding the railways and
pension reform. Indeed, within two months of the government’s
formation, Leitl (acting as president of the Austrian Chamber of Com-
merce) joined with the SPÖ-oriented Trades Union Federation—a fellow
social partner institution—to call for the government’s pension reform
proposals to be withdrawn. The ÖVP-FPÖ government’s relentless neo-
liberal emphasis increasingly brought Schüssel into conflict with the
ÖAAB, the leadership of which has always overlapped with the civil
service union. The ÖAAB was in the vanguard of protests against the
2003 and 2004 pensions reform bills. It obtained some modifications,
but remained convinced its interests were under attack.
Schüssel also faced internal dissatisfaction from provincial parties.
After an 8.4 percent gain in the Lower Austrian Landtag elections of
March 2003 (which benefited Governor Pröll), the electoral trend
changed markedly. The FPÖ’s ever more rapidly declining vote in-
creasingly benefited the SPÖ rather than the ÖVP. In September 2003,
for example, the Upper Austrian ÖVP saw its vote increase by 0.7
percent, while that of the SPÖ soared by 11.3 percent. It attributed the
scale of its defeat largely to the government’s aggressive stance in
respect of its controversial pension reform proposals, which had
dominated Austrian politics during the preceding months, and to the
announcement just weeks before the election of the contentious pro-
94 The Schüssel Era in Austria
posed privatization of the VOEST. Politically, the most painful
consequences of analogous defeats at many other elections36 were the
losses of the governorships of Salzburg and Styria, which left the ÖVP
with only four (of nine), the lowest share in its history. Such results
contributed significantly to one of the main intra-party trends in
Schüssel’s second government, namely a growing distance between the
chancellor and his party. There was a perception on the ground that he
had become out of touch and was exhibiting a lack of concern about the
negative impact of his government’s policies and confrontational style
on provincial parties’ political fortunes. Inextricably linked with this
was his chosen coalition partner, which was again proving unreliable,
lacking in competence, and prone to public pronouncements that were
highly embarrassing. Indeed, one national-level ÖVP functionary
maintains that frustration at the ongoing problems with the FPÖ “was
the main motor of intra-party dissatisfaction within the coalition … and
was present until the very end … by which time nobody wanted … this
coalition partner … anymore.”37
There are two main reasons why internal dissatisfaction did not
generate a challenge to Schüssel’s leadership. First, his government
continued to provide incentives to key intra-party power brokers. In
particular, it was still delivering on the policy preferences of two of the
three Leagues (the ÖWB and ÖBB), who thus had no interest in risking
internal change. Second, he had acquired a reputation as a formidable
political operator, which meant that notwithstanding the ÖVP’s string
of electoral defeats and the fact that from 2003 until March 2006 it was
consistently behind the SPÖ in the polls, there was a belief Schüssel
would somehow again be able to pull the political chestnuts out of the
fire. The ÖVP’s underestimation of the SPÖ threat was based, in part,
on a disdain for SPÖ leader Alfred Gusenbauer, but also on a hope that
the expected economic revival would come in time for the election of
autumn 2006. In early 2006, unemployment did indeed start to decline,
and when a major financial scandal centered on the bank of the SPÖ-
oriented Austrian Trade Union Federation (BAWAG) broke in March,
it appeared the ÖVP would get its last-minute reprieve. 
Yet to the surprise of most ÖVP supporters, the party lost the 2006
election and with it the chancellorship. Schüssel soon resigned the
chairmanship in favor of Molterer, but rather than withdrawing from
politics, he assumed the latter’s position as caucus chair. This fueled
speculation that notwithstanding the party’s electoral defeat, parliamen-
tary arithmetic, and the FPÖ’s oppositional orientation, he might yet
attempt a political comeback. This was unlikely to be successful, how-
ever. His second government’s problems collaborating with Austria’s
right-wing populists strengthened those within the party favoring a
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return to grand coalition government, a goal achieved in 2007. Mol-
terer’s gamble of July 2008 to precipitate early elections with a view to
regaining an ÖVP plurality failed to pay off at the election of 28
September 2008. The ÖVP leadership then passed to Josef Pröll, whose
strategy was to resume a more consensual line and form a coalition with
the SPÖ. The pragmatic Leagues were thus again able to obtain policy
objectives via the re-instituted system of social partnership, and the
ÖVP’s stasis-inclined structure once again militated against internal
change.
External Relations
Schüssel entered his second administration from a position of
strength that one might assume would permit him to dominate the
ÖVP’s external relations. The cabinet over which he presided included
eight ÖVP nominees, but merely three FPÖ ministers. In the coalition
agreement, the FPÖ had effectively capitulated on all the issues that had
been the subject of its internal “Knittelfeld rebellion” (including EU
enlargement, delayed tax reform, and budget consolidation) and had
signed up to what amounted to an acceleration of Schüssel’s neo-liberal
policy preferences. Moreover, Schüssel’s potential to force through that
agenda appeared to have been enhanced by the scale of his party’s
electoral victory, which in turn reinforced his determination not to be
constrained by Austria’s consensual extra-parliamentary system of
social partnership.
Yet even at the outset, there were signs that governing with the FPÖ
might again prove challenging. For one, Riess-Passer’s resignation of
the FPÖ leadership had left the party rudderless. Haider having refused
to step up to the plate, there were three interim leaders before a party
congress of 12 December 2002 confirmed provisional leader Herbert
Haupt, the outgoing social affairs minister. Though uncontested, he
could only muster 87.8 percent of the delegate vote. A related second
sign of the problems to come was the FPÖ’s disunity over re-entering
government. November’s caucus vote for entering coalition negotiations
had been unanimous, but support amongst the grassroots members
remained weak. At the party executive meeting of 28 February appro-
ving the coalition agreement, two members had voted against the
proposal. More ominously, the FPÖ leadership felt unable to accede to
internal pressure for an extraordinary party conference to ratify the
agreement and left this to a meeting of the party directorate. Only 119
of the 240 members attended, and of these, eleven voted against. Third,
Haider was even less tied into the coalition than before. Having refused
to resume the party leadership, he had declared (albeit neither for the
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first nor the last time) his irrevocable intention to withdraw from natio-
nal politics. He had thus not participated in the coalition negotiations
and remained a potent and potentially disruptive force within the FPÖ.
The FPÖ grassroots’ populist orientation and hostility to much of
the government’s agenda endured throughout Schüssel’s administration
and were manifested in numerous policy fields. How they were to
impact Schüssel’s management of the coalition was well illustrated in
the government’s very first major project: the 2003 pension reform. In
late March, Schüssel obtained his coalition partner’s agreement to a
white paper submitted for public consultation. Within days, Haupt had
felt obliged to respond to the enormous backlash from within the FPÖ
by proposing (without prior consultation with Schüssel) that the reform
be subjected to a popular referendum. Schüssel managed on 29 April to
get the bill through cabinet (where, as with all cabinet decisions, it
required unanimous support), but at a subsequent meeting of the FPÖ
executive, four of the nine provincial party leaders rejected it. Haupt
then called on President Klestil (with whom Schüssel’s relations had
long been poor) to host a roundtable comprising the government and
social partners to hammer out a compromise. It was unsuccessful, but
after a number of additional meetings, many hosted by Schüssel in the
Federal Chancellery, the cabinet passed its final draft pension bill on 4
June. This was approved by the parliamentary budget committee with
the votes of the FPÖ and ÖVP, yet the very next day, eight of the FPÖ’s
eighteen MPs declared they would not support the bill in the plenary
vote unless there were further reforms. Further compromises were
found, and the bill passed on 11 June, but the process had clearly
demonstrated that Schüssel could not rely upon the FPÖ leadership to
deliver the support of the wider party for coalition policy.
Following another case of poor intra-coalition liaison in September
2003 (this time in connection with the proposed VOEST privatization)
and the FPÖ’s disastrous showing at that month’s elections in Tyrol and
Lower Austria (-11.6 percent and -11.6 percent respectively), the FPÖ
replaced its coalition coordinator. Haupt also symbolically terminated
his regular post-cabinet press conference appearance alongside Schüssel.
Such symbolic responses could not resolve the FPÖ’s four fundamental
and interrelated structural problems, which together greatly complicated
Schüssel’s management of coalition relations. First, the 2002 Knittelfeld
crisis had caused many of the more pragmatic elements of the FPÖ to
leave the party, and protest-orientated elements were now being further
strengthened by a succession of very poor election results.38 Second, the
FPÖ did not have a clearly identifiable and effective national leadership
with whom Schüssel could negotiate. From the outset, Haupt was
constantly under internal pressure, not least from Haider, who under-
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mined him at every opportunity. Determined to resist pressure to resign,
on 28 June 2003 Haupt engineered a vote of confidence in the party
executive, but in October 2003 had to concede the appointment of an
executive party leader. This was Haider’s sister, Ursula Haubner, an
Upper Austrian politician who on 3 July 2004 also replaced Haupt as
leader (with only 79 percent of party congress delegate votes). Haubner
reintegrated Haider into the national leadership, which gave Schüssel
greater clarity over intra-party power relations, but Haider remained an
unpredictable partner.
Third, the FPÖ’s ministerial team was overall not well rooted in the
party. The Justice Ministry initially remained in the hands of Dieter
Böhmdorfer, Haider’s personal lawyer, who was not a party member,
and on 25 June 2004 passed to Karin Gastinger (née Miklautsch),
another Haider nominee and non-party member. The social affairs
minister was the luckless Haupt, who on 26 January 2005 was replaced
by Haubner and who in October 2003 had already had to forfeit the vice-
chancellorship to Transport Minister Hubert Gorbach. The latter was a
business-oriented pragmatist from the small Vorarlberg branch that was
used to governing with the ÖVP and who was for many in the FPÖ’s
grassroots organization far too quiescent. Fourth, while members of the
FPÖ’s cabinet team were detached from the party’s grassroots, FPÖ
MPs were exposed to constant pressure from their provincial parties to
reflect grassroots opposition to government policy. Schüssel had in place
a body comprising the caucus leaders, their administrative directors, and
the heads of the offices of the chancellor and vice-chancellor that was
charged with ensuring the passage of agreed upon legislation. However,
he could not be confident of his coalition partner’s capacity to deliver
the requisite parliamentary majorities.
It is, thus, understandable that he did not object when on 4 April
2005 (after secret prior consultation with him) Haider established the
League for the Future of Austria (Bündnis Zukunt Österreich, or BZÖ).
It immediately guaranteed the government’s majority and was to ensure
that for the remainder of the government’s terms Schüssel could act as
though he headed a single-party government. For one, the BZÖ’s
capacity to counter his policy priorities was undermined by the claim
made at its foundation that its distinctivess lay in governmental res-
ponsibility. Second, contrary to assurances Haider had given Schüssel,
large parts of the FPÖ did not defect to the BZÖ, which in the polls was
thereafter mainly just below the 4 percent share of the vote necessary for
parliamentary representation. Accordingly, Schüssel knew it could not
afford to precipitate elections. For Schüssel’s supporters, the BZÖ
constituted the ultimate confirmation of his strategy of collaborating
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with Austria’s right-wing populists, since it appeared to have separated
the FPÖ’s more pragmatic forces from its incorrigible protest elements.
Relations within the coalition were now much easier for Schüssel,
but his longer-term prospects for maintaining his office and policy goals
were less encouraging. The ÖVP remained behind the SPÖ in the polls,
and the BZÖ’s electoral survival continued to be in doubt. Effectively
ejected from governmental responsibility, the FPÖ had, by contrast,
been freed to resume all-out populist vote maximization and by the
summer of 2006 regained the albeit weak position it had enjoyed in the
polls prior to the foundation of the BZÖ. Despite hopes that the
BAWAG affair might rescue its fortunes, at the election of 1 October
2006, the ÖVP came in second to the SPÖ (by 34.5 to 35.5 percent). The
BZÖ scraped in on 4 percent, while the FPÖ obtained 11 percent, the
same as the Greens.39 ÖVP losses were greatest amongst workers
alienated by policies such as the pension reform. They were partly
attributable to poor mobilization of the ÖVP’s vote, especially where
internal resentment against Schüssel had been greatest. Others criticized
the ÖVP campaign’s focus on the chancellor who, though respected as
a fearsome strategist and tactician, was not popular. Moreover, the SPÖ
had been successful in its three-year campaign to portray him as the
embodiment of “social coldness,” a label predicated upon the govern-
ment’s neo-liberal policies, but which his rather aloof style also did little
to counter. 
Between them, the ÖVP, FPÖ and BZÖ had a parliamentary ma-
jority (94 of 183 seats), but personal relations between the FPÖ and
BZÖ ruled out this coalition combination, as did internal ÖVP oppo-
sition. Schüssel stayed on long enough as party leader to take charge of
the ÖVP’s coalition negotiation team. He faced in SPÖ formateur
Gusenbauer someone as keen to be chancellor as he had been in 1999,
but with only one politically realistic coalition option, namely an SPÖ-
ÖVP government. Schüssel’s reputation for unexpected coalition
maneuvering provided a tactical advantage in the coalition negotiations
in which he managed to achieve for the ÖVP an unexpectedly good
outcome. Despite having lost the election, the party retained the Foreign
Ministry and the key ministries of Finance and the Interior, both
traditionally held by the SPÖ in grand coalitions. Moreover, the
coalition agreement did not contain any radial change to the ÖVP’s neo-
liberal policy agenda. On 11 January 2007, Gusenbauer replaced
Schüssel as chancellor, but weakened from the start by the concession




Schüssel can be regarded as a political entrepreneur motivated in
particular by holding the highest political office and liberalizing
economic policy. Unable to adapt the ÖVP’s organization to his ends,
his pursuit of these goals focused above all on altering the external
constraints he faced. He had two major external options: replacing the
SPÖ as the strongest party, or governing with the hitherto excluded
right-wing populist FPÖ. He will be remembered for deciding to govern
with the FPÖ and for his challenge to the decision-making style and
economic policy consensus of postwar Austrian politics, but also for a
leadership style characterized by ruthless exploitation of external and
internal opportunities to achieve his goals.
Some of the external tactics he employed were successful. These
included those adopted in the coalition negotiations after the 1999, 2002,
and 2006 elections, as well as his decision to face down the international
sanctions against his government. Others failed, including his 1995
attempt to win the chancellorship, as well as his 2006 election campaign.
Moreover, while the FPÖ’s self-destruction in 2002 and the formation
of the BZÖ seemed at the time to have vindicated his prediction that
bringing the right-wing populists into government would fatally
undermine them, by 2008 the picture looked somewhat different. The
combined FPÖ and BZÖ vote was even higher than that of the FPÖ in
1999. Internally, his tactics embraced informal networking, but above
all relied upon the provision of a combination of selective and collective
incentives to key power brokers such as the ÖVP’s Leagues. Though the
party remained divided throughout over both Schüssel’s decision to
govern with the FPÖ and his confrontational political style, he was able
to establish and maintain sufficient internal authority to permit him to
pursue his policy goals. Paradoxically, this was in part due to the
inherently conservative nature of the party’s internal structure, some-
thing that had originally constituted a hindrance to his office, policy, and
vote goals. 
A number of implications for the broader party system resulted
from Schüssel’s decision to bring the FPÖ in from the cold. It caused a
considerable increase in political polarization. Indeed, the enduring bad
blood between the ÖVP and SPÖ was one of the factors undermining the
viability of the Gusenbauer government. Though both the SPÖ and ÖVP
invested considerable effort in the early months of Walter Faymann’s
government in order to appear more conciliatory, it remains to be seen
if consensus has really been restored. Second, Schüssel certainly initially
liberated the ÖVP from the SPÖ’s embrace and expanded his party’s
coalition possibilities, including in the direction of the Greens. On the
other hand, the founding of the BZÖ freed the FPÖ to resume a strategy
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of populist vote maximization and generated personal animosities
between these two parties that at least for some years undermined the
ÖVP’s prospects of forming a government with Austria’s populist,
radical right. Indeed, the overall shift in party strengths since 2006
means that the ÖVP is again left with few alternatives to the role of
junior partner in a coalition with the SPÖ, an position which the ÖVP’s
still unreformed internal structure makes it difficult for an ÖVP leader
to break out of. 
Having said that, although the ÖVP’s electoral defeats have to date
not provoked the kind of organizational change predicted by Janda’s
thesis that such events are the “mother of party change”,40 they did in the
late 1990s allow a strong political entrepreneur to change the party’s
external relations. In an age of greater electoral volatility, political
entrepreneurs are more likely to encounter opportunities to alter their
respective party’s external competitive environment. To be able to capi-
talize on them, however, they will need to manage effectively both the
internal and external consequences of their decisions.
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The Politics of Asymmetry:
(Non) Corporatist Policy Making, 2000-2006
Ferdinand Karlhofer
Introduction
From its establishment in the late 1940s through the turn of the
twenty-first century, Sozialpartnerschaft enjoyed a high reputation in
Austria’s political system. This was clearly the case until the 1980s and
even, albeit with certain qualifications, in the 1990s, when the chamber
system—traditionally the main pillar of social partnership—faced a
severe crisis. Social partnership owed its prestige in the public to its role
as a reliable and calculable mechanism for interest intermediation, thus
decisively contributing to the country’s economic development.
Although there have always been close ties between chambers and the
trade union federation on the one side, and political parties on the other,
the functioning of corporatist policy making remained untouched from
government changes. Called into being under the Grand Coalition of the
Austrian People’s Party (Österreichische Volkspartei, or ÖVP) and the
Social Democratic Party of Austria (Sozialdemokratische Partei
Österreichs, or SPÖ) (1945-1966), social partnership had its golden age
under the single party government of the ÖVP (1966-1970) followed by
the SPÖ (1970-1983). Even when the Freedom Party of Austria (Frei-
heitliche Partei Österreichs, or FPÖ), a party all along critical against
corporatism, joined a coalition with the SPÖ (1983-1986), this had no
effect on the interest system.
Quite different were the premises in 2000. For the first time, a
program of a government explicitly aimed at changing the rules
regulating relations between government and interest groups surfaced,
all the more surprising because the terms of reference had been decided
without any consultation of the social partners. It was the starting point
for a series of disputes between government and associations, in
particular, the labor organizations, the Austrian Trade Union Federation
(Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund, or ÖGB) and the Federal
Chamber of Labor. The tried and successful pattern of negotiation based
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on consensus and compromise was abruptly canceled. As a result, the
polarized politics that surfaced in the government of the ÖVP and FPÖ
(and later the Alliance for the Future of Austria [Bündnis Zukunft
Österreich, or BZÖ]), in particular with the cabinet of the Schüssel I
Administration, revised what had until then been the most resilient pillar
of the political system.
Considering the situation just a few months before 4 February 2000,
both the speed and the intensity of change were surprising. A few days
before the election of October 1999, the presidents of the four big
associations (Economic Chamber, Chamber of Agriculture, Chamber of
Labor, and ÖGB), in a startling press conference, expressed their
reservations about the FPÖ possibly taking office for it might lead, as
they argued, to a “demolition of social partnership.” Yet immediately
after the election, the social partners went their separate ways and
resigned from joint action. Events in the year 2000 conveyed the
impression that the authority ascribed to social partnership had never
existed.
A couple of questions arise in this context. Why did the consensus
of elites, a characteristic of social partnership, not apply before and after
the formation of the government? Was the weakening of the corporatist
negotiation system a deliberate act of the government, or did it just
continue a process that had begun previously? Finally, what will the
future of Austro-Corporatism be?
Addressing these questions this article proceeds in three stages.
Section one provides an overview of the profile of Austrian corporatism.
The second section deals with the interests and motives of the ruling
parties between 2000 and 2006. In section three, the broader context of
the recent changes in the relations between government and interests is
discussed. The article concludes with a look at the ÖGB crisis caused by
currency speculations of the union-owned BAWAG bank and its
implications on corporatist politics.
The Profile of Austro-Corporatism
In the literature on corporatism, Austria has been classified a special
case.1 It also ranks first (followed by Norway and Sweden) on Alan
Siaroff’s scale of integrated economies, with integrated economy
defined as “a long-term co-operative pattern of shared economic ma-
nagement involving the social partners and existing at various levels
such as plant-level management, sectoral wage bargaining, and joint
shaping of national policies in competitiveness-related matters
(education, social policy, etc.).”2
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The capacity to meet the criteria of a highly integrated economy is
closely attributed to Austria’s extraordinary extensive chamber system
covering virtually all people in employment except for public officials.
The chambers are established as self-governing statutory corporations
with compulsory membership. Their broad functions can be categorized
as 1.) those of an autonomous nature, such as services to members, 2.)
the function expressed as the right to give opinions on draft laws in the
legislative process, and 3.) quasi-public and judicial functions in which
the chambers are represented on the decision-making apparatus of the
State (commissions, committees, advisory panels, courts, insurance
institutions, and so forth), as well as those in which they perform direct
State functions (constituting foreign trade delegations and the like).3 All
things considered, the chambers have far-reaching competences
including control over the social security system, involvement in social
and economic legislation, and participation in public administration. In
combination with the Works Constitution Act (Arbeitsverfassungsge-
setz), the chamber system forms the basic framework for corporatist
politics in Austria.4 
Most relevant as corporatist actors in Austria are its chambers,
volunteer organizations, and political parties. The Economic Chamber
(Wirtschaftskammer) and the Chamber of Labor (Arbeiterkammer) are
the interest representations for business and labor, covering about
300,000 employers and 2.5 million employees, respectively. Both
chambers are, in an international perspective, special cases. Economic
chambers with compulsory membership exist in most European
countries, yet the Austrian chamber is the only one which is exclusively
entitled to conclude collective bargaining agreements with labor
organizations. Chambers of labor exist, apart from Austria, in Luxem-
bourg and in two German provinces (Saarland and Bremen). The
outstanding feature of the Austrian chamber, however, is its by far
higher financial endowment (compulsory membership fees amount to
0.5 percent of the gross income), allowing for extensive activities in
service, education, and research.
In addition to the chambers, there are voluntary associations for
business and for labor: the Austrian Federation of Industry (Industriel-
lenvereinigung (IV)) and the ÖGB. In this mixed system of
organizations, the chambers represent the steady pillar, all the more so
because there is no competition between statutory and voluntary
associations. As for the Chambers of Labor, they exist in close
relationship to the ÖGB whose functionaries are at the same time
delegates to the chamber’s assembly. From the very beginning, the
chamber has been an instrument of the union, attending to expertise and
services, thereby providing most helpful “external” support for union
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power, both organizationally and financially. On the employers’ side,
representation is slightly different because the Economic Chamber
covers the whole business community, while the IV is confined to in-
dustrial enterprises. In practice, however, the IV has control over the
Chamber’s industry division.
The three big chambers (for business, labor, and agriculture) are
governed by political factions on the basis of periodical elections. The
ÖVP holds the majority in the Economic Chamber and in the Chamber
of Agriculture, while the SPÖ is dominant in the Chamber of Labor.
Akin, the Trade Union Federation is composed of political factions, with
the SPÖ holding the majority and the ÖVP being the strongest minority.
The Federation of Industry is formally independent, but is informally
closely related with the ÖVP.
The interdependency between associations and political parties
finds its expression in the composition of legislative bodies at all levels.
In the late 1970s, more than 50 percent of the members of the Austrian
National Council (Nationalrat) were at the same time high-ranking
functionaries (including presidents) of the big labor market organiza-
tions. Since then, the number has decreased significantly (to 15 percent
by 2000). The presidents of the three big chambers waived their seats in
the late 1990s; the president of the Federation of Trade Unions followed
in 2006.5
To sum up, chambers and party influence are certainly not
exclusively Austrian properties. It has, rather, been the comprehensive-
ness of the chamber system and the scope and intensity of the parties’
influence that have given rise to the attributes of the Austrian political
system being expressed by the terms Kammerstaat (chamber state),
Verbändestaat (state associations), and Parteienstaat (party state).
The Year 2000:
Interests and Motives of the Ruling Parties
The question regarding which of the two parties played the key role
in paving the way for the coalition is not central in this context.
Certainly of importance, though, was that the FPÖ had to make
substantial concessions in order to erase doubts about its ability to
govern, while the ÖVP could not resist seizing the opportunity of a
political turn. Clearly, the ideological differences between the two
parties were large. On the other hand, in several policy fields, such as
family, social, economic, and security policy, their positions were
considerably less divergent than had been the case between the ÖVP and
SPÖ. All above, the cutback of the welfare state after three decades of
social democratic hegemony was a matter of great concern both for the
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ÖVP and the FPÖ. Regarding social partnership, however, interests and
motives of the new partners in government were quite divergent.
The FPÖ’s attitude towards social partnership was essentially
determined by its relationship to the SPÖ. In countless elections in the
past fifteen years, a good deal of the party’s increase in votes came from
the Social Democratic Lager, causing persistently fierce competition
between the two parties. In the national election of 1999, the FPÖ
became the strongest party among skilled workers, the SPÖ’s traditional
core electorate. The fact that the SPÖ, since the mid-1980s had been
denied a coalition with the party due to its problematic behavior in
dealing with the Nazi past, reinforced the FPÖ’s hostile and exacerbated
attitude.
In election campaigns, the FPÖ frequently took advantage of
grievances against the Kammerstaat caused by extensive personal
privileges and the excessive incomes of functionaries. Surprisingly,
despite its outstanding successes with political elections, the FPÖ failed
to achieve comparable results in chamber elections, not even in the
elections of the Chamber of Labor which was, it should be noted, the
primary target of the party’s attacks. Not even when the chambers were
urged by the government to hold (coercive) ballots among their
members on the question of whether or not they wanted to maintain the
chamber system, the FPÖ’s efforts were crowned with success—a vast
majority in all chambers voted in favor of the status quo. Not much
different, the party failed to make use of discontent among ÖGB
members; an FPÖ separatist trade union named Free Austrian Trade
Union (Freie Gewerkschaft Österrreichs), founded in 1997, recruited
merely a handful of members and vanished quietly from the scene after
a couple of years.
The FPÖ’s inability to catch up among labor organizations the same
way it did in the political arena made its self-perception of being the
“new labor party” incomplete and inconsistent. Due to its outsider status
in labor organizations, the FPÖ’s options for exerting influence were
low, and the same was the case with regard to social partnership. As a
party in government, though, weakness in the corporatist system turned
to strength in politics, at least to some extent. The FPÖ had much less
reason to be considerate of members’ interests and loyalties than the
ÖVP had. Thus, for instance, holding conflict-laden portfolios such as
the reform of administration (implying the impairment of civil servants’
rights) was less challenging; what is more, any resistance of the
employees’ representation could be easily communicated as delaying
tactics to the public.
Quite different was the interest profile of the FPÖ’s coalition
partner, the ÖVP. Subdivided into, among others, three big leagues
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(Bünde) for employers, employees, and farmers, all of them strongly
represented in the respective chambers, the ÖVP can be regarded a
“corporatist” party par excellence. Its leagues are, at the same time,
political groups in the chambers and subdivisions of the party.6 Legal
entities of their own (as a rule, joining the ÖVP takes place via joining
a league), the leagues have direct access to the membership fees. As a
result, any conflict with a social partner organization is potentially an
internal conflict tangling with the balance of power within the party, too.
As already mentioned, several issues such as administrative reform or
bargaining rounds in the public sector, accompanied by unusually
controversial negotiations between the minister in charge (FPÖ) and the
Union of Public Service Employees (dominated by the respective ÖVP
league) would have been unthinkable under a homogenous ÖVP
government.
Industrial Relations and Political Turn
As stated at the beginning of this article, the relations between
government and social partners escalated immediately after the coalition
took office, resulting in an abrupt suspension of corporatist practices.
Significantly, the coalition pact had held out the prospect of a “reform
of social partnership” with regard to several issues (labor market service,
reform of the pension system, gender equality), even explicitly provi-
ding for the involvement of the social partners.
In practice, however, there was a tendency to ignore the principle
of parity in the treatment of business and labor interests from the very
beginning. This exclusion occurred in a threefold way:
Social bias: Most of the relevant government bills for labor and
employment law changes aimed at a cutback of employment rights,
thus severely challenging trade unions and the Chamber of Labor.
Most provocative was certainly a passage in the coalition contract
which read “change of all provisions disproportionately burdening
business.”
Break with the rules of the game: Contrary to the announcement of the
coalition pact, the government did not involve the social partners in
social and economic policy-making processes. Right-leaning social
policy had always been a field where the corporatist actors were
used to negotiate a consensual solution which was (mostly) adopted
by government and parliament. Due to that, social partnership was
frequently criticized for predetermining the parliament’s autonomy.
Yet despite controversy, it secured social peace and contributed to
the economic upturn enjoyed for over half a century. With the
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government leaving no room for negotiation, this function could no
longer be performed.
Inclusion and exclusion: The coalition was obviously strongly in-
fluenced by business interests. In contrast to previous practices,
business associations—Economic Chamber, Federation of
Industry—still enjoyed privileged access to policy makers, while
labor organizations increasingly were excluded. The unequal
treatment of interest groups appeared to drive a wedge between
business and labor organizations.
The rationale of social partnership had always been that none of the
partners exploits its actual position, but all seek to come to a com-
promise—ideally a win-win situation for all actors involved. Now, by
contrast, the trend seemed to go in the direction of redistribution—a
zero-sum game in which only one wins at the cost of others. As a result,
tripartite relations change for the worse: unions and the Chamber of
Labor are no longer accepted as equal partners in the game; their role as
actors in economic and social policy is downgraded and restricted to
partial aspects of the objective.
Irritating for labor organizations, in this context, must have been
less the fact that an anti-corporatist party was in government, but that the
ÖVP as a corporatist party supported the new policy.7 A striking
example of the ÖVP’s changed position was the transfer of the “labor”
portfolio from the Ministry of Social Affairs to the Ministry of Eco-
nomy. So far, there had been consensus that the separation of economy
and labor reflected a distinct role assignment for the respective
ministers. Commenting on the changes in connection with the realloca-
tion, the Economy Minister (ÖVP) stated he wanted “to overcome the
cliché that there was an antagonism between employers and
employees”8—a position implicitly questioning the trade union which
derives its raison d’être from conflicting interests in industrial relations.
Several passages in the coalition pact indicated a strengthening of
business against labor. These passages related to the redefinition of the
health and safety executive’s role (focus on service rather than on
control), shift of the rights of co-determination from the sectoral to the
plant level (thus weakening trade union influence), emphasis of the
service character of the chambers, and reorganization of the electoral
law for chambers.
As regards the Chamber of Labor, the government parties soon
delivered the threat that, if the chamber continued to oppose government
policy, they would cut the Chamber’s membership fee from 0.5 to 0.3
percent of the members’ incomes, thereby forcing it to undertake a
drastic reduction of its services.
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As far as changes of the corporatist structures were at stake, consent
to the envisaged changes was not to be expected from trade unions and
the Chamber of Labor, simply because they could not accept restrictions
for their sphere of influence. Apart from this, the principle of the
chambers governing themselves had always been interpreted broadly;
not only had legal changes of the chambers’ competences and structures
never been undertaken without their consent, but alterations had
principally been made solely on their own initiatives. The “reform of
social partnership” as envisaged in the coalition pact broke with tradition
because political regulation was given priority over the social partners’
autonomous status.
In light of this reprioritizing and the general political turn of 2000,
the rules for the corporatist negotiating system were abruptly redefined,
too. Both in aim and practice, the government suspended the so-far
generally accepted consensus about seeking a balanced configuration of
interest groups. The government’s turn did not necessarily put an end to
the bipartisanism between business and labor. Yet, as a matter of fact,
it was to be expected that the aggravated relationship between
government and labor organizations would have a negative effect on the
established negotiation culture.
Labor on a Collision Course with the Government
Although the corporatist pattern had already declined in the years
preceding the 1999 election, the government change in 2000 marked a
severe break in the relations between associations and the state. Their
new relationship, at least in the first years after the political turn, had
little in common with the traditional understanding of social partnership.
Due to its excellent performance throughout the Second Republic,
Austro-Corporatism had always enjoyed a high reputation. Self-gover-
nance of the chambers, the embeddedness of associations in policy-
making structures, and an underlying assumption of parity between
capital and labor had been the basic principles of its mode of operation.
All three elements were now fundamentally disputed. When the center-
right coalition took office in February 2000, the “reform of social
partnership” was declared a priority objective. Government policy aimed
at reducing the social partners’ influence; contrary to the past, their
expertise was sought less, and the chambers’ formal right to give an
opinion on a draft law was frequently bypassed. In general, legislative
action tended to override the principle of parity at the expense of labor,
thereby making the latter a fierce opponent of the government.
In reaction to the government’s policy, the ÖGB changed gradually
from a formerly pronounced consensual style to a confrontational one.
112 The Schüssel Era in Austria
In October 2001, a ballot vote among the 1.4 million union members
took place. To many observers, even to union leaders, the ballot
appeared risky, since it was the first one of its kind in the union’s
history. In the end, the turnout of 57 percent, in which more than 90
percent voted in favor of a more militant union policy, was surprisingly
high. From then on, the ÖGB had a strong mandate for action which,
however, was not exercised immediately.
As a matter of fact, the vote impressed both the government and the
employers’ side and gave rise to a temporary revival of social partner-
ship; for example, within a startling short time, a joint solution for the
long discussed reform of severance pay was found. On the whole,
however, the unequal treatment of labor and employers’ organizations
by the government continued. In spring 2003, the dispute between the
government and the ÖGB hit its peak when the government presented
a draft law concerning severe cuts in the pension system. Since the
government had refused to consult the social partners (notably labor)
before drafting the legislation, the ÖGB mobilized with almost half a
million workers protesting against the reform plans. Though inviting the
union, among others, to a roundtable discussion,9 the government re-
mained adamant and pushed the bill through parliament. With a total of
10.4 million hours lost and a relative duration of roughly three hours and
sixteen minutes per employee in employment, the strike activities of
2003 exceeded the postwar peak of 1950.
Table 1
Strikes in OECD Countries, 1993-2002*



































*Working days lost per 1, 000 employees, annual average 1993-2002.
Source: Informationsdienst des Instituts der deutschen Wirtschaft Köln,  October 2004.
The outcome of the strike was ambivalent. On the one hand, the
ÖGB clearly lost in its conflict with the government. Yet both the ballot
and the protest actions indicated a metamorphosis of the Austrian trade
union movement. Until a couple of years previous, the ÖGB had been
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committed to a strictly cooperative negotiation strategy, which in doubt-
ful cases was pursued even against the members’ expressed wishes.
Over the years, the membership had gradually fallen from over 60
percent in the mid-1960s to less than 40 percent in the late 1990s. Yet
now, with the background of continuous conflict with the government,
the identification with union goals was on the rise again, thus bringing
the loss of members to a halt—though just temporarily, as it turned out.
Obviously, strong pressure from the party’s rank and file and their
expectations, emanating from the ballot vote of 2001, significantly
contributed to the alteration of the ÖGB, which now puts an emphasis
on mobilization and campaigning. For some time, it was unclear whether
the union would—under altered political conditions—resume its “vote
and seat” on the negotiating table. There were strong indications,
however, that its former role of being the most loyal and faithful partner
in the corporatist system was a thing of the past. Like the associations
of business and farmers which had already been oscillating between
corporatism and lobbyism for several years, the ÖGB, too, was likely to
accentuate its members’ interests rather than the commonweal, thus
inevitably leading to less calculability of the actors involved.
The Broader Context of Change:
Power Shift and Fragile Consensus
Even though the momentum for the rapid changes of relations
emanated from the government, it must be recalled that the scope for
mutual concessions had already narrowed. In retrospect, a striking loss
of authority of the corporatist associations occurred. In particular, on the
economic chamber’s side an increasing number of sectoral groups
tended to refuse macro-level collective bargaining agreements, many of
them striving against coercive chamber membership. In response to
discontent and adopting an attitude of laissez-faire, the federal chamber
repeatedly accepted particularist groups stepping out of line and refusing
to conclude bargaining agreements with the union. In general, internal
troubles on both sides—centrifugal tendencies on the employers’ side,
at the same time, a steady loss of members on the ÖGB’s side—
inevitably had an impact on corporatist relations. For either side, it
became increasingly difficult to find the balance between optimal goal
achievement as a corporatist actor on the one side, and member-oriented
pressure politics on the other. Like it or not, the associations changed the
tune, from time to time escalating, although—what is worth mentio-
ning—never risking the collapse of the negotiation system. Yet the
system had already become fragile before Wolfgang Schüssel came to
power.
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Obviously, aside from the political turn, other forces at work were
responsible for the declining demand for corporatist policy-making. First
and foremost, the opening of the Austrian market—a process that started
in 1973 when Austria signed a free trade agreement with the European
Community and found its completion with the entry into the European
Union in 1995—contributed to it. The logic of corporatist action was no
longer demand-side but supply-side oriented, that is, acting in accor-
dance with the imperative of backing the country’s competitiveness.10
The coalition which came to power in 2000 put the focus from the very
beginning on a genuinely “anti-corporatist” goal: zero budget. Later on,
the government committed itself to the Brussels consensus on macro-
economic stabilization policies, thereby, once again, foiling the corpora-
tist logic of operation.11
Second, in the 1990s the Austrian chamber system suffered from a
severe loss of legitimacy which, in the end, challenged its future exi-
stence. Basically, the chambers, as organizations with compulsory
membership, are not faced with density problems, as free associations
are, since there is no exit option for members. Thus it is not associability
but the turnout in elections that must serve as an indicator of organi-
zational stability. It was the turnout that decreased in all chamber
elections, most dramatically in the Chamber of Labor which, between
1984 and 1994, registered a decline from 64 to 30 percent. In order to
cope with the crisis, all chambers started extensive reform processes
which, all things considered, put the focus on the improvement of
services for members.12 By the late 1990s, the crisis was overcome,
members’ confidence was regained, and turnout increased again. One
consequence, however, was a gradual shift from the “logic of influence”
towards the “logic of membership” (following the terminology intro-
duced by Philippe Schmitter and Wolfgang Streeck13), making the
chambers less reliable actors in terms of social partnership.
Third, the extension of actors in decision-making bodies (think
tanks, policy advisers) have had an effect on the formerly almost exclu-
sive position of corporatist actors in a number of policy fields.14
Fourth, the policy style in Austria has markedly shifted from con-
sensus democracy to conflict democracy.15 Certainly, the year 2000, with
the relations between government and the social partners (strictly
speaking, the labor side) souring from one day to the other, marked an
unprecedented rupture in the history of the Second Republic. However,
the basics of consensus democracy had become unstable long before the
political turn.16
Given the international drive of continuing decentralization with the
center of gravity of industrial relations shifting from the macro- to the
meso- and the micro-level, the foundations of corporatist policy-making
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have eroded thoroughly.17 With some time lag, the “winds of change”
have been blowing in Austria, too. During the 1990s, social partnership
came increasingly under stress, mainly due to the limited scope for
action coming along with Europeanization and economic structural
change. The process of interest concentration and problem solving was
more and more complicated as a result of the divergent interests and
orientations of the social partners. It became clear that Austro-Corpo-
ratism, in a historical sense, had already passed its zenith. Notably, the
Parity Commission on Prices and Wages, formerly the core of social
partnership, no longer existed; at least, it has not been convened since
1998.
The associations, without withdrawing from the negotiating system
as such, set out to extend their strategic repertoire. Namely, the em-
ployers’ motives have become ambivalent. While the Economic
Chamber has still a self-interest in cooperating with labor organizations,
the Federation of Industry regards itself, meanwhile, as a lobby
organization rather than a social partner.18 (The latter, having had a
strong influence on the center-right government, was supposed to be the
spiritus rector of the turnaround in social and economic policy).19
Corporatism appears to be no longer the one and only way for
interest representation; instead, a parallelism of both corporatist and
lobbyist practices has become the rule. The trend in Austria seems to
confirm the paradigm shift mirrored in recent comparative research on
interest groups: the increasing differentiation of societal interest
intermediation pluralizes corporatist arrangements, thereby confronting
the actors with an increasing diversity of interests, interest represen-
tation, collective action, and political strategies.20 As a matter of fact,
there is no continuous pattern of interest intermediation in Austria;
rather, the boundaries between “corporatist” and “pluralist” forms of
interest representation have become indistinct.21
Latest Developments:
Union Crisis and Collective Bargaining
In 2006, the ÖGB experienced an unprecedented shock after the
union-owned BAWAG, one of the largest banks in Austria, suffered
heavy losses in currency speculation. Since, as a result, the ÖGB faced
debts of close to two billion Euro, the bank had to be sold in order to
avert union bankruptcy. The BAWAG debacle caused unrest within the
ÖGB and a severe union crisis affecting both the identity and credibility
of the organization, particularly because high-ranking union leaders had
been informed about the shady dealings. As a first consequence, the
union president and the secretary of finance were forced to resign (the
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president, in addition, had to withdraw from parliament). In January
2007 at a union congress, substantial changes were passed aiming at,
among others things, more transparency and control in the union
structure.22
The ÖGB crisis is still far from being overcome; confidence among
members is deeply shaken (more than 40,000 members were lost in
2006) and can be rebuilt only gradually. Clearly, the ÖGB has been
weakened in the course of the BAWAG affair, and it is doubtful that it
will regain its old strength as a player in the political arena. Surprisingly,
however, and contrary to widespread expectations, the system of collec-
tive bargaining has not really been affected by the union troubles. The
same applies to cooperative relations with employers—in September
2006, right at the height of the union crisis, the social partners concluded
an agreement (Bad Ischl Declaration) aiming at a reform of the modus
operandi for future cooperation. Since then, the social partners have
agreed upon several position papers and opinions delivered to the (new)
government.23 In retrospect, the six years of center-right government
under Chancellor Schüssel were not a heyday of Austro-Corporatism.
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Unremarkably Remarkable,
Remarkably Unremarkable:
Schüssel as Austria’s Foreign Policymaker
in a Time of Transition
Reinhard Heinisch
Within [the constraints of European Council meetings] Wolfgang
Schüssel was the omnipresent stage director, who determined the mise-
en-scène, set the tone and manipulated the script as and when he saw
appropriate. Schüssel’s influence was apparent from the very beginning,
when the Presidency first outlined its ideas about the agenda at the end
of April [of 2006]. It was typical of the chancellor’s style that he chose
to ignore the Council’s rules of procedure […] As a result, the tone was,
and to a large extent remained, Schüssel speak rather than Council
Secretariat speak […]. The section on Justice and Home Affairs was not
“Justice and Home Affairs,” let alone an “Area of Freedom, Security,
and Justice,” but “Europe Protects” […]. In the weeks that followed, the
chancellor continued to ride roughshod through the post-[Council of]
Seville procedures […]. Schüssel also tried to determine the wording of
the Conclusions at several crucial points […]. Suffice to say, that as far
as these two topics were concerned, it was the chancellor who defined
the terms of the debate throughout. […].
Rules of procedure are not and never have been a constraint. Nor is
it the cautious advice of senior officials. On the contrary,
fonctionnaires, whether in Vienna, Brussels or elsewhere, exist to
serve their political masters, not to restrain them. Previous presidents
in office have depended heavily on the advice of their permanent
representatives in Brussels. Although Gregor Woschnagg has been a
senior member of the chancellor’s entourage at the European Council
since 2000, he was in the final analysis just another fonctionnaire,
with little if any influence where it mattered […].1
Peter Ludlow’s account of the “Schüssel Presidency” of the Euro-
pean Union in 2006 is a telling indication of the style and manner of
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Schüssel the man and the politician. It evokes the image of a masterful
tactician, whose prodigious strategic talent has been echoed in news-
paper commentaries both at home and abroad when he was credited with
“defanging” the notorious Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche
Partei Österreichs, or FPÖ) leader Jörg Haider.2 Ludlow’s observations
also portray a person who plays his cards close to the chest, relies on a
small coterie of confidantes, and appears sometimes dismissive of the
input from outside the inner circle. What emerges is the picture of a
politician who follows his own instincts against both the apparent better
judgment of others and even the political mainstream. Yet, despite a
certain smugness often associated with the smartest student in class and
in spite of a reputation for appearing cool and technocratic, Schüssel has
also demonstrated a keen sense of the popular, if not to say, the populist
political message. In situations when he has nothing to say, however, he
prefers to remain silent, waiting for others to make a move and expose
vulnerabilities. The Austrian weekly Profil qualified this taciturn streak
as “silence as a tactic.”3 
This essay does not present a point-by-point account of Schüssel’s
foreign policy from 1995 to 2006, but seeks instead to provide a general
analysis of the man and his decision making. Specifically, it argues that,
as the architect of Austria’s external relations, Schüssel represented a
political departure from his predecessors. His unquestionable commit-
ment to Austria’s future in an integrated Europe aside, Schüssel’s
foreign policy was to remain largely an extension of his domestic politi-
cal ambitions and objectives. First, as a political entrepreneur, his main
objective lay with breaking Social Democratic political dominance, even
if that meant engaging in policies that alienated Austria from its
international partners. Second, as Conservative party leader tempted by
the opportunity of chancellorship, he pursued what many foreign critics
would regard as a mésalliance and a breech of political taboo. Thirdly,
as chancellor faced with domestic opposition, he would time and again
recognize the political value of confronting “Brussels,” even at the
expense of being politically isolated when pursing Austrian objectives
in the European Union (EU). Fourth, through his silence when others
railed against Europe or by making subtle gestures himself, Schüssel
helped exacerbate a populist discourse in which the European Union
came to be viewed increasingly negatively by a large share of the
Austrian public. The argument here is not that Schüssel necessarily
ought to have acted differently. Rather, it needs to be recognized that he
was willing to go further in the interest of party/political expedience
than his two predecessors.
In doing so, one may argue, Schüssel leaves behind an ambiguous
legacy. On the one hand, his imprint on European politics was larger
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than that of any other Austrian government leader with the exception of
Chancellor Bruno Kreisky in the 1970s. In the process, Schüssel
undoubtedly displayed, at times, tactical brilliance and confronted
“Europe” with the shortcomings of its own policy decisions. By the
same token, we must recognize that, during Schüssel’s tenure as foreign
minister and chancellor, the nation and its foreign policy went through
a profound transition when Austria was facing the twin challenges of
political integration and economic globalization. More than anybody
else, Schüssel would have been well-placed to mitigate latent Austrian
tendencies toward self-isolation and existing fears of external threats;
instead, his center-right government, time and again, instrumentalized
such sentiments to mobilize political support.
Unremarkably Remarkable and Remarkably Unremarkable
The quiet tactician Schüssel, often likened to a “poker player,”4
appears as one of the most remarkable Austrian politicians in recent
history. Not since the chancellorship of Bruno Kreisky in the 1970s did
an Austrian head of government have so much freedom to maneuver and
leave his imprint on national politics. By 2008, Schüssel was even
treated in the international media as a serious candidate for the new post
of president of the European Council. Apart from neutering the Freedom
Party, his achievements entailed leading his own Austrian People’s Party
(Österreichische Volkspartei, or ÖVP) back to power in 2000 after thirty
years either in opposition or as a junior partner in an unloved coalition.
Despite his party’s worst results in a national election, Schüssel played
his cards so well that after nearly four months of negotiations, he was
able to assume the chancellorship while forcing the stronger Social
Democrats into opposition. Subsequently in 2002, Schüssel presided
over the biggest gain of an Austrian party in national elections when
support for the Conservatives soared from 27 percent to over 40 percent.
Other credentials of Schüssel “the poker player” include his success
at outmaneuvering his colleagues in fourteen EU member states that had
imposed bilateral sanctions on his government for coalescing with the
Freedom Party. The chancellor withstood both the enormous domestic
pressure accompanied by massive demonstrations and largely hostile
media reporting as well as international isolation and condemnation.
Shortly after Austria’s EU partners ended their sanctions, a handshake
between Schüssel and his German and French counterparts, two of his
most ardent critics, at an EU summit were as much a symbolic gesture
intended to show improving bilateral relations as a signal of begrudging
respect for the Austrian chancellor’s political stamina under fire.
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Remarkable as the these episodes may be, it seems puzzling that the
same Schüssel had previously served as a singularly unremarkable and,
at times, even tactless foreign minister, when, for example, he insulted
the head of the German Bundesbank and the Danish foreign minister by
thoughtless remarks. In nearly five years as head of the Austrian foreign
ministry, he failed to leave his mark on the country’s international poli-
cy and was often remembered more for being at odds with the Austrian
head of state, President Klestil, and Austria’s EU Commissioner, Franz
Fischler, both members of Schüssel’s own party.
Under similarly difficult political conditions for the ÖVP, even
Schüssel’s famously staid and staunchly conservative predecessor, Alois
Mock, had managed to implement his vision of a new, post-1989
comprehensive integration policy, which he pursued with single-minded
determination.5 His goal of anchoring Austria as much possible in the
Western alliance system, thus throwing overboard the Social Democratic
foreign policy priorities of the 1970s, may not have been to everybody’s
liking, but at least it represented a clear and consistent new roadmap of
where the country was to be headed. Such independent policy contours
never emerged under Schüssel as foreign minister, whose tenure
coincided with Austria’s entry into the European Union. Neither he, nor
the government as a whole, distinguished themselves during these first
years of EU membership, more often than not failing to achieve support
for Austrian policy objectives in Brussels.
It is also puzzling that someone who has often been labeled a master
tactician was capable of such profound misjudgments both in domestic
and international politics. For example, as soon as Schüssel had taken
over the party in 1995, he gambled on provoking new elections,
assuming he had caught his coalition partner, the Social Democratic
Party of Austria (Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs, or SPÖ), in
a moment of weakness. The latter, however, subsequently won one of
their most resounding electoral triumphs in years, emerging in the end
far stronger in the coalition government than the People’s Party.
Likewise, the election in 2006, which ended Schüssel’s tenure as
chancellor, was a political upset when the SPÖ unexpectedly inched
ahead of the Conservatives because he and his party had badly misread
the mood of the people. 
As will be discussed below, the chancellor’s misinterpretation of the
political tealeaves was also apparent in international relations. Although
credited for getting Austria and his government out of the sanctions in
2000, Schüssel, more than anybody else, has to bear the responsibility
for maneuvering the country into that situation. Five years as foreign
minister had apparently not provided him with the standing and trust in
the eyes of his European counterparts so as to avert the embarrassing
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affair altogether. He was neither kept abreast of what was about to
unfold, nor did he correctly judge the international consequences of his
decision to form a coalition with Haider’s Freedom Party. Even after the
boycott, Austria’s bilateral relations with several fellow member states
remained at an unprecedented low point. It is indeed remarkable that,
under Schüssel’s leadership, a small, neutral country like Austria failed
to have thoroughly good relations with several of its equally democratic
neighbors. Despite Schüssel’s unquestionable political accomplish-
ments, he therefore remains a political figure full of contradictions both
in terms of his policies and qualities. 
The Accidental Foreign Policymaker
As Ludlow observes correctly, if we are to understand Schüssel’s
foreign policy, “we have to get back to Schüssel the head of govern-
ment, if not Schüssel the man.”6 Neither by his biography nor by any of
Schüssel’s public pronouncements earlier in his political career do we
detect an affinity with, or a particular interest in, international relations.
To Schüssel, foreign policy seems incidental in that he obtained the post
of foreign minister in 1995 along with becoming vice-chancellor and
party leader. The logic of maintaining a carefully calibrated balance of
power within the governing SPÖ-ÖVP coalition ensured that Schüssel
obtained a cabinet portfolio with sufficient gravitas. More importantly,
it afforded the Conservatives independent access to the international
stage, supplying them with crucial information during Austria’s sensi-
tive integration process into the European Union. From the standpoint
of political symbolism alone, it was critical for the People’s Party not to
leave this arena to the chancellor and the Social Democrats. 
Wresting this cabinet post from the SPÖ in 1985 had been
something of feat for the Conservatives because of the central impor-
tance accorded to it by the Austrian Left. In the subsequent decade,
Schüssel’s predecessor, Alois Mock, shaped this portfolio to such an
extent that many of the objectives of the Austrian Conservatives became
de facto the national foreign policy priorities. However, after developing
medical problems and seeing his dream of Austria’s integration into the
European Union come to fruition, Mock reluctantly retired in 1995. At
the same time, an ongoing internal conflict in the People’s Party bet-
ween the Catholic conservative wing and the reformist liberals had come
to a head, resulting in the ousting of yet another politically unlucky party
leader. This time it was Erhard Busek, the party’s foremost exponent of
urbane liberalism, who was forced to step aside. Yet he doggedly
resisted pressures by the ultraconservatives to have one of their own
become the new party leader and threatened to run once again as a
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candidate for leadership, thus possibly denying a significant majority to
the eventual successor. The impasse was resolved when, to everybody’s
surprise, Busek nominated Minister of Economic Affairs Wolfgang
Schüssel as the new party leader. 
In the cabinet since 1989, Schüssel seemed an unlikely choice.7 For
one, he appeared too liberal to be a credible personification of the
party’s new edgier conservative profile. Secondly, as a long-term top
functionary in the Economic Federation, he represented business in-
terests in the party and, indirectly, in Austria’s famously consensual
neocorporatist system. Therefore, he seemed hardly the man to lead the
ÖVP into a bold new direction in tune with the rising confrontational
mood of its members. Instead, the new party leader was initially seen as
yet another compromise candidate reflecting the smallest common
denominator between the party’s varying factions.
Given the centrality of foreign policy to the ÖVP, it is nonetheless
remarkable that the person chosen to succeed someone of Mock’s stature
utterly lacked the corresponding international credentials. There was,
indeed, little in the new party leader’s background to suggest that he was
particularly well-suited to be Austria’s new foreign minister. It is,
however, a measure of Schüssel’s talent as a politician not only to have
already had a long career within the party, holding significant party
offices at least since 1975, but to emerge as the compromise candidate
in such a divided organization. Traditionally counted among the liberal
Viennese camp and in style and appearance relatively unconventional,
he had nonetheless enjoyed the support and protection of the conservat-
ive Mock.8 
Foreign Policy and Austrian Party Politics
In the 1970s under Chancellor Bruno Kreisky, Austrian foreign
policy emerged from the Soviet shadow and became bolder and more
globally oriented so that its practice of passive neutrality gave way to a
period of active neutrality. The country’s position between the major
blocs and the general climate of détente in the 1970s provided many
opportunities that Kreisky skillfully understood to enhance Austria’s
position relative to its power resources.9 However, by the early 1980s,
Vienna’s relations with Washington became increasingly strained. Most
importantly, the international environment had changed, constraining
Austria’s room to maneuver compared with what it had been in the
1970s. Vienna’s support for leftist movements in Latin America and
other parts of the world were regarded as unwelcome by the Reagan
Administration, and Austria’s close economic ties to Eastern Europe
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became the subject of increased scrutiny.10 With Kreisky’s resignation
in 1983, Austria returned to a more regional orientation.11
The new direction of a “realistic foreign and neutrality policy”
commensurate with the Austria’s true capabilities and immediate
(mainly economic) interests was implemented to its fullest when the
foreign ministry came under ÖVP control in 1987. In part, this had been
the price for persuading the Conservatives to join the Social Democrats
in government. As Paul Luif observed, Conservative Party leader Alois
Mock was one of the first Austrian politicians to adopt a “global
approach” to European integration,12 which meant that the country
should seek full membership in the European Community/European
Union, instead of a selective participation in Europe’s internal market.
The ÖVP’s thrust toward Europe affected all other political parties
in that it pushed the traditionally Euro-skeptical Social Democrats into
the pro-European camp so as not be outdone by their principal rivals. In
turn, the smaller opposition, such as the Greens (Die Grünen) and,
especially, the Freedom Party, came to adopt negative attitudes to inte-
gration, hoping to attract those voters who disapproved of the govern-
ment’s policy toward Brussels—in the case of Haider’s FPÖ, it actually
meant a complete reversal of their earlier position. 
Generally speaking, Austria’s policy toward integration was a
muddled affair in the sense that it seemed both precipitous and oddly
obstinate at the same time. Although Austria had not debated the
possibility of full membership as late as the 1986 elections, the country
plunged itself into this process only a short time thereafter, submitting
the so-called “letter to Brussels” on 17 July 1989. Nonetheless, the
document contained a lengthy list of reservations and exceptions, ma-
king it seem it was the European Community that wanted to join
Austria.13 Most crucially, each of the three applications (to the three
communities of the European Community) contained a reservation
concerning Austria’s neutrality (in contrast to Sweden and Finland),
which became the subject of prolonged negotiations.14 The Janus-faced
approach to Europe had its roots in the insular mentality of a population
accustomed to a position of relative geopolitical detachment and
geographic isolation after almost fifty years spent existing between two
powerful military blocs.15 Austria’s ambivalent attitude toward European
integration, compounded by an “image and identity crisis”16 because the
country had lost its cherished role as a bridge between East and West,
is well-documented and need not be revisited.17 What is important here
are the ramifications of Austria’s somewhat insular mentality for the
Schüssel era and the rise of Austrian populism in the 1990s and beyond.
Besides pushing for integration, the Conservatives were also the
architects of Vienna’s policy during the conflict in the former Yugos-
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lavia, which was unfolding on Austria’s doorstep. On the question of
recognizing the independence of Slovenia and Croatia, the ÖVP quickly
moved ahead suggesting that “Austria would have to be [their] advocate
and interpreter in the West.”18 In their commitment to the cause of
Slovenian and Croatian independence, the People’s Party not only risked
public confrontations with its Social Democratic coalition partner,19 but
also stern rebukes by Paris and Moscow, as well as a serious confron-
tation with Belgrade—the latter accused Austria of fomenting separa-
tism. As in the case of European integration, the Austrian Social
Democrats eventually converged more or less on the position adopted
by Foreign Minister Mock. In retrospect, however, it is noteworthy that
Mock and his party abandoned their avowed “realistic” foreign policy
in favor of an activist, if not to say interventionist and idealist, course in
the Yugoslav conflict.
From Nation State to Member State—
Schüssel as Party Leader and Foreign Minister
When Schüssel took the reigns of both his party and the foreign
office, he found a situation in which the Conservatives had been largely
in the driver’s seat on foreign policy, but were otherwise in acute danger
of shrinking to mid-size status. The Social Democrats could, despite all
setbacks, still count on the bonus of being the chancellor’s party while
the FPÖ benefited from growing anti-European and anti-internationalist
sentiments. Austria’s largest and most powerful newspaper, Neue
Kronenzeitung, began converging on the anti-European line of the
Freedom Party, calling, for example, the former ÖVP Minister and then
EU Commissioner Franz Fischler “unpatriotic” and the European Union
a threat to Austria’s identity.20 Presenting itself as the Europa-Partei was
no longer an attractive enough rationale to lure sufficient voters to the
ÖVP. If anything, the party’s avowedly pro-European stance conflicted
with a new kind of Austrian patriotism and the emerging politics of
identity.
Under Mock, foreign policy had been largely independent of the
day-to-day domestic political calculus. Instead, it was based on the clear
principle that Europe was paramount and Austria’s integration into the
emerging Union the overriding objective of the party and the country.
Under Schüssel, the Conservatives’ emphasis shifted in subtle but
perceptible ways, although the ÖVP remained the relatively most pro-
European of Austria’s parties. Now, however, it presented itself less as
Europe’s voice in Austria and increasingly as Austria’s advocate in
Europe. At the time, the European Union was slowly turning into a
popular target in national politics because of a series of conflicts
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between Vienna and Brussels. Specifically, several uniquely Austrian
arrangements had run afoul of EU regulations, and the government was
additionally chided by the European Commission for the slow pace of
implementing the large body of community law. Unfamiliarity with the
political process at the European Union level as well as ineffectiveness
in both forging cross-national alliances and reading the political signs
early enough meant that Austria saw itself outmaneuvered and overruled
when key interests were at stake. This created the public impression that
the “big countries were ganging on the little Alpine republic.” From
unilaterally wanting to restrict transalpine road traffic to maintaining the
nationally popular anonymous bank accounts, Austria saw itself
pressured by the European Commission to comply with treaty obli-
gations.21 
An even more sensitive matter concerned Austria’s integration into
the so-called Euro zone. The comprehensive austerity measures required
to meet the convergence criteria and, thus, qualify for the planned single
currency were politically costly to Social Democrats and Conservatives
alike. The voters reacted with anger to a scenario in which they were
first promised major economic benefits from accession in 1995 and
subsequently confronted with a series of social cutbacks in the name of
participating in the single market.22 Other “European” issues such as the
outbreak of mad-cow disease, first in the United Kingdom and later
elsewhere in Europe, the dismantling of border checkpoints in com-
pliance with the Schengen Agreement, and the looming question of
enlarging the European Union into Eastern Europe all added to an anti-
EU backlash that was bound to hurt the ÖVP as the most openly pro-
European party.
Membership in the European Union presented not only problems,
but also provided political party advantages by offering Austrian
policymakers an additional platform in an important new setting. Soon
after accession, Foreign Minister Schüssel and the Austrian government
became fully engaged in the European Union decision-making processes
and were trying to take advantage of the international political limelight.
This occurred first in the context of the negotiations for the new
Amsterdam Treaty and then during Austria’s first EU Council Presi-
dency in 1998. Especially the latter case had been intended to showcase,
a year prior to the national elections, both the accomplishments of the
government and Austria’s readiness for membership. It was also meant
to turn around the public’s mood about “Europe.” However, despite
extensive preparations for the first presidency of a new member state,
conflicts between the two political parties and attempts between the
chancellor and the vice-chancellor to upstage one another diminished
potential political party benefits.23 
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For Schüssel, who was not only foreign minister but, more
importantly, vice-chancellor and party leader, domestic questions and
party-political concerns were taking center-stage regardless of how they
would be perceived in Brussels and by Austria’s political partners. In
fact, when ÖVP officials began making ominous statements linking
Czech and Slovenian EU membership with extraneous but populist
issues, it became clear that opposition to “Europe” could serve as a
welcome source of political mobilization for the Austrian center-right.
As a precondition for EU accession, the Freedomites and also some
Conservatives demanded that the Czech Republic rescind the “Beneš
Decrees” and Slovenia the so-called “AVNOJ Mandates” to redress the
grievances of ethnic Germans expelled after 1945. The campaign by
right-wing politicians in Austria fed on popular anti-Slavic sentiments,
exacerbating latent negative attitudes in the population about the
enlargement process. Another issue affecting Austrian-Czech relations
was the dispute over the Czech nuclear power plant at Temelin, the
closure and dismantling of which Austria’s public demanded as a
precondition for approving Prague’s accession to the Union. This was
a particularly sensitive matter for Schüssel’s party because the Austrian
border state of Lower Austria was governed by one of the ÖVP’s most
powerful and influential politicians, Governor Erwin Pröll.
Although Austria and the ÖVP’s official rhetoric continued to
present the Alpine nation as a supporter and friend of the quick
integration of its southern and eastern neighbors into the European
Union, the country’s de facto policy was more obstinate.24 As a result,
Vienna gradually acquired the image of a troublemaker, whose true
intention was to slow down or even thwart Eastern expansion. In due
course, this foreign policy was notably criticized by East European
politicians such as Polish Foreign Minister Wladyslaw Bartoszewski,
who accused Vienna of a lack of leadership and a failure to continue the
“direction of Kreisky and Busek.”25 We may, therefore, agree with
Helmut Kramer that apart from Austria’s formal role during the EU
presidency in 1998 when Vienna did support the launching of accession
negotiations, “the contribution of Austria and the Austrian government
to the expansion of the “common European house,” which was to
receive not only “an additional floor but also a new foundation”, can be
qualified as “disappointing.”26
Austria’s tacit skepticism of enlargement was even more re-
markable given that its economy not only benefited enormously from
this development, but that Austrian businesses explicitly embraced
expansion. In time, they became the largest international investors in
countries such as Slovenia, Slovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria—Jan
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Stankovsky estimates that Austrian GDP grew by an additional 3 percent
due to the economic stimulus from enlargement.27
There were other policy areas in which Austria played a more
constructive and internationalist role. In 1994 the country had joined the
Danish-led Standby Force High Readiness Brigade for UN Operations
(SHIRBRIG). Subsequently, it participated with small troop contingents
in the International Force (IFOR)28 and the Stabilization Force (SFOR)
in Bosnia and later in the Kosovo Force (KFOR). This commitment of
750 men was a novel departure for Austrian foreign policy and
domestically rather controversial.29 Vienna also followed an invitation
by the West European Union (WEU) and the Western European
Armament Group (WEAG) for full membership. These measures were
designed to integrate Austria’s defense and armament industry into the
emerging European security and defense architecture. The Austrian
expertise in the Balkans was especially valued by the European Union,
which entrusted experienced officials such as Wolfgang Petritsch30 and
Erhard Busek31 with important international missions. Vienna also
actively supported EU instruments such as the Stability and Association
Pact (SAP) with the countries of the Western Balkans in order to
facilitate their integration into Europe. Outside the European theater,
Austria’s foreign policy continued to follow a tradition of pursuing
humanitarian and social objectives, especially in the area of human
rights32 and the elimination of landmines (Ottawa Process).33 In this,
Austrian policy relied increasingly on cooperation with non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and benefited from Vienna’s
location as an important seat of international organizations such as the
United Nations and the Organization of Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE).
The most controversial foreign policy initiative that Conservatives
undertook was the push toward membership in the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), the discussion of which had been spearheaded by
Mock and others in the party. In 1997, the ÖVP officially adopted this
step as a foreign policy objective despite objections by some quarters in
the party. Initially, it seemed an attainable goal in the sense that the
suddenly shifting conception of Austrian neutrality appeared to lead to
its complete lapse, thus making accession to NATO possible. However,
after some initial hesitation, the Social Democrats rejected the idea. This
and the growing influence of populism on matters of foreign policy
made NATO membership a politically costly agenda. A subsequent
ballot initiative launched in 1996 in favor of Austria’s permanent
neutrality was signed by 6.2 percent of the eligible voters. However,
even this low number was sufficient—along with polls showing that 60
percent of Austrians regarded neutrality as part of the country’s
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identity—to convince Schüssel to abandon the quest for NATO
membership. Austria’s Left in particular regarded the Western alliance
not only as too expensive a security option, but, in many cases, an
instrument of U.S. hegemony. This negative perception prevailed even
after nearly all of Austria’s neighbors had joined NATO and other
traditionally neutral countries had abandoned their respective policies
(such as Finland in 1995 and Sweden in 2002).
Instead, Austria joined the NATO-led Partnership for Peace (PfP-
plus), which represented a minimal consensus between the coalition
partners. This was a disappointing outcome in light of an earlier overly
ambitious joint declaration by SPÖ-ÖVP to pursue “policies in the spirit
of European solidarity and for the purpose of permanently guaranteeing
the security of the Republic […] and the full participation in the
effective European security structures.”34
Summing up, Austrian foreign policy in the mid- to latter half of the
1990s had entered a period of transition and ambivalence. After Austria
had managed to be an active and useful member of the international
community during the decades of its rather exceptional position between
the two blocs, the geopolitical changes after 1989 and the country’s
insertion into the complex multilevel European system resulted in a
prolonged period of insecurity. After the all-important national goal of
EU membership had been realized, Austria’s ambivalence about its role
in the new Europe manifested itself fully in the ambiguity of its actions.
The changes in the external environment were complemented by
domestic political processes that saw the decline of the major political
parties, which had dominated national politics and foreign policy
decision making since the end of the Second World War. Simul-
taneously, new political actors such as the FPÖ under Jörg Haider and
the Greens, a new populist political style, and new issues such as the
politics of identity and the fear of globalization gained in importance. As
a consequence, the country’s level of activity in and commitment to
international affairs was increasingly affected by a domestic political
discourse shaped by populist voices on the far-right and anti-
international tabloids. In those foreign policy areas that were judged as
politically “safe” because the causes seemed popular or sufficiently
“harmless” or because they were occurring largely “below the radar
screen” of the general public, Austria remained fairly active. In other
areas that were regarded as controversial and politically costly, the
party-political calculus often prevailed. As a result, Austria became a
less predictable international partner. 
Foreign Minister Schüssel was the face of Austria’s ambivalent
foreign policy at the time and did not particularly endear himself to his
international colleagues. While he can, for the most part, not be held
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responsible for the difficulties the country experienced with confronting
the new geopolitical realties, he certainly did little to mitigate the
situation or demonstrate any special leadership. He was neither willing
nor able to communicate to the country the importance of the nation not
appearing in the international community as a freeloader that was
benefiting from the enhanced security and market opportunities while
demonstrating an unwillingness to make contributions commensurate to
the available resources. 
Neither on the basis of Schüssel’s background nor his interests was
he the best person to manage Austria’s succession successfully. In fact,
his double role as chancellor and party leader even added to the problem
in that he had to weigh carefully any position he took on foreign policy
with the long-term political interest of his party. His goal of extricating
the ÖVP from the unloved coalition with the Social Democrats and
reversing the political fortunes of the Conservatives were paramount for
Schüssel the party leader. Had he only been foreign minister, he might
have been better placed to be a forceful advocate of a more active
foreign policy without fearing to damage the party. As the ÖVP moved
to the right and the overlap in the domestic agenda with the Freedom
Party grew, foreign policy was no longer an important enough factor to
restrain the party leader from forging a coalition with an aggressively
nationalist party, the FPÖ, which was widely regarded as an interna-
tional pariah.
Austria as International Pariah—
Schüssel Becomes Chancellor in 2000
The single most important development in Schüssel’s first term as
Austrian chancellor and arguably the most difficult period for Austrian
foreign policy since the end of Allied occupation in 1955 was the inter-
national quarantine after the ÖVP formed a government with Haider’s
Freedom Party. Already the strong showing of the FPÖ in the 1999
elections had dominated the international headlines. At the time, the
most negative reaction by a foreign government came from Israel.35 In
front of international journalists in Luxemburg, Israeli Foreign Minister
David Levy made unmistakably clear that any participation by the FPÖ
in a future government would change the bilateral relations between
Austria and Israel.36 
France, too, expressed growing concern about the situation in
Austria. Already in November 1999 during the Istanbul summit of the
Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe, French President
Jacques Chirac indicated to the Austrian delegation that the inclusion of
the FPÖ in a future Austrian government would have “far-reaching
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consequences.”37 At the time, according to French diplomatic sources,
Vice-Chancellor Schüssel assured the French that this would not happen.
Already once before in February of 1999, the Conservatives had rejected
the notion that they intended to form a partnership with the Freedomites.
This fact gave rise to speculations that Chirac felt betrayed by his fellow
conservative counterpart in Austria because the Gaullist French Pre-
sident had always resisted the political temptation of cooperating with
the extremist right in his own country.
The rocky negotiations between the SPÖ and ÖVP during Decem-
ber and January continued to make headlines, and numerous interna-
tional voices sought to deter Schüssel from contemplating a coalition
with Haider. Following an international Holocaust Conference in
Stockholm on 21 January 2000, the mostly Social Democratic govern-
ment leaders expressed their solidarity with outgoing Chancellor Viktor
Klima and informally discussed possible measures against Austria in the
event of a Freedom Party government. A second thrust to thwart a
Schüssel-Haider government in Vienna came from the French President.
While Schüssel rejected the international calls as unwarranted inter-
ference in national politics, Haider continued to mock his international
critics, aggravating the situation.38
Before the final round of negotiations between the ÖVP and the
FPÖ on 1 February, the United States along with Israel and most other
Western democracies threatened consequences for their bilateral rela-
tions with Vienna. In response to the international concerns, the ÖVP-
FPÖ pact included a preamble, of which President Klestil was officially
introduced as the author, but evidence suggested that, in fact, Schüssel
had drafted most of the statement himself.39 In this lengthy declaration
signed by Schüssel and Haider entitled “Responsibility for Austria—A
Future in the Heart of Europe,” the new government expressed its
commitment to the protection of human rights, the principles of
democracy, and the abolition of discrimination and intolerance. It stated
that Austria was bound by EU treaty commitments to the principles of
liberty, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. It also declared
the government’s continued support for the European Monetary Union
and EU enlargement, promised a self-critical scrutiny of the Nazi past,
and accepted Austria’s responsibility under the Nazi regime. 
A catalogue of measures against Austria emerged in conference
calls involving groups of three or four.40 Initially, Luxembourg Prime
Minister Claude Juncker hoped the sanctions would be presented to the
Austrians at an EU Council meeting. Instead, EU Council President and
Portuguese Prime Minister Antonio Guterres announced them on the
afternoon of 31 January, indicating they were to go into effect after the
center-right government had taken office. Chancellor Klima, Foreign
133
Minister Schüssel, and President Klestil were informed, but Austria was
not consulted in the negotiations by the other fourteen EU nations. The
measures were as follows: 1) the governments of the fourteen would not
promote or accept any bilateral official contacts at the political level
with an Austrian government integrating the FPÖ, 2) there would be no
support (promotion or acceptance) in favor of Austrian candidates
seeking positions in international organizations, and 3) Austrian am-
bassadors in EU capitals would only be received at a technical level.
Although Austria’s bilateral relations with the other EU members were
effectively downgraded to a technical level, the sanctions were not
imposed by the European Union as such and, thus, did not legally affect
Austria’s participation in EU institutions. Had this been the case, the
smooth operation of the Union would have been jeopardized, which both
the EU and its members wanted to avoid. 
From the beginning there was a strong indication that, inter-
nationally, the views about Austria and the sanctions were more diver-
gent than the public protestations of unity and the harshness of the
measures made it appear.41 Besides Israel, which immediately recalled
its ambassador, a range of other countries in Eastern Europe and the
Americas expressed support and understanding for the international
boycott. The United States temporarily called its ambassador back to
Washington “for consultations,” but adopted what Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright, dubbed a “wait and see” attitude.42 The East Euro-
peans were more cautious in their approach because, as applicant
countries, they wanted to remain in the EU leaders’ good graces. How-
ever, they did not wish to provoke Vienna into vetoing or seriously
delaying their accession. Thus Austria’s smaller neighbors Slovakia,
Slovenia, and Hungary did not join the boycott, whereas the Czech
Republic and Poland did. As a result, the relations between Vienna and
Prague deteriorated even further. Nonetheless, the President of the
Czech Parliament Vaclav Klaus sent a letter of solidarity to Schüssel,
denouncing Brussels. Meanwhile, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor
Orban demonstratively invited the Austrian chancellor to Hungary. 
In the negotiations prior to forming a government and in the run-up
before the sanctions were announced, Schüssel displayed his charac-
teristic knack for turning long odds into a political advantage. He re-
mained steadfast, relying on a close circle of supporters in the party and
ignoring the enormous criticism that came from abroad, the media, the
Austrian president, and quarters in his own party. For one, he recognized
that the international pressure could give him much needed political
leverage at home and increase the political legitimacy of his embattled
government. The actions by the EU14 directed at Schüssel’s admini-
stration were perceived by most Austrians, even those critical of the
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ÖVP-FPÖ government, as an affront against the entire country and an
illegitimate interference in national sovereignty. Thus the boycott served
as a source of cohesion and public mobilization for Schüssel’s govern-
ment while making life difficult for the opposition, which had to be
careful not to appear unpatriotic when criticizing the center-right coali-
tion. 
Second, the international pressure also allowed Schüssel to do-
mesticate the Freedomites and commit them to a policy that was de facto
more pro-European than their rhetoric. Most crucially, the worldwide
negative reactions to Haider sealed his fate in national politics, and he
withdrew to his home state of Carinthia where he had been the elected
governor. From there, he tried to dominate his party but, as time would
show, with decreasing effectiveness.43 Within three years, his party
splintered, and Haider came to preside over what was a diminished split-
off from the Freedom Party. In retrospect, it is profoundly ironic and
somewhat paradoxical that the sanctions actually increased both
Schüssel’s leverage and room to maneuver. 
Internationally, the quarantine was undoubtedly a blow to Austria
and Schüssel’s prestige. As the chief architect of the new government,
the boycott was primarily directed at him. But the measures also
contained a series of weaknesses that Schüssel was willing to exploit and
turn to his advantage. For one, the sanctions were legally hard to justify,
for they had no real basis in either the common EU law or international
law.44 Austria had neither breached any agreements, nor been found
guilty in any tribunal. The formation of the center-right government
reflected the national electoral will and was entirely consistent with
Austrian law. Second, the measures were politically problematic and
hastily conceived. On the one hand, there was no clear agreement on the
goal and purpose of the sanctions, and it seemed only a matter of time
before the united front would splinter. The smaller countries and the
more sovereignty-conscious nations such as Denmark and the United
Kingdom appeared increasingly uneasy. On the other, the sanctions
contributed to the image problem of the European Union as a place in
which political correctness ran amok and big nations bullied smaller
ones if the latter had dared vote for the “wrong” party. The sanctions
were also tactically ill-conceived because, in the long run, they put the
onus of action on the EU-14 and not Austria. If the latter simply did
nothing, the others were forced to act because the sanctions could not be
maintained indefinitely. That created a dilemma because many member
states did not have the stomach to impose harsher and perhaps more
effective measures whose legitimacy would have been even more
doubtful. At the same time, lifting the sanctions without Austria making
any concessions was considered a humiliating defeat. The EU-14 had to
135
face the fact that there was no readily apparent face-saving exit strategy.
Nonetheless, the formal goal of changing the composition of the
Austrian government was insofar unattainable as Schüssel had
overriding domestic priorities that he wanted to implement regardless of
the international pressure. 
The international quarantine had also unintended consequences
negatively affecting the public perception and media coverage, not just
in Austria,45 but also abroad.46 Stories abounded that Austrians, either
individually or as groups, had been treated poorly in different European
countries because of overeager officials or because the meaning of the
measures had been misunderstood. What is more, the grotesque diplo-
matic contortions necessary to pretend that everything was “business as
usual” to ensure the smooth decision-making process of the European
Union, such as refusing officially even to discuss the issue, contrasted
unfavorably with the rather puerile gestures to avoid at all cost any
contact with Austrian delegations at various EU gatherings. Arranging
photo opportunities, seating orders at dinners, group photos, and
handshakes became nightmares for protocol officials.47 Some of these
actions were directed against Schüssel personally. One such form of
humiliation included wearing buttons48 mocking the Austrian chancellor,
refusing handshakes, and suspending bilateral institutional relations.49
In many ways, the tokenism of these acts symbolized also the help-
lessness of the EU-14 to effect real change in Austria, but provided
instead ample reason for ridiculing the measures.
After various Austrian attempts, including a so-called “charm offen-
sive” by the new Foreign Minister Benita Ferrero-Waldner as well as
mediation attempts by President Klestil and the new SPÖ leader Alfred
Gusenbauer, had failed to resolve the issue, Schüssel decided to raise the
stakes and bring greater pressure to bear by revealing a lengthy
catalogue of counter-measures.50 Most critical among these was the
announcement that the Austrian government would hold a national
referendum on the sanctions and exercise its veto-option to block
legislative progress in EU institutions. Chancellor Schüssel traveled to
Brussels in July 2000, forcing a meeting with Commission President
Romano Prodi. Simultaneously, the Austrians intervened with the
Commission charging that, in a flagrant violation of the EU Treaty,
Austrian students and civil servants had been subject to discrimination
in member countries, notably in Belgium. Parallel measures were aimed
at legal action against the EU-14 and included proposing a “objective
framework” for resolving similar cases in the future.51
Taking a more aggressive stance toward the European Union carried
little risk for the Austrian government given the anti-European senti-
ments of the population. While polls in Austria signaled that the
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attitudes towards the European Union had plummeted during the first
half of 2000, surveys taken in all EU member countries showed that the
overwhelming majority of Europeans did not support the measures.52 In
this context, a growing number of politicians, both in EU institutions
and among member states, began searching for a way out. In view of the
upcoming elections in Italy and motivated by concerns about a backlash
against the European Union, the government in Rome was eager to
mediate, as documented by an exchange between Foreign Minister
Lamberto Dini and his Austrian counterpart Ferrero-Waldner, which was
leaked to the Italian press.53 Politicians in Greece, Ireland, Denmark,
Finland, and subsequently also the United Kingdom, the Netherlands,
and Sweden had either gone on record questioning the usefulness of the
sanctions or voiced opposition to their continuation.54 
An important first step in the resolution of the crisis and a vin-
dication for Schüssel was the “acquittal” of the ÖVP on 6 June 2000 in
the ongoing proceeding to revoke its membership in the European
People’s Party. The mechanism chosen to study the case and review the
record of the Austrian Conservatives was to become the model for an
international approach to assess the entire case against Austria.55 The
formula that was eventually adopted centered on a so-called committee
of sages, who would investigate the political nature of the Freedom
Party in terms of whether it conformed both to the letter and the spirit of
Article 7 in the Treaty of Rome. Schüssel had initially resented the idea
of Austria having to undergo an external review, but in the end re-
cognized its political usefulness.
From 28 through 31 August 2000, former Finnish President Martii
Ahtisaari, the German expert on international law Jochen Frowein, and
the former Spanish Foreign Minister and previous EU Commissioner
Marcelino Oreja met with a variety of representatives of all Austrian
political parties, major interest groups, and principal institutions. The
three sages gave Austria an unambiguously positive verdict although it
was critical of aspects of both the FPÖ and Austrian asylum procedures.
In its judgment of the government’s political practice as well as
Austria’s legal protections of minorities and existing programs to fight
xenophobia, racism, anti-Semitism, and discrimination, the report con-
tained much praise.56 It also concluded that the sanctions had outlived
their usefulness and were counterproductive.
On 8 September, Ahtisaari, Oreja, and Frowein handed their fin-
dings to French President Chirac in his capacity as EU Council
president. Since the substantive conclusions had already been leaked57
to the media, the French had no alternative but to release the official
report immediately to the public. Four days later, a communiqué of the
fourteen released in Paris stated that the bilateral measures between the
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EU-14 and Austria had been removed and that the quarantine had been
“useful.” Because the measures were lifted without a follow-up pro-
cedure, the Austrian “government hailed the decision as a triumph.”58
Nonetheless, the experience continued to overshadow Austria’s foreign
policy during the entire first chancellorship of Schüssel. 
At the time of the boycott of the EU-14, Austria also had to chair
the OSCE and successfully oversee the return of Yugoslavia to the
international organization.59 Yet, apart from such successes, Austria’s
relationship with its European partners remained difficult. In issue after
issue, from enlargement to transit traffic, Austrian neutrality, and
eventually the question of Turkey’s accession to the European Union,
the Alpine nation was either out of step with the majority of its
European partners or embroiled in political conflict.
Between Euro-Skepticism, Populism, and Business
as Usual—Schüssel’s Chancellorship 2000-2002
Despite concerted efforts by the Schüssel government to create an
image of normalcy and “business as usual” in the relations with its
European partners, the effect of the international boycott lingered.
During an official visit by the Austrian Chancellor to Berlin in No-
vember 2000, his German counterpart signaled distance and was un-
willing to exchange little more than superficial pleasantries. France,
Sweden, and Belgium continued to avoid any gestures that could be seen
as more than the minimum necessary required by the standards of
bilateral contacts among EU members. A noticeable improvement both
in the atmosphere and substance of relations came with the smaller EU
members such as Greece, Finland, Denmark, and Ireland. Generally,
however, the climate between the Austrian government and its inter-
national counterparts benefited from the resignation of the FPÖ leader
so that both Chancellor Schüssel and his foreign minister could dismiss
his continued verbal outbursts as those of a provincial politician that one
should ignore. 
The international sanctions against Austria were a painful but useful
learning experience for all parties concerned. In some respect, the
measures demonstrated to Austrians and also to Haider that a Freedom
Party-dominated government would face tremendous international oppo-
sition. The European Union, on the other hand, found itself confronted
with questions about its own democratic character and was forced to
admit that “nationality is even more ‘sticky’ than it may have seemed.”60
In response, the fifteen member states of the European Union decided
at their summit in Nice in December 2000 to amend the EU Treaty in the
sense that the Union could intervene in the future if there arose the
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“danger” of a serious breach of treaty principles (by, for example,
setting up a Committee of Wise Persons to report on the case). In this
way, the Austrian delegation successfully promoted and supported the
principle that the member state in question must be heard before there
was any action taken.61
Despite the stated commitment to European integration by the
center-right government, FPÖ officials took every opportunity to cri-
ticize the European Union for everything ranging from its handling of
mad cow (BSE) and foot-and-mouth disease to rulings against Austria
on transit traffic and anonymous savings accounts. High-ranking party
members routinely attacked EU officials, specifically the commissioner
on enlargement, Günter Verheugen, referring to him as a “coward”62 and
Austrian EU Agriculture Commissioner Franz Fischler, calling him a
“traitor.”63 
EU enlargement ended up in the crosshairs of the FPÖ. The
accession by the Central and Eastern European countries was unpopular
in Austria. Haider demanded that “integration can only take place
without a significant detriment to Austrian interests.”64 The complexity
of the integration process, its uneven economic impact, and the humi-
liation of the sanctions all played their part. Moreover, campaigning
against “Europe” diverted attention from the Freedom Party’s disastrous
domestic political performance and provided a way to distinguish itself
more clearly from its coalition partner. Thus the Freedom Party con-
tinually brought up new issues and made certain demands designed to
raise Austria’s political leverage while slowing down the enlargement
process. For example, Freedomite officials insisted that “enlargement
must cost less” and announced that Austrian contributions between 2004
and 2006 would be lower than demanded by the European Com-
mission.65 FPÖ politicians also continued to insist that Prague rescind
the “Beneš Decrees” if the Czech Republic did not want Austria to block
the accession process. With respect to the controversial Czech nuclear
power plant at Temelin, the Conservatives appeared to support the
hostile rhetoric of the Freedomites. 
Wolfgang Schüssel, who had not forgotten the criticism that came
from Prague and Ljubljana for his mésalliance with Haider, appeared
initially in no mood to placate the mutual sentiments. Particularly
surprising were statements by the Austrian Chancellor in which he
implied the internationally highly respected Slovene President Kucan
was still “with one leg in the old (Communist) regime” [of former
Yugoslavia], to which the latter replied in an interview, “I am not
offended but have certainly gained a new impression of Chancellor
Schüssel.”66 As in the case with the Czech Republic, there were similar
demands made of Slovenia that it, too, shut down its nuclear reactor at
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the plant in Krško. As a result, Austria’s relationship with its two Slavic
neighbors, the Czech Republic and Slovenia, reached a nadir between
2000 and 2001. Finally, relations with Germany also continued to be
poor, although that had more to do with the difference in political
philosophy between the leftist Social Democratic-Green coalition in
Berlin and the center-right government in Austria.
Whether it was out of a lingering feeling of personal humiliation at
the hands of his international counterparts, tactical calculus, or a com-
bination of the two, Schüssel’s foreign policy with respect to Europe
became bolder and tougher in the sense that his statements and several
of his initiatives were made with a view to the domestic audience, or in
coordination with the domestic political calendar. In this, the chancellor
was oddly helped by the climate created by the preceding sanctions. The
European Union was reluctant to reengage Austria in such a negative
manner and tolerated some of the noises coming from Vienna. Re-
peatedly, Schüssel let matters escalate, despite knowing that Austria was
internationally isolated on particular issues, only to pull back at the last
moment. 
With tiny Slovenia, it was Ljubljana’s explicitly conciliatory policy
toward its bigger Austrian neighbor that brought about an improvement
in relations. The same cannot be said about the situation between Vienna
and Prague, where the issue of the Temelin nuclear reactor appeared
intractable. While the Czech Republic had invested several hundred
million dollars and thirteen years of construction, Austria regarded itself
as, what the Economist labeled “a self-proclaimed nuclear free zone
obsessed with the idea that Temelin would become another Cher-
nobyl.”67 There was broad agreement across all political camps in
Austria that the project had to be stopped, so there was widespread
dismay when EU Commissioner for Enlargement Günter Verheugen
announced that nobody could dictate energy policy to an applicant
provided the plant met all (national) safety standards (there was no
single EU standard at the time). Border boycotts (for which the regional
government closed the schools so students could participate), demon-
strations, and fiery speeches by politicians formed the climax of a wave
of anti-Czech protests. 
Recognizing the futility of Austria’s demands and fearing real
political damage, Schüssel eventually reached for the political olive
branch that Prague offered by agreeing to a joint dialogue about a safety
review and mutual consultation. Labeling it the “Melk process” was
classically Schüssel in that it made it appear this was not only an
Austrian initiative, but also launched in Melk, Lower Austria, and, thus,
in that (ÖVP governed) region of the country which was most opposed
to Temelin. Eventually, Prague agreed to some additional safety
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measures, which, however, did not become part of the Czech treaty of
accession. Vienna’s initiative to get the Czech Republic to rescind the
so-called Beneš Decrees and recognize the claims of expelled Germans
went nowhere. However, Austria did succeed in negotiating (along with
Germany) the longest possible exemption (seven years) from having to
open its labor market to workers from the new EU member states,
which, in terms of Austrian Realpolitik, was much more important for
the government than the symbolism of the anti-German decrees.
The Schüssel government was haunted by the still unresolved issue
of international truck traffic through Austria, which continually brought
the country into conflict with Brussels and its powerful neighbors
Germany and Italy. The comprehensive arrangement worked out in 1998
under which Austria was to spread its road toll evenly across the entire
length of the affected transit route was nixed after the governor of the
province, a member of Schüssel’s Conservative party, refused to
implement it. The subsequent tug-of-war between Vienna and both the
European Community and the European Council, in which Austria found
itself isolated and outvoted multiple times, was an acrimonious issue for
all sides concerned. The matter also led to verdicts by the European
Court of Justice against Austria for being in breach of its treaty obli-
gations. Pressured by strong local opposition and popular demands, the
Schüssel government was unable to agree to a compromise solution,
which also would have implied accepting a disproportionably high share
of the environmental burden and cost. Austria eventually struck back by
bringing its own court case against the European Commission and
threatening the European Council with blocking a part of the accession
negotiations with the new member states. 
Whereas the details and merits of the case cannot be reviewed here,
the transit dispute with the European Union exposed the continuing
weaknesses inherent in the Austrian approach to policymaking in the
European arena, especially the initially noticeable lack of anticipation,
initiative, and imagination. In general, there was little Austrian input in
the early stages of opinion and policy formation at the European level.
Instead, Austria waited for a consolidated policy position to emerge,
which it then sought to block, deflect, or wear down in protracted
negotiations. This issue also draws attention to a bigger underlying
problem: Austria has not really had any stable partners or allies at the
European level. Unlike the Scandinavians, the Benelux countries, or the
Mediterranean member states, Austria does not have an automatic cohort
of sympathetic neighbors to which to turn for support. Attempts to
launch initiatives to develop such interest-based natural partnerships
remained largely without effective results. For example, an intended
“strategic partnership” with Austria’s neighboring EU accession
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countries had to be renamed “regional partnership” and yielded as little
of substance as did the Central European Initiative or the Danube
Cooperation Process.68 
However, the dispute over the trans-Alpine truck traffic also shows
that the Schüssel government became savvier over time and learned to
extract concessions by taking advantage of the fragmented and shifting
interests arrayed against it in multiple policy arenas. Nonetheless, this
was an area in which important national objectives were at stake and
where Austria legitimately felt it had to resort to all available means to
stand its ground. Yet it is another example of how Vienna seemed un-
able to make itself heard and advance an arguably reasonable agenda on
the basis of already existing international agreements without acrimony
and friction. The complaints, threats, and lawsuits as well as verbal
exchanges on all sides accompanying this process are indicative that, in
its dealings with Europe, Austria was still far from being able to work
smoothly behind the scenes.
In the transit controversy as in the conflict over enlargement and the
Czech nuclear plant, the Schüssel government (along with nearly all
other Austrian parties) was willing to play “Europe” off against do-
mestic interests and thus contributed to an “us versus them” populist
discourse in which the “others” and Brussels were portrayed as ganging
up on a small country. From an official side, there was neither sufficient
effort to explain the kind of obligations Austria had incurred as a result
of membership, nor an attempt to convey what facts had persuaded other
member states to arrive so often at a decision different from that of
Vienna. Instead of seeking to mitigate the existing tensions, the latter
were instrumentalized for the purpose of domestic party politics by
reinforcing latent myths about Austrian exceptionalism.
Political Calculus and the Troublesome Freedom Party
The coalition with the conflict-prone Freedomites did offer some
tactical advantages to Schüssel in that it made the Conservatives appear
more statesmen-like, professional, and pro-European. At the same time,
the existence of the FPÖ reminded others that worse could follow if
Schüssel were not to succeed with his political project. For this, the
Conservative party leader was willing make sacrifices, if need be, also
in Austria’s international relations. Ever since the Conservatives had
moved to the right, they sought to undo much of what they regarded as
an excessive Socialist imprint on Austria’s social and economic system.
Both the ÖVP and the FPÖ were also eager to reduce severely the
influence of the SPÖ on the state and the public sector, over which the
Social Democrats had accumulated significant power after three decades
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in the government. By and large, the policy changes introduced were not
the “slash and burn” neoliberalism that critics alleged, but were in line
with conservative reforms elsewhere. However, the new political
agenda, especially in social policy, was such that its implementation
would have been impossible without close cooperation between the
Conservatives and the Freedom Party. Schüssel also recognized that
many of the reforms implied greater hardship for core Freedomite voter
groups. Therefore, to maintain his alliance with the FPÖ and keep his
domestic reform project on track, the chancellor was willing to tolerate
regular Freedom Party outbursts about international and EU matters.
In general, the ÖVP learned to reign in the Freedomites on the
foreign policy questions where it mattered or to use them in a sort of
“good cop/bad cop” manner. In some instances, the Conservatives
appeared to support the rhetoric of the Freedomites, while, as in the case
of the conflict with Prague over Temelin, one ÖVP cabinet minister
along with the tacit approval of the EU Commission had worked out an
agreement with the Czech government that no longer demanded the
dismantling of the plant. In other instances, politically thankless issues
were left for FPÖ-led ministries such as the vastly unpopular decision
to purchase expensive fighter planes. Within the Schüssel cabinet, the
Freedomites faced the added difficulty of remaining internationally
isolated even after the sanctions had ended. When, for example, German
Chancellor Gerhard Schröder briefly visited his Austrian counterpart,
Vice-Chancellor and FPÖ leader Susanne Riess-Passer was not even
invited to the luncheon and the photo-op. Such missed opportunities
robbed the latter of valuable public relations while allowing the
chancellor and his foreign minister, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, to do-
minate the international stage.
The coalition with the Freedomites also resulted in significant
political drawbacks for Chancellor Schüssel. Its precarious internal
situation made the government perpetually unstable. Internationally, the
Freedom Party was a constant embarrassment and served as a reminder
that Austria’s international relations would not be fully normal as long
as this coalition existed.69 FPÖ officials regularly put the Schüssel
administration into an awkward position by offering revisionist accounts
of Austrian history when, once again, portraying the country as a victim
of history.70 For example, the government was generally praised for
concluding a Euro 420 million restitution settlement with some 149,000
surviving forced laborers of the Nazi regime itself. Yet several
Freedomite officials left little doubt how they regarded this accord—an
FPÖ member of Parliament referred to it as “protection money” to
safeguard “Austrian trade relations with the U.S.”71 Anti-Jewish remarks
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also accompanied Haider’s third visit to Saddam Hussein, which was in
itself an embarrassment, always prompting stern U.S. protests.
Eventually, the tension between the two coalition parties over
Europe became a significant strain in the government as well as within
the Freedom Party between the leadership and the base. To the extent
that the FPÖ’s poor overall political performance resulted in a string of
electoral defeats in regional elections and declining poll numbers,
campaigning against “Europe” became an ever more important source
of Freedom Party cohesion and mobilization. The FPÖ’s stance on
Europe was also the one policy area that allowed the party to appeal to
its diverse coalition of voters, uniting modernization losers, hardcore
right-wingers, welfare chauvinists, blue-collar workers, and cultural
traditionalists. Thus being able to pare the Freedom Party down to a
manageable size must have seemed an irresistible option to Schüssel. 
After early elections in the fall of 2002 which had been prompted
by the turmoil within the FPÖ, Schüssel was able continue the coalition
with a much diminished partner. The chancellor’s room to maneuver
increased further after the Freedom Party fragmented in the spring of
2005, at which point the ÖVP carried on with a group of former
Freedomite members in government. The latter had formed a new
political party dubbed the Alliance (for the) Future (of) Austria (Bündnis
Zukunft Österreich, or BZÖ). As a result, the coalition partner was less
and less able to affect foreign policy decision making other than by
threatening to bring down the government and effectively commit
political suicide. 
The Center-Right’s Embrace of Foreign Security Policy 
A policy area in which the center-right government brought about
steady and substantive change was that of national security policy.
Although many of the initiatives were by themselves too insignificant
to raise much public attention and, in some respects, represented merely
the logical extension of earlier policies, their cumulative effect
amounted to Austria’s integration into the European security and
defense architecture. Nonetheless, the country stopped short of outright
membership in NATO. As in the rest of Europe, the evolution of se-
curity policy in Austria was overshadowed by the events of 11 Septem-
ber and the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.72 
Austria, along with the rest of the European Union, supported the
United States after the terrorist attacks of 9-11, but declared its neu-
trality when the war in Iraq started. Shortly thereafter, this declaration
was withdrawn to “avoid the impression of equidistance” between
Washington and Baghdad.73 Subsequently, Austria tried to stay out of
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the transatlantic quarrels, but refused to grant U.S. war planes the right
to fly through Austrian airspace. The widespread hostility in Austria to
the U.S. intervention in Iraq only solidified the already prevailing
negative views about full membership in the Western military alliance.
As early as May 2000, the government had introduced a new
defense doctrine based on the principle of comprehensive security. In
2002, the chancellery updated this concept by talking about “preventive
security.”74 In line with new foreign policy focus, Austria sent, for first
time, military attachés to Syria and Iran. In 2001, the Schüssel Admini-
stration established a new National Security Council which would report
directly to the chancellery, thus replacing or superseding the previous
assortment of advisory bodies. In the same year, the government also
changed the neutrality clauses in Austrian law to allow for the shipment
of military materials to combatant countries in the context of the EU’s
Common Foreign and Defense Policy (CFSP). The strategic partnership
between the European Union and NATO as envisioned by the Treaty of
Nice resulted in an internal Austrian debate regarding whether the
country’s concept of neutrality had changed to such an extent that the
military could take part in CFSP peace enforcement missions even
without an appropriate UN Security Council mandate. Although the
government eventually backed down on this question, the mere con-
templation of possible Austrian military action outside a UN authorized
mission shows how far Austrian foreign security policy had changed
within a few years.
Undeterred, the Schüssel II government pursued active Austrian
participation in actions and collaboration with EU member states to aid
militarily in the defense of a fellow EU country although it was well
understood that many of the European armed forces involved would
have to rely on NATO assets. Only after fearing losses in regional and
national presidential elections in 2004 did Austria support a Finnish
initiative designed to weaken Britain’s proposal of such unconditional
military support.75 Austria subsequently participated in the newly created
European Defense Agency and announced in 2004 that the country
would also take part in the European Battle Group with Germany and the
Czech Republic. In this manner, Austria could logistically rely on
Germany as a lead nation.76 However, the popularity of neutrality
convinced the Freedom Party and, subsequently in 2004, the ÖVP to
recommit themselves once again to this cherished Austrian doctrine,
although neutrality’s real meaning and practicality had become rather
questionable by that time.
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Austria and the Question of Turkey’s Accession
to the European Union
During Schüssel’s second term, probably no foreign policy position
caused more international stir and was more controversial than Austria’s
stance on the question of Turkish accession to the European Union.77
Given the cultural, geographic, and political distance between Vienna
and Ankara, Austria’s active opposition seemed incomprehensible to
outsiders because expectations assumed that Greece or Cyprus would be
the real obstacles to Turkey’s accession. Moreover, Turkish membership
was expected to affect positively the EU’s defense architecture and,
thus, the relationship with NATO and the United States. Conventional
wisdom said it would provide the European Union with a significant
foothold in the politically sensitive Middle East and serve as a showcase
of how the West could integrate a moderate Islamic country into
alliances. In short, these were all highly important geopolitical questions
that not only extended far beyond Europe, but also affected the political
arena of European defense policy and transatlantic relations in which
Austria was less than a minor player. Even more remarkably, the
Schüssel government spent significant political capital on this issue and
maintained its position in the face of a great deal of international
pressure, including that brought by the United States.78 
The simplistic view of Austria’s actions, reflected in several
international publications, invoked Austria’s historical role as an anti-
Turkish bulwark and made references to the Ottoman sieges of Vienna
in 1529 and 1683.79 Other international commentators had pointed out
that many Christian-conservative politicians such as those in the
Austrian People’s Party regarded the European Union as a Christian club
and did not wish for a Muslim country to join.80 The reality was more
complicated. First, the lingering negative perception of the previous
round of enlargement, in the context of which the government had talked
tough but was unable to deliver, provided the subtext of the Turkish
question. Many in the Alpine nation dreaded the perceived uneven
economic impact and the expected high cost of yet another large but
poor country acceding to the European Union, for which Austrians
assumed their country—as a net payer— would have to pay a dispropor-
tional share. Second, the crucial issue of immigration played a role
because Austria already contained a substantial Turkish population. The
majority of these individuals were guest workers and often not from the
fairly westernized Istanbul, but from the more tradition-bound east and,
thus, appeared culturally rather distinct from the Austrian mainstream.
Following a massive influx of foreigners in the 1990s, especially from
Eastern Europe and the Balkans, immigration had become a hot political
topic that was driven by ever more populist rhetoric. 
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Along with the issue of economic competition, the public discourse
centered on questions of identity and the cultural compatibility of
Turkish immigrants with Austrian and European society. Conservative
politicians appeared especially sensitive to the argument that, in an
increasingly more culturally heterogeneous Union, the ordinary citizens
would feel alienated and, thus, increasingly less attached to the common
European project. As a small country with, historically, an ambivalent
national identity, Austrians appeared particularly susceptible to these
concerns. Always sensitive to the public’s mood, the Schüssel govern-
ment recognized that Austrian approval of its own EU membership
would decline further if Brussels went ahead with Turkish accession so
shortly after the acrimonious debate on East European enlargement.81 
There were two additional factors strengthening Vienna’s determi-
nation to delay or derail Ankara’s bid. For one, there was the question
of Islam, which was indeed an issue for some in a Christian conservative
party and coincided with a curious debate in parts of Austria (and
Germany) about the appropriate size of mosques and the height of
minarets in relation to Christian houses of worship. Secondly, there was
a genuine sense on the part of some in the Austrian civil service that an
even more complex European Union would not only become unwieldy
and de facto ungovernable, but difficult to manage especially for the
smaller states with their lesser resources.82 Sentiments like this gave rise
to the question of how much capacity the European Union truly had to
absorb further members under current circumstances. As a result,
Austria made this an issue and saw to it that the point of the Union’s
“absorption capacity”83 be inserted into EU Council documents. Thus,
when the European Commission announced that Ankara had fulfilled
enough prerequisites to warrant the opening of accession negotiations
and the EU Council was expected to give a green light, Austria refused
to go along. Vienna kept insisting that Turkey be offered an “alterna-
tive” to membership in the form of a “privileged partnership” and
resisted pressure to vote in the affirmative. The British EU Presidency,
which was determined to deliver a positive verdict on Turkey, was
particularly exasperated by the Austrian stance as Foreign Minister Jack
Straw readily admitted.84 Although the Turkish Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdogan was waiting to attend the Council meeting to receive
personally the EU’s go-ahead on 3 October 2005, Schüssel did not
budge. Before making any concessions, he appeared at the very least
determined to await the outcome of regional elections in Styria on the
same weekend, where his party was expecting losses.85 When the
Chancellor finally relented at the end of the summit, the Austrians were
able to secure the concession by the Council that accession talks would
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also begin with Croatia,86 whose future in the European Union Vienna
had always championed.
The fact that the Schüssel government promoted the integration of
“Austria’s largely Roman Catholic neighbor” so heavily, as CNN put
it,87 as well as that of the other Danube and Balkan countries, indicates
the importance not necessarily of religion per se but at least of culture
and heritage in the approach that Austrian conservatives take concerning
European integration. What critics sometimes dismiss as Habsburg
nostalgia and Abendland88 rhetoric has served as source of historical and
cultural identity for tradition-minded Austrians. From this perspective,
it becomes understandable that, at EU gatherings, Schüssel refused to
refer to “Macedonia” by its awkward official UN name of FYROM,
sought to bring Serbia and Montenegro closer to the European Union,
and pushed for moving forward with the Stability and Association
Agreement with Bosnia and Herzegovina. No less than three Austrian
officials served in top EU positions concerning the Balkans,89 which is
in itself an indication of Austria’s expertise about a region with which
the country has seen itself connected through dynastic history. Needless
to say, Schüssel also consistently “championed Kiev’s cause in the
European Council”90; after all, the Ukraine’s westernmost territories
were once part of the Hapsburg orbit and, thus, belong to the same
Mitteleuropa. 
At the Zenith of His Power and Influence—
Schüssel’s Final Years as Chancellor
As the sole master of Austria’s foreign policy, the chancellor began
his second term with more discretion in shaping Austria’s foreign
relations than any Austrian politician since Bruno Kreisky in the 1970s.
After the Freedom Party in parliament was reduced to less than half of
its previous size in 2002 and eventually replaced in the coalition by the
tiny BZÖ, Schüssel’s free hand in foreign policy became even freer. By
the same token, the chancellor’s latitude was also never really
constrained by the members of his own party, all of whom had accepted
that the dramatic reversal of the Conservatives’ fortune was in large
measure owed to their leader’s prowess. 
What is more, the two ÖVP foreign ministers during Schüssel’s
chancellorship were considered political lightweights and unlikely to
undertake independent action. Benita Ferrero-Waldner was amiable and
popular but, as a previous career diplomat, did not have the backing in
the party that her predecessors Mock and Schüssel had enjoyed. In
addition, she came across more as a chief of protocol, a post she had
held with the United Nations, than as the real architect of Austrian
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foreign policy. In 2004, Ferrero-Waldner moved on to become European
Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighborhood
Policy after her failed bid for the Austrian federal presidency. She was
succeeded by Ursula Plassnik, who was even closer to the Chancellor.
Married to a Social Democrat, the new foreign minister had entered
the ÖVP only when she had accepted her position and, thus, depended
entirely on the Chancellor’s protective hand. Plassnik had previously
served as Schüssel’s chief of staff. After a brief stint as ambassador to
Switzerland, she was recalled by Schüssel to take over the foreign
ministry. In the context of European Councils, observers could not help
notice “that the chancellor still regarded her as an official, rather than as
a minister, let alone a peer.”91 Other senior foreign policy officials faired
little better. “Gregor Woschnagg, [who was Austria’s long-serving
Permanent Representative to the EU] was obliged to admit to his
colleague […] that he did not have any influence over Vienna’s
stance.”92
By his second term as chancellor, Schüssel had been on the inter-
national stage for more than seven years and was one of the most
experienced members of the European Council. Enjoying the respect
typically accorded to elder statesmen, the Austrian chancellor had seen
many other European leaders come and go. The culmination and con-
clusion of the decade in which Wolfgang Schüssel presided directly or
indirectly over Austria’s foreign policy was the country’s second EU
presidency in 2006. In this context, Vienna hosted both the Latin
American-EU summit and U.S. President George W. Bush. Chaired by
the Austrian chancellor, sixty government delegations representing
twenty-seven EU and thirty-three Latin American and Caribbean coun-
tries visited the capital, which was the largest diplomatic gathering since
the Congress of Vienna. The annual EU meeting with the U.S. president
was understandably another highpoint during the Austrian presidency,
not only because this was the first time in more than two decades that a
sitting U.S. head of state visited the country, but Bush also appeared
“more disposed to engage the Union in a serious dialogue than his first
administration.”93 
President George W. Bush and Chancellor
Wolfgang Schüssel meet during the U.S.–EU
summit meeting in Vienna on June 21, 2006.
picture credits:
HOPI-MEDIA Medienservice GmbH, Vienna
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Schüssel approached the six months of presiding over the European
Council with a meticulously prepared, comprehensive, and detailed
agenda laid out in a White Book. He was also fortunate in that one of the
most intractable issues, the EU’s new financial perspective, had been
unexpectedly resolved in the final days of the UK presidency. With a
view to the domestic audience and the upcoming national elections,
Schüssel’s program emphasized creating jobs and growth and made
specific references to the European social model after what Ludlow
termed “six months of abrasive ‘Anglo-Saxon’ rhetoric.”94 The so-called
values debate, which the Austrian government hoped would rebuild
confidence in the European project after the French and Dutch “no”
votes on the EU’s constitutional treaty, stressed classical Austrian
themes such as subsidiarity and better regulation. Schüssel also flexed
his muscles when other delegations objected to references in the
Austrian presidency’s draft proposal on enlargement that qualified
“absorption capacity” as a “criterion.”95 On this issue, he initially re-
mained adamant and “allowed his critics to bash their heads against
what appeared to be a brick wall.”96 In the course of the negotiations, the
Austrian chancellor made what appeared to be some tactical concessions
and struck a conciliatory note by stressing language that the Council
would “honor existing commitments.” What mattered both to him and
in Austrian public opinion were frequent references to the “present and
future perception of enlargement” and assurances that public opinion
“must in the future be taken into account when the European Council
decides on how far and how fast to go with enlargement.”97 
Generally, Schüssel conducted himself ably and won plaudits for his
commanding presence during Austria’s EU Presidency. The latter was
considered overall a success under difficult circumstances, for the Union
was still reeling from internal divisions and seeking to recover from the
rejection of the Lisbon Treaty. However, Schüssel’s handling of the
Council received other than praise; insiders also noted that “his
management style placed unnecessary strains on the system” and that his
constant assertions of “his own authority undermined the authority of
some of his closest” (and ablest) advisors.98 It was also pointed out that
his impatience with normal procedure meant that “on occasions quality
was sacrificed” and that he did not get some of the things he most
wanted because “his partners resented the pressure” to which they were
subjected.99 In the end, however, the government’s performance at
presiding over the European Council mattered little to the Austrian
electorate whose decision to turn against the Schüssel administration
was driven by domestic political considerations.
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Conclusion
The strengths and weaknesses of Schüssel in his handling of the EU
presidency mirror his contradictory record in Austrian foreign policy.
On the one hand, he has shown a great mastery of detail and con-
siderable tactical prowess and tenacity, as well as a keen sense of public
opinion and atmospherics. Moreover, he usually appeared personally
affable and approachable. On the other, he needlessly provoked others
into stiffening their resolve and clung for too long to indefensible
positions. He also acquired a reputation of supreme self-confidence
bordering on arrogance, making him impervious to the sound advice of
others. Thus, despite impressive tactical victories, his record in foreign
policy contains some strategic blunders. 
Schüssel presided over the Alpine nation’s foreign relations in a
period of transition and insecurity during which the country was seeking
a new role for itself while struggling to define its identity in an inte-
grated Europe and a globalizing world. It was a decade when Austria’s
foreign policy was also increasingly overshadowed by a populist dis-
course in which the external environment was perceived as consisting
primarily of threats. Three aspects seem particularly noteworthy in this
context. First, Schüssel did little to mitigate the negative perception of
all things foreign. In fact, both his rhetoric and, more often, his silence
even exacerbated these latent tendencies in Austrian public opinion. He
was largely unable to communicate effectively the purpose of the
country’s EU integration and its benefits. Yet, while Schüssel may not
have tried hard enough to change Austrian attitudes toward Europe, he
needs to be credited with trying to sensitize the European Union more
to the perceptions of ordinary Europeans. 
Second, during Schüssel’s tenure as the architect of Austria’s
foreign policy, the country often stood alone. Unable to forge lasting
partnerships, at odds even with some of its neighbors, and frequently
opposed by Brussels and a majority of EU member states, Austria was
forced into humiliating retreats after the country had staked out
obviously hopeless positions. The international isolation of the Austrian
government was worst during the international boycott in 2000. Yet this
was also the moment of one of Schüssel’s greatest triumphs. There were
also other occasions in which either the chancellor’s tenacity paid off or
the European Union moved closer to the Austrian position. The French
and German governments, for example, became arguably more skeptical
about Turkish accession, and the European Union signaled it would
recognize the particularly sensitive nature of trans-Alpine road traffic
and, thus, the need for greater regulation.
Third, under Schüssel, foreign policy took a backseat to a domestic
political agenda that intended to break the power of the Austrian Social
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Democrats and undo their influence on the national economy. This is not
to say that external relations were not very important to the chancellor,
but what mattered more was their impact on domestic politics.
Schüssel’s conservatively accented foreign policy was most visible in
foreign security and defense policy, whose expansion contrasted sharply
with the complete de-emphasis of development policy. The latter had
been an important Social Democratic objective until the 1980s. As
former secretary general of the Austrian Economic Chamber, Schüssel
undoubtedly welcomed the anti-dirigiste bent of European integration.
It was a means of delivering Austria from the corset of labor-imposed
regulations that he regarded as stifling. In this, the chancellor was un-
doubtedly a champion of Europe. Nonetheless, Schüssel was no
Thatcherite free marketeer. In fact, by being steeped in the Christian
Social tradition, he also recognized the limits of any deregulatory
agenda in the interest of social harmony and economic security. 
To the ÖVP leader, Europe appeared to be a means to other ends,
not an end in itself. In this, Schüssel, by his own admission100 appears
different not only from statesmen like Helmut Kohl and Jacques Delors,
but also from his predecessors like Erhard Busek and even Alois Mock.
Whether, for example, his insistence on “absorption capacity” merely
reflects concern about good government, or shows his sensitivity to
public opinion, or is in reality an expression of a narrow ethno-cultural
understanding of Europe, or combines all three is difficult to say. In any
case, the chancellor’s own record betrays an ambivalence toward foreign
relations that seems to match that of his population. 
Yet Schüssel outlasted or outsmarted most of his domestic political
opponents and international colleagues. He may not have endeared
himself to all, but he undoubtedly earned the respect of many of his
peers. We may, therefore, agree with Peter Ludlow when he writes that
Wolfgang Schüssel was “undoubtedly one of the most interesting
members of the […] European Council”101 and as such one of the most
impressive and politically successful political leaders in modern
Austrian history.
Notes
152 The Schüssel Era in Austria
5. Mock too, was in a coalition with the stronger Social Democrats and was likewise
confronted with harsh international criticism of Austria, in that case, for having elected
Kurt Waldheim president.
6. Ludlow, “European Council,” 5.
7. Peter Pelinka, Wolfgang Schüssel—Eine politische Biografie (Vienna: Ueberreuter,
2003), 126-28.
8. It is also remarkable that Mock and Schüssel represented two opposing wings of the
party in that the latter had been a top functionary representing business and employer
interests from 1975 to 1991, whereas the former came from the ÖVP’s Federation of
Workers and Employees.
9. In these years, Vienna became a seat of the United Nations and the permanent host to
the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. For most of the decade, Austria
remained a focal point of international diplomacy, hosting a staggering array of high-
level visitors and important conferences, while Austrian diplomats and politicians, with
Kreisky at the center, played a significant role in numerous international initiatives.
10. Washington, for example, feared with some justification that sensitive U.S. tech-
nology circumvented stringent export controls by being shipped to Eastern Europe
through Austria.
11. John Luchak, “Amerikanisch-österreichische Beziehungen von 1955 bis 1985:
Neutralität und der Ost-West-Konflikt,” Ph.D. diss., University of Vienna, 1987, 229.
12. Paul Luif, On The Road to Brussels—The Political Dimension of Austria’s, Fin-
land’s, and Sweden’s Accession to the European Union (Vienna: Braunmüller, 1995),
191.
13. Aside from the important question of the country’s international status as a neutral
nation, the Austrian cabinet had insisted on the following additional conditions: Austria’s
federal character had to remain intact, the economic competition in the Single Market
was not to affect Austria’s social system, the domestic environmental standards and the
“active environmental policy” would have to be maintained, “nationwide family far-
ming” was to be protected, and the lingering dispute over international transit traffic
through Austria would need to be resolved outside the accession framework. Heinrich
Schneider, “Gerader Weg zum klaren Ziel? Die Republik Österreich auf dem Weg in die
Europäische Union,” Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft 23.1 (1994): 5-
20, here 5.
14. Initially, the European Union opposed these reservations conveying its opinion to
Austria officially in an avis issued on 31 July 1991. Brussels feared that Austria’s neutral
status could conflict with article J(8)2 of the European Union Treaty requiring unanimity
for a resolution on joint action related to the common defense policy. Austria’s neutrality
also threatened plans concerning the integration of the West European Union (WEU)
into the European Union. In long negotiations with Brussels, Austria subsequently
reduced the concept of neutrality to the “military core” (Herbert Hausmaninger, The
Austrian Legal System [Vienna: Manz, 1998], 84), which the European Union eventually
accepted in 1994. 
15. It also reflected the tensions, especially manifest in the run-up to the 1989 national
elections, between the two government parties as labor interests remained both pro-
foundly skeptical of the EU/EC’s deregulatory agenda and wedded to the concept of
Austrian neutrality.
16. Helmut Kramer, “Strukturentwicklung der Außenpolitik (1945-2005),” in Politik in
Österreich—Das Handbuch, ed. Herbert Dachs et al. (Vienna: Manz, 2006), 807-37.
153
17. Christian Schaller, “‘Ja’ oder ‘Nein’ zu ‘Europa’? Die österreichische Debatte im
Vorfeld der  Rekonstruktionsversuch,” in EU-Referndum. Zur Praxis direkter Demo-
kratie in Österreich, ed. Anton Pelinka (Vienna: Signum Verlag, 1994) 49-85; Heinrich
Schneider,  Alleingang nach Brüssel: Österreichs EG-Politik. (Bonn: Europa Union Ver-
lag, 1990); Reinhard Heinisch, “Salvation and Villain: The Role of Europe in Austrian
Politics and the Rise of the radical Right,” Politique européenne 14 (Autumn 2004): 165-
87; Paul Luif, On The Road to Brussels; Reinhard Heinisch, Populism, Proporz and
Pariah—Austria Turns Right: Austrian Political Change, Its Causes and Repercussions
(Huntington, NY: Nova Science, 2002).
18. Kramer, “Strukturentwicklung der Außenpolitik,” 827.
19. Mock, Alois, ed., Das Balkan-Dossier: Der Aggressionskrieg in Ex-Jugoslawien—
Perspektiven für die Zukunft (Vienna: Signum, 1997).
20. Kramer, “Strukturentwicklung der Außenpolitik,” 831.
21. Reinhard Heinisch, “Austria—Confronting Controversy,” in The European Union
and the Member States, eds. Eleanor E. Zeff and Ellen B. Pirro (Boulder CO: Lynne
Rienner, 2001).
22. Fritz Plasser and Peter Ulram, “Meinungstrends, Mobilisierung und Motivlagen bei
der Volksabstimmung über den EU-Beitritt,” in EU-Referndum: Zur Praxis direkter
Demokratie in Österreich, ed. Anton Pelinka (Vienna: Signum Verlag, 1994): 87-119.
23. Otmar Höll and Sonja Puntscher-Riekmann, eds., The Austrian Presidency of the
European Union: Assessment and Perspectives (Laxenburg: Laxenburg Working Papers,
1999).
24. Gerald Hinteregger, “Wo ist die Ost-Kompetenz Österreich’s?” Europäische Rund-
schau 26.4 (1998): 3-24; Michael Gehler, Der lange Weg nach Europa: Österreich vom
Ende der Monarchie bis zur EU, vol. 1, Darstellung (Innsbruck: Studienverlag, 2002);
Helmut Lang, Die österreichische EU-Rastpräsidentschaft 1998 (Frankfurt: P. Lang
Verlag, 2002).
25. Kramer, “Strukturentwicklung der Außenpolitik,” 831.
26. Ibid., 831-32.
27. Jan Stankovsky, “EU-Erweiterung: Chances und Herausforderungen für die
österreichische Wirtschaft,” in Europäisierung der österreichischen Politik—Kon-
sequenzen der EU-Mitgliedschaft, ed. Heinrich Neisser and Sonja Puntscher-Riekmann
(Vienna: WUV, 2002), 319-67, here 320.
28. This transport regiment consisting of 250 soldiers was deployed near Sarajevo and
represented the first such mission by the Austrian Army. It was especially sensitive for
Austria as a neutral country that the overall command lay with a U.S. and, thus, NATO
commander.
29. Helmut Kramer and Vedran Dzihic, Die Kosovo-Bilanz—Scheitert die internationale
Gemeinschaft? (Vienna: LIT Verlag, 2005).
30. Petritsch was the EU’s chief negotiator during the Rambouillet Conference in 1999
designed to defuse the Kosovo crisis.
31. Busek became special EU coordinator for the Stability Pact with Southeastern
Europe.
32. Following the UN World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in 2002, Austria
played a leading role in the “Network Human Security,” which seeks to enhance the
cooperation between governments, NGOs, and international scholars in the area of
human rights.
154 The Schüssel Era in Austria
33. Austria was entrusted with the development of a proposal for a convention on the
prohibition.
34. Paul Luif, “Wandel der österreichischen Neutralität—Ein sicherheitspolitischer
Trittbrettfahrer,” Working Paper 18 (Vienna:  ÖJIP, 1998), 363.
35. The relations between Austria and Israel had been especially sensitive ever since the
Waldheim affair in 1986 when Tel Aviv had recalled its ambassador from Vienna. After
Tomas Klestil became president in 1992 and after both he and Chancellor Vranitzky had
expressed remorse and regret for the nation’s role in the Holocaust, bilateral relations
were normalized. Nonetheless, Israel continued to monitor the activities of Haider and
the FPÖ very closely.
36. Der Standard, 11 Oct. 1999.
37. Margaretha Kopeinig and Christoph Kotanko, Eine europäische Affäre: Der Weisen-
Bericht und die Sanktionen gegen Österreich (Vienna: Czernin Verlag, 2000), 17.
38. He described the French President Jacques Chirac as someone “who had made every
mistake one could possible make” (Kleine Zeitung, 30 Jan. 2000). Later he was also to
call Chirac “a pocket Napoleon” (Der Standard, 27 Feb. 2000). During the same event
in January, Haider referred to the Belgian government as “corrupt,” having “tolerated
pedophiles” (ibid). One day later, he gave an interview to the Italian daily Corriere della
Sera, in which he was quoted as warning against the EU’s enlargement and implicitly
linking Austria’s position on Slovenia’s accession to the European Union with that
country’s settlement of the claims of expelled ethnic Germans (Der Standard, 31 Jan.
2000).
39. Kopeining and Kotanko, Eine europäische Affäre, 23.
40. Heinrich Schneider, “Österreich in Acht und Bann: Ein Schritt zur politisch inte-
grierten Wertegemeinschaft,” Integration 23.2 (2000): 120-48; Kopeinig and Kotanko,
Eine europäische Affäre.
41. While Belgian Foreign Minister Louis Michel (cf. Ian Black “Europe Rallies Against
Haider Coalition,” The Guardian, 4 Feb. 2000) vowed to “smash this government as
quickly as possible” and President Chirac declared to maintain the sanction’s regime as
long as an “extremist, xenophobic party is in the government,” EU Commission
President Romano Prodi sent a telegram congratulating Schüssel and expressing his
concern but also his hopes for “constructive cooperation” (Kopeinig and Kotanko, Eine
europäische Affäre, 25).
42. “An Interview with the Secretary of State,” The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, PBS, 7
Feb. 2000.
43. Reinhard Heinisch, “Success in Opposition—Failure in Government: Exploring the
Performance of the Austrian Freedom Party and other European Right-wing Populist
Parties in Public Office,” West European Politics 26.3 (2003): 91-130.
44. Peter Pernthaler and Peter Hilpold, “Sanktionen als Instrument der Politikkontrolle—
der Fall Österreich,” Integration 23.2 (2000): 105-19.
45. Some 66 percent of Austrians stated they were outraged by the sanctions. Naturally,
the ratio was highest among conservative (82 percent) and freedom voters (84 percent)
while relatively lowest among Green (47 percent) and Social Democratic supporters (37
percent). About one third (35 percent) did not believe in a quick end of the international
boycott. However, only 19 percent wanted Austria to leave the Union, although that
percentage (43 percent) was noticeably higher among FPÖ sympathizers (Der Standard,
4 March 2000).
155
46. See for example: “In the meantime, the EU’s decision to speak as one, against one
of its own, is having its own fallout. It has given birth to a new Euroskepticism” […] The
Change in the mood is a direct response to the heavy-handed tactics of the EU leadership
in Brussels” (The Washington Post, National Weekly Edition, 14 Feb. 2000, 26B).
“Haider and the Hypocrites: The Inclusion of a Slick and Sickening Fascist in the
Democratically Elected Government of Austria has Provoked a Peculiar Season of Over-
Reaction and Under-Reaction” (New Republic, 21 Feb. 2000). “[…T]he best antidote the
EU member states could offer against Jörg Haider would be to make good on their own
recent lofty rhetoric, supplementing their existing anti-immigration statutes with a
genuine commitment to combating xenophobia at home” (Civilization, April/May 2000:
44). “’The Perils of Austracism’ […] It is time the European Union ended its absurd
isolation of Austria. Divorce in haste, repent at leisure […] it is embarrassing, because
the fourteen are already starting to squirm. They must now either climb down or risk
getting into an even bigger mess […]” (Economist, 17 June 2000: 20).
47. When, for example, the Austrian Minister of Social Affairs, Elisabeth Sickl, spoke
at the EU’s first ministerial meeting after the boycott was launched, the French and
Belgian ministers walked out. Subsequently, also the senior Italian official (Italy had sent
no minister at all) left demonstratively, resulting in the cancellation of the ministerial
photo opportunity and planned social agenda. At the EU summit in Freira, Portugal,
there was an embarrassing discussion about who would be standing next to whom when
the official photograph was taken. Then, at the Lisbon Council meeting, all the other
countries shunned the hotel in which the Austrian delegation stayed for fear one might
run into FPÖ politicians in an elevator or corridor. A request by the Austrian Chancellor
to discuss the boycott in the formal meetings was rejected by the EU-14.
48. At an EU meeting, delegates appeared wearing a button with a crossed-out bow-tie,
the trademark of the Austrian Chancellor, who subsequently switched to regular ties.
49. Upon learning that the Austrian Minister of Defense was a member of the FPÖ, his
Belgian counterpart Andre Flahaut protested at the Council meeting in Sintra, Portugal,
and subsequently ordered all bilateral military contacts between Austria and Belgium
suspended. German Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping expressed support for his
Belgian counterpart and criticized especially the ÖVP for “having broken their promise
to go into opposition.” (Der Standard, 28 February 2000).
50. The government’s catalogue included all the following. 1) Organizing opinion
surveys in all member countries coordinated by an Austrian survey research institute, the
results of which greatly strengthened the position of the Austrian government because
the poll suggested majorities in each of the 14-EU countries favored an end to the
sanctions. 2) The Austrian foreign ministry, through its embassies and consulates, began
an increased information campaign about the political situation in Austria and the
government’s policies. The government also announced it was compiling a com-
prehensive report on the state of racism, anti-Semitism, and anti-foreigner sentiments in
Austria. 3) The provincial governments were asked to reach out especially across their
borders to neighboring regions. 4) The government also sought to organize special
“Austria days” in each of the fourteen member countries, particularly in Paris, London,
and Madrid. These events coincided with visits by the Austrian foreign minister to maxi-
mize media attention. For the fall of 2000, the government planned a special “interna-
tional media action day.” 5) The government’s plan also foresaw activating special
international elite networks of “friends of Austria,” such as Austrians living abroad or
members of Austria clubs and various cultural societies. 6) A host of measures aimed at
preventing EU institutions from conducting business as usual. Austria thus continued to
demand that the sanctions be placed on the agenda of Council meetings. Moreover, the
Austrian chancellor traveled to Brussels in July, forcing a meeting with Commission
President Romano Prodi.
156 The Schüssel Era in Austria
51. Profil, 31 July 2000.
52. There was only one nation, France, in which a relative majority (42 percent vs. 40
percent) felt that the ÖVP-FPÖ government represented a danger to democracy and
human rights in Austria. In thirteen of fourteen member nations, as well as in
Switzerland, more than 50 percent of the people surveyed felt the boycott should be
lifted (but vigilance maintained). These sentiments were most pronounced in the small
countries of Greece (74 percent), Denmark (73 percent), Switzerland (71 percent), and
Finland (68 percent), where the concern about outside intrusion was traditionally high.
Among the big four member states, the populations of Germany (72 percent) and Italy
(65 percent) were noticeably more supportive of an end to the sanctions than those in the
UK (51 percent) and France (46 percent) (Der Standard, 14 June 2000).
53. Profil, 21 Aug. 2000, p. 23.
54. Profil, 10 July 2000, p. 26; Profil, 31 July 2000, pp. 30-31.
55. Kopeining and Kotanko, Eine europäische Affär, 31.
56. The report’s conclusions were as follows (excepts): “The legal situation of applicants
for asylum is similar to that in other European Union countries. In our assessment the
current government continues Austria’s traditionally open policy towards refugees. […]
As in other European Union countries such a refugee rate creates problems of social
integration. We have however not discovered any indications that the new Austrian
government has deviated from the principles followed by its predecessors.” (Martti
Ahtisaari et al., Report,  adopted in Paris on 8 Sept. 2000, sec. 40, p. 14, http://
www.mpil.de/shared/data/pdf/report.pdf (accessed 22 Nov. 2008). “[…] It can be stated
that the policy of the Austrian government as to immigration shows a commitment to
common European values” (Ahtisaari et al., Report, sec. 51, p. 17). The three wise men
acknowledged also the existence of “areas with certain problems,” which included
“extremely short periods for appealing asylum decisions” (a practice amended after a
ruling by Austria’s Constitutional Court in 1998), the great reliance on charitable
organizations to care for refugees, detaining applicants “even without the realistic
possibility of returning them to a third country or their country of origin,” and “holding
a relatively high number of minors in detention” (Ahtisaari et al., Report, sec. 14, p. 14).
The report dedicated an extensive part of the document to an “evaluation of the political
nature of the FPÖ” and concluded it was a “right-wing populist party with extremist
expressions” (Ahtisaari et al., Report, sec. 92, p. 27), but that “[w]e have gained the
impression that the overall performance of the Ministers of the FPÖ in government since
February 2000 cannot be generally criticized” (Ahtisaari et al., Report, sec.104, p. 30).
About the sanctions, the wise men’s committee clearly stated that they had outlived their
purpose: “It is our opinion however that the measures taken by the XIV Members States,
if continued, would become counterproductive and should therefore be ended. The
measures have already stirred up nationalist feelings in the country, as they have in some
cases been wrongly understood as sanctions directed against Austrian citizens” (Ahtisaari
et al., Report, sec. 116, p. 33).
57. The were media reports that Frowein and Ahtisaari may have favored a harsher
verdict concerning Austria and that there had been disagreements about the final version
of the report. In order to create a fait accompli, Oreja allegedly leaked the report to the
media (Kopeinig and Kotanko, Eine europäische Affäre, 33).
58. See “EU Lifts Sanctions Against Austria,” 12 Sept. 2000, http://www.CNN.com/
2000/WORLD/europe/09/12/vienna.eu.02/index.html (accessed 15 Nov. 2008).
59. Anselm Skuhra and Michael Merlingen, “Der österreichische Vorsitz der OSZE—Ein
Rückblick,” in OSZE-Jahrbuch, ed. Institut für Friedensforschung (Hamburg: U of Ham-
burg P, 2001).
157
60. Gerda Falkner, “The EU 14’s “Sanctions” Against Austria: Sense and Nonsense,”
European Community Studies Review 14.1 (2001): 14-20, here 15.
61. See the proposal by the Austrian Delegation concerning Articles 7 and 46 of the EU
Nice Treaty Negotiations,  CONFER 4782/00 ANNEX 2 Brussles, 6 September 2000.
62. Der Standard Online, 14 April 2002.
63. Der Standard Online, 8 April 2002.
64. Profil, 25 Sept. 2000, p. 33.
65. Der Standard Online, 2 Sept. 2002.
66. Profil, 27 Oct. 2000, p. 64.
67. The Economist, 2 Sept. 2000, p. 44. It should also be pointed out that the plant was
not without controversy in the Czech Republic itself and was built to a standard not as
advanced as that in Western Europe. Points of Austrian criticism were the containment
shell of the reactor bloc and the heat exchange system, which, in the case of an accident,
were said to allow internal contamination to reach the outside world.
68. Lázló Kiss et al., “Die Regionale Partnerschaft: Subregionale Zussammenarbeit in
der Mitte Europas,” Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft 32.1 (2003): 57-
75.
69. While government representatives were also noticeably absent from internationally
well-attended events held in memory of the victims of Fascism (for example, a
Mauthausen commemoration in May 2001, the anniversary of the Lidice massacre), FPÖ
officials nonetheless found time to attend pan-Germanic manifestations and right-wing
vigils. A high-ranking Freedom official even likened Austria’s postwar occupation to the
Nazi regime, referring to the Allies as “tyrants” (Der Standard Online, 11 July 2002,
http://derstandard.at/ (accessed  15 Nov. 2008 ).
70. For examples, see Max Preglau, “Rechtsextrem oder Postmodern? Über Rhetorik,
Programmatik und Interaktionsformen der FPÖ und der FPÖVP-Koalition,” unpublished
manuscript  (Innsbruck: U of Innsbruck, 2002). 
71. Der Standard Online, 1 Jan. 2002, http://derstandard.at/ (accessed 15 Nov. 2008).
72. Specifically after the attacks in Madrid on 11 March 2004, Vienna stated that in cases
of terrorism and in solidarity with other European nations, it would make its military
resources available since such threats involved non-state actors and therefore did not
affect the country’s constitutional restrictions on neutrality.
73. Anselm Skuhra, “Österreichische Sicherheitspolitik,” in Politik in Österreich—Das
Handbuch,  ed. Herbert Dachs et al. (Vienna: Manz, 2006), 838-61, here 856.
74. Ibid., 855.
75. Paul Luif, “Österreich,” in Jahrbuch der europäischen Integration 2003/2004, ed.
Werner Weidenfeld und Wolfgang Wessels (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2004), 367-70, here
369.
76. Anselm Skuhra, “Österreichische Sicherheitspolitik,” 857.
77. “EU ‘on Precipice’ over Turkey,” CNN, 3 Oct. 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/
WORLD/europe/10/03/eu.turkeytalks0800/index.html (accessed 15 Nov. 2008).
78. “EU warns Austria on Turks,” The Guardian, 1 Oct. 2005.
79. Rainer Hermann, “Feiertag für Chauvinisten” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 3 Oct.
2005, http://www.faz.net/s/RubDDBDABB9457A437BAA85A49C26FB23A0/Doc~
158 The Schüssel Era in Austria
E57B43A0062B14EFDB26D7638D3EE98FB~ATpl~Ecommon~Scontent.html
(accessed 15 November 2008).
80. “Schüssels kroatische Karte,” Berliner Zeitung, 5 Oct. 2005.
81. “Austria Repeats Turkey Objections,” BBC News, 1 Oct. 2005, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/europe/4299626.stm (accessed 15 Nov. 2008).
82. In the context of a different research project, this author conducted structured
interviews with Austrian civil servants in preparation for the second Austrian EU
Presidency in the context of which ministerial officials complained repeatedly that they
already had to attend some eighty bilateral and multilateral preparatory meetings which
were a strain on a small civil service.
83. Peter Ludlow, “Dealing with Turkey—The European Council of 16-17 December
2004,” EuroComment Briefing Note No. 3.7 (Feb. 2005): 1-56, here 39.
84. UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw in meetings with his Austrian counterpart stated:
“It is a frustrating situation but I hope and pray that we may be able to reach agreement.”
(Vincent Boland and Daniel Dombey, “Straw Holds Out Hope for Turkey’s EU Entry
Talks,” Financial Times, 2 Oct. 2005, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e7750a02-3369-11da-
bd49-00000e2511c8.html [accessed 15 Nov. 2008.])
85. The Conservatives not only lost 8.7 percent and the governorship in Styria, but also
expected heavy losses in the upcoming votes in Burgenland and Vienna. 
86. Membership talks with Croatia had been suspended after the chief prosecutor of the
international war crimes tribunal on former Yugoslavia ruled that Zagreb was failing to
help track down an indicted war criminal General Ante Gotovina. The European Union
made the question of cooperation with the tribunal in The Hague a condition for starting
entry talks.
87. “EU ‘on Precipice’ over Turkey,” CNN, 3 Oct. 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/
WORLD/europe/10/03/eu.turkeytalks0800/index.html (accessed 15 Nov. 2008).
88. Referring to an exclusive Christian/Western “occidental” conception of Europe. 
89. Stefan Lehne is Javier Solana’s Balkan coordinator, Albert Rohan serves as Stability
Pact Coordinator Ahtisaari’s number two, and Erhard Busek had previously been the
EU’s Special Coordinator of the Stability Pact.
90. Peter Ludlow, “The Austrian Presidency of the EU,” EuroComment Briefing Note
4.1 (Dec. 2005): 1-31.
91. Ludlow, “European Council,” 5.
92. Ibid., 2-3.
93. Ludlow, “Austrian Presidency,” 25.
94. Ibid., 5. 





100. Cf. Datum, July 2008: 27-31.
101. Ibid., 67. 
II. POLICIES AND POLICY CHANGES
Wolfgang Schüssel and Austrian Foreign Policy
Otmar Höll1
Introduction
Two decades after the end of the Cold War, two major processes
characterize the still ongoing transformation of the global and European
political landscape. First is the process of globalization and, strongly
interlinked with it, an ever increasing socioeconomic and political
interdependence of all states, as well as new and challenging security
threats. Second is the continuing emergence of an international system
of cooperation that will be more multilateral than those witnessed during
the last century. For a small state like Austria, which since the end of
World War II has tried hard to come to grips with the uneasy task “to
balance between autonomy and dependence” as Peter Katzenstein put it,2
full membership in the European Union (EU) was the logical and
necessary step forward to avoid economic and political marginalization
in a globalizing world. So when Austria joined the supranational Union
in 1995, a completely new chapter of its foreign relations had been
opened.3 It had become “part of a greater political whole,” as then-
Federal President Thomas Klestil said in his speech on the Vienna
Heldenplatz on 1 July 1998; a new era of foreign policy under com-
pletely different political frameworks had begun. 
So when Wolfgang Schüssel took over the Foreign Ministry from
Alois Mock on 4 May 1995,4 the international environment as well as
the fundamental constraints of Austrian foreign policy had changed
completely in legal and political terms. That makes it difficult to
compare Schüssel’s foreign policy to those of the two other remarkable
“eras” of Austrian foreign policy under Bruno Kreisky and Alois Mock.5
A great part of Austria’s former national “foreign policy” was now
transformed into “European domestic policy.”6 What made Austria’s
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voice and impact in the international arena more important—having
become a recognized member of a global economic and political
group—became less visible at home: increasingly, Austrian foreign
policy and, to some extent, security policy have been merged into a
“common” policy of the Union, which means discussing new ideas and
initiatives first in Brussels with representatives of the other members
rather than at an early stage with the public at home. EU membership
and the Partnership for Peace agreement (PfP) with the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) in February 1995 (and PfP “plus” in
November 1996) predictably had an additional impact on downgrading
the substance of Austria’s (previously “permanent”) neutrality, which
had served the country well during the long period of the Second
Republic. In this period, both abolishing the status of neutrality and
eventually seeking NATO membership were seriously and contro-
versially discussed by political elites, with some repercussions in the
media and in the general public, but these issues are not likely to pop up
again in the foreseeable future. 
Schüssel, who was not a “born” foreign affairs professional like
Kreisky or Mock whose brains and hearts were intertwined with this
specific field of politics, suffered no disadvantage due to this fact. As a
highly intelligent and pragmatic professional, he quickly learned how to
make optimal use of the complicated, sometimes obstinate, institutional
setting of the Austrian Foreign Ministry and to profit from the
sophisticated knowledge of those collaborators and advisors he carefully
chose. He had no specific mission or long-term vision for a particular
Austrian foreign policy besides the European approach. The non-
European world or the United Nations were of minor interest for him.
His understanding of how to deal with foreign policy was mainly limited
to strategic considerations: to represent Austrian interests abroad as well
as possible and to act in a highly efficient and solution-oriented manner.
His era was full of ups and downs; when he became chancellor in 2000,
like others before him, he dominated Austrian foreign policy after he
had stepped down as foreign minister. So we can say that his “era” of
foreign policy lasted from 1995 until 2006, when his time in the
Chancellery ended. Will this “Schüssel era” of foreign policy prevail as
being worth remembering in the critical assessments of future
historians? On this question there is some doubt; some say that
Wolfgang Schüssel will be remembered as a politician who framed and
shaped Austria in the first years of the twenty-first century, especially
as Austrian chancellor, but not in the same way as he did while serving
as foreign minister.
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The First Phase: 
Continuity and Adaptation (1995-2000)
When in 1995 Austria joined the European Union, its institutional
structures had already been evolving for more than four decades, which
required Austria to undertake a high amount of institutional, strategic,
and political adaptation of its internal political and administrative fabric.
In adjusting the domestic decision-making structures to EU membership,
Austria had to tackle three major problems: first, the coordination of
EU-related governmental policy and governmental decision-making
processes; second, the involvement of the nine federal provinces
(Bundesländer) into decision-making processes (Austria is a federal
state); and third, cooperation with and scrutiny by parliament. 
However, this process had already begun in a broad way before
accession to the European Union and resulted in a compensation
agreement between the Federal State and the nine provinces for the
losses of competencies due to EU membership,7 giving the social
partners the legal right to obtain all relevant information related to the
EU accession process. It also resulted in the adaptation of decision-
making processes and institutions in the ministries and the revision
(down-grading) of Austria’s status as a permanently neutral country.8
Since then, Article 23f (1) allows participation in economic sanctions,
among other things. Later, new functions were extended to include the
more far-reaching Petersburg tasks. From 1995 until February 2000, the
chancellor and the minister of foreign affairs hailed from different
parties, the SPÖ and ÖVP, which usually complicated things. Therefore,
the two parties arranged a system of complete formal equality between
the political parties in the Coalition Agreement of 1996. Thus
coordination of EU-related ministerial policy and decision making was
done jointly—although often reluctantly—by the Chancellery and the
Foreign Ministry. Also, the provinces were strongly involved into the
decision-making processes, and cooperation with and scrutiny by the
Parliament was adopted.9 
When Wolfgang Schüssel took over the Foreign Ministry, he
somehow “inherited” the foreign agenda from his predecessor, Alois
Mock, and only gradually got more and more involved in its complex
matter. His foreign policy activities during the first two years followed
the previous path set by Mock. Schüssel, leader of the Austrian People’s
Party (Österreichische Volkspartei, or ÖVP) since 1997 and now vice-
chancellor, was charged with a heavy working load and chose Benita
Ferrero-Waldner as his state secretary for the Foreign Ministry, to share
at least some of the “daily work.” He took part in the meetings of the
General Affairs Council and the European Summits and showed an
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impressive record in quickly understanding, participating in, and hand-
ling multilateral negotiation processes. 
As a new member of the Union, Austria in this period broadened its
foreign economic relations. Austria was a partner in EU cooperation
agreements with politically and economically interesting partners in
many parts of the world, including Asia and Latin America, and was a
stake-holder in the so-called European agreements in the Central and
Eastern European regions. In 1996, Austria acceded also to the Lomé IV
Agreement with African, Caribbean, and Pacific States. Austrian
representatives were actively involved in the preparations and negotia-
tion meetings that led to the highly important Amsterdam Treaty of
October 1997 (in force since May 1999). Austrian proposals focused
especially on the topics of the environment, fundamental rights, and
equal treatment.10
The Highlight: First Presidency of the Union
Austria in the second half of 1998 was the first country of the three
who had become EU member states (together with Finland and Sweden)
in the fourth enlargement round to take over the presidency of the
Union.11 Especially for small states, assuming the presidency of the
European Union is a complicated and prestigious matter. Depending on
the pillars of the Union, the respective policy field, and events in the
international environment, presidencies have different rights and roles.
Their formal task is to manage the Council’s business, to act as the
spokesperson of the Council and of the Union as a whole, and to initiate,
coordinate, and implement policy, especially in the political fields of the
second and third pillar. Austria had to preside over little less than fifty
ministerial conferences, and approximately 1,500 technical meetings,
which was a heavy workload for a small country. But even more tricky
are the political functions for presidencies, like acting as neutral brokers
to find consensus or majorities in cases where decision-making pro-
cesses are blocked. Presidencies also have a symbolic function; they are
paramount for the way Europeans perceive the Union, and they have an
integrative function for the whole Union. Thus they should try to
mobilize interest and awareness in member states for common tasks and
in doing so strengthen identification with the Union and bring about
socialization of citizens and political elites. 
Austria assumed its first presidency at a decisive moment for the
Union’s integration process. Among other agenda items was the third
stage of the Economic and Monetary Union to be prepared, the en-
largement process for the next enlargement round of ten or more can-
didates, and the Agenda 2000 reform package, yet these were only the
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most prominent tasks.12 Administration and programming for the
Presidency had started rather late, yet it was done efficiently. The
priorities of the first Austrian EU Presidency were officially the
following: 
Enlargement is by far the best and most effective instrument to
strengthen security in the regions. It keeps the nationalist demons at
bay. It reinforces the civil society in these countries and stimulates
economic and political reforms. It helps to stabilize societies and thus
reduce the risk of organized crime and illegal migration. In the long
term, the Union will either export stability towards the East, or will
import instability. No other country has a higher stake in this than
Austria.13
The 1998 Presidency was, in fact, a short one, because the six-
month period included the summer months July and August which
would see only reduced activity in the EU’s institutions in Brussels. It
ended without any unexpected or major crisis. Starting the preparations
for the fifth enlargement round, one of the most central tasks, was well
accomplished. Although the Austrian coalition government’s position
was strongly in favor of enlargement, more than 50 percent of the
Austrian population were against it, mainly due to economic fears, as
Eurobarometer statistics show. Yet the Austrian coalition government
managed to balance domestic and international dimensions and
successfully finalized the preparatory work for enlargement, introduced
the common Euro currency, and concluded the necessary final decisions
on the working capacity of the European Central Bank. Some progress
was also made on Agenda 2000, which included reforms of the Common
Agricultural Policy and the Structural Policy and advanced negotiations
on the highly important provisions for the financial framework for the
next seven years’ budgetary period from 2000 to 2006. Austria would
have liked to move faster on the issue of EU-budget, but had to leave the
task to Germany, whose presidency followed Austria’s. In spite of some
reluctance on the side of member states, an innovative step towards
improvement in the security related matters of Pillar Two of the
European Union was the topic at the unofficial first meeting of Defense
Ministers during the Presidency in Vienna, on the invitation of Austria’s
then Defense Minister Werner Fasslabend of the ÖVP, which initiated
a series of such meetings and contributed to improving progress on the
EU’s Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). At the informal European
summit in the Carinthian city of Pörtschach some weeks later, convened
by Chancellor Victor Klima, Tony Blair signaled a significant shift in
British views regarding EU defense, which later on in November 1999
led to the well-known French-British initiative of St. Malo. Progress on
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the ESDP was greatly needed, as the EU’s failure to play a constructive
and moderating role in the Yugoslav wars in the 1990s had made
painfully clear.
Among the most difficult tasks of a Presidency is the proper
handling of—more than often unforeseeable—international crises some-
where in the world. In the case of Austria’s Presidency, this could have
happened in the Western Balkans, the Middle East, or Asia. For a neutral
country like Austria, this could have led to some unconventional and
troublesome problems. Fortunately enough, the Presidency was a rather
quiet and “normal” one, with some challenges like the Rubel and the
Kosovo crises. With the support of the Commission, Austria in the
opinion of most of the members, succeeded in doing an overall good job,
with critical remarks from only some member countries.14 The critiques
focused on the lack of coherent political strategies and courage with
regard to challenging tasks, such as the Agenda 2000 and the imminent
institutional reform. Others recognized some ambivalent attitudes
concerning EU enlargement, where they found that “a special commit-
ment was pronounced in public and seemingly countervailed in
action.”15
Austria’s first Presidency of the European Union also produced
interesting domestic results. I take it as a proof of the ambivalence
hypothesis of mine concerning Austrian foreign policy in the whole of
the Second Republic that after the impressively high turnout in the
referendum on Austrian EU membership in 1994 (in which two thirds
of the Austrian electorate voted in favor of membership) the coalition
government of the Social Democratic Party of Austria (Sozialdemo-
kratische Partei Österreichs, or SPÖ) and the Austrian People’s Party
(Österreichische Volkspartei, or ÖVP) failed to maintain a high level of
open public discourse about European matters. It only was taken up
again in the time of the Presidency in the second half of 1998, some time
before it started and after it ended. Political discourse about the
European Union has unfortunately been dominated by flashy elements
rather than by serious strategies and communication about the status quo
and by the nature and the perspectives of the European integration
process. 
Finally, the Presidency undoubtedly resulted in positive effects in
domestic politics, especially in terms of achievements in the Austrian
administrative structures and the cooperation within and among mini-
stries and the two coalition parties. The intensive workload undertaken
in preparation for and during the Presidency and Austria’s intensive
involvement in the political agenda of the Union led to a downgrading
of hierarchical procedures and gave more leeway and also more respon-
sibility to individual politicians, a fact positively recognized by many.
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In short, the Presidency made the Austrian bureaucracy and the Austrian
politicians fit for the Union, and the Austrian public more aware of the
fact that Austria had become part of the European Union and was
internationally more recognized and respected than in recent years. In
an overall assessment as of today and after another successfully accom-
plished Austrian Presidency in the first half of 2006, however, one still
has to be critical. Neither for the political system nor for the Austrian
public opinion were the international experiences and domestic benefits
capable of bringing about sustainable and substantial change.
“Europeanization” was partly and modestly realized on institutional and
administrative levels, but to date can hardly be found on a societal level,
where only little knowledge and considerable skepticism still prevail.
This skepticism also holds true for the rest of the decade and
thereafter. While on the political macro-level Austrian verbal commit-
ment to the European Union still remained high, on the level of civil
society, acceptance of the European Union decreased constantly after
some rise as a result of increased information and discussion on Euro-
pean topics during the first Presidency. Keeping a certain distance from
the Union may be due to the power of Austrians’ traditional, inward-
looking, and skeptical mentality,16 based on a long, ambiguous, and
sometimes disastrous process for arriving at a somehow consolidated
Austrian national identity. It is definitely also due to the ambivalence of
the Austrian political class in relation to EU membership, at least as far
as continuity and coherence in their positions is concerned. Whereas
Jörg Haider’s far-right Freedom Party of Austrian (Freiheitliche Partei
Österreichs, or FPÖ) at the end of the 1990s was rapidly growing and
strongly criticizing the European Union and its enlargement policy with
populist and xenophobic slogans, the two coalition parties in power
remained reluctant to counter these positions and ambivalent in their
communication strategies and positions in the public debate. In the
election campaign to the European Parliament in June 1999, which all
parties saw as a rehearsal for the coming parliamentary elections in
October of the same year, European issues were hard to find. The
campaigns of the parties focused mainly on Austrian neutrality, which,
because of the wars in Yugoslavia in the first half of the 1990s and the
ongoing crisis in Kosovo, was partly understandable. Finally, the
discourse shifted in the direction of a shared consensus that there is a
need to enhance the European security system independent from NATO.
The issue of the Union’s enlargement only played a minor role in the
campaigns, even by the Freedom Party, which immediately resulted in
a 4 percent loss of support for the FPÖ as compared to its results in the
last elections.
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In drawing a short conclusion on the first phase of the Schüssel era,
one could focus on two positive features: first, the continuing legal,
organizational, and administrative adaptation of the political and
institutional structures of Austria’s foreign policy and, second, the
successful organization of Austria’s first Presidency by the coalition
government. Wolfgang Schüssel, who had chosen to become foreign
minister while holding the chairmanship in the People’s Party not least
for strategic reasons and the high visibility of the foreign minister in the
media and who led the Ministry together with Benita Ferrero-Waldner
as state secretary, did a professional job, continuing in the line of Alois
Mock during the first years. In terms of cooperation at the highest
political level, the relationship between the two partners of the coalition
government, the ÖVP and its senior partner the SPÖ, gradually
deteriorated decisively, despite the fact that cooperation and enthusiasm
had been clearly evident on both the SPÖ and ÖVP’s sides during the
whole of 1998 and for some months after successfully ending the
Presidency together. The eventual failure to reach consensus on sensitive
security-related issues in the so-called “Options Report”—notably on the
issue of NATO-membership—(Optionen-Bericht) earlier in March 1998
might have contributed to these destructive dynamics, although the
evident success of the first presidency in the second half of 1998 was
understood as an outcome of a common endeavor.
The Second Phase: From Squeeze to Triumph to Agony
The singular events around the establishment of the Austrian
People’s Party and the Freedom Party of Austria as a coalition govern-
ment that came into office on 4 February 2000 were politically excep-
tional and dramatic. The Israeli ambassador was recalled immediately,
and Israeli President Ezer Weizman said in an interview that “the
situation in Austria now is exactly the same as it was in Germany
seventy years ago.”17 U.S. Ambassador Kathryn Hall was called back to
Washington some days later for consultations, and the fourteen other EU
members put in effect the “measures against the Austrian government”
(later connoted as “sanctions”) that they had threatened to install on 31
January. In this letter, which was sent through the Portuguese Presi-
dency, the fourteen other members had warned they would “not promote
or accept any bilateral official contacts at the political level with an
Austrian government integrating the FPÖ” and threatened sanctions
against Austria, including no bilateral visits on the ministerial level,
ambassadorial visits only on a technical level, and no support of
Austrian applications for international appointments.18 Street protests
followed on the Ballhausplatz in front of the Chancellery and the
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building of the Federal President, as well as at the ÖVP and FPÖ party
headquarters. The amount of attention the Austrian “case” received in
print and in visual media all over the world was enormous. The asso-
ciative thread was usually the same: Austria, from the home country of
Adolf Hitler to the Austrian Secretary General of the UN and later
Federal President Kurt Waldheim to Jörg Haider (often quoted as an
admirer of Adolf Hitler and of Nazi Germany), and finally to police
cordons and protesters against the government on the Vienna streets. 
All this happened, however, because the ÖVP, acting in complete
accordance with the Austrian Constitution and general parliamentary
rules, established a coalition government with the FPÖ.19 Obviously,
Wolfgang Schüssel was the mastermind behind the scenes. This coali-
tion was the unexpected outcome of the national elections of autumn
1999 and of the negotiations that followed regarding building a coalition
government between the SPÖ and ÖVP, with the FPÖ as the “lucky
third.” The result constituted the myth of Wolfgang Schüssel as the
“father of all strategists” at home and a person strongly rebuffed, some-
times even hated, abroad.20
In the prelude to all that, in the elections of October 1999, the ÖVP
and FPÖ ended up as second and third behind the Social Democrats, the
FPÖ led by a very close margin of 415 votes more than the ÖVP. In
spite of this fact, the ÖVP, represented by Wolfgang Schüssel who had
publicly declared its retreat into opposition, was able, based on a tough
tactical gamble, to nominate the chancellor. Thus a change of partners
in a coalition government would be quite a normal thing, if the FPÖ
were not widely recognized as a party on the far right of the political
spectrum, with Jörg Haider as its well known “leader” (at that time) and
quite some high ranking functionaries known as being close to radical
right and even xenophobic positions.21 I do not want to judge here
whether the specific form of reaction taken by the rest of the EU
members was wise or prudent.22 However, on 12 September 2000, the
fourteen EU member countries lifted the sanctions after an internatio-
nally high-ranking investigating committee (“Wise Men Group”)
proposed the step. “A dark veil has fallen from the face of Europe,”
Wolfgang Schüssel was quoted as saying, hailing the decision as “a
great success for Austria resulting from our patience and firmness” on
national TV. 
The lifting of “sanctions” was finally seen as a success for Austria,
which in the wake of the painful discussions was good enough to pro-
pose for the first time formal rules for the application of sanctions
against a Member State (Art. 6 and 7 of the EU Treaty). These pro-
visions were adopted in the Treaty of Nice.
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Finally, one can say that the consequences of including the FPÖ in
a coalition government with the ÖVP later yielded some positive results
for the whole political system in Austria. All other governmental
alternatives, like a renewed “grand coalition” or a minority government,
would have strengthened the FPÖ and given the party and Haider even
more support by protest voters, and eventually the chancellorship for the
latter at the next parliamentary elections, because with the FPÖ
remaining in opposition the probability that it would end up in first place
in the upcoming elections was rather high. As a coalition partner in
power from 2000 until 2002, the party’s mythos diminished. The early,
strategic elections Wolfgang Schüssel provoked in November 2002
changed the whole picture again. The FPÖ lost dramatically, the ÖVP
increased its margin to an incredible 42+ percent, and the SPÖ and the
Greens ended up with a moderate increase. After the snap election,
Wolfgang Schüssel and his now reinforced ÖVP again reinstated a
coalition government with the weakened FPÖ, which lasted until 2005.
The “third Lager” weakened itself further when the newly founded
Alliance for the Future of Austria (Bündnis Zukunft Österreich, or BZÖ)
under Jörg Haider split from the FPÖ. Schüssel then formed a new
coalition government with those parts of the BZÖ which seemed fit for
governmental duties, while Haider—influential still—remained gover-
nor of Carinthia. 
Shortly after the “sanctions” where lifted, however, the BZÖ and
Schüssel announced Austria’s intention to build a “Strategic Partner-
ship”23 with its neighboring countries, the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Slovakia, and Slovenia as well as its “cultural neighbor,” Poland. The
goal of this venture was to look for common interests and to find
common positions of all countries in the region in order to strengthen
their joint influence after having become members of the Union. After
some critical remarks from the European Union as well as from the
neighbors, the name of the group was changed to “Regional Partner-
ship.”24 The group was formally established on 6 June 2001 in Vienna
at a meeting of the foreign ministers of the respective partner states. It
still is an informal—and presently poorly working—forum for regional
cooperation intended to create some added value for the region and for
Europe as a whole, but bound to improve the stance of all group mem-
bers within the European Union. 
Coalition building and regional cooperation groups like those
among Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg (“Benelux”), or “the
Northern cooperation,” including Finland, Sweden, and Denmark, reflect
the highly important dimension of “networking” within the European
Union in general. It is especially so for smaller states which should have
a “natural” interest in building good relations with other members in
169
order to strengthen their influence and receive support in decisions
which are favorable to them. In the views of neutral but well informed
observers in Brussels (and also of reflexive and critical people in
Vienna), Austria on a broad level is not networking very well.25 Success-
ful networking requires a lot of confidence among the members and trust
in the high reliability of the respective country. Undoubtedly, Austria
had not met the high expectations of the “older” members and of some
of the new members which would allow it to become an initiator of new
strategies and measures and a supporter of the integration process of the
candidate countries. When compared to its peer-group of smaller and
middle states, Austria is not in a very favorable position. Indeed, much
depends on “subjective factors”; personal relations and specific persona-
lities—think of Erhard Busek or Wolfgang Petritsch—play an important
role. However, it is important to be known as a trusted part of the
multilevel networking and communicative processes that are going on
all the time. It can be crucial to collect different or similar positions at
an early date, persuade those with contrary positions, and negotiate
initiatives, find compromises, or package deals. It is of high importance
to be known as a responsible and fair actor, especially when the “vital
interests” of a country are at stake, and one needs the support of as many
members as possible. Networking is cost-intensive and needs a lot of
human skills and capacities and a well functioning and well coordinated
center, none of which should end immediately after the end of the
Presidency period. From the beginning of the accession process until
now, the Austrian business sector has done a better job than the political
in terms of networking.
A case in point, but a paradoxical one, was the crisis between
Austrian negotiators and the European Union at the occasion of
negotiations in Brussels to start accession negotiations with Turkey at
the beginning of October 2005. Austria threatened to oppose the
decision for some days and only gave in after provincial elections in
Styria were over and once all members agreed to start accession talks
with Croatia. The issue was intensively discussed during these days both
in Brussels and in the Austrian media and public, where more than 80
percent of the population in the meantime were against Turkish mem-
bership, but more than 50 percent favored Croatian accession. Imme-
diately after Austria gave its approval to starting negotiations, Wolfgang
Schüssel announced the installment of the new Minister of the Interior,
a woman, Liesel Prokop, which came as a great surprise. The new
minister garnered much more media attention in Austria, more than
Brussels’ decision to start negotiations with Turkey. Behind closed
doors, the Austrian chancellor and his foreign minister were more than
often congratulated for standing firm on their position in the Turkish
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case. Once more, Schüssel showed his great talent in strategic thinking
and received considerable respect for it, though from the smaller states.
In contrast, some of the larger states’ representatives felt that their for-
mer resentment against Austria and its chancellor was again justified. 
When Schüssel had become chancellor in February 2000, Benita
Ferrero-Waldner, his former state secretary followed him as foreign
minister.26 Ferrero-Waldner’s primary task was first and foremost to get
rid of the “sanctions,” which she tried bravely and persistently to do.
Finally, she  was given the nickname “Lady Minister with the fighting
smile” (Kampflächeln), an appellation she lived even in situations when
she was more or less ignored during the months of  “sanctions” by her
EU compatriots. 
It came as a windfall for the right-wing ÖVP-FPÖ government
when in January 2001 the United States, the Republic of Austria, Jewish
organizations, and a group of lawyers agreed on a package of Austrian
measures for victims of National Socialism, which for Austria had been
a never-ending story. Not all measures have so far been realized, but an
amendment to the National Fund, granting compensation for the loss of
Jewish property and improving social laws favoring the victims during
this governmental period. Together with the compensation fund act
(Entschädigungsfondsgesetz) for forced foreign labor during Austria’s
Nazi period, both funds should close the still existing gaps in restitution.
The Other Highlight: The Second Presidency
The second Austrian Presidency started on 1 January 2006, only
three months after the Brussels’ enlargement summit. It was a “full-
time” Presidency,27 again occurring at a critical time, since the tensions
inside and outside the European Union were on the rising. The process
of ratification of the Constitutional Treaty had been blocked when at the
end of May and 1 June 2005 two referenda in France and in the
Netherlands both ended negatively. The member states voted for a
“period of reflection,” to analyze the problem and look for possible
solutions, although eighteen countries had successfully ratified the
Treaty, including Austria. Frustration with the EU elite integration pro-
ject seemed surprisingly high,28 so the strategy for 2006 and the priori-
ties of the Austrian Presidency as well were focused more than usual on
citizens’ vital daily interests and needs. Among others, priority was
given to measures on the creation of jobs and economic growth, the
environment and energy, and bringing “the EU citizens” back into the
center. Based on the multi-annual program29 for three years from 2004
to 2006, the two Presidency states, Austria and its successor Finland,
published a common program for the whole year of 2006. This time, the
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Austrian Presidency had to preside over approximately 250 committees
and working groups on the level of ministerial officials, and some 2,500
EU meetings in total. All together, some 10,000 people were involved
in the organization and technical procedures of the Presidency. These
rough statistical figures clearly show how extraordinary the number of
negotiating and decision making meetings had increased as compared to
the first Presidency.
The Presidency in 2006 had a really tough time. Immediately it
started with an outside crisis on 1 January when Russia, because of
troubles with the Ukraine over the price of gas, temporarily reduced the
gas supply. Not long thereafter, the cartoon controversy between
Denmark and the Islamic world came up, and Iran’s nuclear program
with its impact on the European Union commanded the full attention of
Austrian politicians. In cooperation with the Council and the Parliament,
the Presidency coordinated important common positions and success-
fully came to terms with a series of delicate situations. Especially the
Foreign Ministry played a pivotal role in coordinating all Brussels
institutions and the Presidency; it “had functioned as Europe Ministry
and had proven its worth,” as Wolfgang Schüssel put it in his final press
conference at the end of May. Among other topics, some decisions about
a common energy policy were taken, which were incorporated in the
conclusions. Provisional measures were taken to increase cross-border
energy exchanges of 10 percent among member states, to increase the
share of renewables to 15 percent by 2015, and to increase the use of
biofuels to 8 percent. Finally, the conclusion of the services directive
and some progress in the science and research dimension also contri-
buted to the success of the Presidency. Some critical statements in the
media and comments of experts that the Austrian Presidency was more
show than practical achievements, cannot counter the fact that Austria
made good use of the opportunities the EU Presidency offers, especially
for a small state. It provides a wide window to the world and, therefore,
enhanced visibility for the leading country.
The constructive and professional organization of the Austrian
Presidency provoked the respect of the German foreign minister and the
French president, who both hastened to congratulate the chancellor and
the foreign minister for an excellently organized Presidency. Unfortuna-
tely, at home, information on, communication about, and public opinion
regarding the Union improved only in a short term, a trend that did not
continue after the end of the Presidency. Recent Eurobarometer data
show that acceptance of the European Union has fallen from more than
70 percent in 2002 and far below 50 percent in 2007 to only 36 percent
in 2008.30 Another 36 percent say that EU membership is neither good
nor bad, and 26 percent think negatively about the Union. The respective
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average figure for the EU-27 is 54 percent who believe EU membership
is a good thing and 52 percent think their country has benefited from
membership. This Austrian development is not only dramatic, but
difficult to explain, especially if we consider that 75 percent of Austria
at the same time believe their country is doing better economically than
any other country, while in the whole of the European Union only 35
percent believe that their countries are doing better than the rest. Asked
whether the situation in the job markets are better than in other
countries, 72 percent of Austrians answered “yes,” as compared to only
34 percent in the overall Union. Thus Austrians see no relation at all
between favorable economic development, EU membership, and EU
enlargement, which most Austrians will not see happen any more in the
future, except in the case of Croatia. 
Things become a bit clearer and the Austrian “soul” better under-
stood if we continue to look at some other statistical figures. Compared
to 29 percent of the  EU-27 who argue that the voice of their country has
no influence in Brussels, for Austria the figure is 46 percent, and only
38 percent of Austrians trust the European Union, whereas the EU-27
figure is 50 percent. Almost half of Austrians associate the Union with
a waste of money. Interestingly, 45 percent of Austrians believe they
know how the European Union works, which is a surprisingly high num-
ber. I can only understand the results given here in the light of what I
have written before on the traditional shortcomings of information and
communication patterns in Austria. 
Changes in Substance and Priorities
of Austrian Foreign and Security Policy
Changes during the Schüssel era have been numerous, deep-rooted,
and sometimes confusing. If we consider the profoundly changed and
ongoing transition of the international setting with which Austria has
had to cope since the end of the Cold War, many of its political
principles and strategies require change as well, or at least adaptation.
Neutrality policy, relations to the signatory powers of the State Treaty,
neighborly relations especially towards the whole of Western Europe,
and active engagement in international organizations ranked high on
Austria’s foreign policy agenda before the demise of the USSR. While
during bipolarity most of Austria’s foreign political strategies were
reactive, taking cautious advantage of its specific position as a neutral
country between the two blocs, intensified globalization and the demise
of the bloc system demanded a higher amount of active engagement.
Growing economic interconnectedness, increased competition and
vulnerability as a result of increased world market integration, and the
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emergence of regional economic blocs consequently led to the most
fundamental and decisive change: Austrian membership in the European
Union. Independence or as much autonomy as possible had been one of
the most important goals of foreign policy in a wide sense before 1989.
These goals were substituted by strategies of membership and accession
to the clubs of the well-to-do European countries rather than “dying in
isolation.” Looking for a broad spectrum of autonomy as a means of
political independence for a single small country was replaced by
gaining a variety of new options and being actively involved in decision-
making processes of a much larger political unit with much higher
aspirations. Most other changes and strategies of minor importance are
derived from this fundamental decision, and Austria’s European dimen-
sion has changed from articulating a genuine foreign policy to a kind of
domestic policy field. Changes in the administrative structures as well
as in the strategic political fields had already started before accession,
but continued after 1995.
During the whole of the Schüssel era, a good neighbor policy was
still important, but now to a great extent that policy is within the EU
frame, the bilateral rest of it is concerned with only Switzerland and
Liechtenstein, and/or has been connected with issues of future
enlargement, as is the case with “cultural neighbors” Croatia and the
Western Balkan countries. Despite some opposition from different
sources such as the trade unions, the Chambers of Labor and Agricul-
ture, and some federal provinces (especially from the eastern parts of
Austria and especially before provincial elections), the official Austrian
position has always been strongly in favor of enlargement. Of all EU
member states, Austria has been profiting the most in economic terms,
more than Germany, which was highly absorbed with integrating the
former provinces of the German Democratic Republic into a reunited
Germany. Specific Austrian interests in this respect are issues related to
transit traffic (given the country’s central geographic position and
sensitive ecological landscape), freedom of movement from candidate
countries, nuclear safety, ecology, organized crime, and terrorism. 
Moreover, Austria has a particular interest in keeping the Balkans
stable and developing. More or less democratic governments now exist
everywhere in the Balkans, some having further intentions for reforms,
some to a lesser extent, but all are in bad economic shape. As a result,
high degrees of corruption and organized crime exist, and only little
success in the resolution or management of ethnic conflicts has been
made. All the countries of the Balkans need a “European perspective,”
including Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. 
As many small or medium states do, Austria supports, cooperates
with, and makes use of the multilateral framework of international
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organizations and regimes. It is still an active member of the Organiza-
tion for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and supports its
activities in the Balkans and the Caucasus. Austria chaired the OSCE in
2000. 
Austria to some extent has always been active within UN structures,
but with changing intensity. For Wolfgang Schüssel, the United Nations
was no major field of action, but it has been a more important arena
under the leadership of Benita Ferrero-Waldner and Ursula Plassnik;
Austria’s successful candidacy for the Security Council during the
period of 2009-2010 is strong proof of that. Contrary to the first and
second terms in the early 1970s and 1990s, Austria now will not only
play a role as small member of the exclusive club, but will raise its voice
as an EU member. In the past, activities were focused on peacekeeping
missions; in the more recent past, the United Nations was especially
active in the fight against landmines, illegal small weapons production
and trade, the drug trade, and human trade, and it has been strongly
pushing for the establishment of the International Criminal Court.
Moreover, Austria has joined the United Nations in supporting espe-
cially all kinds of human rights activities and disarmament, as well as
time and again advocating for the general strengthening of international
law in international relations. 
Neutrality still remains a delicate and tricky issue. Before accession
to the European Union, permanent neutrality had already been watered
down, and if Brussels’ witnesses are serious and do not lie, then more
than one high-ranking Austrian politician has told their counterparts
there that Austrian neutrality no longer matters. When Wolfgang
Schüssel became foreign minister, he declared in a radio interview on 29
April, “I am not willing to abandon Austria’s neutrality.”31 Later on, he
and other ÖVP and FPÖ politicians declared that regardless of further
progress of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the
Union, Austria should apply for membership in the Western European
Union (WEU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This
would put an end to neutrality, of course. The NATO “option” as a idea
promulgated in the Options Report was decisive for the termination of
negotiations with the SPÖ. In his speech on Austria’s National Day in
2001, Chancellor Schüssel said: “Lipizzaner horses, Mozart balls, and
neutrality do not fit into the complex reality of the twenty-first century.”
But things changed again when former Foreign Minister Benita Ferrero-
Waldner ran for the office of federal president, for she excluded mem-
bership in NATO because of Austria’s neutrality. But she wanted a
solidarity guarantee within the security framework of the European
Union, which would have led to a kind of split neutrality: inside the
European Union solidarity, outside neutrality. But again things pro-
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gressed. In October 2004 when the new Foreign Minister Ursula Plass-
nik was sworn in, she explained that, for her, neutrality was a matter of
fact, and later on she enforced her statement by saying “because
neutrality is part of our Constitution.”32 A similar development can be
found also with the FPÖ and later on the BZÖ. 
Currently, Austrian neutrality is not questioned. I resist discussing
the reasons for this surprising development, which Heinz Gärtner has
done from a theoretical point of view in 2006. The reasons are abundant.
In the context of this article, I wanted to shed some light on the sloppy
and en passant manner in which serious foreign policy matters some-
times are handled publicly. Does it reflect the rather low level of
Austrian political culture? In any case, it is no contribution to a clear,
open, and informative debate.
This overview tried to assess Austria’s changed views, opinions,
and political positions on some of Austria’s major principles, strategies,
and goals and if and how they have changed since EU membership. To
a considerable extent, the changes can be related to Austria’s fundamen-
tal change from a single small and permanently neutral country to a
member of a global political body. It is still neutral, it claims, but to a
much lesser extent than before EU membership, and nobody seems to
care anymore.
Conclusions
Austria’s foreign policy will be facing challenges and options in the
near future. During the ten years of the Schüssel era, the global scope of
Austrian “national” foreign policy, which was part of its success during
the Kreisky era, especially its position as a mediator in international
conflicts, has not risen to its former dimensions. Considering the deep
and still lasting transformation of the present global international setting
with which Austria now has to cope, this fact does not come as a sur-
prise. Many of Austria’s traditional attitudes and strategies require
fundamental change, or at least proactive and creative adaptation. As a
member of the European Union since 1995, it has regained some of its
formerly diminished space for maneuvering insofar as new options arise
from being part of the European Union. It is up to Austrian political
representatives to prepare well, bring, and communicate Austria’s natio-
nal interests and positions to others within the manifold dimensions of
common decision making in the Union. In some respects, this could not
be efficiently achieved so far, although after some troublesome months
in 2000 relations to the other fourteen members are back to normal
again. 
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Finally, Wolfgang Schüssel’s foreign policy record is a mixed one.
Without any doubt, he succeeded in creating respect and recognition for
his professional and efficient handling of and engagement in the two
Presidencies and in several multilateral negotiating processes. But he
was also blamed by some of his fellow politicians in Brussels and at
home for his arrogance and indolence; however, he also was not able (or
willing?) to change the chronic lack of information and debate on the
Union in Austria and could not substantially improve Austria’s am-
bivalent image in Brussels and among member states.
On the contrary, since national foreign and security policy had
become less visible at home, had become to a large extent integrated
into a broader European perspective for the above mentioned reasons,
and would in the future be decided primarily within EU institutions, the
Austrian government under Schüssel’s leadership took no sustainable
initiative whatsoever. Moreover, the manifold new opportunities mem-
bership in the Union provide for member states are not reflected satis-
factorily in the political discourse in Austrian public discourse. After
almost one and a half decades of membership of the Union, Austria and
the Austrian people to a great extent have not really “arrived in
Brussels,” as many experts rightly put it; ambivalence still prevails. 
The ÖVP during the whole of the Schüssel era of foreign policy
spoke of itself in terms of being “the European party” in Austria and has
not changed substantially this image and its communication strategies.33
Of course, the European Union and its institutional framework are far
from being perfect, and a critical—but in general positive—stance and
open discussions are paramount and necessary. But in most cases,
blaming the European Union for all kinds of political shortcomings in
political domestic debates runs counter to the fact that decisions in
Brussels have always been taken with Austrian contributions. Austria
has become part of the Union, but it still behaves as if “the Union” were
the unfriendly, sometimes even hostile, “other.” 
It may well be that Austrian representatives are not always fully
capable of influencing the other members to approve their positions
when common decisions are taken. Of course, no single member of the
Union, not even the larger ones, are able to get all their particular
national agendas approved. The same applies for the smaller states like
Austria. But then it is up to those representing Austria to improve their
record in lobbying and coalition building with other members, or to
make it clear at home why and how Austria cannot get all it wants. Well
informed rumor has it that Austrian politicians are not as successful as
they could be in lobbying, networking, and coalition building. Moreover,
the attitudes of Austria in relation to and in Brussels are far from perfect.
Today Austria still ranks among those members which only sloppily
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carry out their obligations in implementing EU rules into its legal
system. More than once Austria took a high risk (to say the least) in
accepting an EU infringement procedure, for example, on the issue of
the anonymous saving accounts or the attendance of EU students,
especially German students of medicine, at Austrian universities. All
that negatively influenced the image of Austria in Brussels and contri-
buted to the skepticism of the Austrian public regarding the EU’s
motives because the information was highly biased and incomplete.
Austria’s position within the European Union and also the EU’s image
in relation to Austrian citizens would improve if politicians would
fundamentally change some of their traditional nasty attitudes towards
the Union. More information in the Austrian public about concrete
decisions taken and about the general procedures in Brussels, as well as
clear messages about how the Austrian economy as a whole has profited
from membership are necessary to improve Austria’s standing in
Brussels and Brussels’ image to the Austrian public. 
Austria has not only developed its relationship with the members of
the European Union and gained from having done so, but it has also
enforced its initiatives in and improved relations with other countries of
the world because of its EU membership. Austrian initiatives in the
Western Balkans, Franz Vranitzky’s mediation mission in Albania in
1997, and the role Austrian foreign policy and several high ranking
figures like Erhard Busek, Stefan Lehne, Albert Rohan, Wolfgang
Petritsch and others contributed to improving the situation in the
Balkans and positively added to Austria’s reputation in the European
Union and the world. Of course, still much remains to be done to bring
the whole region closer to the European Union. The organization of the
EU-Latin America Summit during the Austrian EU Presidency opened
up new opportunities for Austria in these regions. Finally, the countries
of East and Southeast Asia, including Australia and the Pacific States,
together build one of the most dynamic mega-regions of today’s world,
where Austrian economic and cultural interests as well as security needs
are at stake and deserve much more attention both now and in the future.
I doubt whether Austria is fit enough to lead, given the little factual
attention and little resources—in human and financial terms—the
Austrian administration is able to provide for these regions. 
On the other hand, it is well known that Austria still enjoys high
prestige in many regions of the third world, notably in Africa and the
Middle East. This prestigious image is due to Austria’s well known,
small, and non-colonial state and welfare image, but to an even greater
extent is a result of its role in the not so distant past. Even today,
Austrian developmental and social initiatives during the 1970s within
and outside the UN system and its mediating role in the Israel-
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Palestinian conflict, among others, are still remembered. Even Austria’s
neutral status, whose relevance in the north I doubt, but whose relevance
in these regions and countries I have to admit, forms a solid basis for
improving Austria’s international profile and stance as an active player
contributing to resolving the most pressing problems of our present
world. The fact that Austria acts as a non-permanent member of the UN
Security Council during the period of 2009 and 2010 will require
Austrian politicians to be more creative. 
Foreign and security policy in the future will also have to be more
focused on a broad and comprehensive understanding of security and
development, especially as relates to international terrorism, and also
global problems like the deterioration of the ecological sphere among
others.34 Globalization, besides its consequences for more economic
competition and a globally widening gap between the richer developed
and the least developed countries, means also the community of states
has more and more transnational problems in common, problems that
can only be solved cooperatively by many or all states together. Pre-
ventative foreign policy, not only on governmental but also on other
levels, like civil forms of conflict management and resolution, is a case
in point. But third party intervention or mediation in international
conflicts is by no means a prerequisite of neutral countries or great
powers anymore. There is a growing conviction among politicians,
ministerial officials, and civil societies in all parts of the world that
social peace and economic development is a necessary condition for
sustainable development. The role of Norway (not only) in the Pale-
stinian peace process, for example—problem ridden as Palestine still is
today—was highly recognized and reinforced Norway’s high
international profile as a “like minded country” worldwide. Austria has
failed in the past to adapt its administrative structures and its financial
means to the changed structures and the urgent needs of the international
system, which will also be needed to react efficiently and effectively in
favor of Austrian citizens in crisis and emergency situations abroad. 
In summarizing and in coming to some conclusion, the consi-
derations above show that with some degree of certainty there will be
only modest but important room left for a specific national or “bilateral”
part of Austria’s foreign policy in the future. Domains for such remnants
will be found first and foremost in the fields of culture, in economic
issues like tourism, and in neighborhood policies, common environmen-
tal or security problems connected to neighboring countries, mediation
in international conflicts, and cooperation with some regionally speci-
fied areas. In one of these areas, the Regional Partnership in Central
Europe, Austria could play at least some role. The possibility for playing
a role in the wider regional or even global dimension, like develop-
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mental and environmental issues, as well as of security issues of a global
reach, exists as well. These issues can best be tackled within multi- and
supranational institutions and regimes like the United Nations, the
OSCE, the European Union, and global economic institutions. Austria
would be well advised to act more creatively within multilateral organi-
zations, which by no means totally excludes its activities on bilateral
dimensions. 
In an ever changing international environment, all countries must
adapt their foreign policies to new and transformed dynamics and
events. In the history of humankind, most periods have, in one way or
the other, been periods of transition. Today we live in a world in which
changes are not only fundamental and manifold, but also highly complex
and interdependent; countries and their representatives are supposed to
meet rapidly moving targets. The positive aspect of these circumstances
is that all states are affected and all of them have to change and to
cleverly react to these changes. The challenging part of these circum-
stances is that Austrians have to change. It remains to be seen whether
the hearts and minds of Austria’s political elites and Austrians in general
are well enough prepared to meet the future, for the future will not wait.
Notes
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The Schüssel Years and the European Union
Heinrich Neisser
Austria’s First Stage as a Member
 of the European Union (1995-2000)
Austria joined the European Union (EU) on 1 January 1995.
Together with two other new member states—Sweden and Finland—it
became a full member of a political Union established by the Maastricht
Treaty signed on 7 February 1992, entered into force after the ratifica-
tion process on 1 November 1993. Austria’s admission to the European
Union was legitimized by a referendum which demonstrated that a very
significant majority of Austrians favored this membership. On 12 June
1994, Austria voted for a Europe shaped by the Maastricht Treaty with
the highest percentage of any continental European Country: 66.6
percent.
Thanks to its consistent policy of European integration before 1989,
Austria joined the European Union in an economically advanced stage.
Since 1987, the Grand Coalition, consisting of Social Democrats and
Christian Democrats, governed Austria. The coalition partners tried to
adhere to the criteria for convergence in the form of austerity programs
and tax increases.
Some events gave Austria crucial incentives to participate fully in
EU policy making. One of the most important ones was to develop the
framework of a common Security and Defense Policy. In November
1998, European defense ministers gathered for the first time in the
history of European integration. The ministerial meeting was initiated
by the Austrian presidency and was informal in nature. One month later,
France and Britain adopted a joint declaration in St. Malo in which they
asked the Union to have a “capacity for autonomous action” in the field
of defense. The meeting of Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac was the
beginning of a new stage heralding a more unified European defense
policy. One year later in June 1999 at the European Council’s summit
in Cologne, the European Union adopted the European Security and
Defense Identity and began outlining it by establishing the concept of
battle groups.
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Austria’s admission to the European Union conferred the status of
full membership on the country. Austria became an actor in the Union’s
institutions. It had the possibility of nominating someone as a Commis-
sioner. As member of the Commission, Franz Fischler, the former
minister of agriculture in the national government, was nominated.
Fischler’s portfolio covered agriculture and rural development. 
In the European Council, Austria was represented since 1997 by
Chancellor Viktor Klima, who became in this year the head of
government.1 He was from the Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokra-
tische Partei Österreichs, or SPÖ). The foreign minister was Wolfgang
Schüssel, since 1995 chairman of the Austrian People’s Party (Österrei-
chische Volkspartei, or ÖVP).
Austria also nominated a member for the Court of Justice and
another member for the Court of Auditors. In the advisory institutions
of the European Union, Austria was represented by twelve members in
each of them.2
Special provisions gave Austria the possibility of electing its
members of the European Parliament during the first two years of
membership. In that transitional period, twenty-one Austrian members
of the European Parliament were elected by the Federal Assembly of
Austria (Österreichische Bundesversammlung).3 On 13 October 1996,
the first direct elections of twenty-one members of the Austrian
delegation to the European Parliament took place, based on a system of
proportional representation.4
The most challenging activity during the first five years of Austria’s
EU membership was the presidency. Because Austria joined the
European Union in 1995, its turn filling the  presidency was fixed for the
latter half of 1998. Preparations for the Austrian Presidency began
shortly after 1 January 1995. Administrative adjustments in the Austrian
federal government were necessary, and an assimilation of considerable
information and analyses was needed to guarantee that Austrian policy
makers would be fully informed about EU policy issues. Thus the
Austrian government began to develop and to immerse itself in the
dense network of contacts and consultations typical of the European
Union.
The agenda of the first Austrian Presidency was quite busy. Its
agenda included fighting unemployment, completing of preparations for
the monetary Union, directing the enlargement process towards Central
and Eastern Europe, developing environmental protection policies,
strengthening the EU’s international profile, coordinating the fight
against international crime, and so forth.
Observers generally viewed Austria as having done a great job in
organizing all the meetings, conferences, and summits. As far as the
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policies are concerned, Austria didn’t make great progress on the
agenda. On this point of evaluation, political scientist Michael Huelshoff
states: “Since the Austrian agenda was so heavily influenced by the
agenda it inherited, it is not surprising that the results of its presidency
are best characterized as incremental.”5
By and large, one can say that the first five years of Austria’s EU
membership were a successful period during the course of which Austria
was highly esteemed by the other member states. The situation changed
suddenly at the beginning of the year 2000.
The Case of Austria: A New Government
Takes Over Responsibility (2000)
How the New Government Came into Office
On 3 October 1999, Austria elected a new parliament. In the Natio-
nalrat—the first chamber of the Austrian legislative system—the Social
Democratic Party and the Austrian People’s Party lost some seats; the
Freedom Party of Austria  (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, or FPÖ)
and the Greens (Die Grünen) won. The Freedom Party of Austria
became the second strongest political party, receiving 415 more voters
then the Austria People’s Party.6
The “Sanctions” by Fourteen EU Member States
against Austria
The government of Belgium was a driving force in taking measures
against a possible coalition government formed by the Austrian People’s
Party and the Freedom Party of Austria. At the end of January 2000,
Belgium sent a note to the Portuguese Presidency of the EU Council
demanding joint action by the fourteen EU member states against the
coalition government that was in process of forming in Austria.
On Monday, 31 January 2000, the Portuguese Presidency announ-
ced measures in case Austria formed a coalition government integrating
the FPÖ. This statement, agreed upon by the heads of state and
government of fourteen member states of the European Union, notified
the Austrian president, federal chancellor, and foreign minister of the
following measures:
• the governments of the fourteen EU member states would not
promote or accept any bilateral official contacts at a political level
from Austrian government integrating the FPÖ;
• there would be no support for of Austrian candidates seeking
positions in international organizations;
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• Austrian ambassadors in EU capitals would only be received at a
technical level.
These measures threatened by the fourteen governments of the
member states took effect with the swearing in of the new Austrian
federal government on 4 February 2000.
Austria’s Role within the European Union during
the First Six Months of 2000
This new coalition started its period of governance with a
declaration that was absolutely unusual and unprecedented in the Second
Republic. The leaders of the ÖVP and the FPÖ had signed a preamble
to the governments’ program with the title “Responsibility for
Austria—A Future in the Heart of Europe.” At the beginning, the
government underlined its commitment to European values: 
The Federal Government reaffirms its unswerving adherence to the
spiritual and moral values which are the common heritage of the
peoples of Europe and the true source of individual freedom, political
liberty and the rule of law, principles which form the basis of all
genuine democracy. The coalition government also declared its
commitment to Austria’s membership of the European Union as the
basis of the cooperation between the coalition parties. 
In this respect it declared: “The Federal Government is bound by
those principle of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms and the rule of law which, under Article 6 of the
Treaty of the European Union, are common to all member states of the
European Union.” 
European countries responded to these measures in different ways.
Norway and the Czech Republic expressly agreed with the measures.
Other European countries like Switzerland, Slovenia, Slovakia and
Hungary declined to endorse them. A number of German federal Länder
adopted a friendly attitude toward Austria. 
The non-European states also reacted in different ways. Israel was
the only state to withdraw its ambassador from Vienna. Argentina
confined bilateral contacts to a “strictly technical level.” The United
States restricted itself to recalling its ambassador for periodic reports.
Referring to the above-mentioned measures, the European Commis-
sion made a statement on 1 February: 
“At this stage the work of the European institutions is not affected. In
this context the Commission, in close contact with the Governments
187
of the Member States, will follow the situation carefully, maintaining
its working relations with the Austrian authorities.”
The Austrian government reacted to the joint action by the 14 EU
member states with a decisive rejection of these undemocratically
instigated sanctions and asked for their immediate withdrawal. In
consultation with leading Austrian experts on European and
international law, Austria’s Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs made
the following assessment of the legal aspects of the sanctions:7
1. The statement from the Portuguese Presidency of the European
Council “on behalf of XIV member states” exceeded the limit of
its competence, since a presidency is not empowered to issue
declarations that are not based on decisions by all member states.
2. The declaration violated fundamental legal principles as well as
the spirit of the treaties that are the foundation of the Community
and the Union.8
3. The action against Austria also violated the general loyal
principle of audiatur altera pars and thereby the principle of
fairness and objectivity that is to be expected from other member
states within the framework of the European Union. Austria was
not even given an opportunity to present its own position.
4. The measures also offended international courtesy.
The Austrian federal government made a lot of appearances on tele-
vision and radio and in the print media to clarify the distorted image of
Austria the sanctions presented. In many information campaigns,
Austrian institutions tried to improve the international image of Austria.
Despite of these efforts, Austria was faced with disadvantages and
boycott measures. The reduction of bilateral contacts to a purely techni-
cal level meant that Austria was not fully included in the decision-
shaping process at the EU level. Particular tensions existed between
Austria and certain EU partners. Belgium completely froze military
cooperation with Austria. Belgium’s foreign minister called for a boy-
cott of holidays in Austria. France canceled all events in the 2000 bila-
teral program of military cooperation that could have had a public effect.
Individual school and student exchange programs in France and Belgium
were canceled.
Although the Austrian federal government made many efforts to
reestablish a dialogue among all fifteen member states, it took several
months until the fourteen member states were willing to redefine their
attitude. At the informal meeting of foreign ministers on 6/7 May se-
veral members indicated that they would be prepared to consider an
“exit scenario.” The attitude of the European Parliament was also help-
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ful for finding a solution. In a resolution addressed to the Feira European
Council of on 19/20 June, the European Parliament asked the Council
Presidency “to evaluate relations between the fourteen member states
and Austria and to develop, with all the parties in the EU concerned, a
procedure that will lead to an acceptable solution.”
The Report of the “Three Wise Men” and
the Lifting of the Ban
Soon after the Feira European Council, the Portuguese prime
minister invited Luzius Wildhaber, the president of the European Court
of Human Rights, to nominate three personalities to draw up a report on
the Austrian government’s observance of common European values, in
particular the rights of minorities, refugees and immigrants, as well as
“the development of the political nature of the Freedom Party of
Austria.”
Wildhaber issued a mandate to Marti Ahtisaari, former president of
Finland, Jochen Frowein, director of the Max Planck Institute for
Foreign Public Law and International Law, and Marcelino Oreja, for-
merly Spain’s foreign minister and member of the European Com-
mission, to draw up a special report. This group was dubbed the “Three
Wise Men,” and their report took that name. These three investigators
held discussions with the Austrian government, the parliamentary
parties, the social partners, religious communities, judges, ombudsmen,
and representatives of non-governmental organizations. On 8 September
2000, the Three Wise Men delivered their report to the head of the
European Council, Jacques Chirac. This report recommended the lifting
of the sanctions and stated that “the Austrian government is committed
to European values” and that it “has also taken practical measures to
improve its compliance with these values and standards.” One remark
was critical of the measures enacted by the EU-14: “The measures have
already stirred up nationalist feelings in the country, as they have in
some cases been wrongly understood as sanction directed against
Austria citizens.” Finally, the report suggested the development of a
mechanism within the European Union “to monitor and evaluate the
commitment and performance of individual member states with respect
to common European values.”
The lifting of the sanctions was announced on the evening of 12
September 2000. After seven months and ten days, the French Presi-
dency stated on behalf of the fourteen member states, “The Austrian
government has not failed in its commitments to uphold European
common values.”9 The debate within the European Union “should be
furthered on the way to forecast, monitor, assess and react on similar
189
situations.” The report of the Three Wise Men was the end of an affair
which was very problematic for Austria. Certainly the measures of the
fourteen EU member states become “counterproductive” as the Three
Wise Men pointed out in their report.
There is no doubt Austria lost a part of its international prestige, for
its political image in Europe was damaged. Another effect of the
sanctions was that the attitude of the Austrians changed considerably. In
the spring of 2000, only 34 percent of the Austrian population agreed
that their country had benefited from membership in the European
Union. In the autumn of 1999, that figure was still 45 percent. In
comparison with the referendum on membership in 1994 (66.6 percent),
the level of approval had dropped by half.10
In the year 2008, one can say the EU-14 measures for most
Austrians faded into the history of the European integration process.
Public opinion in Austria is very critical, but the reasons for that are
manifold. The Austrian population feels a great lack of confidence in the
institutions and policies of the European Union.
Summing up the general dimension of the confrontation between
Austrian and the other fourteen member states in the year 2000, three
perspectives indicate the importance of these events for the process of
the European integration.
First, it is imperative to understand that the EU-14 measures have
not been “sanctions” in the sense of the Treaty on European Union
(TEU). Since the Treaty of Amsterdam enforced in 1999, the possibility
for adopting sanctions against a member state formally exists.11 In this
situation, 
The Council, meeting in the composition of the Heads of State or
Government and acting by unanimity on a proposal by one third of
the Member States or by the Commission and after obtaining the
assent of the European Parliament, may determine the existence of a
serious and persistent breach by a Member State of principles
mentioned in Article 6(1), after inviting the government of the
Member State in question to submit its observations.12
If this body determines that a breach has occurred, 
“[…] the Council, acting by a qualified majority, may decide to
suspend certain of the rights deriving from the application of this
Treaty to the Member State in question, including the voting rights of
the representative of the government of that Member State in the
Council.”13
The TEU contains a concrete and clear procedure for the adoption
of “sanctions.” No one element of this procedure had been applied in the
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case of Austria. There was no proposal for making such a decision, no
intervention made by the Council, and no accusation of a serious and
persistent breach of the EU’s principles. There is no doubt: the EU-14
measures have not been “sanctions” in the sense of the TEU because
they had no explicit legal basis. Thus they were only a politically moti-
vated statement made by fourteen member states.
Second, the question must be raised whether the Union follows the
principle of equal treatment, particularly in its application to big and
small member states. To investigate this, a comparison between the
Austria federal government in the year 2000 and the participation of the
National Alliance (Alleanza Nationale, or AN), a post-fascist political
party in the Italian government, yields interesting results. In 1994,
Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi formed a coalition government
with the AN. At that time, the European Parliament adopted a Resolu-
tion on the European Council in Corfu on 4 May 1994 asking “that the
Member States of the European Union should it make clear towards the
President of Republic of Italy that the Italian government must respect
the basic values which have been prevailing for the foundation of the
European Community.”14 This was six years before Austria’s federal
government formed a coalition between the ÖVP and the FPÖ.
More than one year after the formation of the Austrian government
of the ÖVP and FPÖ, Silvio  Berlusconi won the parliamentary election
for Italian prime minister in May 2001. When he formed a government
with the neo-fascists of the AN and the North League (Lega Nord, or
LN), the reaction from the EU side was different. Immediately after the
Italian general election on 13 May 2001, Belgian Minister for Foreign
Affairs Louis Michel evidenced the same reaction against the “neo-
fascists” of the AN and the LN as had been expressed against the FPÖ.
Berlusconi and Italian Foreign Minister Lamberto Dini protested harshly
against this statement; nevertheless, Michel insisted that sanctions be
imposed. Major players in the European Union, however, failed to take
up the call, noting that the case of Italy could not be compared with that
of Austria. French Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine said that the Euro-
pean Union must be vigilant about the new Italian government. Swedish
Prime Minister Göran Persson, at that time the EU Council’s president,
definitely ruled out sanctions against Italy. By and large, the EU
reactions in the case of Italy were much different and much more
moderate than in the Austrian affair. It was a double standard applied
from the EU side.
Third it must be considered that radical political parties, particularly
from the extreme right, exist in many member states (for example, Le
Pen in France, the Vlamske Bloc in Belgium). These parties are elected
in national and regional parliaments. There is no rule from the European
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Union regarding how those parties should be treated in the constitutional
system of the member states. How far political parties can be excluded
is an issue for each nation’s political system. The European Union has
only the ability to influence the democratic quality of the Member States
by adopting the sanctions mentioned above.
Austria’s Presidency in 2006 (1 January to 30 June)
A major European event of the second Schüssel government was the
presidency of Austria in the European Union during the first half of
2006. This special kind of leadership within the Union was the second
chairmanship exercised by Austria (the first time was during the second
half 1998). The Union’s presidency comprises the chairmanship in the
European Council and in the Council of Ministers. It changes every six
months to another country following an order which is adopted by the
Council unanimously; for a list of presidencies, see Table 1. Austria will
hold its next presidency in the year 2018.
Table 1
EU Presidencies from 2000-2006
Year Country with Presidency in 
First Half of Year
Country with Presidency in





2004 Ireland The Netherlands
2005 Luxembourg The United Kingdom
2006 Austria Finland
Essence of the Presidency
The Council of Ministers is the most powerful organ within the
institutional framework of the Union. The Council ensures coordination
of the general economic policies of the member states and has the power
to make decisions and confer on the rules which the Council lays
down.15 The Council consists of representatives from each of the mem-
ber states at the ministerial level, the foreign minister of the state
concerned assumes the title of President of Council of Ministers, and the
foreign ministry of his or her country undertakes, with the help of the
Council Secretariat, the organization of the Council’s business during
the six months.
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Apart from the Council of the European Union, there is also the
European Council, which meets at European Summits several times per
year. The European Council brings together the Heads of State or
Government of the member states and the President of the Commission.
They are assisted by the ministers for foreign affairs of the member
states and by the vice-president of the Commission.16 The European
Council provides the Union with the necessary items for its development
and defines the general political guidelines thereof.
During the first half of 2006, Austria presided over a large number
of bodies: at a political level in the European Council and the Council
of Ministers and at the level of officials in around 250 committees on
working groups. In course of six months, Austrians chaired some 2,000
meetings. They also represented the EU abroad and spoke on its behalf
at summit meetings and international conferences.
Essentially, the EU presidency comprises the European Council and
all the committees supporting and working for the presidency. These
committees and working parties make up the base of the Council’s inter-
nal structures and have grown up over the years to number about 400.17
Every country that holds the rotating presidency sets own priorities
and brings something new in the agenda of EU structures comprising
representatives of the other twenty-six member countries. It is part of the
presidency’s duty to oil the wheels of the community and to strive to
reach agreement on as many issues as possible. The presidency is sup-
posed to exert itself to produce compromise proposals whenever there
is a deadlock.18
The exercise of the presidency requires careful, long-term, plenary
planning.19 Presidencies must draw up programs, and since 2003 they
must cooperate in drawing up three- year, multi-annual strategic plans.
Moreover, for the member state exercising the presidency, it is very
important to react swiftly to unforeseen circumstances.
Today the main question is whether the system of a six month
rotating presidency is an appropriate instrument for effective political
leadership within the European Union. In the Union of twenty-seven, the
single member state has to wait longer before its turn comes around
again. Another argument is that the presidency has becoming increa-
singly complex and onerous. Moreover, an increasing number of policy
processes (like co-decision legislative procedures) go beyond the six
month period and, in any case, the Council’s new multi-annual planning
mechanisms have reduced the scope of presidency initiatives.
For all these reasons, a reform of the presidency of the European
Union has been discussed in the last few years. The constitutional treaty
which couldn’t be ratified by negative referenda in France and The
Netherlands in the year 2005 contained a new system: the president of
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the European Council would be elected by a qualified majority for a
term of two and one-half years, renewable once. The president would be
responsible for leading the European Council and driving forward its
work, for ensuring proper preparation and continuity in cooperation with
the president of the Commission, and for facilitating cohesion and con-
sensus with the European Council, especially in terms of integrating the
work of the General Affairs Council.
Another proposed change involves creating the post of EU minister
for foreign affairs who would chair the External Relations Council. This
minister should be appointed by the European Council and would also
be one of the vice-presidents of the European Commission, with the
responsibility for handling external relations.
For all other Council seats, the system of six-monthly rotation of the
presidency should be preserved.
Organizational Challenges
The biggest challenges for the member state exercising the presi-
dency are the organizational tasks. The presidency has as its primary
responsibility organizing and chairing all meetings of the Council and
of the European Council as well. Fulfilling this task requires a lot of
human resources and a high level of efficiency, especially in the host
country’s national bureaucracy. More specifically, the foreign ministry
must be able to use an intense network of contacts and consultations that
is so common in the European Union.
The administrative focus of the Austrian Presidency 2006 was the
“EU Executive Secretariat,” which was set up in the foreign ministry
and chaired by the secretary general. It was the center for coordinating
all the events that occurred during the EU presidency, including 200
working groups of the Council that had to be chaired by Austrian top
officials and about 4,000 meetings and conferences that had to be
scheduled.
In addition to the regular summits and meetings of the EU institu-
tions, the Austrian Presidency organized two extraordinary events. To-
gether with the European Commission, the Austrian Presidency held a
conference on the future of Europe from 27 to 28 January entitled The
Sound of Europe. The conference took place in the congress center in
Salzburg, the city in which Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart was born exactly
250 years ago. The conference participants discussed fundamental
questions as to the future of Europe and European values, identity, and
culture. More than 300 personalities from the worlds of politics, science,
the arts, and the media deliberated on prospects and proposals for
making progress on the European project in view of global challenges.
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The unease and skepticism people express about Europe was also
addressed and the underlying causes discussed.
Another European conference on subsidiarity was co-organized by
the Austrian Presidency with the Austrian Parliament and the Bundes-
land Lower Austria on 18 and 19 April 2006 in St. Pölten, which is the
capital of Lower Austria. At this conference entitled Europe Begins at
Home, representatives of the EU member states, the European
Commission, the European Parliament, and other EU institutions,
together with experts, discussed the subsidiarity principle and the
proportionality principle as well as better regulation in the institutions
of the European Union. The discussions focused on citizen-based
policies and the contribution of the regions and the local authorities, the
role of parliaments in the implementation of the principles of sub-
sidiarity and proportionality, and subsidiarity and better regulation.
As far as the organizational challenge of the EU presidency is
concerned, Austria’s presidency supplied proof of Austria’s ability to
organize impressive events and to provide appropriate venues for the
social life that is part of the work of the presidency country.
Programs of the Presidency
The programmatic orientation of Austria’s Presidency was laid
down on three levels. First, the key strategic issues had been laid out in
the European Council’s 2004-2006 multi-annual strategic program. Se-
cond, Austria and Finland, who both held the presidency in 2006, used
this as the basis for establishing the debated annual operational program
for 2006 which set out the main objectives for the Council’s work in this
year. The annual operational program contained the following general
objectives:
• create jobs and growth in Europe,
• secure and develop the specifically European social model,
• rebuild confidence in the European project among EU citizens, and
• further establish Europe as a strong and reliable global partner.
Moreover, the two presidencies were to work closely together in
order to ensure that the work of the Council during 2006 contributed to
advancing economic and social welfare, protecting the environment,
ensuring the freedom and security of Europe’s citizens, and strengthe-
ning the role of the Union in the world. Third, based on those two
programs, the Austrian Presidency presented a “white book” containing
the concrete goals and priorities of the Austrian chairmanship. This
document contained 123 items and gave special priority to reviving the
discussion on the future of the European Union and the search for an
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answer to the question of how far the EU’s borders should extend. The
white book dealt with three substantial perspectives: the future of
Europe, including the constitutional debate where Austria failed; the
internal dimension of EU politics, like growth and employment, services
directives, and areas of freedom; and foreign policy, specifically security
and law, as related to the summits with Russia, the United States, and
Latin America.
The program of the Austrian presidency was presented to several
EU institutions. On 9 January 2006, the Commission as a whole visited
Vienna and discussed the main problems Austrian Chancellor Schüssel
presented in the European Parliament in Strasbourg. He explained the
priorities of Austria’s Presidency and mentioned in particular the debate
about the European Constitution, which must be confirmed with the
European Parliament, the European Commission, the national parlia-
ments, and the European public. As mentioned before, this announce-
ment was not effective. The debate regarding the European Constitution
had to be continued one year later under the German Presidency.
EU Summits and External Relations
Apart from the regular summits of the European Council, the Euro-
pean Union organizes special summits between the Union’s represen-
tatives and the political representatives of countries outside the Euro-
pean Union. These summits are organized regularly every two or three
years and are crucial for the external relations of the European Union.
Under the Austrian Presidency, three special summits are notable: the
Latin American summit, the EU-Russia summit, and the meeting bet-
ween the European Union and the United States as an element of the
transatlantic agenda.20 Each of these meetings had a different importance
for the external relations of the European Union.
The Fourth Summit Meeting with Latin America
and the Caribbean
This meeting was chaired by the Austrian federal chancellor in
Vienna from 11 to 13 May. About sixty foreign delegations attended this
summit, making it the largest event during the Austrian Presidency in
2006. There was an open debate among the delegates on multilateral,
economic, and social issues. During the summit, meetings took place
between the European Union and the Andean Community, the Caribbean
Community (Cariforum), Mercosur, Central America, Chile, and Mexi-
co. Moreover, several preparatory meetings of parliamentarians, busi-
ness executives, and representatives of civil society from both regions
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gave participants the opportunity to exchange points of view on nu-
merous topics. In concert with the summit, the first business forum for
leading business executives from the two regions was also held.
Generally, one can say that this summit was a platform for talking
about possible future bilateral agreements. The participating states had
been in favor of an effective multilateral system. Finally, the partners of
the summit stressed the necessity of a closer regional and internal
cooperation on the energy sector.
The European Union and Russia
Relations with Russia were among the top foreign policy priorities
of the Austrian Presidency. The relations between the European Union
and Russia are not only a major factor in the stability and political
development of the European community, but also that of the entire
world. The Austrian Presidency followed the strategy that no one, single,
serious international problem can be solved without taking into account
the Russian position. The main event of the dialogue between the
European Union and Russia, prepared by the Austrian Presidency, was
the summit in Sochi in late May 2006. The main topics of the EU-Russia
summit were energy questions and the possibility of closer cooperation
in the fields of economics and research.
Prior this meeting, a conference of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei
Lavrov and his colleagues with EU representatives took place in
February 2006 in Vienna. This Vienna meeting brought an in-depth ex-
change of opinions on five areas of foreign policy: closer dialogue and
cooperation on the international arena, counterterrorism, non-prolifera-
tion and disarmament, crisis management, and civil defense. The Vienna
meeting reiterated that regional cooperation and integration play an
important role in consolidating security and stability. Austria’s Presi-
dency paved the way for the negotiations regarding a new Partnership
Agreement which would be necessary when the Partnership and Coope-
ration Agreement expired on 1 December 2007.
The European Union-United States Summit
U.S. President George W. Bush made an official visit in Vienna on
21 June 2006. The summit between the European Union and the United
States was an important part of the transatlantic dialogue. The main
topics discussed in that summit were strengthening the economic part-
nership between the United States and the European Union, the fight
against terrorism, perspectives on multilateralism, and climate change.
The signing of an agreement containing measures for improving educa-
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tional exchange, such as mutual recognition of programs of study and
the development of joint training programs, evidenced concrete results.
The meeting of the European Union and the United States in Vienna was
a substantial, but not an outstanding, contribution to the transatlantic
dialogue.
Financial Planning
By 1999, a new long-term financial perspective covering a seven-
year period from 2000 onward was due to be approved by the Council
of Ministers. The financial perspective 2000-2006 expired at the end of
2006. By early 2005, uncertainty still existed about when and how the
next financial perspective, from 2007 to 2013, would be agreed upon by
the EU member states. The United Kingdom Presidency during the
second half of 2005 had exerted much effort on developing a consensus
about the financial perspective from 2007 to 2013. In December 2005,
EU leaders had reached an agreement, but this was overwhelmingly
rejected by the European Parliament in mid-January. The members of
Table 2
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the European Parliament criticized both the size of the budget (Euro 862
billion, or 1.05 percent of GDP) and the relatively small share of funds
allocated to future-oriented resources such a research and development.
After making several efforts, an Inter-institutional Agreement on the
financial framework from 2007 to 2013 was signed on 17 May 2006.
The key elements included a multi-annual financial framework for a
total of Euro 864 billion (in 2004 prices) and additional flexible amounts
and contributions providing for a maximum of some extra Euro 2.4
billion per year; a strengthened commitment to sound financial manage-
ment of EU funds; and a stronger role for the European Parliament
concerning external actions, the budget of the Common Foreign and
Security Policy, and the adoption of the new financial regulation.
Policy Development
One of the most important successes of the Austrian Presidency was
the final discussion of the Services Directive. This directive was
intended to facilitate the provision of cross-border services within
Europe. The Services Directive was essential for completing the internal
market and reinforcing European competitiveness. Services account for
approximately 70 percent of private per capita income and people’s jobs
in the European Union. The directive had different social and consumer
protection implications. Austria had to take particular care to ensure that
the directive as formulated would not lead to wage dumping and social
dumping.
The debate started in 2004 when Commissioner Frederik “Frits”
Bolkestein presented the Commission’s Directive on Services in the
Internal Market (the so-called Bolkestein Directive). This document
contained a very liberalized position on services and was harshly
criticized from many sides. Therefore, the original draft was revised and
negotiated on the basis of a revised directive which the European
Parliament and the Council developed.
After more than two years of debate about and revision of the
original draft, the Austrian Presidency (especially Minister for
Economics and Labor Martin Bartenstein) would reach a consensus: the
Council adopted the Services Directive on 29 May 2006, with only one
abstention by Lithuania. The Council’s adoption had to be accepted by
the European Parliament (in accordance with the co-decision procedure).
In mid-November, the Services Directive was approved as law.
The final outcome was a compromise in many ways. One key
concession late in negotiations ensured that service providers operating
abroad would be required to obey the labor laws of the host country, not
their country of origin. This provision was crafted to avoid a so-called
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“race to the bottom,” under which firms from countries with weaker
social protection, particularly in Eastern Europe, could drastically
undercut competition. 
Key provisions of the directive ensure:
• service providers are not required to open a separate office in every
country in which they wish to conduct trade, nor will they be
required to install local representatives,
• freedom for service sector businesses to establish services in
another member state,
• freedom to provide services on the territory of another EU member
state,
• each EU member state must create a simple “one stop shop” for
service providers from another country to complete all necessary
registration and paperwork,
• a strengthening of service users’ rights by ensuring the right of non-
discrimination,
• the removal of various legal and administrative barriers through
forty-two new measures, and
• the simplification of many procedures guaranteed by sixty-five
measures. 
It is estimated that a least 600,000 extra jobs for workers will be
created and greater choices for consumers will result as competition
delivers a higher quality of services throughout Europe.
Another community policy field called for very quick action by the
European Union. Energy policy became a very sensitive issue when the
gas conflict between Russia and Ukraine started. At the beginning of
2006, Russia’s refusal to ship natural gas to Ukraine made clear how
delicate an issue the energy dependence of the European Union is. In
2006, the Union imported 42 percent of its gas from Russia; this figure
demonstrates the Union’s dependence on energy from other countries.
Almost 80 percent of Russian gas deliveries to Europe flow through
Ukraine. Despite its own gas production, which amounts to less than 30
percent, Ukraine is highly dependent on Russia. The energy supply of
Europe is, therefore, dependent on bilateral and even multilateral
relations and is thus subject to international politics.
Since 1973—the year of the oil crisis—the European Community
tried to intensify the cooperation of the member states in energy affairs.
In 1992, the Maastricht Treaty announced that the European Community
“shall contribute to the establishment and development of trans-
European networks in the areas of […] energy infrastructures.”21 Today
the energy policy is an essential element of the internal market.
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Several green and white books elaborated strategic goals and
measures for a common energy policy. The Austrian Presidency in 2006
focused on three objectives within its energy policy: the increase of
energy efficiency, the promotion of renewable energies, and an improve-
ment of the functioning of the internal energy market. A success of the
Austrian chairmanship was that the Council of Ministers of Energy
Affairs adopted on 14 March 2006 a directive about “energy efficiency
and energy services” aimed at reducing energy consumption over the
next nine years by 1 percent annually. Another success was a top-level
meeting on 15/16 March 2006 in Moscow. This conference was a
meeting of the sixty-eight energy ministers in which EU energy mi-
nisters and chairpersons of international organizations like the IAEO,
OPEC, and the World Bank participated. The Austrian energy minister
asked for “energy partnership in a new style.” While the European
Union is a consumer of energy, Russia a supplier of energy: about 90
percent of Russian exports is energy. During this conference, new pipe-
lines were discussed.
The Austrian presidency also made some progress in the field of
environmental policy. Directives regarding the production of batteries
as well improving air quality were adopted. Austria devoted particular
attention to the issues of air quality and the urban environment. The
objectives of the urban environmental strategy were to improve environ-
mental efficiency and the quality of life in urban areas, to ensure a
healthy living environment for urban residents in Europe, and to
strengthen the ecological contribution to sustainable urban development.
The Austrian Presidency’s efforts to move the Registration, Evaluation,
and Authorization of Chemicals (REACH) directive forward was
another Austrian contribution to environmental policy. The key objec-
tives of this directive reallocated responsibilities in the chemical sector
and established a European Chemicals Agency in Helsinki.
Final Remarks: A General Assessment
In the debate on the progressive nature of globalization, Europeani-
zation is more and more being understood as a response to globalization.
The process of European integration has two aspects: on the one side, it
is globalization on a regional scale; on the other side, it is a defensive
response to the worldwide trend of growing economic interdepen-
dence.22 Political leadership within the European Union has the power
to take advantage of both these aspects. Doing so leads to a process of
structural transformation and influences the speed of integration. The
current presidency system is unique and gives only limited possibilities
to the chairmanship. Nevertheless, the presidency can make a substantial
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contribution to deepening the European integration process. The Jean
Monnet strategy that asserts European unification must be developed
step by step is also evident in the current system of the presidency. The
Austrian Presidency in 2006 was not an outstanding event, but it was an
essential contribution to the process of Europeanization.
The Challenge of Enlargement for the European Union
The last two enlargement rounds have posed many challenges for
the European Union. Some of these challenges arise solely from
enlargement, but others have different roots which present themselves
as being a result of enlargement. The enlargement process east—with
ten new member states in 2004 and two new member states 2007—has
had significant impact on Austria’s position with the Union. When
Austria became a member state of the European Union on 1 January
1995, it was located on the periphery of the Union’s territory. Since the
2004 enlargement, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and
Slovenia—all countries that neighbor  Austria—are member states of the
European Union. Subsequently, Austria shifted from the geographic
periphery to the center of the European Union. Thus Austria has a new
perspective regarding its neighbors, and a new concept of a regional
partnership has been developed. As a result, Austrian strategic concerns
in terms of future EU enlargement have changed. A short analysis of two
enlargement rounds reveal the different approaches Austria tried when
addressing the relations between the European Union and the West
Balkan area and Turkey’s application for EU membership.
Austria’s Link to the “West Balkan Region”23
Austria has traditionally held strong historical, cultural, and busi-
ness links with the Balkans. During its EU presidency, the Austrian
government paid attention to political developments in this area and
stressed its commitment to supporting the efforts of countries in the
region to develop closer ties to the European Union. Austria was con-
vinced that the future of all the countries in the Western Balkans lay
within the European Union. In June 2005, the European Council
reaffirmed that all the Balkan states have a “European perspective” and,
thus, the possibility to accede to the Union under the condition that they
meet the criteria for membership.
Austria strongly supported the strategic priorities of the European
Union for the Balkans. The four main goals of the EU’s policy included
• the creation of an area of peace, welfare, and stability;
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• encouraging countries in the region to cooperate with the European
Union with an eye toward future admission;
• support for reconstruction and recovery; and
• support for reform policy.
Within Austrian foreign policy, diplomatic relations with the Balkan
countries play a significant role. Austrian diplomats have a special
expertise in the Balkan region, and Austrian businesses have a lot of
operations in the countries of the Balkans. Austrian companies are the
most important foreign investors there. Thus, there are many reasons
why Austria’s Presidency placed a special focus on Balkan issues. Bet-
ween November 2005 and June 2006, Austria initiated seven con-
ferences dealing with Balkan issues. In all these meetings, security con-
cerns played an essential role. At the center of the discussion was better
cooperation between the European Union and the Balkan states in
preventing and combating crime, organized or otherwise, particularly
terrorism, trafficking in person, corruption, and fraud.
Austria gave special support to Croatia in its efforts to become a
member of the European Union. The former Commissioner Franz Fisch-
ler works as a special adviser to the Croatian government on European
affairs.
The Application of Turkey: A Special Agreement
The relationship between Turkey and the European Union has its
roots 1963 with the signing of an Association Agreement, which
eventually led to Turkey’s accession to the Union. In 1987, Turkey made
a formal application for membership. The reaction of the European
Community was negative. The Commission considered Turkey inca-
pable of bearing the constraints and disciplines “applying to member
states,” and the community was not ready to cope with the problems that
Turkey’s integration would bring. 
The Luxembourg Summit of December 1997 excluded Turkey from
the formal enlargement process and denied Turkey full candidate status
while at the same time offering enlargement negotiations to eleven other
applicants. Despite a Customs Union agreement introduced in 1996, the
EU’s relationship to Turkey remained distant. In 1998, the European
Commission presented a European Strategy for Turkey to “prepare
Turkey for accession by bringing it closer to the European Union in
every field.” This strategy was not a great success, and Turkey didn’t
welcome it as a positive step towards full integration.
The Helsinki Summit of December 1999 brought much more pro-
gress, for the European Union formally granted Turkey the status of
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candidate country. After that, Turkey was recognized as a candidate
country and evaluated on the same criteria as all the other candidates.
Official negotiations began in October 2005, but the parties made
slow progress. By the end of June 2008, eight of the thirty-five chapters
of the acquis communautaire had been negotiated, but not finished, and
only one chapter had been concluded. Negotiations of several chapters
stopped when Turkey refused to open its harbors to ships registered in
Cyprus because Turkey refuses to recognize Cyprus diplomatically. 
Austria’s position in the case of Turkey has been rather reluctant.
As opposed to the position taken by the U.K. Presidency in the second
half of 2005, Austria did not support full membership for Turkey. U.K.
Foreign Secretary Jack Straw made a clear announcement on 8 Septem-
ber 2005 supporting the full membership of Turkey:
A stable prosperous Turkey anchored in the European Union would
be a powerful symbol indeed that the true divide lies not between
civilisations but between the vast majority of civilised people across
the world and uncivilised few who use violence and terror to try  to
destroy the common values and beliefs which bind the rest of us. It
will prove that a secular democratic state which shows respect for
Islam can live comfortably within Europe.24
Given the attitudes of many member states, numerous politicians
noted that Austria would be bound to change its position. However,
Christian Democratic politicians propagated the idea that Turkey is not
“of Europe” and that the European Union had “cultural, humanitarian
and Christian values different than Turkey’s.”
The attitude of the Austrian government to the Turkish application
was strongly influenced by public opinion in Austria which was clearly
against the full membership of Turkey in the Union. The polls showed
a broad majority against it. Therefore, the Austrian government followed
the proposal of the German government which favored a “privileged
partnership.” But the content of this kind of partnership is not clear. As
another measure, the Austrian government made a promise to the
Austrian people to organize a referendum before Turkey will be a mem-
ber of the European Union.
During the EU presidency, Austria highlighted the necessity of an
analysis of the EU’s capacity to accept new member states. The Austrian
perspective was that the case of Turkey must be examined not only in
regard to the Copenhagen Criteria, but also in terms of the Union’s abi-
lity to integrate new member states. Moreover, some Austrian politicians
pled for a referendum in Austria before Turkey should be admitted into
the Union.
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Reinventing Tradition and the Politics of History:
Schüssel’s Restitution and Commemoration Policies
Günter Bischof and Michael S. Maier1
“Human beings’ ability to rewrite the past to suit the
present—and especially to recast our individual complicity
with a shameful past—is testament to the creativity and
ingenuity of the species. It is a phenomenon whenever one
official orthodoxy gives way to another.”2
Introduction
During his six years in office, Wolfgang Schüssel’s ambivalent
political history (Geschichtspolitik) was as active, if not more so, than
that of any postwar Austrian chancellor. One has to assume that his
coalition partner, the Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei
Österreichs, or FPÖ), was a reluctant partner in most of his initiatives.
Little is known to date about actual negotiations inside the government
coalition about FPÖ reactions to Schüssel’s restitution policies during
his first government and his call to the nation to make the “memory year
2005” a Gedankenjahr—a year of thoughtful reflection about important
anniversaries (1945, 1955, 1995). This essay operates with the working
assumption that most of these initiatives in managing Austria’s complex
recent past and shaping the collective cultural memory of Austrians
originated with Schüssel personally and the People’s Party (Öster-
reichische Volkspartei, or ÖVP) as a project for strengthening Austrian
identity and patriotism. Schüssel took close personal interest in the
progress of the restitution negotiations and the details of planning the
events of the memory year 2005.3 The FPÖ—with its long history of
defying any notion of the past (Vergangenheitsbewältigung)—played the
silent coalition partner. At times, FPÖ/BZÖ party members ran active
interference by making public statements that militated against
Schüssel’s policies. The contrite Social Democratic Party of Austria
(Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs, or SPÖ) engaged in a serious
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effort of investigating the “brown spots” (“braune Flecken”) in its own
party history. The principal opposition to Schüssel’s politics of history
came from the critical intellectual class—mainly situated on the left and
from outside the parliamentary opposition.
This essay argues that signal restitution policies of the Schüssel
government were a historical turning point, if long overdue, in postwar
politics. By March 2000, the Schüssel government set up a task force
headed by Maria Schaumayer to investigate and compensate former
slave laborers who worked in Nazi industries during the war. Only
weeks later, Ambassador Ernst Sucharipa began negotiations with
organizations representing Jewish victims to fill “gaps and deficiencies”
in Austria’s complex postwar restitution legislation, culminating in the
“Washington Agreement” of 17 January 2001 and the commitment to
pay restitution to victims of “Aryanizations” in 1938, thus bringing legal
closure to this long-standing issue.4 
Vice-Chancellor Schüssel surfed on the international wave of
confronting the ugly National Socialist past.5 He reacted to the sanctions
of the European Union against the formation of his government in late
January 2000. Schüssel wanted to circumvent his new government’s
humiliating international pariah status after the formation of the ÖVP
coalition government with populist enfante terrible Jörg Haider’s right-
leaning FPÖ. The Schüssel government’s initiatives and breakthroughs
in restitution policies had been the result of an international wave in the
1990s of nations embracing their historical guilt and moral responsibility
for past injustices.6 Judging from a Festschrift published on the occasion
of his sixtieth birthday in 2005—with essays written and edited by his
fawning party associates and friends—one would never guess that fair
restitution policies and a focus on Geschichtspolitik were part of
Schüssel’s political vision.7
The later 1980s and 1990s formed an era when Austria’s World War
II past was rewritten. Ever since the great debate about ÖVP presidential
candidate Kurt Waldheim’s World War II past, postwar Austria’s
consensual postwar memory culture proffered by the two principal
parties, the ÖVP and SPÖ, had been changing.8 A younger generation of
historians was willing to engage in battle with the postwar myths. They
have subjected the official victim doctrine (Opferdoktrin) of Austria as
a casualty of Hitlerite Germany—the founding myth of the Second
Republic—to ever more critical inquiry. An alternative historical
narrative of Austrians as perpetrators during World War II has been
gaining ground and eroding the official “victims doctrine.” The long
hibernation of the contested space of World War II history ended in
Austria in the mid-1980s. In 1988, historians and officials took the
fiftieth anniversary of the Anschluß as an opportunity for a closer
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investigation of Austrians’ roles as perpetrators of war crimes during
World War II. When the Wehrmacht exhibition (Wehrmachtsaus-
stellung) toured Austrian cities in the 1990s, Austrians had to confront
the myths of the “clean” German Army and Austrian soldiers’ partici-
pation in war crimes on the eastern and southeastern fronts. During the
1988 national “memory year,” President Waldheim was finally willing
to admit that in 1938 and during the war there were “Austrians who were
victims and others who were perpetrators.” SPÖ Chancellor Franz
Vranitzky in a 1991 speech in Parliament again spoke of Austrian
“victims and perpetrators” and of Austrian “collective responsibility” for
the pain inflicted by the perpetrators. Both Vranitzky and President
Thomas Klestil reiterated the new memory formula of Austrian “victims
and perpetrators” and acknowledged “Austrian responsibility” for
supporting National Socialism during speeches in Jerusalem in 1993 and
1994 respectively.9
The 1990s turned out to be a decade when restitution to and recon-
ciliation with victims was an important element in international politics.
After the end of the Cold War, the Eastern European nations, after
ridding themselves of communism, began confronting their unmastered
pasts. On top of this, the administration of U.S. President Bill Clinton
made the “unfinished business” of full restitution of Holocaust era assets
a political priority and part of its wider campaign for human rights;10
moreover, American lawyers pushed class action suits against Swiss,
German, and Austrian financial institutions and businesses, sparking the
appointment of historians’ commissions and serious investigations into
the uncharted territory of the past.11 The spillover effects of this
international politics of restitution and reconciliation, which probed
what Elazar Barkan has called “the guilt of nations,” put enormous
pressure on the Austrian government to follow suit.12 
In 1995, the SPÖ/ÖVP grand coalition turned words into deeds.
Chancellor Vranitzky’s coalition government set up a new National
Fund (Nationalfonds) to compensate victims of Nazi policies. In 1998,
the SPÖ/ÖVP coalition government of Chancellor Victor Klima set up
the long overdue Austrian Historikerkommission to investigate the
massive property thefts and transfers of the World War II era. In both
these governments, Schüssel served as vice-chancellor and foreign
minister and was part and parcel of the new politics of history admitting
to Austrians’ offender history (Tätergeschichte) in World War II war
crimes. 
Yet Schüssel also proffered a Schlussstrichmentalität—ridding
Austria of the long shadows of World War II past, while the massive
research project of the Historikerkommission reports published in
2003/2004 opened up a wide window into the vast criminal project and
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deep implication of Austrian Täter in National Socialism, along with the
spotty and uneven postwar restitution efforts. Never before had
historians and legal scholars probed the depth of the Vienna pogroms
and property transfers (“Aryanizations” of Jewish property during 1938-
1942) so thoroughly as the deeply researched thirty-two volumes of the
historians’ commission have done.13 
In the preamble of its 2000 government program, the Schüssel
coalition government paid lip service to both Austria’s need to confront
“the dark chapters of Austrian history” and the 1991 formula pioneered
by Chancellor Vranitzky of Austrians being both “victims and per-
petrators” during World War II. At the same time, Chancellor Schüssel
tended to return to the traditional, overly legalistic “Austria as victim”
paradigm. In a number of high profile statements, he stubbornly insisted
that “Austria was a victim of Hitlerite aggression in 1938,” thus back-
tracking to the one-sided old postwar Opferdoktrin paradigm. Con-
currently, however, historical scholarship has ever more deeply fleshed
out the dreadful narrative of Austrians’ role in Hitlerite war crimes.
Critical scholarly and ambiguous official narratives of Austrian World
War II memory coexist and are still at war with each other.
Schüssel’s launch of the Gedankenjahr during 2005 seized the
celebration of a number of important anniversaries as a spectacular
opportunity for Geschichtspolitik and (re)definition of Austria’s collec-
tive memory culture. Schüssel set up a special office to coordinate the
numerous historical exhibits, events, and commemorations, which gave
him plenty of opportunity to put his spin on how he wanted to read
Austria’s postwar past and forge the country’s identity. This presented
an opportunity to turn the clock backward in confronting Austrians’
roles in and lack of contrition over World War II crimes. He prodded
Austrians to think about their postwar success story rather than their
wartime complicity.14 This allowed Austrians to bask in nostalgic con-
templations of history rather than confront both the homemade era of
Austrofascism15 and the unseemly World War II past. Rewriting the
past, reaffirming dear historical myths, was a strategy to control the
present. 
Indeed, when it came to politics of history the greatest failure of
Schüssel’s ÖVP party leadership came in his refusal to confront the dual
legacies of Austrofascism and Nazism. The ÖVP refused to follow the
example of the Socialist Party and investigate its predecessor’s roles in
bringing down democratic government in 1933 and engaging in post-
Anschluss “Aryanization” of Jewish property and investigate the ÖVP’s
postwar strategy in recruiting and harboring former National Socialist
Party members in its ranks.16 To date, the ÖVP has failed to master its
own past and look for the Nazi skeletons in its closet. Schüssel missed
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a golden opportunity to embark on such a critical historical mission.
Taken together, then, Schüssel’s Vergangenheitspolitik is as ambiguous
and tortuous as Austrians’ roles in World War II and their belated effort
to come to terms with that past.
Restitution and Compensation during the Schüssel Years
After the end of World War II—for half a century—the complex
restitution and compensation issue for victims of National Socialism had
been an inglorious chapter of Austria’s Geschichtspolitik, often neglec-
ted or intentionally silenced by governments. The international and
independent Austrian Historikerkommission concluded in its final 2003
report that the entire restitution complex in Austria was continually
overshadowed by the Opferdoktrin and Austrian governments’ persistent
refusal to accept any (shared) responsibility for Nazi war crimes.
Numerous restitution laws were reluctantly passed by Parliament from
1945 onwards. Yet they made access to material compensation for Nazi
victims very difficult and produced enormous resentment in Nazi
victims vis-à-vis the Republic of Austria. Moreover, the Historiker-
kommission also drew attention to the fact that restitution or
compensation acts were—as a form of equilibrium thinking (Gleich-
gewichtsdenken)—often paralleled by laws compensating other victims
of war such as German Wehrmacht soldiers, “victims of the postwar
Allied occupation,” and other victim groups, including former Nazi
perpetrators and supporters of Hitler’s dictatorial regime. The restitution
laws included almost every Austrian in the great postwar Austrian
victims’ collective.17
In 1995, on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the Second
Republic, the paradigm shift in Austria’s Vergangenheitsbewältigung,
which had started with the Waldheim fiasco of 1986, reached a point of
new political sensitivity for the country’s wartime culpability. This
became manifest in the establishment of the Nationalfonds. The National
Fund of the Republic of Austria for Victims of National Socialism was
set up by the SPÖ/ÖVP grand coalition under Socialist Chancellor Franz
Vranitzky in order to express Austria’s “particular responsibility”
towards the victims of the Nazi regime.18 It was designed to demon-
strate—beyond mere monetary compensation—a high symbolic value,
bridging the historical chasm between the Republic of Austria and the
long-neglected Nazi victims. As the former ÖVP party whip Heinrich
Neisser, who was one of the movers and shakers behind the establish-
ment of the Nationalfonds, pointed out, the Fund was basically a
“political gesture of reconciliation, recognition and respectfulness.”19
For the first time ever in Austria’s postwar restitution and compensation
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history, lump-sum recognition payments (so-called “gesture payments”)
of 70,000 schillings (later 5.087 euros) were extended to all surviving
victims of Nazi persecution around the world. In cases of social hard-
ship, even larger payments were made.
It has been statistically established that 80 percent of the applicants
to the Nationalfonds (and its successor, the General Settlement Fund)
were Jewish.20 In a dramatic turning point, victim groups long ignored
by the postwar political establishment were recognized for the first
time.21 Both homosexuals and the survivors of euthanasia crimes
received compensation and, thus, a late symbolic validation of their
persecution by the Nazis. Former slave or forced laborers remained
excluded, however.22 By October 2008, 30,097 humanitarian payments
totalling about 153 million euros (approximately 200 million dollars)
had been transferred to Nazi victims by the National Fund. There is no
deadline for applications, so future payments can still be made.23 
The Nationalfonds is also designed to keep the memory of Nazi war
crimes and persecution alive. It has sponsored some 700 comme-
morative and historical projects around the globe to actively document
Nazi war crimes and bear witness to the suffering of victims of National
Socialism.24 Even though a complex unresolved parallel problem—
namely paying compensation for losses of or damages to private
property after the 1938 Anschluss was left open—the National Fund and
the intensive media coverage of its inception and role marked a turning
point in Austria’s now much more transparent restitution policy. The
vaunted Nationalfonds undoubtedly played a decisive role in raising
public awareness of the Holocaust. Its transparent administration also
pioneered the way towards the future trajectory of intensifying restitu-
tion and compensation measures.
In the late 1990s, the Republic of Austria also experienced
enormous pressure to make amends for past injustices and became
caught up in the international trends of what has been called “Holocaust-
era assets” issues. After the collapse of communism and the end of the
Cold War, a new historical consciousness about historical guilt of state
actors emerged. Following the establishment of “truth and reconciliation
commissions” in South Africa and Latin American countries, historical
commissions were appointed by European governments as well as
private corporations to investigate illegal property transfers forced under
duress that had taken place under the Nazi dictatorship; moreover, the
entire complex of postwar restitution legislation was reviewed. The
District Attorney of Manhattan seized four iconic painting by Austrian
painter Egon Schiele that were under suspicion of being art looted by the
Nazis. These paintings happened to be in the possession of the state-
financed Leopold collection in Vienna. Swiss banks had to investigate
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and pay compensation for “dormant bank accounts” among their assets
of Holocaust victims. An intense discussion, which resulted in compen-
sation payments, in Germany about former slave laborers exploited by
the Nazi economy increased the pressure on the Austrian federal
government to follow suit and turn its attention to forced labor exploited
by the Nazi economy in the former Ostmark.25 
Then came the parliamentary elections of October 1999 and the
contentious formation of a new government, resulting in the unlikely
coalition of the ÖVP and FPÖ led by Chancellor Schüssel. The inaugu-
ration of the Schüssel government on 4 February 2000 resulted in an
outcry by the international community for giving the “right-wing”
Freedom Party of Jörg Haider governmental power. Isolation of the
pariah government followed. Austria’s Vergangenheitspolitik, or rather
the lack thereof, more than ever garnered international attention. Sanc-
tions by the European Union and intense protests from around the world
against giving the likes of populist Jörg Haider a place in the sun forced
Schüssel and Vice-Chancellor Susanne Riess-Passer (FPÖ) to send
positive signals concerning Austrian sensitivity towards the contro-
versial chapters of its World War II past and coming to terms with them.
The long-standing restitution and compensation issue, where significant
progress had been made in the second half of the 1990s by an SPÖ/ÖVP
coalition government with Schüssel as vice-chancellor and foreign
minister, provided the changing government (Wenderegierung) an
opportunity to close “the gaps and deficiencies” in Austria’s restitution
agenda. Dramatic concessions in the restitution arena were designed to
salvage and enhance the international image of the new government. In
an interview, FPÖ provincial politician and State Secretary Eduard
Mainoni called the advances in restitution policies a “win-win situation”
for his party.26
The record of Austria’s postwar restitution policy was not so poor
in terms of the amount of payments made. But restitution occurred in
fitful starts and was marked by a record of frequent and willful
procrastination (“ich bin dafür, die Sache in die Länge zu ziehen”27).
Policy makers had operated with bad faith and had always been reluctant
to advertise vigorously their cumulative accomplishments, fearing
public abuse and additional demands from the victims. Compared to this
record of Austria’s previous restitution policies, the brisk pace of the
Schüssel/Riess-Passer government in approaching the unresolved
questions of restitution and compensation was remarkable and
downright frantic. On 15 February 2000, only a few days after the
stigmatized ÖVP/FPÖ coalition embarked on their new government,
Chancellor Schüssel appointed Maria Schaumayer as his special envoy
to conduct bilateral negotiations concerning compensation to former
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Nazi slave and forced laborers working on Austria territory. For Stuart
Eizenstat, President Bill Clinton’s special envoy on Holocaust-era assets
issues, the main motive for Schüssel’s urgency in this complex problem
long brushed aside was quite evident. He noted in his memoirs that
Austria’s diplomatic isolation by its EU partners put Schüssel on the
spot “to demonstrate to the world his sensitivity to Holocaust issues by
tackling the forced labor issue [U.S. sponsored] class-action suits had
thrust into prominence.”28 
From the very beginning, Chancellor Schüssel gave the publicly
much admired Schaumayer his complete personal support. As a former
highly successful governor of the Austrian National Bank, she enjoyed
a sterling reputation as a public official. Schaumayer also could count
on a broad consensus from all Austrian political parties and Parliament.
She pursued a clear and very transparent negotiating strategy in her con-
tacts with the governments in Central and Eastern Europe representing
the slave laborers. This vigorous public stance produced an unusually
high public acceptance rate from the Austrian population on an issue
which was usually subject to considerable abuse and the typical Austrian
grousing (Raunzerei). The gentle yet bold Schaumayer convinced both
Schüssel and Eizenstat to take a different approach from the Federal
Republic of Germany. To simplify and strengthen the negotiation
process, Schaumayer (with the able and keen assistance of Martin
Eichtinger, a professional diplomat) advocated the strict separation of
the agendas relating to the forced laborers (Zwangsarbeiter) from the
even more contentious issue of 1938-1942 looted property
(Arisierungen). The Austrian side aimed for intergovernmental agree-
ments to block the involvement of greedy class action lawyers. Such
direct negotiations between governments were designed to end the
interminable class action suits by American lawyers such as the
redoubtable Ed Fagan.
Central and Eastern European negotiators and representatives of
victim’s associations directly negotiated with representatives from
Austria, including Austrian industry directly affected by the outcome.
Moreover, the top experts from the academic community and members
of the Historikerkommission were invited to add their valuable back-
ground knowledge and to participate in the negotiations. In May 2000,
only three months after the initiation of these negotiations, a Recon-
ciliation Fund Conference was organized in Vienna to approve the key
outcomes of the negotiations. At this unprecedented conference, the
various representatives agreed that Austria would pay six billion
schillings (more than 400 million dollars at that time) to an estimated
150,000 former Zwangsarbeiter who were still alive. Schaumayer, with
her great sensitivity and calm temperament, added additional payments
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to victims. Next to slave and forced laborers who had worked in industry
and agriculture, the expanded categories of victims who would be
compensated included children, who had been deported with their
parents and female forced laborers who had given birth to children in the
Danube and Alpine Gaue of Hitler’s Third Reich.
In July 2000 in record time, the Reconciliation Fund Law was
approved by both houses of Parliament with the unanimous vote of all
parliamentary parties. During September and October, Schaumayer was
able to conclude intergovernmental agreements with five Eastern Euro-
pean countries (Belarus, Poland, the Czech Republic, Ukraine, and
Hungary); in November, a separate agreement was signed with Russia.
Austria also insisted on receiving a “Statement of Interest” from the U.S.
government, designed to achieve “legal closure” in this issue and pre-
vent future private U.S. class action suits.
This dramatic breakthrough in the restitution arena was only the
beginning. On 5 October 2000, Schüssel and Eizenstat met again in
Vienna to set the course for yet another round of important restitution
negotiations. Four months later, only days before the accession of
George W. Bush as U.S. president on 20 January 2001, another agree-
ment was signed with the Clinton Administration after very tough
negotiations by Ambassador Ernst Sucharipa, the director of Vienna’s
venerable Diplomatic Academy whom Schüssel had appointed special
envoy on “Aryanization” matters. In return for keeping the class action
lawyers at bay and achieving “legal closure” in U.S. courts, Chancellor
Schüssel agreed to provide immediately 150 million dollars in com-
pensation payments for Jewish apartment leases and commercial
property, household goods, and personal valuables “aryanized” mostly
by force after the Anschluss in 1938. The Nationalfonds, established in
1995 and under the able leadership of Hannah Lessing producing an
admirable record in compensation payments, was commissioned to
administer also the transactions of this new round of compensation
payments. Additionally, it was agreed the General Settlement Fund
would cover all the remaining “potential gaps and deficiencies in prior
Austrian restitution programs.” The Executive Agreement between
Austria and the United States signed on 24 October 2000 marked a
historical breakthrough in Austria’s compensation policies and can be
seen as a major accomplishment of Schüssel’s Vergangenheitspolitik. It
not only improved Austria’s reputation among the Eastern European
countries, but also finally brought Austria in alignment with Western
practices of more openly mastering the past. Once the class action suits
against Austrian companies were withdrawn in December 2000, the
Fund for Reconciliation, Peace, and Cooperation began its work in
Vienna.29
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The payments made to the slave and forced laborers in Central and
Eastern Europe were dispersed quickly. One may dispute how
significant these funds were, yet to the thousands of retirees who
enjoyed these unexpected payments, they were most welcome,
especially as they came with an Austrian apology for the past injustices.
At last, their suffering was acknowledged. According to the Recon-
ciliation Fund Law, voluntary compensation payments of 20,000
schillings (1,453 euros) were made to former forced laborers in
agriculture, and 35,000 schillings (2,543 euros) to forced laborers in the
industry. Slave laborers (prisoners of war in Ostmark camps) received
105,000 schillings (7,630 euros); an additional amount of 5,000
schillings (363 euros) was paid for childbirth. At its beginning, the Fund
was capitalized at more than 439 million euros. Both the Austrian
government and the private sector made contributions, at least 50
percent of the funding coming from Austrian businesses. The state-
owned industrial sector alone provided some 73 million euros for the
funding (about a third of the industrial sector’s portion), with large
amounts coming from the Austrian State Railways and the electricity
industry. By 2005, the Austrian Reconciliation Fund had approved some
132,000 applications and disbursed 352 million euros. The remaining 96
million euros were distributed in a project-oriented manner, benefiting
former slave and forced laborers and even their heirs. To keep the
memory of these abject era and Austrian culpability alive, 20 million
euros were allocated to the newly established Future Fund for Research
and Remembrance, set up in 2005 to sponsor research projects with a
focus on the Nazi era.30
Parallel to this set of quickly concluded negotiations on Sklaven-
und Zwangsarbeiter, the issues dealing with the restitution for
“Aryanized” property turned out to be much more challenging. The
seasoned diplomat Sucharipa was confronted with a multiplicity of
negotiating partners, namely representatives of the Clinton Admini-
stration and Austrian and international Jewish victim organizations, as
well as the demanding class action lawyers. After exploratory dis-
cussions in Vienna, New York, and Washington, the Framework Agree-
ment Concerning Austrian Negotiations Regarding Austrian Nazi Era
Property/Aryanization Issues of 5 October 2000, negotiated between
Schüssel and Eizenstat (see above), formed the statutory framework for
these negotiations. Numerous rounds of parleys between Sucharipa and
Eizenstat studied Austria’s former restitution legislation. The agreeable
pair began to hammer out a fixed amount deemed adequate for com-
pensations. The agreement was nailed down in Washington on 17
January 2001 in the waning days of the Clinton presidency. The Austrian
government adopted the agreement on 23 January 2001.31 The imme-
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diate outcome of the Joint Statement was that the Austrian government
transferred an additional sum of 150 million dollars to the accounts of
the Nationalfonds, earmarked for compensating Jewish victims of
“Aryanization” who had lost their tenancy rights, household property,
personal valuables, and other effects.32 For a second time, the National
Fund made lump sum payments amounting to 7,639 euros to more than
20,000 deserving applicants. From what was left over from the fund,
additional supplements of 1,000 euros were paid out to all applicants or
their heirs.33 According to the second law passed by the Austrian
Parliament on the basis of the 17 January 2001 Washington Compen-
sation Agreement, the General Settlement Fund for Victims of National
Socialism was established on 28 May 2001. It was designed “to compre-
hensively resolve open questions of compensation of victims of National
Socialism for losses and damages as a result of or in connection with
events having occurred on the territory of the present-day Republic of
Austria during the National Socialist era.”34 
Again, both the Republic of Austria and Austrian private corpo-
rations endowed the General Settlement Fund with 210 million dollars,
of which 25 million dollars was earmarked for losses from insurance
claims. In contrast to the lump sum disbursements made and completed
by the National Fund, the General Settlement Fund is still paying out
calculated pro rata payments to more than 20,000 Holocaust survivors
or the heirs of eligible claimants. The applications were due to be filed
before the deadline of 28 May 2003. This compensation was earmarked
for victims whose businesses were liquidated, or who lost real estate,
capital assets (bank accounts, stocks, bonds, and mortgages), movable
property (unless covered by the National Fund), insurance claims,
occupational or educational losses, and any other losses or damages that
were not covered under prior restitution or compensation measures. For
the purpose of in rem restitution of publicly owned property, an
Arbitration Panel was set up to adjudicate claims.35 After “legal closure”
was reached with the U.S. government in December 2005 (meaning
Austrian companies could not be sued again by class action lawyers), the
General Settlement Fund began disbursing “initial payments” of 10
percent and 15 percent of the allotted amount, depending on the legal
process.36 By 13 January 2009, 12,744 advance payments had been
transferred.37 Finally, the Washington Agreement of 2001 also included
a set of social benefits for surviving victims of the Nazi persecution,
including pension payments and money dedicated the nursing care of
aging victims. Taken together, the Austrian government measures
passed since the establishment of the Nationalfonds in 1995, the Re-
public of Austria and the Austrian business community allocated
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restitution and compensation payments amounting to a whopping 1
billion U.S. dollars.38 
Cynics will argue that Schüssel’s accomplishments in restitution
policies are a case of “too little, too late.” Yet the ever critical tribe of
historians of Austrian World War II memory also ought to concede that
Chancellor Schüssel played a crucial role in advancing long overdue
restitution and compensation programs for Austrian victims of Nazism,
especially Jews and Roma and Sinti. There may be personal reasons for
his active role. Like hundreds of thousands of other Austrian families,
Schüssel’s personal family history also has to contend with “brown
spots” (braune Flecken).39 Schüssel is unique among Austria’s postwar
chancellors in inserting himself personally in these negotiations.
Schüssel’s very active restitution policies, his excellent knowledge of
the issues, and his “sure instinct” have received high marks and been
valued as one of the “plus factors” of his term in office.40 No less than
Stuart Eizenstat, Clinton’s chief negotiating partner on the U.S. side,
gave him generous credit for his “inspired leadership” in this delicate
and complex issue.41 Nevertheless, historians will also agree that
Schüssel’s inspired restitution policies were in response to the “class-
action syndrome”42—part and parcel of the international Holocaust-era
assets debates of the 1990s. Moreover, the circumstances of his
accession to the federal chancellorship also did their part to motivate
Schüssel to choose an aggressive forward defense. The storm of protests
at home and abroad following the participation of the right-wing FPÖ in
Schüssel’s coalition government made these dramatic advances in
restitution policies a matter of shrewd politics. Historians still have few
insights into the intergovernmental negotiations between the ÖVP and
its polarizing coalition partner, the FPÖ, and have, therefore, chalked up
much of the progress in this area to Schüssel’s personal leadership.
Schüssel deserves credit for delving into the contested field of
compensating long-neglected groups of Austrian Nazi victims with
almost reckless abandon. By the time the Austrian memory year arrived
in 2005, much of Schüssel’s restitution agenda had been completed, and
he could delve into shaping the meaning of the past with his hyperactive
Geschichtspolitik.
The Year of Historical Memory 2005
It would be presumptuous to assume that in an essay one could
cover the blizzard of memory events in 2005 comprehensively. In the
following analysis, some trends and key discourses will be identified
that might characterize the direction of Chancellor Schüssel’s am-
biguous politics of history intended to rewrite the master narrative to his
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liking and his efforts to shape Austria’s cultural memory. An overall
assessment would be ill-advised, but parameters for future debates and
evaluations of this era may arise from a broad treatment of the memory
events. Sufficient historical evidence is already available to embark on
such an assessment. A good starting point is the useful preview of the
entire program activities along with a glossy “reader” of texts and
photos what the year 2005 might signify for prominent Austrians,
produced by the Federal Chancellor’s Office.43 
Schüssel set up a special Planungsbüro under the leadership of State
Secretary Franz Morak, a planning team organized by journalist Hans
Haider, responsible for coordination of the blizzard of anniversary
activities.44 At the end of the memory year, the Planungsbüro published
the comprehensive documentation 2005: Ein Gedenkjahr—a three-
volume set with a printed volume of speeches, 2 DVDs documenting the
many memory events of 2005, and a DVD on the controversial memory
events named 25 Peaces.45 This media-documentation set constitutes a
summa of what Schüssel and his memory event managers tried to
accomplish in 2005. In addition, historian and filmmaker Helene
Maimann published a useful volume of key texts published in news-
papers and media during the year as a running commentary on the
memory activities and their meaning, tending to be critical of the
Gedankenjahr presumptions of reinventing the past.46 Even more
dismissive of Schüssel’s politics of history is the volume of essays by a
younger generation of mainly cultural historians, many of them outright
contrarians.47 A special Forum in this journal also tried to summarize the
commemorations of 2005 and the “exhibitionism” of Austrian memory
culture in the numerous historical exhibits and their catalogues.48
American historian Matthew Berg was the first scholar outside of
Austria to take note of and analyze the intense 2005 memory discourses
in Austria.49 
To his credit, Wolfgang Schüssel takes Austrian history seriously,
but also sports uncompromising views on it, steeped in his party’s
ideology. He involved himself personally in the management of a
patriotic consensual narrative of the entire trajectory of post-World War
I Austrian history and the staging of memory events—his ultimate
objective being the strengthening of the Austrian nation as he sees it. In
2004, he had already gathered prominent historians and philosophers
around him at the Federal Chancellery to act as his consultants in
preparing for the memory year 2005. Even though there seems to be a
debate over “copyright,” the idea of making 2005 a year of reflection
apparently originated with Helene Maimann in a conversation with her
boss Wolfgang Lorenz at the Austrian National Broadcasting Cor-
poration (ORF). Lorenz, one of Schüssel’s consultants, mentioned the
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Gedankenjahr idea to the Chancellor who apparently swallowed it hook,
line, and sinker and claimed the copyright.50 
The planning bureau was set up in the Federal Chancellery in 2004
to prepare the catalogue of the many 2005 memory events and their
hierarchy. Federal ministries and institutions such as the National
Library and the various state museums were asked to commemorate the
anniversaries with special exhibits. The staging of the memory year was
designed to be nationwide, so the Bundesländer also were called upon
to contribute to the memory blitz with exhibits and memory events.51
Presenting the program for 2005, State Secretary Morak gave the
marching orders. The “Jubiläumsjahr 2005” would make a stand
(Standortbestimmung) on “the positioning of Austria around the
question where do we want to find ourselves in the future.” Chancellor
Schüssel raised the issue of Austrian identity formation from 1945 to
2005 as a basic inquiry for this year of reflection, essentially asking,
“Who are we?” Rarely has a nation staged such an extended series of
historical commemorations over the course of a whole year. Critics soon
began to make fun of Schüssel’s ulterior motives (Hintergedanken) and
the bathos of the “year of historical reflection,” the Austro-centric rituals
of commemoration, and the presumptions behind the entire “patriotic
‘Jubiläumsmaschine’” of Morak’s planning bureau.52
The unfolding of the 2005 memory year happened on many
different levels, and a comprehensive overview is impossible. Even the
Planungsbüro’s meticulous recording of every happening failed to track
every memory-related occurrence, especially those staged abroad. On
the one hand, there were the many official commemorations, historical
exhibits with their grand openings, and the event series 25 Peaces. On
the other hand, semi-, non-, and anti-official symposia, exhibits, and
happenings occurred all over Austria and around the world.53
On the official level, the commemorative anniversary celebrations
of key historical events were given the highest priority: 27 April 1945
(Austrian Declaration of Independence and formation of the Provisional
Renner Government), 15 May 1955 (signing ceremony of the Austrian
State Treaty at Castle Belvedere), and 1 January 1995 (Austria joining
the European Union). A festive assembly of the Austrian Parliament
launched the official inauguration of the memory year 2005. This
ceremony was overshadowed by a commemoration of the victims of the
recent tsunami catastrophe in East Asia. Chancellor Schüssel seized the
opportunity to remind the audience that the East Asian natural disaster
reminded him of the “landscape of ruins” left by the war in Austria sixty
years ago. Schüssel thus continued the traditional metaphorical diction
in his party since Chancellor Julius Raab in the 1950s, seeing World
War II as a “natural catastrophe” that had overwhelmed and victimized
220 The Schüssel Era in Austria
the passive Austrians.54 Critics such as contrarian Robert Menasse
quickly jumped on Schüssel for this comparison that sent the message
that “fascism was a natural catastrophe,” engulfing the population like
an unstoppable flood.55 
To be fair, Schüssel’s speech in Parliament actually concentrated on
both Austria’s success story of economic and political reconstruction
and bridge-building during the Cold War, and its procrastinations in
facing the past. He did mention Austria’s historical trail of tears
(historische Wundspuren) since 1914, including the “expulsion, expro-
priation, and murder of Jewish citizens,” as well as the handicapped,
homosexuals, Roma and Sinti, and the persecution of all people of
different political and religious persuasions—thus expanding the
categories of Austrian victims of National Socialism beyond the tradi-
tional Austrian victims collective of civilians, soldiers, and resistance
fighters. President Heinz Fischer (SPÖ) stressed that in the spring of
1945 Austrian democracy was restored after the horrors of National
Socialist violence. Fischer noted that in 1945 “the red-white-red flag
triumphed over the swastika, and democracy over dictatorship.”56 
In February, the ten-year membership of Austria in the European
Union was celebrated in a “European Congress” in the Vienna Hof-
burg—with the stress on both Austria and the European Union profiting
from this membership.57
The anniversary activities culminated in April and May 2005
around the key historical events of 27 April 1945 and 15 May 1955 as
the anchors of postwar memory culture. Within the timeframe of three
weeks, the sixtieth anniversary of the Declaration of Austrian Indepen-
dence was celebrated in the Hofburg, while the fiftieth anniversary of
the signing of the Austrian State Treaty was celebrated in the Belvedere
Palace. Austria’s liberation from the Nazis was at the center of the first
anniversary and the country regaining its full sovereignty at the center
of the second. Critics note that an undertone of liberation from the four
Allies marked the State Treaty celebration, especially among the
conservative forces of the country, who had already felt that way in 1955
(“liberation from the liberators”).
Fischer’s 27 April keynote address concentrated on both the end of
Hitlerite Germany and the foundations of postwar democracy and
freedom. He reminded his audience of the victims of World War II,
including civilians, soldiers, resistance fighters, and Jews (a somewhat
hidebound listing of victims). He admonished Austrians not to play off
27 April against 15 May, for both days were crucial foundations in
building the postwar “Austrian house.” Schüssel also dwelt on the many
Austrian victims of the war: civilians, those murdered in concentration
camps, victims of religious and political persecution, Jews, Roma and
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Sinti, the handicapped, and killed and maimed soldiers and prisoners of
war. In his accounting, Austria “strangely” had almost as many victims
(400,000) as Nazis (500,000)—thus low-balling the number of Nazis—a
tactic the ÖVP had consistently employed since the first round of state
treaty negotiations in London in 1947 (the Ostmark prided itself on some
700,000 registered Nazi party members). Then Schüssel backtracked
into the traditional ÖVP narrative when he noted that Austria “had
fought longer than any other country against Hitler and National
Socialism,” without explicitly referencing Dollfuss’ “resistance” against
the Nazis. Both speakers took a deep bow before founding fathers such
as Leopold Figl. Both saw European integration and the European
Union’s peace project as an antithesis to the nationalisms that fueled
World War II.58
On 15 May, the old Proporz-coalition historical narrative triumphed
again (Vice-Chancellor Hubert Gorbach from the coalition partner BZÖ
was curiously absent as a speaker). Fischer again stressed that the
liberation of Austria and the defeat of Hitlerite Germany in April 1945
was the starting point of Austrian independence and democracy after the
war; then 1955 brought “full freedom and independence.” He thanked
the representatives of the four Allies who were represented at the State
Treaty ceremony for the sacrifices of their soldiers in liberating Austria
and for their economic support to make Austria viable after the war. He
noted the difficult path of negotiating the Austrian State Treaty and the
“heavy burden” the Austrian people felt from the ongoing four-power
occupation after the war. As is customary in the SPÖ, Fischer praised
Austria’s peace-oriented neutrality policy after 1955. Schüssel addressed
the changing geopolitical context in 1955 and the “great luck” Austria
had in seizing the moment to complete the State Treaty. Austria received
back “the precious gift of her freedom,” which it used to join the United
Nations and the European Council. He recounted the success story of
Austria’s economic miracle after the war—thanking Americans for the
Marshall Plan—and its importance as a bridge between East and West
in the Cold War. He obliquely paid lip service to the fact that Austria
paid restitution and damages, albeit too late, without mentioning the
specific victim groups benefiting from these restitutions. He concluded
that Austria was a latecomer to nation building, yet recorded with pride
that Austrians’ enthusiasm for their nation was great.59 There was a lot
of trite commentary in the traditional consensual rhetoric of these
speeches, and critics made fun of the “teflon memory” in these empty
rhetorical formulas.60
At the same time, there was a lot of speechmaking during the
opening of the historical exhibits at the Schallaburg in Lower Austria
and at the Castle Belvedere in Vienna in mid-April and mid-May. Both
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these exhibits also displayed the original copy of the Austrian State
Treaty on loan from Moscow for a few weeks, a piece of material
history that was a great hit with hundreds of thousands of visitors. The
Schallaburg show Österreich ist frei concentrated on the occupation
period and the Austrian success narrative culminating in the signing of
the State Treaty in 1955. The Belvedere exhibit Das Neue Österreich,
which came together very late due to political controversy surrounding
it about finances and conceptualization, gave the entire narrative of the
two Austrian Republics, starting in 1919 and including the World War
II era.61 These two exhibits tended to support the master narrative of the
success story of postwar Austria. This was obviously the principal
narrative the Schüssel government was promoting throughout the
memory year 2005 with some minor dissonances, complimenting the
story of Austrian hardship after the war and triumph after the end of the
four-power occupation. Clearly, as one critic noted acerbically, the war
years were not counted in the celebration of the postwar success story
and “Austria celebrated its non-existence” in those difficult years when
it was a victim of the Nazis.62 
In the contested narratives of Austrian history, the representations
in these exhibits staged and reproduced the postwar myths designed to
silence the conflicted past (which included Austrofascism, Austrian war
criminals, postwar procrastinations in restitution policies, and the like).
These exhibits thus were constructed to intensify the uncontroversial
master narrative of Austrian history. These exhibits therefore acted as
“privileged spaces for the will to dramatize very specific conceptions of
identity,” averred Heidrun Zettelbauer.63
What Schüssel called the “playful” 25 Peaces was the most curious
and controversial production of the Federal Chancellery’s Planungs-
büro. Twenty-five events (as many as there were EU states at the time)
were staged as reminders of the hard times during and after the war. The
equestrian statues on Vienna’s Heldenplatz were camouflaged as they
had been during the war, when they were protected from Allied bombs;
next to them a vegetable garden was planted as had been done in 1945
when the Viennese were starving. The night of 12 March 1945, when the
inner city of Vienna was subjected to its most severe Allied air attack,
was restaged on 12 March 2005, by way of fearful light and sound
installations. In the days prior to the key State Treaty anniversary on 15
May, a herd of cows grazed in the Belvedere gardens, as bovines had
done during the occupation period. A copy of the Belvedere balcony was
sent with a crane around the country for Austrians to reenact Figl’s
famous yet spurious “Österreich ist frei” balcony scene on 15 May (this
was termed “do-it-yourself Figl”). The famous “four in the Jeep”
patrolled Vienna again, and the zonal borders were painted on the streets
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of the capital to remind the Viennese of the four-power partition of their
city during the occupation decade. The planners of the 25 Peaces wanted
to encourage Austrians to think creatively about their nation’s past
through these staged representations in the public space. “History as
happening” was designed to appeal to the younger generations of
Austrians who usually do not visit museums and exhibits.64 
Critics savaged the 25 Peaces and the combative mastermind be-
hind such historical “event culture,” Wolfgang Lorenz. The “son-et-
lumière spectacle” (Robert Menasse)—the recreation of the “Bomben-
stimmung” after an Allied air-attack—was especially seen as “event
history” and a trivialization of the past (Lisa Mayr). Writer Marlene
Streeruwitz told Lorenz that to make a complex history appealing to a
younger crowd was condescending and mendacious (“Schwieriges zu
entschwierigen ist Lüge”). In an interview with the Viennese weekly Der
Falter, the combative Lorenz rejected the notion that his 25 Peaces were
cheap “infotainment” and attacked all consumers of high-brow culture
as bores (fad), implying that his low-brow historical entertaining
reenactments at least sported considerable excitement among partici-
pants.65 The funniest attack on the 25 Peaces was an alleged “cow-
napping” by a group of Internet activists. Newspapers reported an
Internet story of the kidnapping of one of the cows, peacefully grazing
in the Belvedere gardens, by unknown terrorists who also demanded that
Chancellor Schüssel and the CEO of Austrian Television publicly admit
that “they had been misleading the Austrian population in 2005 with lies
about history and inciting them towards nationalism.”66 There is no
question that tens of thousands of people were attracted to the “hands-
on” form of “everyday history” (Alltagsgeschichte) by participating in
the discourses sparked by the 25 Peaces. Whether it produced the
thoughtfulness (nachdenken) intended by the event producers and
thereby allowed Austrians a more profound understanding of the past by
way of immersion in their history is impossible to assess empirically.
Next to this official master narrative celebrated in anniversary
speechmaking and the exhibitionism of luscious and uncontroversial
historical shows, there was a counter narrative issued at every turn of the
anniversary celebrations by critics and intellectuals, some of it shrill and
much of it unforgiving, attacking and demeaning the official mindset,
often in the best tradition of Karl Kraus.67 The main points of contention
were the “stubborn revival of the victim’s myth” and the “celebration of
the Austrian perpetrators collective as the Austrian victims collective.”68
The real victims of World War II such as the Jews and the Holocaust
were largely marginalized during the memory year. The State Treaty
anniversary of 1955 was privileged over the liberation of Austria in 1945
in the Schüssel government’s “hegemonic” historic discourses. April
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1945 was interpreted as the end of the war rather than the liberation
from the Nazis. Some Austrian elites apparently were still having a hard
time determining whether the end of the war spelled defeat or
liberation.69 Dwelling on Figl’s famous 1955 dictum “Austria is free” as
the beginning of Austria’s newborn postwar freedom rather than the
election of 1945 was appalling. The fact that a majority of Austrians
perceived the fall of the Hitler regime as defeat and did not welcome the
Allied liberators was strictly ignored.70 In the age-old Josephinian
tradition, the historical master narrative of Austria’s postwar “success
story” of liberation both from the Nazis and then the Allies and
integration into the European Union was ordered from the top down by
the “chief administrator” of the state and his comrades “responsible for
ideology.”71
Conclusion: Legacies—Was bleibt?
The legacy of Schüssel’s Vergangenheitspolitik is ambiguous. On
the one hand, no postwar Austrian chancellor embarked on more
ambitious restitution policies. His prominent ÖVP predecessors on
Vienna’s Ballhausplatz, Leopold Figl and Julius Raab, had hemmed and
hawed and procrastinated, and so did long-serving SPÖ Chancellors
Bruno Kreisky and Franz Vranitzky. Kreisky’s active role in Vergangen-
heitspolitik, by the way, ever since he served in high office was as
determined as Schüssel’s in reinforcing Austria’s victim’s status and
celebrating Austrian resistance during the war.72 Schüssel, determined
to impose his master narrative on an unsuspecting public, did backtrack
on the 1990s paradigm shift in Austrian World War II memory. Next to
the restitution payments to slave laborers and Jews, the Schüssel
government quietly passed legislation to pay restitution indiscriminately
also to Austrian prisoners of war, who had fought on all fronts during
the war. To demonstrate politically correct gender consciousness for
good measure, the postwar “Trümmerfrauen,” namely those women who
cleaned up the rubble in Austria’s cities after the war, received symbolic
token restitution payments, too.73 It did not matter whether the Austrian
POWs had been fervid Wehrmacht fighters or the Trümmerfrauen had
been members of the Nazi Party; their suffering needed to be
acknowledged sixty years after the war. This tended to reinforce the
myth of Austrians (both on the frontlines and the home front) as victims
rather than as perpetrators. Even though Schüssel expanded the
traditional Austrian World War II collective of victims in his comme-
morative speechmaking, he stubbornly insisted in early February in a
much-quoted interview with the Neue Zürcher Zeitung that “Austria was
a victim,” namely the “first military victim of the Nazis.” As early as
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July 2000, he had stressed in a parliamentary debate: “Austria was a
victim of National Socialism; Austria was wiped off the map, dis-
appeared, was a victim.” In November 2004, he reiterated the same
notion an interview with the Jerusalem Post: “The Nazis took Austria
with force. The Austrians were the first victims.”74 He made no mention
of his own party’s Christian Social predecessors and their pre-Anschluss
authoritarian regime that cast a willful death sentence over democratic
governance.
Coupled with outrageous statements from the camp of his coalition
partner that the Auschwitz gas chambers did not exist and that
Wehrmacht deserters were “murderers of their comrades” (Kameraden-
mörder)75—statements that Schüssel to his credit did publicly
disavow76—it appeared to many critical observers that the opportunity
for a real breakthrough in Austria confronting the crimes of National
Socialism and mastering its World War II past was missed once again.
Schüssel and his party’s Schlussstrich mentality lacked contrition for
Austrians’ complicity in World War II war crimes. They went a step
forward on restitutions, but two steps backward on a critical reflection
and confrontation of Austria’s ambiguous recent past.77
 Heidemarie Uhl, the most distinguished historian of Austrian
World War II memory discourses, concluded with resignation that the
State Treaty and the consensual year 1955 replaced the controversial
year 1945 as the crucial founding myth. In public opinion polls, 20
percent of Austrians have a fond image of the State Treaty, but only 1
percent hold positive associations with 27 April 1945. She adds that the
Schüssel government reactivated the narrative of the Austrian “success
story” in the 2005 anniversary year and superimposed it over the post-
1986 critical narrative of Austrian responsibility for the crimes of
National Socialism. In 2005, Austria missed the opportunity to embrace
the European trend of finally abandoning exculpatory postwar
mythology and placing the memory of the Holocaust as the principal
European site of memory into the center of its cultural memory.78 In his
brazen effort to encourage Austrians to reflect critically about their
troubled past during the war and reinforce the positive national identity
of the country’s success story after the war, Schüssel reinvented the
hidebound Austrian tradition of the contested Opferdoktrin, which had
been eroding since the mid-1980s and was increasingly abandoned.
While most Germans have engaged in a culture of contrition, many
Austrians seem to wallow still in their “victim culture.”79
In 2005, Schüssel’s ÖVP indulged in a commemorative carnival
while the opposition SPÖ seriously engaged in mastering the em-
barrassing Nazi detritus (braune Flecken) in its own past. While the
Socialist Party in 2002 began a serious scholarly investigation into
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former Nazis that served in various postwar party organizations and
posts and published the report in 2005, Schüssel’s ÖVP refused to
launch such a critical self-study. In the national elections of 1945, both
parties vied for the votes of former Nazis. Moreover, 10.7 percent of
SPÖ and 12.8 percent of ÖVP deputies in Parliament and higher
legislative bodies were former Nazis. Both parties failed to thoroughly
de-Nazify their membership after the war and maintained these “brown
spots” in leadership positions. But unlike the Socialists, Schüssel’s
People’s Party refused to confront this seedy past in its history. Ameri-
can historian Matthew P. Berg, who participated in one of the SPÖ’s
self-studies, is on the mark in concluding that the SPÖ belatedly held a
“genuine claim to moral high ground” by demonstrating “its willingness
to acknowledge the active complicity of many of its members in the
Third Reich.” Moreover, unlike the Christian Socials, the prewar
predecessor party of the ÖVP, the SPÖ “never supported any form of
dictatorship,” a fact that the ÖVP was even less willing to concede.80 As
ÖVP leader, Schüssel failed to press his party to confront both dictator-
ships, the first one many of its members had supported and are still
trying to exculpate.
Schüssel’s Geschichtspolitik in the memory year 2005 made clear
that popular and scholarly discourses probably will always coexist next
to each other. Apart from the chattering classes of high-brow print media
commentaries and superficial discussions on television, these two
communities are separated by deep chasms of professional boundaries
and do not communicate with each other much (other than the few
scholars privileged to have been invited to the Chancellor’s roundtable
as consultants). The vast array of historical exhibits staged during the
memory year 2005 all over Vienna and across the country and attracting
more than a million visitors (310,000 alone in the Belvedere exhibit Das
Neue Österreich81), may be the only medium where more complex
scholarly perspectives were presented to a larger public.82 Yet, as noted,
some of these extravaganzas presented uncritical trajectories of con-
sensual success history. It should be added that the scholarly community
gathered in numerous symposia and conferences to reflect on the state
of postwar history and historiography.83 
Apart from a few high profile keynote lectures and opening
speeches, the historians communicated among themselves and did not
interact much with the political leadership. Nor were Schüssel’s chief
antagonists Menasse, Streeruwitz, and Maimann present at such high-
brow scholarly gatherings—acting the part of classical Austrian con-
trarians and Raunzer, writing from the margins, and pursuing their own
partisan political agendas. Alexander Pollak is right in observing that
“the state of knowledge (Wissensstand) of a society rarely corresponds
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Economic Policies and Economic Change
Johannes Ditz
Introduction
In the past fifty years, Austria has undergone a transformation;
initially a “poorhouse,” it has become one of the most prosperous
nations in Europe. This change—measured as gross domestic product
(GDP) per capita—shows that Austrian economic policy has been able
to find, generally speaking, the right answer to its many domestic and
international challenges. Without a drastic change of course in its
economic policies in the mid-1980s, this positive development in
Austria would not have been possible. 
After restoration of stability in the mid-1950s, Austrian economic
policy took a market-oriented direction and focused on economic and
social policies supportive of a social market economy that would also
be strongly shaped by the Austrian representation of interests by
employers and employees (a social partnership). With an economic
policy aimed at the promotion of exports and investments, accompanied
by a responsible wage and income policy, Austria was able to achieve
above-average growth rates. A cautious expansion of the government
spending ratio and the continuous development of the social system
made possible the attainment of a higher standard of living for all
Austrians. Similar to the “German economic miracle,” Austria’s
economic rise was also a success, and it was able to decrease its
unemployment rates year after year.
At the start of the 1970s, full employment was a reality. Thanks to
the Social Democratic Party of Austria (Sozialdemokratische Partei
Österreichs, or SPÖ) leading a one-party government during the 1970s
and early 1980s (the Kreisky era), a step-by-step transition to an
Austro-Keynesian economic model took place. Based on Scandinavian
social structure and following John Kenneth Galbraith’s thesis on
“public poverty,” Austria took advantage of the 1970s boom to heavily
increase state operations, to expand the transfer systems, and to develop
an Austrian welfare model. Compared to other countries, the recessions
of 1974-1975 and 1981-1982 were well managed through Keynesian
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demand management, employment increases in the public sector,
“decreed” employment accommodations at the state’s utility
companies, and waivers of termination rights at the nationalized
primary industries.
The negative consequences and high costs of these policies became
evident in the mid-1980s. The federal deficit, which grew from just
under 50 billion shillings (Euro 3.63 billion) in 1970 to almost 750
billion shillings (Euro 54.5 billion) in 1988, increasingly constricted the
budgetary financial margin. Interest payment expenditures increased
from 2.8 billion shillings (Euro 0.2 billion) in 1970 to 50.2 billion
shillings (Euro 3.65) in 1988. The total tax rate increased heftily from
34.3 percent (1970) to 41.1 percent (1985).
The limitations of the tax burden began to show. The cash flow
development and equity capital formation of Austrian companies was
negatively influenced, in an increasing manner, due to tax changes in
balance sheet regulations (2nd Tax Amendment Law of 1977). 
The motivation and willingness of Austrian employees to take risks
were eroded due to rising tax progression and extremely high marginal
tax rates. A value-added tax of 30 percent increased the prices of luxury
and semi-luxury products (cameras, furs, and so forth). The nationa-
lized industry lost billions as a result of the exertion of political
influences, a false diversification strategy, and speculative operations.
Looming insolvency had to be averted through widespread assumptions
of liability and capital grants by the state (the ÖIAG Law of 1987).1 As
a result of evident structural weaknesses, the national unemployment
rate began to increase from 1.9 percent (1980) to 5.6 percent (1987). 
The need for a fundamental political change of course—from a
state-run demand-based policy to a supply-based policy oriented toward
competition, deregulation, and exports—became more and more
apparent. This change, of course, was programmatically prepared by the
Austrian People’s Party (Österreichische Volkspartei, or ÖVP) and
implemented by the Grand Coalition that was formed after the National
Council elections of 1987. Robert Graf (the economic spokesperson),
Johannes Ditz (head of the ÖVP’s Political-Economic Department),
Josef Taus (industry spokesperson), and Wolfgang Schüssel (secretary
general of the Austrian Business Federation) were primarily responsible
for the ÖVP’s economic program. 
The changes focused on revisions in the budget structure and
expenditure-related budget reorganization measures, the prompt
integration of Austria into the European single market, deregulation and
privatization measures, and relief-oriented tax reforms. 
As a coalition negotiator (1987), minister of economic affairs
(1989-1995), and vice-chancellor (1995-2000), Wolfgang Schüssel
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decisively helped to shape the transition from demand-based to supply-
based economic policy in Austria. As Austrian chancellor (2000-2007),
he deepened and strengthened the supply-based economic course. 
Figure 1
Austrian National Ratios as a Percent of GDP
Source: Statistics Austria.
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Change of Course during the 
Vranitzky-Mock Government
The change of course in the economic policy of the SPÖ-ÖVP’s
Grand Coalition concerned, primarily, financial policy. Budget policies
attempted to reduce the government spending ratio, to slow down the
deficit growth, and to decrease taxes. Additional growth and higher
employment rates were to be achieved in the future through a
competitive economy, dynamic exports, and increased internatio-
nalization. 
Budget Policy
In budget policy, a multi-year concept was developed with the
goals of reducing the number of government agencies, decreasing the
transfer tasks by abolishing services, and limiting subsidies to social
insurance agencies to an achievable level. The efficiency of public
companies was increased, and less financing was made available to
local authorities down the line for residential construction and other
public services. The organization of the labor market administration
was improved, and unemployment benefits were statutorily re-regulated
and limited. Pay raises in the public services sector and the review of
pensions were postponed for a half-year (wage freezes).
As a result of these measures, the government spending ratio and
federal net deficit were markedly reduced, and deficit growth was
slowed. When in the middle of 1994 the SPÖ increasingly challenged
the budget restructuring course and, subsequently, the nation’s net de-
ficit climbed again to more than 5 percent, the ÖVP realized that
growth and stability were at risk, and re-elections took place (Figure 3).
The SPÖ won the election with social-oriented promises, but the
ÖVP pushed through the continuation of the budget restructuring course
at the following coalition negotiations. Under the direction of Minister
Viktor Klima (SPÖ) and Minister Johannes Ditz (ÖVP) and at the
request of regional government heads, both parties agreed upon a
consolidation package that was comprised of two-thirds savings and
approximately one-third earnings increases. Personnel reductions,
changes in employment law, and moderate wage increases stabilized
personnel expenditures in the public services sector. Within two years,
9,200 service positions were eliminated. The Austrian Post & Telekom
was outsourced and converted into a public limited company. Structural
reforms in civil service pension law limited early retirement benefits for
public servants. The General Social Security Act (ASVG) made the
path to early retirement unattractive because it reduced benefit
amounts. Additional savings measures involved transfer payments for
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the nursing/care area, unemployment benefits, and family-related ser-
vices.
Figure 3
Austrian Net Deficit as a Percent of the GDP 
Source: Bundesministerium für Finanzen (BMF).
On the income side, tax loopholes were closed by eliminating
exemption clauses and timely tax subventions, and by including gas and
electricity in tax assessments. 
Thanks to these measures, it was possible to reduce the government
spending ratio from its highest point of 56 percent to 51.4 percent in
2000. The net deficit as a percentage of the GDP dropped from 5.7
percent to 1.7 percent, also in 2000.
Overall, the Grand Coalition was able to bring budget development
under control with multiple budget restructuring concepts. Budgetary
maneuvering room for tax relief measures was achieved; stabilization
of the debt ratio, on the other hand, was not. The debt ratio grew
significantly more slowly than it had during the Kreisky years, but an
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Figure 4
Austrian National Debt Ratio in Percent 
Source: Wirtschaftsforschungsinstitut (WIFO).
Tax Reform Policy
In order to stimulate the economy and growth, the Grand
Coalition’s main goal was to reduce the tax burden that had grown
heavily during the 1980s and to improve the tax framework conditions
for industry, commerce, trade, and tourism. 
Tax Reforms I (1989) and Tax Reforms II (1994) that were con-
ceived by Finance Minister Ferdinand Lacina (SPÖ) and State Secretary
Johannes Ditz (ÖVP) dramatically changed the tax policy landscape in
Austria. In addition to fiscal recognition of performance and profit, the
executed tax reform measures focused on a strengthening of equity
capital formation (corporate income tax reform), an improvement in
competitive capabilities, and a fortification of private demand. The 30
percent value-added tax on luxury and semi-luxury products that was
introduced under Chancellor Kreisky was repealed. The Austrian tax
system was rebuilt with two large reform stages. The first reform stage
involved wage and income taxes, and corporate taxes for public and
private limited companies. In line with the basic premises of Reagan-
era tax reforms, tax rates were reduced for wages and income, but in
return, tax exemption provisions and tax loopholes were eliminated.
Exemption limits were increased, and the number of tax rate brackets
was reduced. The top income tax rate was decreased from 62 percent to
50 percent. Among the middle-income brackets, the three tax brackets
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tax bracket of 32 percent. In total, the number of tax brackets was
reduced from ten to five:
• The marginal tax rate was reduced from 21 percent to 10 percent.
• Between 50,000 and 150,000 shillings (approx. Euro 3,600 and
Euro 11,000), the marginal tax rate became 22 percent instead of
the earlier 27 percent and 33 percent, respectively.
• Between 150,000 and 300,000 shillings (approx. Euro 11,000 and
Euro 22,000), the marginal tax rate became 32 percent instead of
the earlier 39 percent, 45 percent, or 51 percent.
• Between 300,000 and 700,000 shillings (approx. Euro 22,000 and
Euro 51,000), the tax rate became 42 percent instead of 55 percent
and 58 percent.
• Starting from 700,000 shillings (approx. Euro 51,000), the mar-
ginal tax rate became 50 percent, instead of 58 percent, 60 percent,
or 62 percent.
The corporate tax, which until 1989 had also been progressively
designed and which amounted to 55 percent for the majority of Austrian
companies, was reduced to 30 percent. The government also abolished
the preferential taxation for distributed profit. Thus, the taxation for
company-retained profits was radically reduced, and self-financing was
significantly improved. 
As part of the second stage of tax reform, the abolition of the trade
earnings tax and business capital taxes significantly increased the
attractiveness of Austria as a location for industry. Extraneous equity
capital formation was fostered and made attractive through the ex-
pansion of the Austrian model for capital gains tax on stocks and
GesmbH2 shares. In Austria, interest is uniformly taxed at 25 percent at
the source. This tax also satisfies the income, capital gains, and
inheritance tax burdens. 
The tax reforms and tax reduction measures of the Lacina-Ditz
tenure led to a turnaround in the tax policies and tax philosophy of the
Kreisky era. While high tax rates were combined with comprehensive
tax incentives during the 1970s, the objective in the 1980s was to make
the achievement and reporting of profits attractive. The government
recognized that a structural conversion would be achieved through
high-yielding businesses and not through national sponsorship, and a
sufficiently high equity stake would mean security in times of crisis for
companies. In the mid- 1990s, all economic policy decision makers
understood that positive developments in growth and employment in a
small country such as Austria would only be achieved through increa-
sing exports, internationalization, and competitive businesses. 
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EU Entry: Prerequisite for Export Dynamics
and Internationalization
The new orientation of Austrian foreign trade policy was, next to
budget and taxation policy, the third important change in the reformu-
lation of Austrian economic policy which was no longer based on the
state, but on internationalization and competition. Vice-Chancellor and
Foreign Affairs Minister Alois Mock must be given historical credit for
introducing, in the mid-1980s, a positive shaping of public opinion on
the topic of Austria’s accession to the European Union and for seizing
this initiative. The fall of the Iron Curtain and the incipient opening of
the East encouraged the Vranitzky/Mock government to strive for rapid
admittance to the European Union and not to accept the integration of
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) nations into the European
market area, which was initially proposed by the Union, as a long-term
solution. 
Austria realized that its growth and economic chances as a small
country in the heart of a newly-forming Europe would only be protected
by a clearly Westernized orientation and barrier-free access to the
newly-created EU single market. In order to improve export opportuni-
ties for Austrian companies to the former Council for Future Economic
Assistance (Comecon) countries, Austria entered into free trade agree-
ments with Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, the Czech
Republic, and Turkey between 1991 and 1993. In doing so, Austrian
foreign trade and economic policy was well aware that the desired
bridge-building function and internationalization in the direction of
Central Europe could only be successful if Austria became a full-
fledged member of the European Union and the European heartland. 
Negotiations for EU admission were initiated on 1 February 1993.
The federal government was well prepared for them. Financial and
support programs were to be developed for those branches that would
be particularly affected by the changes. The government presented the
Austrian population with the reasons for and the advantages of EU
admission, within the scope of a national information and education
campaign. This helped to promote speedy negotiations. On 12 June
1994, 66.58 percent of the Austrian population approved EU admission,
with 81.27 percent voter participation. 
Admission on 1 January 1995 led to comprehensive changes in
Austria’s economic structure. Due to competitive pressures, old struc-
tures were broken, upcoming liberalization and privatization plans were
accelerated, and political influences were extensively eliminated. As a
result of EU admittance and these developments, Austria’s exports
increased heavily, and a strong surge in direct financial investments in
Austria and by Austria occurred. Strong growth in the area of exports
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and services led to an above-average growth rate as compared to other
countries.
Figure 5
Austrian Exports in Billion Euros
Source: Wirtschaftskammer Österreich (WKO).
Restructuring and Privatization of Nationalized Industry
With the formation of the 1987 Grand Coalition, the government
planned the first partial privatizations in the public sector industry. The
financing help needed for ÖIAG (Österreichische Industrie Aktienge-
sellschaft) operations was tied to a comprehensive restructuring and
reorganization agreement. Following initial restructuring successes,
repeated restructuring setbacks led to a total change of course that
affected Austrian private sector industry. The objective pursued until
then, to achieve an internationally successful Austrian conglomerate
(Austrian Industries), was abandoned with the 1993 ÖIAG Law in favor
of a clear privatization strategy. 
With the 1993 amendment to the ÖIAG Law,3 negotiated by Mi-
nister Viktor Klima (SPÖ) and State Secretary Johannes Ditz (ÖVP),
the ÖIAG obtained a new assignment of duties. The newly-appointed
ÖIAG management was statutorily obligated to sell off the majority of
directly-owned shares in industrial companies within a specific time
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strial firms and industrial added value would be preserved insofar as
economically justifiable. 
Based on this law, twenty-seven privatization measures were
initiated until 1999. Smaller participations were sold by up to 100
percent to private owners, such as AT&S and Schoeller-Bleckmann
Oilfield Equipment AG, for example—both internationally reputable
companies and sought-after ATX values nowadays. Initial public
offerings (IPOs) and the disposal of majority shares through the stock
exchange were planned for the larger holdings VA-Steel, VA-TEC, and
Böhler-Uddeholm. 
In 1994, the majority privatization of VA-TEC and OMV-AG took
place. In 1995, VA-Steel had its IPO, in the course of which 31.7 per-
cent of shares were sold. In March 1996, the majority privatization of
Böhler-Uddeholm AG took place. The AMAG, which was reporting
losses, was restructured. At the end of 1996, it was fully sold to an
Austrian industrial group as part of a management buyout. 
Overall, privatization earnings in the amount of 23 billion shillings
(Euro 1.7 billion) were achieved between 1994 and 1996. The success-
ful work of the ÖIAG as a privatization agency led to the transfer of
additional privatization candidates in their areas of competence. In
1997, the Austria Tabak (Austria Tobacco) IPO took place. A strategic
partner was sought for the mobile network operator Mobilkom Austria,
which was divested from the Post as part of a controlled auction pro-
cess. This resulted in strategic partnerships between Telekom Austria
and Telecom Italia in the area of mobile units and later also in the
fixed-line area. (Figure 6)
With its entry to the European Union, privatization, tax reform
policies, and budget consolidation, the Grand Coalition undertook a
remarkable and, above all, successful change of course in economic
policy in the 1990s, accomplishing its goals without social unrest or
strikes, as was the case in other countries.
Critical to this success was not just the ÖVP’s espousal of this
change of course, but also the acknowledgement and contributions on
the part of the SPÖ’s leading economic politicians (Franz Vranitzky,
Ferdinand Lacina, Rudolf Streicher, and Viktor Klima). 
The political success was primarily ascribed, however, to the SPÖ
and not to the ÖVP, which was the initiator. At the end of the 1990s, the
joint reform process began to lose steam. Daily politics increasingly
focused on short-term measures, pending privatization projects were
postponed, and the implementation of already agreed-upon savings
measures was slowed down and often evaded. Due to these occurrences,
the focus of budget restructuring increasingly shifted from the budget’s
expenditure side to the earnings side. The total tax rate, which had
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averaged 40.6 percent under Lacina-Ditz between 1987 and 1995,
increased in only four years by 3 percentage points, or Euro 9 billion, to
an average of 43.6 percent under the Finance Ministers Klima/Edlinger.
Figure 6
ÖIAG Figures in Million Euros 
Source: Österreichische Industrie Aktiengesellschaft (ÖIAG).
Economic Policy under
Federal Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel, 2000-2007
The re-formation of a Grand Coalition, which was sought in the
year 2000, failed largely due to a debate on whether policy that was
oriented towards denationalization, deregulation, and budget
consolidation should be intensely pursued (ÖVP), or should be weake-
ned or corrected in order to prevent “social hardships” and to preserve
the exertion of state influence in sub-areas (SPÖ). With the newly-
formed government of Wolfgang Schüssel (ÖVP) and Susanne Riess-
Passer (FPÖ), the answer clearly pointed in the direction of “less state
and more private ownership.” In preparation for the introduction of the
Euro, highest priority was given to reducing the national debt ratio and
the deficit. Following the successful IPOs of formerly state-run com-
panies, the Schüssel government planned, for the first time, the total
handover of owner functions to the private sector (100 percent priva-
tization). The government fostered the development of a functioning





























1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
246 The Schüssel Era in Austria
nuously improved the framework conditions for Austria as a location
for industry.
In 2001, the highest priority in budget consolidation was given to
the highest total tax rate of the Second Republic, 44.8 percent. The
wage and income tax amendment of 2005 limited itself to relief for
low-income earners and an increase in exemption limits. Since there
was also no permanent revision of tax rates for wages and income under
Schüssel/Grasser, the wage and income tax burden for middle-bracket
incomes in Austria is almost 50 percent higher at present than at the
beginning of the 1990s. 
Reduction of Government Spending and Debt Ratios
The primary goal of the Schüssel government was to meet the
convergence criteria of the Maastricht Agreement and to pursue con-
sistently a reduction of the debt ratio, a goal that was introduced with
the 1995 restructuring package.
Both objectives were met. The debt ratio declined from its highest
point of 66.5 percent in 1995 to 61.7 percent in 2006. In 2007, the
Maastricht criterion of having a debt level below 60 percent was met by
Austria for the first time with 59.1 percent. The objective of achieving
a balanced budget (zero deficit), also propagated by the federal
government, was achieved for the whole country in 2001 through heavy
tax increases and reductions in personnel and social expenditures.
(Figure 7) 
The resulting economic slowdown of approximately 0.6 percentage
points and the elimination of about 6,000 people from the labor force
prompted the Austrian federal government to take countermeasures.
The recent annulment of measures to stimulate investment activity was
rescinded. As a result of this development, Maastricht-conforming
national deficits of between -0.5 percent (2002) and -1.4 percent (2006)
were reported between those years. 
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Figure 7
Austrian Public Debts According to National Accounting,
as a Percent of the GDP
 
Source: Bundesministerium für Finanzen (BMF).
Figure 8
Total Austrian National Deficit as a Percent of GDP
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The government spending ratio, which had clearly risen to more
than 50 percent toward the end of the Kreisky era, for the first time
sunk below the 50 percent mark during the Schüssel government
through savings measures and the divestment of state-run companies to
private enterprise administration. An “affordable” level of 48.2 percent
was achieved—without permanent tax increases.
The divestments included the Austrian universities, the state’s
Property Administration, museums, the financial market regulating
authorities, and a few more. The 2003 Federal Railway Structure Act
fundamentally reformed the Austrian state railways by improving
capital backing and limiting subsidies. The Austrian Federal Railway
Holding (ÖBB-Holding-AG) established individual public limited com-
panies for passenger transportation, transportation of goods, the infra-
structural sector, and services. Personnel savings were achieved pri-
marily in the area of finance and customs administration, as well as
through the consolidation of the police and gendarmerie. 
Figure 9
Austrian National Spending Ratio as a Percent of GDP
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The core of the reform measures on the expenditures side was,
without a doubt, the adaptation of the Austrian pension system to the
changed demographic framework conditions and the increased life
expectancy for the Austrian population. While the Grand Coalition
merely positioned select measures and corrected erroneous develop-
ments, the Schüssel government attempted to achieve a uniform
pension system for the future using a comprehensive package of
measures. The eligibility age for retired persons was increased through
cancellation of earlier benefits, thus improving markedly the long-term
financial viability of the system. Early retirement pensions based on
long insurance terms and unemployment were eliminated. The upva-
luation factors for retirement pensions were reduced, and the standard
retirement age was set at sixty-five years. A newly-established age
range to receive retirement benefits provided some flexibility as to the
actual age at which people retire. The retirement age in Austria will
range in the future between sixty-two and sixty-eight years. Those
retiring before sixty-five years of age will incur pension reductions, and
those who retire later will receive increases. The 2005 Pension Harmo-
nization Law modified the system to implement personal retirement
accounts for every individual with the goal of achieving, in this manner,
more transparency for every benefits recipient based on a modern and
fair pension system. 
The pension reform showed the ÖVP-FPÖ government’s will to
achieve reform. The parties were ready to implement unpopular perfor-
mance standard measures in order to guarantee the necessary safety of
pensions in the long term. 
Strengthening of Austria as a Location for Industry
With the barrier-free access to the European single market and the
almost simultaneous establishment of market-oriented economic
structures in the former Comecon nations, the framework conditions for
the Austrian economy changed fundamentally during the second half of
the 1990s. The strengthened competition and the abolition of trade
barriers compelled the Austrian economy, which was structured around
medium-sized enterprises, toward change, innovation, and internatio-
nalization. Successful innovations and internationalization measures
opened up new opportunities in the European markets and worldwide.
In particular, the intensely-growing markets of Central and Eastern
Europe offered the Austrian economy new investment, participation,
and export possibilities. As a result, the level of internationalization of
the Austrian economy increased from just under 5 percent of GDP to
more than 25 percent within ten years. Investments from foreign coun-
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tries have almost quadrupled in the last ten years, the greatest invest-
ments coming from companies in Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and
Switzerland. Austrian investments abroad concentrated primarily on the
new markets in Central and Eastern Europe. Financial direct invest-
ments have more than quintupled from Euro 12.9 billion (1997) to Euro
72.2 billion (2007). Today, Austria is the largest investor in Romania,
Slovenia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the
neighboring countries of Slovakia, Hungary, and the Czech Republic,
Austria ranks as the third largest investor. 
Figure 10
Development of Direct Austrian Investments in Billions of Euros by Year 
Source: Wirtschaftskammer Österreich (WKO)
The Schüssel government supported this development with an
offensive regional economic policy. Through numerous initiatives and
reform measures, the attractiveness of this industrial location increased,
and continuous strengthening of the Austrian economy’s competitive-
ness occurred. Austrian competition law was reformed. Austrian
industrial regulations, which govern professional access for the self-
employed, were liberalized and debureaucratized. In general, market
access for small and medium-sized enterprises was facilitated and
improved. Business hours of operation were formulated more flexibly
and liberally. The mobility and flexibility of Austrian labor laws and
working-time legislation were markedly increased. Thanks to the
procurement of employee provision funds and the conferment of rights
to severance pay, employee ties to one particular company were aban-
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zation of the energy markets, and liberalization of the telecommunica-
tions market supported market development in the communications
area. Austria restructured its procurement law to be EU compliant. Tax
measures and the “Go International” initiative supported international
integration of the Austrian economy. Research tax sponsoring, institu-
tional reforms, and greater funding of research programs greatly expan-
ded research and development (thus increasing the Austrian research
quota). In terms of infrastructure, high priority traffic routes toward
Central and Eastern Europe were built and expanded. The state-run
labor market administration was reshaped as a modern labor exchange
agency, placing great value on quality management. The main focus of
the labor market administration’s development program was on
qualifications and skills.
The Schüssel government also placed a focus on location-relevant
measures for tax policies. A reduction in the corporate tax rate from 34
percent to 25 percent and the introduction of modern group taxation for
international company groups, which fiscally allows for net loss carry-
overs for foreign subsidiaries in Austria, improved the attractiveness of
Austria as a location for company headquarters and holding companies.
In terms of the taxation of public limited companies, Austria finally
went from being a high-tax country at the end of the 1980s to a low-tax
country by the middle of 2005. 
The tax yield from corporate taxes increased during this period
from 0.8 billion Euros to 5.7 billion Euros, despite radical tax rate
decreases, because companies’ conduct also changed with the reduction
in the tax burden. While attempts were made in the 1980s to keep re-
ported profits as low as possible through technical balancing methods,
company revenue was considered evidence of success in Austria after
the tax reforms of the 1990s. This had as consequence a type of “Laffer
effect”: the lowering of tax rates led to a heavy increase in the tax yield
(see Figure 11).
The regional economic policies described herein turned Austria
into a dynamic and attractive industrial location at a time of globaliza-
tion, integration, and the opening of Eastern markets. The Austrian
export economy became the critical growth engine. Between 1996 and
2006, the number of Austrian exporters tripled. The average growth rate
of Austrian exports (goods and services) totaled 8.8 percent and was,
thus, significantly higher than that of the EU-15 (6.5 percent) and
higher than the rate for the rest of the world (7.5 percent). Further, the
increase in the export rate from 35.9 percent (1996) to 58.3 percent
(2007) (see Figure 12) was a key contributor to Austria’s rise as the
third wealthiest country of the European Union. 
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Figure 11
Austrian Government Income from Corporate Taxes in Billion Euros
Source: Bundesministerium für Finanzen (BMF).
Figure 12
Number of Austrian Exporters (rounded) Triples following EU Admission
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Figure 13
Development of the Austrian Export Rate as a Percent of GDP
Source: Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit (BMWA).
Development of an Austrian Capital Market
Until the middle of the 1980s, the financing of the Austrian
economy occurred almost exclusively through foreign financing (bank
loans) and domestic financing (cash flow). Financing through financial
markets played no role due to cemented ownership positions and
extremely high tax rates. The Vienna Stock Exchange (Wiener Börse
AG, or WBAG) was overshadowed by these conditions. With the chan-
ge in corporate tax assessments in the 1990s and the privatization of
formerly state-run companies through the Vienna Stock Exchange, the
first steps were taken toward the formation of an Austrian capital
market. The Schüssel government recognized how important an effi-
cient Austrian capital market would be for growth, innovation, and
employment and subsequently promoted the systematic development of
the Austrian capital market.
In 2001, the government launched an information and internationa-
lization campaign for an Austrian capital market and appointed a capital
market representative. Collaborations with other central European stock
exchanges were initiated, and an international ownership structure for
the Vienna Stock Exchange was sought and found. The Austrian
Corporate Governance Code provided an internationally adequate regu-
latory framework for good company leadership and control that would
be accepted as a guideline by both the stock-listed companies as well as
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products, which would benefit Austria during tax assessment—40 per-
cent of the capital paid in would be invested in an “underdeveloped”
European Equity Fund (EEA) Stock Exchange’s shares—the Vienna
Stock Exchange was supported and, at the same time, a concrete push
was given towards more self-insurance. 
A result of this capital market initiative was an increase in the
market capitalization at the Vienna Stock Exchange, from 32.2 billion
Euros in 2002 to 146.2 billion Euros in 2006. 
Figure 14
Market Capitalization of the Vienna Stock Exchange Increases, in Billion Euros 
Source: World Federation of Exchanges (WFE); Economica Institut. 
The average trade turnover in domestic shares grew from 1 billion
Euros in 2002 to 13.7 billion Euros in 2007 (see Figure 15). 
The increase in the proportion of international turnover among total
turnover of 16.6 percent (2002) to 52.3 percent (2006), together with
the simultaneous reduction in the national percentage, reflected the
growing internationality of the Austrian exchange (see Figure 16).
The good performance of Austrian companies as market leaders in
niche markets with successful Eastern European engagements, attrac-
tive price-to-earnings ratios, and solid dividend policies were critical to
the successful establishment of the Vienna Stock Exchange in 2002.
The ATX index markedly outperformed the established indices between
2002 and 2006, whereby 95 percent of ATX companies operated in
Central and Eastern Europe. The goal of becoming the leading stock
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Figure 15
Average Monthly Turnover of Domestic Shares in Billion Euros and Including
2007 Avergage Daily Revenue for Profit-Sharing and Participation Certificates*
*624 million Euros, an increase of +1224 percent
Source: World Federation of Exchanges (WFE); Economica Institut.
Figure 16
Domestic and International Trade Turnover at the Vienna Stock Exchange,
in Percent
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for the Vienna Stock Exchange in the last few years. In the opinion of
research economists, the Vienna Stock Exchange has clearly functioned
in recent years as a catalyst for growth. The Vienna Economic and So-
cial Research Institute calculates a cumulative growth effect of 1.1
billion Euros and a positive employment effect of 5,900 additional jobs
for the years 2003 to 2005. 
Return to Private Ownership and Reduction
of Government-Backed Debts through the ÖIAG
The 2000 amendment to the ÖIAG Law, prepared by the ÖIAG
(Hollweger/Streicher/Ditz) for the coalition negotiations between the
SPÖ and ÖVP, was adopted by the Schüssel government without any
changes to its content. The amendment provided for the fusion of the
ÖIAG, PTBG (Postbeteiligungs Gesellschaft) and PTA (Post & Tele-
kom Austria), whereby the ÖIAG’s portfolio expanded with inclusion
of the Österreichische Post AG, Telekom AG, and PSK (Postsparkasse).
At the same time, all of these companies’ state-guaranteed debts were
transferred to the ÖIAG. The amendments further provided for the
annulment of the nation’s refund obligations and liabilities and for the
repayment of all debts (within one legislative period) through privatiza-
tion revenue. The law’s objective was clear: to bring the old nationa-
lized policies of the Kreisky era to a final and visible end with a com-
prehensive privatization program and the total abolition of state-backed
debts. While the partial privatizations and IPOs of earlier state under-
takings were the norm during the Vranitzky government, the Schüssel
government aimed for the total withdrawal of the state as proprietor.
The national core shareholder, ÖIAG, was to be replaced by private
proprietors, while preserving Austrian interests as much as possible.
While privatization revenue had only been used until the year 2000 to
service interest payments, the Schüssel government began to reduce
liabilities on its own. The privatization contract formulated by
Schüssel/Grasser provided for the 100 percent privatization of the PSK,
Austria Tabak AG, Printmedia Austria AG, Flughafen Wien AG,
Österreichischen Staatsdruckerei GesmbH, Österreichischen
Dorotheum GesmbH, and Telekom Austria AG.
In 2000, the 100 percent sale of PSK shares to the Bank für Arbeit
und Wirtschaft AG (BAWAG) took place within the scope of a con-
trolled auction process. Telekom Austria was made public despite
difficult framework conditions. The ÖIAG’s approximate 46.4 percent
share in Austria Tabak AG was sold to Gallagher AG Europe under
specific strategic conditions. The privatization of VA-TEC was confi-
gured with difficulty, but following some turbulence, respected buyers
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were found in Siemens Austria and Andritz. The ÖIAG participation in
Böhler-Uddeholm was ceded to a private group and is now part of the
portfolio of the also privatized VOEST-Alpine AG. VOEST-Alpine
AG—the core of the former nationalized industries of the Kreisky
era—has become in the last fifteen years an internationally recognized,
expanding group of steel companies with top stock performance, head-
quartered in Austria. The same applies to the OMV Group and the
Böhler-Uddeholm group. These former state-run companies have be-
come stock listed corporations and market leaders in niche markets,
whose shares are coveted by international investors due to their good
performance and successful internationalization strategies. 
Even Telekom Austria has achieved, on its way to the stock ex-
change, the conversion from bureaucratic public utility to international
communications and services provider in a relatively short time. The
Austrian Post AG was taken public in 2006. This action was over-
subscribed eight-fold; more than half of all Post Group employees in
Austria became shareholders of the company in the course of this ope-
ration. The goal of the Schüssel government to reduce ÖIAG debts with
privatization revenue was achieved. The ÖIAG debts, amounting to
Euro 6.3 billion in the year 2000, were completely paid off. At the end
of 2006, there was a surplus of liquid assets totalling Euro 252 million
(see Figure 17).
Figure 17
Austrian Debt Level in Billions of Euros by Year
Source: Österreichische Industrie Aktiengesellschaft (ÖIAG).
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The result of investment management that focused on value appre-
ciation and shareholder value consciousness was that the portfolios still
managed by the ÖIAG increased in value by more than half between
2000 and 2006, from Euro 5.0 billion in 2000 to Euro 8.2 million in
2006, despite comprehensive privatizations. The ÖIAG’s portfolio is
composed today of only the stock-listed participations in Austrian
Airlines AG, OMV AG, Telekom Austria AG, and Österreichische Post
AG. 
Figure 18
ÖIAG Share Performance, in Million Euros by Year
Source: Österreichische Industrie Aktiengesellschaft (ÖIAG).
The difficult nationalized industry, which had burdened the budget
and the employment market so massively at the end of the 1980s, was
finally closed down twenty years later by the Schüssel government
following numerous reforms.
Increase of the Total Tax Rate:
A Growing Burden for Mid-Sized Companies
The focus of Schüssel/Grasser’s financial policies was oriented
toward stabilization and reduction of the budget deficits. In order to
achieve these objectives, tax increases and an increase of the total tax
rate of almost 2 percentage points, from 42.9 percent to 44.8 percent,
were implemented during the first year of the Schüssel government.
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+ 3.0 percent
(+ €€  9 billion)
+ 2.4 percent
(+ €€  7.2 billion)
and the average total tax rate of 43 percent for the Schüssel period
slightly underperformed the average total tax rate (43.6) for which
Chancellor Klima and Finance Minister Edlinger (SPÖ) were respon-
sible. It was markedly higher, however, than the average tax rate for the
Lacina/Ditz periods which totalled just 40.7 percent, almost 3 percen-
tage points or Euro 9 billion less than during its highest phase. 
Figure 19
Average Total Austrian Tax Burden as a Percentage of GDP
Source: Bundesministerium für Finanzen (BMF).
The tax relief measures that were part of the 2005 tax reforms
concentrated mainly on incentives and tax cuts for companies. There
was no perceptible relief in mid-level incomes due to a sinking of wage
and income tax rates. The “cold progressive scale effect” that com-
menced with the large income tax rate reform of 1989 was not made
retroactive. However, tax exemption limits for lower incomes were
noticeably raised. When the threshold was exceeded, however, an
income tax rate of 38.3 percent became effective. The tax progression
subsequently increased sharply and reached the top tax rate of 50
percent with a taxable annual income of 51,000 Euros. With this
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progression, the wage and income tax burden for middle-bracket
incomes has increased by approximately 50 percent in the last twenty
years. The steep progression that is in place for annual incomes of
15,000 to 50,000 Euros is being increasingly seen by Austrian tax-
payers as unfair. The growing tax burden is faced, however, with a
broadly diversified system of budgetary transfer payments. Since these
transfer payments are not allocated in a coordinated and bundled
manner, taxpayers increasingly feel like they are “the losers of the
system.” The total tax rate, which has been reduced from its highest
mark of 44.8 percent in 2001 to approximately 42 percent at present, is
less the result of systematic relief policies, and more the result of de-
creasing revenue elasticity in the Austrian tax system.
The portion of quantity-dependent taxes and the value-added tax
system in place have led to the tax yield increasing by only 0.95 percent
with growth of 1 percent. During boom times, they lead to an automatic
sinking of the total tax rate.
Summary and Outlook
In 2005, the reform dynamics of the Schüssel government began to
weaken. In the run-up to the 2006 National Council elections, the
government limited itself to listing its successes. Reforms that had been
discussed in the Austrian education sector were no longer initiated and,
in part, no longer deemed as necessary. Organizational and financial
problems in social policies were recognized too late, and it was no
longer possible to apply any satisfactory solutions. Macroeconomic
success data obstructed the government’s view of those who lost in the
new system, and it was little acknowledged that all those who contri-
buted to the economy to achieve such successes had to work harder and
often had to change their personal wants and habits. Tax policy concen-
trated too strongly on group headquarters and too little on the needs of
small- and medium-sized companies and middle-income wage earners.
Further, the opposition parties were able to gain points with excessive
promises for better education and social fairness. The opposition gave
off the (false) impression that globalization effects could be remedied
with more government spending. 
With Wolfgang Schüssel’s surprising election defeat in 2007, the
reform policies in Austria also came to a standstill. The SPÖ-led Grand
Coalition was unable to finance and honor the social promises it had
made prior to the elections. The new government lacked the awareness
of issues necessary for the implementation of pending reforms in the
health, administration, and education sectors. In both parties, conser-
vative distribution and social politicians increasingly gained the upper
261
1. The ÖIAG (Österreichische Industrie Aktiengesellschaft) is Austria’s state privati-
zation agency.
2. The GesmbH is a limited partnership in which the general partner is a limited liability
company.
3. More specifically, the Federal Law Gazette No. 973 (1993).
hand and wanted to solve the new problems using old recipes from the
1970s. Furthermore, differing approaches to solutions by both gover-
ning parties, together with partisan tactical maneuvers, hindered a joint
approach. The government broke up after only eighteen months. 
The result of the “Schüssel years,” which were in place in Austrian
economic policy from 1987 to 2007, is that Wolfgang Schüssel decisi-
vely helped to shape the change of course from a state-centred economy
to an economy oriented towards internationality and exports through his
roles as negotiator of the 1987 coalition agreement, and later as
minister of economic affairs and vice-chancellor. He collaborated on
the 1989 and 1994 tax reforms and was one of the chief negotiators,
along with Foreign Affairs Minister Alois Mock, Finance Minister
Ferdinand Lacina, and State Secretary Brigitte Ederer, in the EU ad-
mission talks that were so important to the export dynamic.
As chancellor, Schüssel promoted internationalization and pushed
the state sector back to a financially viable scale. The national debt ratio
was stabilized and restored to a Maastricht level of below 60 percent.
With a committed privatization concept, the nationalized industry in
Austria was successfully ended, and an Austrian capital market was
established starting in 2000. Thus, at the end of 2007, Austria’s econo-
my was better equipped for the future than it was two years earlier.
Thanks to EU accession, the opening of the East, and successful reform
measures, Austria has become, in the past twenty years, an international
industrial hub in the heart of Europe. From diverse positions, Schüssel
the politician left his mark in the course of more than twenty years in
public service.
The excessively large public sector of the mid-1980s was thus
reduced, but bureaucracy and the tenacious adherence to outdated struc-
tures in fulfilling state duties continue to represent a danger to and a
drag on growth and employment. It remains to be seen whether the im-
provements and adaptations achieved in the public sector are sufficient
for ensuring Austria’s successful path. Austria must undoubtedly find
its way back to a long-term policy of reform in order to continue to be
successful in the upcoming years.
Notes
Schüssel and the Welfare State
Max Preglau
This essay offers an overview of the Wolfgang Schüssel years and
their longer-term effects in the field of social policy. I start by charting
the initial conditions of Schüssel’s reform project: the state of the
Austrian welfare system established to overcome the “social challenge”
in the period of “Fordist” capitalism already beyond its peak at the end
of the 1990s; the current transformation of economy and society that
seriously challenges the Austrian welfare system, the rise of “post-
Fordist” network capitalism and the erosion of “normal” labor, “normal”
family, and the culturally homogeneous nation; and the new restrictions
and options for social policy resulting from this transformation. The
second section turns to social policy under Wolfgang Schüssel’s chan-
cellorship. The third section evaluates the impact of Schüssel’s reform
of the welfare state, exploring if and in which sense his successor Alfred
Gusenbauer is still following Schüssel’s course of social policy.
Initial Conditions
The Austrian Welfare System: The Status Quo before Schüssel
As in other welfare systems in Europe and the rest of the industria-
lized world, the Austrian welfare state has been introduced as an answer
to the “distribution challenge”1 at the turn from the nineteenth to the
twentieth century.2 The most important stages in this development are
listed below.3
The first steps towards the welfare state had been taken during the
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy—with the gradual introduction of labor
protection measures like the limitation of the daily work time (1884/
1885), the introduction of an obligatory insurance against accidents
(1887) and of a health insurance (1988), and a pension insurance for
white collar workers (1906).
The establishment of the welfare system occurred after the foun-
dation of the First Republic in 1918 powered by the political strength of
the Social Democrats. Regulations for the installation of work councils
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and the Chamber of Labor were passed, the eight hour workday as well
as insurance against unemployment were introduced (1918-1920), and
a decision about the introduction of a pension insurance for workers had
been made, but was not yet implemented (1927).
After a rollback caused by the world economic crises, Austrofacism,
and National Socialism, the span of years between the foundation of the
Second Republic in 1945 and the State Treaty of 1955 had been used for
the restitution of the status quo before fascism and its codification
within the “General Social Insurance Act 1955” (Allgemeines Sozialver-
sicherungs-Gesetz, or ASVG) This act became the basis for all further
developments of the social security of employees, but also the guideline
for the subsequent inclusion of employers and self-employed people in
the system starting in 1979 and for the subsequent harmonization of the
different regulations for blue collar workers, white collar workers, and
civil servants.
Beyond any doubt, the 1960s and the 1970s (and the period of the
Social Democratic one-party government of Bruno Kreisky in particular)
had been the “golden age of social policy.”4 On the one hand, the co-
verage of the system had been extended beyond the group of just
employees to include employers, the self-employed, and family mem-
bers. On the other hand, the scope of entitlements and services had been
widened to encompass dynamic improvement of pensions, compensation
payments for low pensions, improvements of health and unemployment
insurance and holiday entitlements, and introduction of paid parental
leave, free prenatal medical care for mother and child, a state subsidy for
births, a leave for care of relatives, free school books and university
studies, and so forth.
In the 1980s, the scene had begun to change. The economic, social,
and political conditions had become turbulent and less favorable. The
budgetary margin for social expenditure had narrowed, and the welfare
system had turned from expansion to stagnation.
To understand these changes over time and their implications for
the Schüssel years, one must also understand the basic structure of the
Austrian welfare system. It is based on three columns: paid labor,
marriage and family, and citizenship.
Regarding paid (wage) labor, the four social insurance systems
(accident, health, unemployment, pension) are funded by contributions
of employers and employees defined as a percentage of the wage sum
(according to the Bismarck principle), and the entitlement to benefits
from these systems result from participation in the work force. 
Regarding marriage and family, members of the family of an
insured person also benefit from the insurance systems, and further
subsidies for families are offered by a public fund for family subsidies
264 The Schüssel Era in Austria
(Familienlastenausgleichsfond, or FLAF) financed first and foremost by
employers’ contributions but also by a percentage of a worker’s wages.
Regarding citizenship, Austrian citizens who are either not in the
labor force and do not directly benefit from the social insurance systems
and/or do not benefit from internal or state-controlled family transfer
payments are protected by a “second net of social security” (means
tested). This system is financed by taxes and organized on the regional
level.
To determine the type of the Austrian welfare system, I refer to
Gösta Esping-Anderson’s typology of welfare regimes,5 which distin-
guishes between liberal, conservative, and social democratic regimes. A
“liberal” regime type, present in the United States, Canada, and
Australia, puts its priority on “market-based welfare”; social services
and transfer payments are means tested and on a low level. A “conser-
vative” regime type, established in countries like France, Germany, or
Austria, tends towards state paternalistic protection and provision; social
rights and benefits are closely linked with class position and occu-
pational status, and its family orientation is very strong. A “social demo-
cratic” regime type, as in Sweden, Norway, or Denmark universally
includes all members of the society regardless of their social background
in a comprehensive system of social rights and services. In terms of this
typology, the Austrian system is basically “conservative,” but during its
golden age, some “social democratic” elements were also introduced.
The performance of the Austrian welfare system is impressive. The
risk of poverty rate is significantly reduced through the social
transfer—from 25 percent to 13 percent in Austria (resulting in risk of
poverty reduction of nearly 50 percent).6 Its integrative power can be
best appreciated by considering the fact that after its introduction the
relationship between the industrial classes had changed from “class
struggle” to “social partnership,” and the political system had transfor-
med from a labile “conflict democracy” into an ultra-stable “concor-
dance democracy.”7
Transition from Fordism to Post-Fordism
as a Challenge of the Welfare State
As in other welfare systems in Europe and the rest of the industria-
lized world, the Austrian system is, for better or for worse, linked to a
particular societal context: Fordism.8 The Austrian welfare state
emerged as a part of this particular stage of development of capitalism.
Among other characteristics, Fordism is marked by 
• a system of “mass production” based on full employment; on in-
dustrial labor standardized through a Taylorist and bureaucratic
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organization, mechanization, collective bargaining, and labor and
social legislation; and on high wages and on mass consumption;
• the generalization of the bourgeois family model, composed of the
“male breadwinner” and the female housewife and mother and
guaranteeing the exchange of  income, goods, and services between
the spouses as well as the transfer of public family allowances;
• a Keynesian economic and social policy, supplying economic
stability and growth and collective social advancement through the
improvement of social security and redistribution; and
• a “national constellation” in which the nation-based economy is
maintained and controlled by tariff and currency policy and in
which the national community is largely composed of native ci-
tizens.
Table 1
Indicators for Social Change in Austria
Indicator Change, in Percentage
Declining Labor Volume 1960-1997 - 25 
Rising GNP (figures for Germany) + 180 
“Atypical” labor in the work force
2004
33  (all) / 50 (female)
More Women in Academia 35  (1961) -> 57 (2001)
Rising Female Employment 50 (1951) –> 65 (2004)
Divorce Rate 46 (2006) / 20 (1951)
Ratio of “Normal” vs. “Atypical”
Couples and Families 2001
3:1 (2001) / 6:1 (1971) / projected 2:1
(2030)
Increase of FDI in Austria 2005: 400  of 1996
Increase of FDI in the European
Union
2001: 900  of 1986
Foreign Workforce and Population
2007
Ca. 10   (1950 < 3 )
Foreign-born 2007 Ca. 16 
Source: Statistics Austria, EUROSTAT.
Since the 1980s, capitalism seems to have entered a new stage—
“post-Fordism,”9 or, in terms of M. Castells’ more positive notion,
“network capitalism” and “network society.”10 The most relevant pro-
perties of this new stage of capitalism in our context are the following
(see Table 1):
• A production system of “flexible specialization,”11 based on scien-
tific knowledge, on flexible network organization, on electronic
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information and communication technologies (ICT), on plura-
lization, flexibilization, “disorganization”12 and deregulation of
labor, and on diversification of products and services. Economic
prosperity and growth are no longer linked to full employment and
growth of labor volume. The highly qualified core parts of the
workforce in the advanced network sector of the economy are
winning in terms of labor autonomy and income, and the
traditionally qualified workforce is progressively marginalized—be
it as part-time and temporary project workers, as “new entrepre-
neurs” in the network sector, or as part of the workforce in de-
clining traditional industries, and people without any qualifications
are in danger of complete exclusion.
• The transformation of gender roles in the family occurs as women’s
participation in education and labor rises, family ties get looser, and
new forms of partnership and family—with or without marriage,
with or without children, hetero- or homosexual, staying single, and
so forth—are developed.13 
• “Neoliberal” supply-oriented monetarist economic and social poli-
cies that distrust state ownership and regulation and trust instead
private investments and self-regulated markets, while espousing
anti-interventionism develop.14
• “Post national constellation”15 in which national states operate on
liberated and deregulated markets; in order to remain attractive as
locations for globally operating capital, they have to invest in infra-
structure (knowledge and qualification, communication, transport,
energy), cut taxes, and reduce labor regulations and “unproductive”
expenses. Moreover, they are exposed to competition with other
states for investments on liberalized and deregulated markets. At
the same time, migration has led to a changed composition of the
societal community and challenged its nationalist identity.
Restrictions and Options for Social Policy
in the Age of Post-Fordism
This societal development seriously affects the nature of the state
in general and of the type of social policy established in the era of
Fordism in particular. Unlike in the era of Fordism, the state is not
primarily a welfare state any more, but a “national competition state,”16
engaged in a zero sum competition with other national states. Regarding
their competition strategy, the state, in principle, has two choices. First
is the offensive strategy which involves investing in knowledge and
education in order to attract investors and create new jobs in the new
knowledge economy while at the same time investing in social policy in
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order to enable the population to participate in and maintain their
employability in a flexible network economy. This strategy has been
successfully practiced in Scandinavian countries like Finland and
Sweden and in the Netherlands.17 Second is the defensive strategy which
avoids an outflow of capital and unemployment through cutting taxes,
abolishing labor regulations, reducing social expenses, and increasing
the pressure on the labor force. Some “liberal” countries like the United
States or Great Britain are following that strategy; some “conservative”
countries complement this strategy with protectionist measures like
incentives for women to stay away from the labor market and barriers
for migrant workers. Of course, these two strategies can also be com-
bined. 
Furthermore, the paradigm of social policy is shifting from “active
full provision” towards “activation.”18 The new paradigm of social poli-
cy entails not only a reduction, but also a redirection, of social expen-
diture as new modes of care and social services provision are introduced
(see Table 2).
Table 2













allowances and tax credits for
family care and market
service, public financial
support for paid domestic
service
Source: Fine, own adaptations.19
The forms established in the Fordist welfare system—paid or un-
paid, formal or informal provisions—are complemented and/or substitu-
ted by mixed “hybrid forms.” At the same time, organization and ma-
nagement of formal care is reorganized to include contracting with
private providers, embracing new administrative arrangements (intro-
duction of monitoring surveillance, funder-provider splits, output-based
funding, management by objectives, and so forth, known as “new public
management”), overcoming the fragmentation of and improving the
coordination between services (case management, one-desk principle,
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networking of services, and so forth), encouraging less intensive and
cheaper service through substitution policies, and improving the
targeting of services.20
Regarding the broader socio-political orientation of social policy,
basically two versions of activating social policy may be distinguished.
First is the “progressive” version which accepts the reality of post-For-
dist network society and aims at the empowerment of people to get
along with the new flexible working and living conditions. Second is the
“conservative” version which still clings to the Fordist past and tries to
keep the people on board the “sinking ships” of a full employment eco-
nomy, family, and nation.
The Transformation of the Austrian Welfare State
in the Schüssel Years, 2000-2006
“Neo-Liberal” Social Policy
The containment of social expenditure in Austria had already started
under the Grand Coalition of the Social Democratic Party of Austria
(Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs, or SPÖ) and Austrian People’s
Party (Österreichische Volkspartei, or ÖVP) the  in the 1990s for a
rather pragmatic reason: the need to adapt to reputedly factual budgetary
constraints. Two “austerity packages” passed in 1994 and in 1995 en-
tailed more restrictions, cuts, and/ or deductibles in the areas of health,
unemployment, and pensions insurance.21 
The new center-right coalition between the ÖVP and the Freedom
Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, or FPÖ), in office
since February 2000, inspired by the “neo-liberal” trust in markets and
“self-responsibility,” continued and even intensified this approach to so-
cial policy. The coalition’s “neo-liberal” agenda of reduction and
transformation of the supposedly overdeveloped welfare system
followed the principle “less welfare state, more entrepreneurship,”
according to Minister of Finance Karl-Heinz Grasser.22 
This neo-liberal agenda of the ÖVP-FPÖ coalition was put into
practice via different channels. One channel was the change of formal
administrative structures and political decision-making procedures. The
competence for labor affairs was transferred from the Ministry for
Social Affairs to the Ministry for Economic Affairs.23 Additionally, in
order to increase its influence on social policy, the new government tried
to cut the autonomy of the corporatist Economic and Social Partnership
(ESP). The first initiative in this direction was undertaken in summer
2001,24 but was reversed in autumn 2003 by the Constitutional Court25;
the second initiative in this direction at the end of 2004 was successful.26
Finally, Schüssel’s government also broke with the tradition of the non-
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autonomous ESP—that is, the inclusion of employer, employee, and
farmers’ organizations in the process of parliamentary decision ma-
king—for instance, on the occasion of the pension reform of 2003. 
The other channel for the neo-liberal agenda of Schüssel’s govern-
ment was material decision making. In its first period, several measures
were significant. Under the headline “Measures for Budget Consoli-
dation,” mass taxes and dues were raised, a fee for outpatients’ depart-
ments and a tax on accident benefits were introduced,27 tuition fees as
well as restrictions on the pension system (for example, elimination of
early retirement) and on unemployment insurance (for example, lower
replacement rates, cuts of family surcharges, longer waiting periods for
repeated claims, harsher sanctions for abuse) were implemented.28 In
terms of social policy, Schüssel’s first cabinet can be credited with the
“Billion for Handicapped Persons”29 which was funded in the budgets
for 2001 and 2002.
A far-reaching change of the welfare system was the introduction
of two private pillars into the hitherto purely public pension system: a
company pensions scheme30 and a scheme for individual retirement
provisions.31
In its second term in office, the ÖVP-FPÖ/ BZÖ coalition continued
with this agenda: 
Labor and Labor Market Policy
Schüssel’s cabinet agreed upon a further liberalization of business
hours32 and upon a reduction of part-time work for older employees33 as
well as of unemployment insurance (resulting in stricter definitions of
“acceptable” employment and “acceptable” commuting distances).34
Also part of the agenda of the ÖVP-FPÖ/BZÖ government35 (ÖVP/ FPÖ
2003), but not realized was the introduction of unemployment insurance
for employers and the self-employed.
In the area of labor market policy, Schüssel’s cabinet put its focus
on “activating” measures to raise “employability” (according to the rele-
vant guidelines and the “Lissabon Agenda” of the European Union),
including a new combination wage model.36 An important step towards
labor market liberalization was abolishing the monopoly for placement
services of the state-controlled “Labor Market Service” (AMS).37
In the year 2005, the so-called “service check” was created. With
this innovation, the government tried to make a step towards the
legalization of illegal housework and its integration into the social
insurance system.38
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Pension Reform 
After the introduction of two private pillars during its first term in
office, the government engaged in the reform of the first public pillar of
the system. Basically the government aimed at 1) adaptation of the
system to the current demographic transition through a reduction of the
payout and 2) harmonization of the different pension systems through
the introduction of a unitary system for all occupational groups. In spite
of strong resistance from the trade unions and the parliamentary
opposition, the relevant decisions were made on 11 June 200339 and 18
November 2004.40 The core issues of the new system:
• the regulation will be in force on 1 January 2005 for all people
below the age of fifty;
• the rate of contribution is 22 percent for blue and white collar
workers, 17.5 percent for the self-employed, and 15 percent for
farmers;  
• eligibility occurs after only seven instead of fifteen years of
employment;
• up to four (instead of two) years of eligibility may be replaced by
time spent on child care; 
• time spent on child care (or care for the dying) is rated relatively
generously with the average income of women (Euro 1.350),
whereas the rating of times of unemployment was reduced;
• regular retirement age is sixty-five; earlier retirement leads to
marked deductions; 
• replacement rate is 80 percent after forty-five (instead of only forty)
years of contribution; the basis of the computation is the average
income of the whole occupational carrier (instead of the average of
the last fifteen years); 
• heavy workers will have a chance for early retirement without a
reduction of their pensions41; the current regulation for early
retirement (“Hackler-Regelung” giving the right of retirement after
forty-five years of contribution to the pension system) will be
extended until 2014;
• minor appreciations of years of contribution occurs, reduced
increase of pensions; 
• in order to secure sustainability, the system will be automatically
linked to further demographic development;
• losses through the reform are limited with a maximum of 5 percent
for 2004 up to 10 percent from 2024 onward.
Projected in the coalition agreement,42 but ultimately not realized,
was a minimum pension.
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Considering the increase of part-time and discontinuous labor and
the minor weight of years of contribution to the pension system (-8
percent) on the one hand and the absence of a minimum pension on the
other, a growing part of the younger generation (in general) and women
(in particular) will have real trouble safeguarding their future based on
the revised pension system.  
Health Reform 
In the first half of 2003, Schüssel’s second cabinet pushed through
the harmonization of contributions to health insurance (unitary contribu-
tion rate: 7.3 percent; +0.4 percent for white collar and -0.3 percent for
blue collar workers), the raise of the contributions to the health insuran-
ce for retired persons (+1 percent), and the introduction of deductibles
for medical consultations and new contributions for leisure time
accidents (0.1 percent).43
In October 2004, the federal state and the regional states agreed
upon a “package for financing the health system”; this package included
among others an increase of the tobacco duty, further deductibles and a
temporary elevation of contributions to the health insurance.44
At the same time, the ruling coalition prepared an organizational
reform of the health system: Within a nationwide health organization
structure Austria is divided into four “health zones” and thirty-two
“health regions.” In order to assure a high quality at reasonable costs the
medical activities of hospitals and independent physicians, inpatient and
outpatient treatment, standard level- and high level-medical service
efforts should be optimized and better coordinated.45
Taxes and Fees 
Fees were further raised, for example, the fee on fuel. On the other
hand, as the first step in a two step-tax reform, the level of tax-free in-
come was raised to _14,500 per year, and taxes were reduced.46 In sum,
the relief amounts to the rather modest sum of Euro 169 million.47
The second step of the tax reform with a volume of Euro 2.2 billion
contains, among other features, a reduction of corporate tax from 34
percent to 25 percent and a modification of the income tax (less tax
brackets, raising of the brackets in order to prevent hidden progression)
aiming at a simplification of the system and a reduction of the tax
burden. Furthermore, a rise of the single earner tax allowance was part
of the reform.48 
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Poverty Reduction
Contrary to its announcements, Schüssel’s second cabinet took no
significant measures against poverty. Neither the minimum pension nor
the nationwide unitary guaranteed minimum income which was sup-
posed to replace the old regional system of subsidies that was neither
uniform nor able to secure one’s livelihood were put into practice.49
With this social policy agenda aiming at a better targeting of social
services and an individualization and privatization of the social risks,50
the “social democratic” elements of Austria’s welfare regime were re-
duced, and additional “liberal” elements were introduced. Faced with the
realm of a “post-Fordist” network economy, a “defensive” strategy was
chosen to avoid the outflow of capital and unemployment through
cutting taxes, abolishing labor regulations, reducing social expenses, and
increasing the pressure on the labor force. This strategy was supple-
mented by two other problematic elements: a conservative gender and
family policy and a restrictive migration and integration policy.
Conservative Family and Gender Policy
In terms of family and gender policy, Schüssel’s cabinets enforced
the “conservative” character of the system inspired by traditional models
of family and gender relations, trying to reduce women to the function
of housewives and mothers and to keep them dependent upon the male
breadwinner and the state-controlled family transfer.
In terms of the formal administrative structure, the abolishment of
the Ministry for Female Affairs, the integration of its former areas of
responsibility into the Ministry for Social, Family, and Generation
Affairs, and the launching of a Department for Male Affairs within this
Ministry is symptomatic of the new approach to gender and family
issues.51
In terms of material policy, the paradigmatic model in this respect
is the “children’s allowance” (Kindergeld).52 It was introduced during
the ÖVP-FPÖ coalition’s first term of office as a substitute for the pre-
vious policy of paid maternal leave for employees. Admittedly, other
groups besides housewives and mothers (for example, students and the
self-employed) also benefit from this measure, but the allowance is no
surrogate for a regular income, and it tempts women to stay away too
long from the workplace. In its second term, Schüssel’s cabinet con-
tinued with this policy. The children’s allowance for multiples was
raised,53 and as already mentioned above, the single earner tax allowance
was improved.
Ambivalent in its consequences for the gender relations was the
consideration of time spent on childcare for the calculation of pensions
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and the introduction of voluntary pension-splitting during the child’s
first four years, both introduced with the pension reform 2003/04. On the
one hand, women gained an independent legal claim to a pension; on the
other hand, the cash equivalent of that claim is low, and the measure
sustains the “male breadwinner” model. 
Two further family policy measures of Schüssel II are similarly
ambivalent in their consequences. The first measure is the leave for end-
of-life care and care for the seriously ill (without salary, up to six
months), passed in parliament in May 2005.54 Its scope is limited to the
members of “normal” family, and considering the existing gender
differences in their labor market participation and income, it sustains the
unequal gender order. The second measure is the right of part time work
for employees which was introduced in order to reconcile parenthood
and labor passed in parliament on 26 May 2003.55 Only 25 percent of the
employees potentially benefit from this measure; it primarily applies to
women and, thus, contributes to the reproduction of the established
gender order. Furthermore, step-parents are not included in this regu-
lation.56 
Shocked by negative results of the PISA Study about the quality of
education in Europe, the ÖVP-FPÖ/BZÖ coalition loosened its
resistance against institutional child care. In July 2005, it paved the way
for the provision of additional day care facilities for 10,000 children.57
As far as new forms of marriage and family such as patchwork
families or homosexual couples are concerned, both of Schüssel’s ca-
binets consistently refused to face reality and ensure equal treatment.
Although the Constitutional Court had ruled out the discrimination of
homosexual couples58 and in spite of the Anti-Discrimination Directive
of the European Union, the relevant initiatives of Minister of Justice
Karin Gastinger finally were not successful.59
At the same time, the ruling ÖVP-FPÖ/BZÖ coalition made a
decision with disadvantageous consequences for the legal status of
patchwork families. The regulation extending insurance coverage to a
partner with whom one was cohabitating was changed so that it no
longer applied to non-married couples, be they heterosexual or homo-
sexual.60 Thus a practice of equal treatment of married and unmarried
couples introduced twenty-five years ago was revoked.61
In May 2004, the coalition agreed upon a revision of the Equal
Treatment Act62 in order to implement an anti-discrimination directive
of the European Union. The new regulation was meant to protect all
employees from discrimination at their workplace on the basis of sex,
race, ethnicity, religion, age, or sexual orientation. However, the EU
directive was implemented only minimally.63
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During Austria’s EU presidency, Schüssel’s cabinet launched an
action plan against “tradition-bound violence” against women such as
female genital mutilation, forced marriage, or honor killing. At the end
of January 2006, a relevant network was founded and financed by the
EU Fund for Human Rights and Democracy.64 By the end of March
2006, the Austrian parliament passed measures for the protection of
victims of “tradition-bound violence” against women.65 Without down-
playing the importance of the fight against this type of crime, it is
noteworthy that it xenophobically associates violence against women
with the tradition of the migrant population and goes along with an
ignorance and neglect of home-grown violence against women. 
Restrictive Immigration and Integration Policy
By means of immigration and integration policy, additional natio-
nalistic, protectionist, and xenophobic elements were introduced into
social policy. Most instructive about the approach to migration and
integration in Austria is the attitude toward these policy issues at the
Ministry of Internal Affairs: migration is perceived as a threat and a
matter of homeland security, not as an opportunity, and migrants are not
welcomed, but received with distrust. 
The most prominent example for the restrictive approach to immi-
gration and integration legislation in the first term of office for
Schüssel’s ÖVP-FPÖ coalition was the newly introduced “Integration
Agreement” that has to be signed by immigrants. Unlike its Dutch
model, it offered no new opportunities and positive incentives (such as
better access to the labor market and public housing, the right to vote on
the communal level, an earlier award of citizenship), but imposed more
obligations (language and regional studies courses) and hurdles (health
test) and threatened immigrants with negative sanctions such as pro-
gressive deductibles, fines, and removal.66
In its second term in office, Schüssel’s cabinet continued with its
restrictive agenda, particularly in the arena of asylum legislation. As far
as asylum law is concerned, the ÖVP-FPÖ coalition in 2003 passed
legislation involving more complicated application and appeal pro-
cedures. In addition, revisions of one’s justification of one’s application
offered in hindsight were prohibited.67 After the abrogation of this law
by the Constitutional Court in October 2004,68 the ruling coalition made
another effort to change asylum legislation including, among others,
provisions regarding extensive custody pending deportation, forced
nutrition of hunger strikers, and fines for people acting as accessories to
the abuse of asylum rights and for fictitious marriages. At least the
prohibition of a revision of the justification of one’s application in
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hindsight was moderated. The new law was passed as a part of a com-
prehensive migration legislation package on 7 July 2005; it was suppor-
ted by large parts of the oppositional SPÖ.69 
On 24 March 2004, the Agreement between the Federal State and
the Regional States Concerning the Support of Refugees implementing
a relevant EU directive was passed unanimously in the parliament.70
With this measure, the subsistence of asylum seekers was guaranteed.
During the same period, legislation for immigration and citizenship
was considerably modified as well. The quota for legal immigration was
reduced from 8,518 places for 2001 to 7,000 places for 2006, about 50
percent of which were reserved for immigrants admitted in order to
reunite families. In addition, more seasonal migrant workers were
admitted in order to accommodate the short-term demand on the labor
market. Furthermore, higher requirements within the Integration Agree-
ment, higher requirements (knowledge of language and culture, having
one’s own means of subsistence) and longer waiting time (twelve
instead of ten years) for naturalization, additional difficulties for binatio-
nal couples and for transnational adoptions, and less security for mi-
grants against deportation were features of the legislation. At least
further steps towards a harmonization of residence and labor were taken,
and more independent rights for people who came to the country via the
family reunion policy were granted. The new laws concerning legal
residence and settlement were passed with the approval of the oppo-
sitional SPÖ on 7 July 200571; the decision upon the new rules for
citizenship followed on 1 March 2006.72
A few measures of the ÖVP-FPÖ/BZÖ government sought to
reduce discrimination and encourage the integration of migrants. These
included the extension of children’s and family allowance to migrant
women who do not share a household with an Austrian citizen,73 and the
introduction of measures for the promotion of speech development of
migrant preschool children and school students.74
Reviewing gender, family, migration, and integration policies of the
Schüssel era reveals that the administration chose the “conservative”
agenda, still clinging to the “sinking ships” of the traditional gender
order, “normal” family, and maintaining a nation of aboriginal citizens.
With regard to gender and family, it supported the traditional male
breadwinner model of family, it discouraged full-value female employ-
ment, and it continued with discrimination of deviant couples and
patchwork families. As far as migration is concerned, the policies of the
ÖVP-FPÖ/BZÖ coalition inhibited immigration and impeded social
integration. 
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Final Evaluation of the Social Policy of the Schüssel Years
A comprehensive retrospect on the “Schüssel Years” shows a clear
tendency toward a neoliberal transformation of the welfare state into a
national competition state, toward the consolidation of traditional gender
order and family, and toward a nationalist exclusion of migrants. 
Neoliberal transformation of social policy does not necessarily
mean reduction of social expenses. The rate of social expenditure has
been stable or has even increased since the 1990s,75 but focusing on the
different sorts of expenses reveals a more mixed and non-uniform
picture. Some social contributions have decreased—be it because of
reduction (of, for example, unemployment payment, pensions), because
of the introduction of deductibles (in, for example, health insurance), or
because of their substitution by private arrangements (such as, for
example, pensions). Yet expenses for monetary children’s and family
allowances have increased, whereas the expenditure for institutional
child care has stagnated. Compared to other European countries, Austria
has developed into a country with a relatively high standard of monetary
allowances and a relatively low standard of institutional services.76
Except for the introduction of the support of refugees required by
a relevant EU directive, the investments in measures for the integration
of migrants have been rather moderate. Thus it’s no wonder that,
according to the Migration and Integration Policy Index, Austria ranks
as the second to the last of all EU countries in this policy area.77 
In its turn to embrace the national competition state model,
Schüssel’s two cabinets chose the “defensive strategy” of reducing the
tax burden and wage subsidies to create more capital and “activating”
labor by means of negative incentives. The socio-political orientation in
the Schüssel era was “conservative,” enforcing promotion of the tradi-
tional gender order and “normal” marriage and family and engaging in
the continuous discrimination of unmarried couples and patchwork fami-
lies. Simultaneously, the discrimination of the migrant population con-
tinued and was even intensified. Thus the  ÖVP-FPÖ/BZÖ coalitions did
not account for the emerging “network society” and (mis-)invested in
the sinking ships of normal labor and full employment, the male bread-
winner family model, and the nation of aboriginal citizens. 
The effects of this backward policy orientation are numerous. The
inequality of incomes increased,78 and poverty continues in Austria. Five
percent are acutely poor, a further 7 percent are at risk of poverty, and
a further 20 percent are affected by restrictions of their standard of
living. The primary risk groups are female widows and (predominantly
female) single parents and migrants.79 The number of people living on
public social support has increased more than threefold since 1999.80
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The system of public social transfer reproduces and even amplifies these
inequalities.81
The gender gap of professional status and income continues82;
women have been driven “back to the kitchen,” (re-)entry into the labor
market after parental leave ends has become more difficult,83 and the
restrictive migration and integration policy has led to labor market
problems (shortage of qualified labor and/ or care takers) as well as to
structural social exclusion and cultural isolation of the migrant popu-
lation.84
The coalition agreement of the subsequent SPÖ-ÖVP-coalition85
contained some projects in the area of social, gender and family,
migration, and integration policy issues promising a reorientation of
policy along the lines of EU trends. Initiatives like the guaranteed mini-
mum income; the inclusion of employers, the self-employed, and
freelancers in unemployment insurance; the improvement of professio-
nal training and occupational retraining; and the introduction of the
comprehensive school indicate a shift from a “defensive” to an “offen-
sive” competitive strategy prepared to invest in human capital and in
social security as a precondition of flexible labor.
Initiatives like the flexible nature of the children’s allowance, the
expansion of institutional child care, or the abolishment of discrimi-
nation against homosexuals, non-married couples, and patchwork
families indicate a shift from a “conservative” to a “progressive” socio-
political orientation and to the acknowledgement of the new model of
network society which includes flexibility in work and life and pluralism
of ways and styles of living.
Because the ÖVP was neither prepared to give up basic principles
and core results of the Schüssel era, nor to concede major political
successes to its ally, in the political practice of the coalition many of
those projects were either diluted (as in the comprehensive school) or
retarded (as in the introduction of the guaranteed minimum income)
and/or finally completely prevented (as in the equal treatment of
homosexuals, non-married couples, and patchwork families).
Furthermore, there was also much continuity provided for in the
coalition agreement. The competitive strategy still included “defensive”
elements such as the further liberalization of opening hours and working
hours for shops or further restrictions on unemployment insurance.
Unimpressed by the criticism expressed by human rights organizations
and the supreme jurisdiction of the European Union, the SPÖ-ÖVP
coalition consensually continued with the restrictive agenda of migration
and integration policy, thus staying on the “conservative” socio-political
course of its predecessor.
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Thus state and social policy in Austria currently are in a state of
uncertainty—undecided and torn apart between an “offensive” and a
“defensive” competitive strategy and between a “conservative” and a
“progressive” socio-political orientation. Schüssel’s ÖVP was not pre-
pared to make a fundamental turn, whereas Gusenbauer’s SPÖ was not
strong enough to push the turn through by force; it was also unwilling
to change the conservative course in the area of migration and inte-
gration policy. Thus even Gusenbauer’s policies remained dependent on
the path taken by Schüssel, and social policy was shaped by Schüssel
beyond the years of his chancellorship.
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The Demise of “Minoritenplatz-Schleicherei”:
Eighty-Four Month of Wende
Higher Education Policy in Austria
Josef Leidenfrost1
Introduction
It is remarkable that the policy field of “higher education” is in-
cluded in this volume on the Schüssel years in Austria 2000-2007.
Higher education is regularly ignored when taking stock of historical
developments in any given era.1 In the basic handbook Politik in
Österreich edited by several Austrian political scientists,2 thirteen
different key policy areas were covered; “higher education” was not
among them. Oswald Panagl’s and Peter Gerlich’s Wörterbuch der
politischen Sprache in Österreich3 has entries on fraternities and student
politics (Studentenverbindungen and studentische Politik), but none on
higher education policies (Hochschul-/Universitätspolitik), let alone
higher education reforms (Hochschul-/Universitätsreform), even though
Austrian higher education marched at least through five major reforms
since 1945. Only Nikolaus Dimmel and Josef Schmee’s Politische
Kultur in Österreich 2000-2005 contains a contribution by Claudia von
Werlhof that carries at least “Hochschul” in its title.4 Occasionally,
celebratory Festschriften for declared experts in the field of higher
education politics (such as Manfried Welan, Christian Brünner, and
Wolfgang Mantl5) may cover some specific aspects of higher education
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policy in general, while they shy away from the partisan political dis-
courses of higher education policies in Austria. 
Higher education reform, however, was high on the agenda during
the years 2000 to 2007 of the coalition governments of Wolfgang
Schüssel with the FPÖ/BZÖ of Susanne Riess-Passer, Herbert Haupt,
and Hubert Gorbach. Higher education as a policy field went through
changing paradigms, some as a result of careful planning in the domestic
arena, others unfolding almost by coincidence or as a result of outside
pressure.6 Granting Austrian universities autonomous rules and charging
modest tuition fees to Austrian students for the first time in a generation
represented dramatic changes. New access regulations for foreign stu-
dents and selection procedures for Austrian students in certain academic
disciplines at public universities as a result of a European Court decision
in 2005 represent yet two other major changes. So do the new laws
affecting higher education governance as a result of long planned
reforms as well as of short-term decisions coming along with the
implementation of the “Bologna goals” after 1999. Extensive media
coverage of higher education issues made these paradigmatic changes
part of a wider Austrian conversation. The policy decisions unleashing
some of the most important changes are the subject of this essay. 
Elisabeth Gehrer and the Resetting of the
Higher Education Policy Agenda
After several weeks of negotiations for a new coalition government
between the Social Democratic Party of Austria (Sozialdemokratische
Partei Österreichs, or SPÖ), the conservative Austrian People’s Party
(Österreichische Volkspartei, or ÖVP), and the right-wing Freedom
Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, or FPÖ) in which all
possible variations and combinations of parties had been discussed7, the
new coalition was presented to the media and to the public on 4 Fe-
bruary 2000. The result, namely a small coalition between Wolfgang
Schüssel’s ÖVP and Jörg Haider’s FPÖ, was a big surprise to all obser-
vers. For the first time, the populist right-wing Haider party was inclu-
ded in a governing coalition in Austrian politics.
Whereas some of the nine FPÖ ministers and secretaries of state in
the Schüssel/Riess-Passer team were mostly unknowns, the name of the
new higher education minister Elisabeth Gehrer was familiar to the
majority of the Austrians. In 1980, Gehrer, a former primary school
teacher, had become a member of the city council of Bregenz, Austria’s
westernmost provincial capital. Ten years later, she joined the Vorarl-
berg provincial government, in charge of the education portfolio. In both
positions, she had been strongly involved in setting the agenda and
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making decisions in education policy on the provincial level. Gehrer
entered Vienna politics with a reputation of toughness. When she was
first appointed federal minister for Education and Culture in 1995, the
press dubbed her the Alpine “power lady” and “miracle lady” (Power-
frau aus den Alpen, Frau Wunderwuzzi, Mutter Courage vom Boden-
see).8 
Her new office as minister was located in the Palais Starhemberg in
Vienna's first district on the Minoritenplatz, ever since the late nine-
teenth century the “powerhouse” of education politics in Austria.9 In the
new Schüssel/Riess-Passer coalition government, Gehrer’s new portfolio
was widely expanded on 1 April 2000. The Education Ministry was
merged with the former Ministry of Science and Transport and became
the new super Ministry of Education, Science, and Culture. Such a mer-
ger of the several educational competences had already been discussed
publicly during the late 1990s in the discussion forum of experts
Österreich Zukunftsreich (originally launched by then Vice-Chancellor
Wolfgang Schüssel), and during the election campaign of 1999, Gehrer
herself raised the issue of such a merger.10 At the time of the late
1999/early 2000 coalition negotiations between the SPÖ and ÖVP, even
the chief negotiators Chancellor Viktor Klima and Wolfgang Schüssel
had talked about it.11  
This accumulation of tasks and duties turned Gehrer’s ministry into
one of the new key ministries (Schlüsselressorts) in the new ÖVP/FPÖ
coalition government and gave Gehrer added cache to Schüssel’s cabi-
net. With the merger it became “the highest administrative and planning
institution of the Republic of Austria for schools, higher education (in
particular universities and Fachhochschulen), adult education, scientific
research and international affairs in the field of science, the federal
museums, and for the protection of historical monuments.”12
Gehrer as the new conservative ÖVP minister for education,
science, and research tried to turn the traditionally “red” ministry
“black.” Yet even with the new “black” boss, the institution was —for
the time being— largely Social Democratic “red” since many of the key
positions within the higher education administration had been held by
Social Democrats, who had been appointed by the previous SPÖ
ministers Hertha Firnberg, Heinz Fischer, Hilde Havlicek, Rudolf
Scholten, and Caspar Einem (between 1970 and 2000). Only during the
years of ÖVP Minister Erhard Busek (1989-1995) had some changes
been made with the appointments of a few conservatives in leading
positions within the ministerial hierarchy.13 Gehrer’s taking office and
sweeping changing of colors in the ministry (Farbwechsel im Mini-
sterium) were naturally welcomed by ÖVP officials as well as some
university people.14 
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After February 2000, then, education policy in Austria was domi-
nated by Minister Gehrer and her advisers, who had served in previous
administrations or were new appointments. Some operated discreetly in
the background like Gehrer’s chef de cabinet since 1995 Peter Mahrin-
ger who was the eminence grise in the powerful ministerial bureaucracy.
“P.M.” (his initials) had already served Erhard Busek as close adviser
during the latter’s term as Vice Mayor of Vienna.15 Another force to be
reckoned with was Sigurd Höllinger, the “red” director general of the
ministry and mastermind behind many of the reforms in higher edu-
cation during the 1990s.16 He had been hired by Hertha Firnberg in 1976,
and Minister Heinz Fischer promoted him to director general for higher
education in 1986.17 Some observers even characterized him as the
quasi-minister (eigentlicher Wissenschaftsminister).18 
Gehrer handpicked her own team of experts. Among the seven new
directors general in the ministry appointed during her tenure from 2000
to 2007, she chose three women, namely Brigitte Böck, Heidrun Stroh-
meyer, and Barbara Weitgruber, a renowned expert on the internatio-
nalization of higher education,.19 Outside the ministry, Gehrer regularly
consulted experts of her personal choice.20 The most political body was
Chancellor Schüssel’s personal kitchen cabinet starting off the week
every Monday morning at ÖVP party headquarters. Andreas Khol (third
president of the National Assembly), Wilhelm Molterer (ÖVP party
whip at the parliament), and Minister Gehrer faithfully attended these
sessions that were chaired by the Chancellor and reviewed old policies
and set strategies for the new policy initiatives.21 The agenda with which
Gehrer had to contend as minister was mostly determined by preset
conditions; the inheritance she accepted was burdensome.
The 1990s: The Maastricht Criteria Confront
the Mass Universities
The first center-right government of the Second Austrian Republic
began its work in difficult times. On the one hand, the new political
actors in Vienna were confronting a deep aversion to tackling the
backlog of reforms (Reformstau) left by the increasingly paralyzed
grand SPÖ/ÖVP coalition government of Viktor Klima and Wolfgang
Schüssel. On the other hand, many of the new “incoming” decision
makers and their new (and not so new) advisers were obsessed with the
desire to change things now that they were in the position to bring about
fundamental turnabout—the Wende. 22 
In the field of higher education, the legacies of the past were distinct
and multi-faceted. They had been shaped by strong and weak ministers
and their administrations, some cooperative, others oppositional. Four
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higher education ministers had been from the Socialist Party, namely
Hertha Firnberg (1970-1983), Heinz Fischer (1983-1987), Rudolf
Scholten (1995-1997), and Caspar Einem (1997-2000); two had been
from the conservative ÖVP, namely Hans Tuppy (1987-1989) and
Erhard Busek (1989-1995).
When Chancellor Bruno Kreisky established his Socialist govern-
ment in 1970, he appointed Hertha Firnberg as the first Minister for
Science (in fact, Higher Education!) and Research in postwar Austria.23
The trained social scientist Firnberg emerged as the “grande dame” of
higher education during her thirteen years in power.24 Her most far
reaching reform was the Universitätsorganisationsgesetz (UOG) 1975,
which “democratized” the Austrian universities and did away with many
of the hierarchical structures. It probably was a delayed outgrowth of the
1968 student movement in Austria.25  
Heinz Fischer’s term as science minister in the SPÖ/FPÖ coalition
governments led by Fred Sinowatz and then Franz Vranitzky (1983-
1987) was unspectacular, continuing the policies set into place by Firn-
berg. In the first SPÖ/ÖVP coalition government under Chancellor
Vranitzky and Vice Chancellor Alois Mock, the pendulum started to
swing in the other direction. In early 1987, the respected university
professor Hans Tuppy was appointed Minister for Science and Research.
He had been a candidate for a ministerial post ever since the late 1960s.
A favorite for the position of the minister of education under ÖVP
Chancellor Josef Klaus, party strategists favored a younger candidate,
so Klaus appointed the upstart Alois Mock instead.26 After seventeen
years of “red” control over higher education policies, Tuppy in 1987 was
the first “black” science minister. As a university professor for bioche-
mistry and a former rector of the University of Vienna as well as a
former president of the Austrian Academy of Sciences, he was met with
high hopes. During his term as minister, the introduction of the bachelor
degree in Austrian higher education was widely discussed for the first
time. It was rejected at that time but was implemented ultimately more
than ten years later when Austria had to adopt the bachelor/master
system through the “Bologna process” with its new system of higher
education degrees.27 Also during the Tuppy years, Austria entered the
dynamic processes of the European student mobility programs even
before the country joined the European Union in 1995 in the fourth
enlargement round. Austria organized its own “pre-ERASMUS” student
mobility program, a privately funded scholarship to support the mobility
of university students within Europe. 28 
In the spring of 1989, Erhard Busek succeeded Tuppy on the
Minoritenplatz. He brought strong credentials to the job of Minister of
Science and Research, having served as the People's Party speaker for
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higher education issues in the Austrian Parliament during the late 1970s.
The fall of the Iron Curtain and the opening of the “new democracies”
along Austria’s eastern border (Ostöffnung) unleashed a profound boom
in European integration. Busek was an intellectual in his own right and
had been a key participant in the “Mitteleuropa” debates of the 1980s.
He initiated innovation and major changes in higher education, including
the new regulations in study law as a first step towards the Europeani-
zation of curricula in Austria.29 Busek also created the Fachhochschulen,
a new tier of applied sciences in the Austrian higher education system.30
In 1993, he also pushed through parliament a new organizational law for
university reform (Universitätsorganisationsgesetz, or UOG 1993). 
Rudolf Scholten, a former banker, succeeded Busek in 1995 as
science minister in a new SPÖ/ÖVP coalition government again led by
Franz Vranitzky and now Wolfgang Schüssel (in direct succession of
Erhard Busek). He had already served as Minister of Education and
Culture since 1990, being noticeably more interested in culture and the
arts than in general education policies.31 When Scholten began negotia-
tions for the first annual budget under the new Social Democratic–
Conservative coalition in early 1996, it soon became apparent that
higher education would also be affected by the budget cuts necessary in
all branches of the federal government. These were driven by the so-
called “Maastricht criteria.” European Union member states who wanted
to join the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and adopt
the Euro as their currency were forced to lower their budgetary deficits
under a certain percentage determined by Article 121(1) of the Treaty of
Maastricht (European Community Treaty).32
These necessary budget cuts, which soon became known as the
government’s savings plan (Sparpaket),33 were also severe in higher
education. The cuts included the reduction of student social support
funds from the public coffers (now awarded by the students’ academic
achievements rather than mere social need), as well as the reduction of
extra teaching assignments (Lehraufträge) for teachers, which amounted
to a sizable pay cut for non-tenured lecturers. Moreover, free public
transportation for students, one of the major achievements of the
Kreisky years, was canceled.34
A wave of resistance swept onto Austria’s streets to fight these cuts
in higher education. Tens of thousands of university students marched
in the streets;35 some rectors (that is, university chancellors) gave
aggressive press conferences (one of them even wearing the costume of
the Grim Reaper);36 other rectors published open letters in newspapers,
alerting the public to the severe consequences of a declining higher
education system which would result from the planned budget cuts.37
The protests culminated on 12 March 1996, when the members of the
289
new Vranitzky/Schüssel government walked across the Ballhausplatz—
above ground—from the Federal Chancellery to the Federal President’s
offices. There they were greeted with previously unheard of catcalls and
jeers.38 This moment was more than symbolic, signaling the beginning
of the end of twenty-five years of Social Democratic higher education
policies.
Rudolf Scholten’s tenure as science minister was short-lived, lasting
for a mere 122 days since Chancellor Vranitzky himself resigned in mid-
January 1997 and handed the reigns to his successor Viktor Klima. In
the following reshuffle of cabinet positions, Caspar Einem was appoin-
ted as the new Minister for Science and Transport [sic!] in the new
Klima/Schüssel SPÖ/ÖVP coalition government. Einem had started out
as Secretary of State in the Federal Chancellery before he became
Interior Minister in spring 1995.39 Contrary to his predecessor Scholten,
Einem actually showed initiative in his job as Science Minister. He acted
as an honest agent of societal change, including higher education
issues.40 He tackled several topics and ignited some spectacular initia-
tives such as the plan to send management consultants to observe pro-
fessors’ academic performance in the classroom.41
On the occasion of Austria’s first presidency of the European Union
in 1998, Einem published and presented to the public an ambitious
“White Paper on Higher Education in Austria.”42 There he drew up a
road map for changes, but could not implement it because he lost his job
after the snap national elections in the fall 1999. Still Einem left a
lasting legacy to higher education in Austria. During his tenure, he
signed the “Bologna Declaration” for Austria in June 1999, which intro-
duced the three-tiered degree system (bachelor/master/doctorate) into
Austrian higher education.43
While Einem served as minister, the implementation of the UOG
1993, initiated by Busek, entered into its final phase. This thorough
organizational reform agenda initiated new tasks, organizational
structures, and rights and duties for the principal university governing
bodies (senates, rectors, vice rectors, faculty bodies, deans, and joint
curricular committees). It also allowed for expanded latitude for de-
cision making in the individual universities.44 Initially, the UOG 1993
legislation had been praised. Yet later on critics denounced it for coming
into effect over such an extended period of time, its costliness, and the
morale problems it created among many university employees.45 At a
time when the ongoing reforms had not yet been fully implemented, an
even more radical reform agenda was already pushed, namely the full
legal autonomy of universities (Vollrechtsfähigkeit der Universitäten).46
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From Kowtowing to Autonomy: The University Act of 2002
and the Demise of the “Minoritenplatz-Schleicherei”
The new coalition government sworn in on 4 February 2000 was
determined to redevelop the university organization reforms beyond the
UOG 1993 and its half-realized reform that had been stopped in its
tracks by the 1999 elections. The agreement adopted by the ÖVP and
FPÖ coalition partners included the commitment to embark on a reform
process resulting in the full autonomy of Austrian universities.47 Only a
few weeks into her new office, Minister Gehrer announced that high on
her priority list was making autonomous universities full legal entities.48
Experts from Austrian universities had compiled and debated a
comprehensive position paper about the restructuring of Austrian
universities in a global competitive environment in the late 1990s.49 This
was a groundbreaking step towards the positioning of universities inde-
pendent from the daily petty interferences of the political system and the
heavy-handed ministerial bureaucracy.50 
Minister of Education, Science and Culture
Elisabeth Gehrer and the mastermind of university
reforms in Austria, Director General Sigurd Höllinger
picture credits: 
Toms Grinbergs, University of Latvia, Riga
Stefan Titscher who had acted as the coordinating editor of this
study was a recognized expert in organizational development and change
management. As the former head of the Senate of the Vienna University
of Economics and Business Administration, he had gained a lot of
experience in changing university governance.51 Late in the year 2000,
Gehrer hired him to help conceptualize and write the law and prepare the
implementation of the new system. Titscher and Sigurd Höllinger, the
still powerful Director General, monitored the details in the reform steps
together. The new law’s cornerstones were the full legal capacity of
universities, multi-year performance contracts with the Ministry, global
budgets covering several years, new regulations for teaching staff,
promotion of talent within the universities, simplified administrative
processes, the shortening of the duration of studies for all majors, and
compulsory evaluation systems with appropriate follow-up measures.52
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In August 2001, in the midst of the summer holidays when most
Austrians are vacationing, a draft proposal (Gestaltungsentwurf) was
presented to public. According to the critics, this tactic was both prudent
and sly. Subsequently the draft law (Gesetzesentwurf) was made public
in early March 2002. The deadline for comments and further feedback
was again set very tightly for 19 April 2002.53 During this short ten-
week consultation period, predominately negative and critical statements
from stakeholders, lobbying groups, and individual citizens surfaced.54
As is usual with such bold reforms, narrow-minded insistence on tra-
dition and resistance to change in the universities were profoundly
challenged. It was hotly discussed in the communities affected by it and
had both defenders and critics.55 
For the first time in modern higher education politics, the discussion
was also carried on electronically via the worldwide web, which was
deliberately utilized during the gestation phase of the new law. The
Ministry even set up a special “Weltklasse” (world class) homepage to
engage in a discourse about the coming systemic changes.56 Critics in
the Viennese weekly magazine Falter made fun of the notion of
Austrian “world-class” universities, arguing that,  
“Weltklasse” is a slogan used in the lingo of educational reforms on
the university level. According to the present federal government and
the responsible Minister Gehrer, the Austrian universities are destined
to be “tops in Europe in education and research.” The way stations on
the road to W. [world-class] are the new university teacher contractual
employment law, the development of profiles, and the university law
2002. Critics think that the boasting inherent in the term W[eltklasse]
is laughable.57 
Indeed, the rhetoric “Weltklasse” was used extensively as a
marketing tool by the Ministry via the “Weltklasse” homepage. At the
same time, it was savaged by the critics and antagonists in and outside
of the university.58
The university communities were given the chance to make their
voices heard too and present their views to a wider public. Erwin
Niederwieser, the long-time Social Democratic member of parliament
and education party spokesman from the Tyrol, launched yet another
web page.59 In addition, the universities of Innsbruck and Vienna60
operated their own sub-web pages dedicated exclusively to the
discussion of the new law. This parallel public sphere ran counter to the
government’s campaign (Gegenöffentlichkeit). Rarely has Austrian civil
society engaged public higher education issues with such intensity.
The opponents of the Universitätsgesetz 2002—some of them plain-
ly partisan—engaged in several other forms of public discourse,
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countermanding the government rhetoric in promoting the new law. The
Austrian Green Party organized a day-long parliamentary symposium
with leading educational experts on the pointed question “University
Law 2002: World-Class or Cul-De-Sac?” (“Universitätsgesetz 2002:
Weltklasse oder Sackgasse?”). The Social Democrats filed an official
complaint with the Austrian Constitutional Court against some specific
clauses of the law.61 This court confirmed the basic constitutionality of
the law—with only three clauses on the performance agreements being
revoked in the end.62 The plenary session of the Austrian Parliament at
last took up the law, debated it, and passed it on a partisan majority vote
by the ÖVP and FPÖ representatives on 11 July 2002.63
As the new law was being implemented, it broke with many
traditions dear to the stakeholders in the Ministry and the universities.
Traditional paradigms were shifted as better measurable performance
and productivity were being expected. The new multi-year contracts—
the performance agreements (Leistungsvereinbarungen) between the
universities and the Ministry—signaled the end of hidebound traditions
such as the old-fashioned negotiation of resources between ministers and
their favorite professors (Minoritenplatz-Schleicherei). 
Minoritenplatz-Schleicherei served as an accurate yet disrespectful
description of the sneaky deal-making in the Ministry’s corridors. The
groveling and kowtowing of university staff to the top ministerial
decision-makers (the director general, the Minister’s chef de cabinet, or
even the minister him/herself) in their pompous first- and second-floor
offices in the Ministry located on the Minoritenplatz was legendary. It
took non-Austrians to publicly denounce these special habits. Academic
immigrants from Germany, namely Stefan Laske, professor of business
administration and chairman of the academic senate at the University of
Innsbruck, and Wolf Dietrich Freiherr von Fircks-Burgstaller, rector of
the Vienna University for Veterinary Medicine,64 were among the first
to use this specialist term to castigate the brazen favoritism. Mino-
ritenplatz-Schleicherei, as a time-worn technique well established in the
former imperial capital, was aptly characterized by seasoned observers
from the provinces such as Helmut Konrad, rector of the University of
Graz from 1993 to 1997, nevertheless an intimate connoisseur of the
Vienna power games himself:
[…] the Ministry always doled out the budget appropriations to the
individual institutions using less than transparent criteria […] The
Minoritenplatz in Vienna, seat of the [Science] Ministry, was the
rarefied center of power. This favored the Vienna universities, who
knew how to play the channels of intervention more directly. To
express it more pointedly: the number of flower bouquets often served
the crucial advancement of one’s causes.65
293
A similar view of the system is held by Kurt Grünewald, a professor
at Innsbruck University (and member of the Green party). He saw the
Austrian universities’ desire for autonomy as directly related to the
frustrations and disappointments with lengthy and complicated bureau-
cratic ways of decision-making in the Ministry. But he also criticized the
universities for having played their share in the opaque inflexibilities of
the old system:
The struggle for personnel, supplies, new instruments, necessary
renovations, and new buildings, as well as the regular experiences
with questionable new [professorial] appointments […] were the main
factors [in the call for more autonomy]. To be fair, the universities
and their governing bodies contributed their share to the ongoing
mismanagement. Both the Ministry and the universities were
characterized by inside favoritism, deceptions, vanity, and snobbery
to the point of arrogant condescension and lusting for power. Yet the
opposite was the case too.66 
Sigurd Höllinger, the long-serving high Ministry official and him-
self one of the key actors on the Minoritenplatz has his own opinion on
the pre-2002 kowtowing university crowd. Soon after his retirement in
the fall 2005, he was first asked in an interview: “You once observed
that your daily fare consisted of griping assistant professors, intriguing
department chairs, and incompetent student representatives.”67 His ans-
wer was stunning:
Much has changed, yet this still goes on. Once something does not
work out well in the new system, then the search begins for support
from the Minoritenplatz. […] It will take time before one knows
where the political critique is going […] It also happens that errant
scholars end up in the Ministry, demanding that the decision of a
chancellor be reversed.68  
The agenda and duties of the Ministry have changed as a result of
the paradigmatic role reversal in the new UG 2002 era, the power shifts
from the center to the periphery of the universities in the provinces, and
the pending necessity for reorganization. When Minister Gehrer was
grilled in Parliament about the consequences of the university reform in
her Ministry, she put it bluntly: “Of course, the [University Law of
2002] had repercussions inside the Ministry. The Ministry will be leaner,
fewer people will work in it, they will engage in and are already being
trained for new tasks.”69 When Gehrer left office in January 2007, the
Ministry’s staff indeed had been cut by some 300 positions.70 Time will
tell whether those staying are properly trained for their multiple new
duties.
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The new university law came into full force on 1 January 2004,
after a transitional period that followed its passing by Parliament in the
summer of 2002. The implementation, at times, was rather turbulent. An
incident at the University of Vienna in early 2004 illustrates the turmoil.
It happened when emotions had been stirred up during the decision-
making process of the controversial new organizational plan for the
university. Students had already disturbed a meeting of the university’s
Senate and occupied a meeting room a week before a panel discussion
was scheduled for the eve of 20 January 2004. The partisan think-tank
SPÖ Zukunfts- und Kulturwerkstätte organized a forum on universities
between decline and world-class status.
The invited panel featured some illustrious speakers, namely Georg
Winckler, the rector of the University of Vienna; Höllinger, the general
secretary of the Science Ministry; Josef Broukal, a former TV anchor
and Socialist higher education spokesman and member of parliament;
and Patrice Fuchs, chairwoman of the Austrian National Union of
Students. Fuchs opened the discussion with her statement. When it was
Höllinger’s turn, the audience started applauding and booing, and
continued to do so for several minutes. Banners were unfurled with
slogans such as “Stop Studying—Begin Comprehending,” “Smash the
Org[anization] Plan,” and  “Winckler is ruining the University.”71
Then a person jumped onto the podium and threw a cake at
Winckler—it was a cream cheese cake. A few moments later another
cake—this time a chocolate cake—flew in Höllinger’s direction.72 The
scene quickly turned into pandemonium, and the forum was suspended.
Chancellor Schüssel denounced the students’ actions as a poor showing
(Armutszeugnis); Minister Gehrer criticized it as an “incredible esca-
lation” (unglaubliche Eskalation).73 Whereas the chairpersons of the
Austrian Student Association Patrice Fuchs and Ralph Schallmainer
refused to take responsibility for the sticky sweet protests, other student
representatives called the pie-tossing “a creative political means of
protest” (kreatives, politisches Mittel des Protests).74
The Universitätsgesetz 2002 has been called the “law of the
century,” a Jahrhundert-Gesetz, yet it has already been amended three
times since its first promulgation. This seems to indicate that not all of
its regulations were written for the long-term. Another revision and fine-
tuning is pending at the time of writing this article.
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The Minister Leaving Through The Back Door:
The Difficult (Re)Introduction of Tuition Fees 
During the 1990s, the numbers of students at Austrian universities
made serving them less manageable. Any Austrian high school graduate
with a “Matura” diploma was entitled to attend any Austrian university
free of charge.75 Yet at the same time that student numbers increased
dramatically, public expenditures for higher education were cut. This
produced major bottlenecks in higher education financing and
challenges for university governance and in over-filled lecture halls that
no politician really wanted to explicitly address.76 The progressive
education reforms of the Kreisky years provided the children of the
baby-boom generation unrivaled access to higher education in Austria.
During the late 1990s, the political class was challenged to address the
transfusion of these high school graduates into the higher education
arena.
The budgetary cuts (Sparpaket) of 1996 induced by the “Maastricht
criteria” mentioned above intensified debates about the financing of
higher education. The students vigorously protested the cutting of social
entitlements. The public discussion began to drift to topics such as alter-
native ways of financing higher education. It also began to address the
alleged privileges of universities, including financial ones. Soon, the
discourse arrived at the introduction of tuition fees. Newspapers
commented critically on the student protest movement against budget
cuts and even only discussing about tuition fees.77 
Some politicians and parts of the university community began to
favor the introduction of tuition fees. Even Social Democrats such as
Helmut Konrad, the rector of the University of Graz, publicly made the
case for tuition fees. He averred that tuition fees would be fairer than a
numerus clausus and also more efficient than budget cuts (namely
additional Sparpakete).78 Elisabeth Gehrer, at that time Minister for
Education and Culture but not responsible for higher education, started
talking in public about the introduction of tuition fees at Austrian
universities. She noted, “I have problems regarding the issue of charging
tuition fees in universities since it might result in a war over basic
beliefs [Glaubenskrieg].” She also stated that for the SPÖ coalition
partner any public debate was verboten, which did not help matters.79
Expert studies by economists Richard Sturn and Gerhard Wohlfahrt on
tuition-free access to universities looked into alternative models of
financing higher education.80 
In the end, though, it was left to the Wende government to initiate
change. The ÖVP/FPÖ coalition agreement of February 2000, entitled
quite tellingly Österreich neu regieren, did not contain a policy goal on
tuition fees. Yet the section on budget policies included a clause on
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“reviewing the targeting and equitable distribution of public spending”
(Überprüfung von öffentlichen Ausgaben auf Treffsicherheit und
Verteilungsgerechtigkeit), which called for a closer look into the ade-
quacy of existing social support schemes.81 Wolfgang Mazal, a Univer-
sity of Vienna professor of labor and social law, was asked to compile
such a study during the summer of 2000. Like the coalition agreement,
Mazal’s report also did not contain recommendations on the introduction
of tuition fees.82 
However, during a mid-fall cabinet strategy session at the Federal
Chancellery four days before a decisive Cabinet meeting, the die was
cast in favor of tuition fees. On the evening of Friday, 15 September
2000, Chancellor Schüssel, Minister of Finance Karl-Heinz Grasser (at
the time still a Ph.D. student in business administration at the University
of Klagenfurt),83 and Martin Bartenstein, the Minister of Economics and
Labor, confronted Elisabeth Gehrer with the concrete plan to introduce
tuition fees for all university students by 2001. The youthful Grasser
played hardball with Gehrer and threatened to reduce Gehrer’s budget
by 2 billion Austrian Schillings unless she agreed on charging tuition
fees. A reluctant Gehrer relented.84 She felt manhandled, though, and
was considering resigning from her post right after that meeting. Her
chief of staff Mahringer talked her out of taking such a step.85 
On 19 September 2000, the Ministerrat took the final decision to
introduce tuition fees in all Austrian public universities.86  This put an
end to one of the most prominent achievements of the early years of
Social Democratic education policy: in 1972 the Kreisky government
had abolished all tuition fees.
The new regulations were presented to the press by Chancellor
Schüssel and Vice Chancellor Riess-Passer who briefed the press in the
Pressefoyer after the cabinet session. Minister Gehrer was not present
during this press conference.87 She had left the Chancellery by way of
the backstairs.88 The same evening, Gehrer went public during the
primetime news program on Austrian Public Television, Zeit im Bild.
She put a brave face on the introduction of tuition fees in explaining the
new policy to the public:
Even when I was minister of state [in Vorarlberg], I was favoring
tuition fees in Fachhochschulen. I also support the partial introduction
of fees for golden agers, long-time students, and those who work on
second and third doctorates. 5,000 [Austrian] Schillings in tuition fees
per semester is a very moderate amount; the socially weak will be
safeguarded by stipends that will be available.89
In a newspaper interview published the next day, Gehrer charac-
terized the sudden introduction of tuition fees as the result of a weekend
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brainstorming session! The partial introduction of fees for only certain
students was not feasible. After all, the principal reason for tuition fees
was to increase the quality of studies. 90 
The public outrage was immediate. Both students and university
administrators reacted with prompt rejection of the announced tuition
fees.91 The Green and SPÖ opposition parties filed urgent motions in
Parliament (Dringliche Anfragen). The ÖVP and FPÖ coalition partners,
in turn, passed a special decision in Parliament (Entschließungsantrag)
defending fees. They promised to increase scholarships and improve ser-
vices offered by the universities. They also decided to install a student
ombudsman with a new agenda of fighting deficiencies, maladministra-
tion, and poor services at universities.92
Students organized a broad range of nationwide protest activities.93
Demonstrations were held in several cities. Sometimes these protests
were actively supported by university chancellors such as Rector
Winckler of the University of Vienna.94 Similar to the public debate
about the University Law 2002, the affected community communicated
extensively via the worldwide web on the issue of tuition fees.95 On the
Minoritenplatz in Vienna, a quite spectacular sit-in action took place in
the Ministry offices. In early October 2000, some students occupied the
office of Director General Höllinger on the second floor of the Palais
Starhemberg for two and one-half hours.96 The government did not bow
to the street protests. Based on the Cabinet’s decision, the Hochschul-
taxengesetz was amended in early 2001 which finally made university
tuition fees public law.
The (re)introduction of tuition fees in Austria produced some
immediate results. For one, the number of enrolled students decreased
from 227,948 (2000/01) to 182,805 (2001/02). Media commentaries had
a heyday with this decline.97 Probably it was the exclusion of the
“Karteileichen” from the official statistics, namely those students who
maintained their enrollment but did not take classes for multiple reasons,
that explained the significant reduction in enrollment.98 This improved
the recording of active students, hence allowing administrators to plan
more efficiently and improve teacher-student ratios. By 2004, enroll-
ment figures were on the rise again. In the long run, it seems, the tuition
fees did not lead to a permanent reduction of student numbers.99
Did the (re)introduction of tuition fees, along with a whole range of
quality and efficiency measures for institutions of higher learning,
enhance the efficiency in public universities? Economists Gudrun Biffl
and Joe Isaac argued affirmatively in a position paper on the impact of
tuition fees. They averred that it would produce more effective teaching
methods and restructure the system towards faster graduation rates.100
The fees, in the most rose-colored assessment, were supposed to im-
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prove overall study conditions in the universities—which only happened
to some extent. Awareness among faculties and students has grown,
however, about their respective responsibilities in the more effective use
of public funds.101
Hans Robert Hansen, the former rector of the Vienna University of
Business Administration, dismissed the introduction of tuition fees as
the “triumph of fiscal over education policies.”102 In addition, educa-
tional scientist Hans Pechar stated that tuition fees represented yet
another (involuntarily) contribution by students to consolidate the
country’s budget like already in the mid 1990s. The universities, though,
would continue to survive. There would not be a state of emergency, but
distrust and cynicism would increase, which were poisoning the climate
in higher education politics already for years, “‘Regieren neu’ eben.”103
A European Court of Justice Decision and
Its Consequences for Austrian Higher Education
The Republic of Austria has a population of some eight million in-
habitants and accommodates approximately 250,000 students within its
higher education system. Germany, Europe’s most populous nation, has
some 83 million inhabitants, among them approximately 1.9 million
students. In the late 1980s, the Austrian Science Ministry began to
initiate new efforts to increase the international mobility of Austrian
university students.104 Yet at the same time, the regulations were
tightened for incoming students wanting to study in Austria.105 This
regulation pursued a hidden agenda, namely the augmentation of student
mobility for linguistic reasons. The goal was to increase student mobility
between countries with different languages, not among countries with
the same language (such as Germany and Austria or France and French-
speaking southern Belgium).
The issue of trans-border access to higher education institutions had
not been raised during the negotiations for Austria’s accession with the
European Commission. A problem began to emerge only when Euro-
pean integration, including free movement of people and students, was
rapidly progressing. The issue of foreign students’ admission entered the
political agenda in the late 1990s, ironically as the result of a case
involving an Austrian citizen who had passed her general qualification
exams in Germany, but was not admitted to a German university
because the major she wanted to pursue was subject to the numerus
clausus. The student could not secure admission to an Austrian uni-
versity either (her second choice). She filed a complaint with the
Austrian Constitutional Court, charging that admission regulations to
Austrian universities were unconstitutional; moreover, that it was a
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breach of European Community law. The High Court rejected the mo-
tion. It determined that it was the legislation’s objective to prohibit a
massive inflow of foreign students (especially German medical students
barred from German medical schools), who wanted to circumvent the
admission restrictions in their home countries. Austrian regulations on
university admission thus passed the domestic constitutional test. The
Constitutional Court, however, did not rule out that European Commu-
nity law may have been violated.106 
In the following months, politicians simply ignored the problem
while university representatives repeatedly warned about a potentially
serious problem on the horizon. In November 1999, while the negotia-
tions to construct a governing coalition were carried out after the im-
portant October elections, the European Commission sent a letter to the
Austrian government. It was the first formal notification about major
shortfalls in Austrian admission standards violating Articles 12, 149, and
150 of the Treaty of Amsterdam.107 
When Elisabeth Gehrer became the new science minister in
February 2000, she entered a contentious arena vis-à-vis European
Union demands of opening admission to Austrian universities to
foreigners. The admission issue had been passed back and forth like a
hot potato between Vienna, Brussels (the seat of the European Com-
mission), and Luxembourg (the headquarters of the European Court of
Justice). At the time, the implementation of the University Act of 2002
was on a tight schedule and represented the highest priority in higher
education innovations. The foreign student access and admission issue
obviously was not. The Science Ministry did not pursue a clear and
proactive strategy, nor did it prepare a “Plan B” for the worst-case
scenario of the European Court forcing the issue of admission of foreign
students.
On 20 January 2005, Judge Francis G. Jacobs, the Court’s Advocate
General, went public with his opinion (Schlussantrag). Jacobs recom-
mended a selective admission standard, including the introduction of
entry exams and admission procedures based on a system similar to a
numerus clausus.108 This decision of the European Court of Justice
fanned the public debate in Austria to a flame. A radio report analyzed
the coming dilemma well. Its title said it all: “The European Court of
Justice’s Decision May Be the End of Open Access to Universities”
(“EuGH-Urteil könnte offenen Hochschulzugang kippen”).109 Georg
Winckler, the chancellor of the University of Vienna and chairman of
the national Austrian Rectors’ Conference at the time, recommended a
Studieneingangsphase, a kind of trial period for university freshmen
during their first two semesters.  Newspapers injected some scare-
mongering headlines into the debate. The Vienna daily Der Standard
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wrote, “The European Court of Justice Wants to Open the Lecture Halls”
(“EuGH-Anwalt will Hörsäle öffnen”). The daily Salzburger Nach-
richten entitled its story “Access to University is Endangered, Students
Will Face High Hurdles” (“Uni-Zugang in Gefahr. Studenten drohen
hohe Hürden”).110 Meanwhile, some rectors were beginning to adopt
Judge Jacobs’ argument that free access to Austrian universities would
have to end. 111  
German students who had been denied access to their own
universities had the biggest stake in the European Court’s ruling. The
German media therefore homed in on the story, too.  The German
weekly news magazine Der Spiegel, always good for caustic headlines,
entitled its story “Alarm over the Piefkes in Vienna: The Germans Ante
Portas” (“Piefke-Alarm: Die Deutschen vor Wien”).112 While the
Spiegel article praised the dismantling of access limitations for
international students at Austrian universities, the advantages of the
same language for German students, and the low tuition fees, Rector
Winckler raised the specter of an influx of as many as 23,000 German
“numerus clausus refugees.” This was the number of rejected applicants
to German medical schools in 2004/05. He warned that other disciplines
regulated by the numerus clausus at German universities might also be
forced to open admission for international (particularly German) stu-
dents in Austria.113 
While this crisis was brewing, officials in Vienna responsible for
dealing with this impending problem of a run on Austrian universities
by German students, still simply watched. Insiders in Austria agreed that
the pending court decision in Luxembourg would produce major pro-
blems, yet nobody seemed to be working on preparing for this scenario
of open access for foreign students. The Vienna conservative daily Die
Presse ridiculed the laggard ministry officials with their appeasing
tactics:
Those responsible in the Education Ministry are playing the waiting
game and are —credibly—claiming that they have not been working
on strategies. They first want to read the fine print in the decision of
the European Court. They are passing the buck to the universities,
along the lines of the motto—once the European Court gives the
green light to foreign students in April or May then it’s time for the
universities to find ways to master the onslaught of students. It will
come in July when the enrollment period begins for the upcoming
semester.114 
In mid-April 2005, Director-General Höllinger at last began to
ponder alternative scenarios in case the European Court followed the
Advocate General’s opinion. He suggested a simple amendment to the
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University Act of 2002 that would enable universities to introduce
special access standards for specified majors during a period of two
years. This amendment would become law before the registration period
began at universities.115 In essence, this signaled the end of free access
for Austrian students to their native universities—yet another dramatic
change in Austrian higher education politics. 
The enrollment period for the 2005/06 fall semester began by sheer
coincidence in early July during the week prior to the announcement of
the European Court’s decision. Consequently, last-minute admission
regulations were established in great haste. The Medical University of
Vienna introduced a “first come-first served” principle, assigning study
slots according to the original application date.116 Prospective medical
students spent an entire night camping out in a park next to the Vienna
Medical University to be first in line for registration when it opened up
the next morning.117 Four-hundred and seventy applicants registered
successfully during the next (that is, the first) day of the official ad-
mission period. 118 
At last, on 7 July 2005, the European Court of Justice in Luxem-
bourg issued its verdict in the case C-147/3. It followed much of the
wording of the Advocate General Jacobs’ opinion issued in January: the
Republic of Austria had failed to comply with the obligations of the
respective articles in the Treaty of Amsterdam. In the afternoon of the
same day, Minister Gehrer announced the amendment to the University
Act of 2002 that Höllinger had been talking about in April. The amend-
ment covered special admission regulations in the fields of medicine,
veterinary medicine, dentistry, biology, psychology, pharmacy, and
business administration. This list corresponded to the list of numerus
clausus restricted majors at the German universities.119 Less than forty-
eight hours after the European Court decision, the ÖVP and their new
coalition partner, the BZÖ, passed this amendment regulating access to
Austrian universities.120  
For the first time since the early 1970s, Austrian universities
introduced selective admissions standards, partly disguised as changes
of curricula. This triggered more critical media coverage and added
further confusion to the situation. Worried students-to-be and their
parents launched protests about the untenable situation. Aggressive
German students—who were applying to the medical universities in
Vienna, Graz, and Innsbruck—along with their lawyers threatened to sue
these universities. They both argued that these measures introduced rank
inequality and injustice into the system.121
Student representatives were stunned. “This is another sad day on
the path to eliminate open and free access to universities,” complained
the Austrian Student Union (Österreichische Hochschülerinnen und -
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hochschülerschaft, or ÖH).122 The media perceived these changes
differently:
The ÖH’s protests […] seem odd. Their “life’s dream” allegedly was
destroyed by ending open access. It seems that the Student Union is
grieving over the demise of nocturnal waiting lines and public
auctions for seminar slots. Select admission will allow all those who
are serious about studying to do this all the same under fair and fine
conditions. The introduction of gateways for improving quality
should be a rational mandate—before the German asylum seekers
arrived and now even more so.123
Reviewing these changes in Austrian higher education in the
summer of 2005 almost four years later, it must be said that the ratio of
Austrian to international students enrolled in the popular majors that
supposedly came under siege by the influx of German students did not
change too much. However, a significant increase occurred in the field
of medical studies. One year after the European Court’s dramatic de-
cision, Austrian medical universities were forced to introduce a quota
system for Austrian students as a result of the enormous interest of
German students in Austrian medical universities.124 In 2005/06, the
Vienna Medical University had 1,500 Austrians and the same number
of German applicants competing for only 1,560 study slots. The Inns-
bruck Medical University had 500 slots to fill from 447 Austrian
applicants and 2,147 German applicants. For the 300 open slots at the
Graz Medical University, 917 Austrians and 1,964 Germans com-
peted.125
It is a fact that some universities had waited for the day when they
would be able to launch selection procedures by introducing entrance
standards and entrance exams. The Salzburger Nachrichten offered a
shrewd obituary in the summer of 2005:
Behind the scenes, official sources will admit that the European Court
decision did not strike Austria with the force of lightening. The
chance to put up access hurdles by way of speedy procedural changes
through the welcomed back door from Europe was gratefully
accepted. What had hitherto been a clandestine good-bye to free
access, now enjoys the force of law […] Rectors have long tried to
unleash a debate about access to universities. Now the European
Court decision allegedly forced both ministers and rectors to
introduce access restrictions at once and without much debate. Free
access to universities became history from one day to the next by way
of sheer fly-by-night activism. This hectic activity was homemade.
The government and the rectors had years to plan for such a European
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Court decision which would be handed down sooner rather than
later.126 
The Brave New World of “Bologna”:
Systemic Challenges and Changes Far Beyond 2010
In June 1999, the northern Italian city of Bologna became the center
of higher education in Europe. Delegates from twenty-nine countries
gathered in Bologna in June 1999 and signed the Joint Declaration of the
European Ministers of Education.127 Its main goal was the development
of the European Higher Education Area (EHEA) by the year 2010. The
Declaration’s six initial focus areas have concentrated on the adaptation
of a system of easily readable and comparable degrees, the adoption of
a common European high education degree structure based on under-
graduate and graduate (BA/MA) degrees, the establishment of the
European Credit Transfer System; the further promotion of student
mobility, European cooperation in quality assurance, and the European
dimension in higher education.128 Austrian Science Minister Caspar
Einem signed the declaration, committing the country to take part in the
implementation of the above-mentioned goals.129 
The “Bologna goals,” as it turned out over the years, have become
yet another catalyst in the planning and execution of ongoing university
reforms in Austria. “Bologna’s” importance as a means to pursue im-
portant goals in higher education policies became clear soon after
Minister Gehrer took office in 2000. During the first “Austrian Bologna
Day” in June 2000 held in Vienna all the Bologna goals were part of the
agenda, among them quality assurance and accreditation, both relatively
new to the Austrian higher education system.130 Barbara Weitgruber, the
high official at the Science Ministry in charge of international relations
of Austrian higher education institutions, emphasized the motivation
needed in universities to implement the necessary reforms of the
“Bologna process.”131 Director General Höllinger was pushing univer-
sities into high drive in pursuit of the reform agenda, noting, “To put it
mildly, the approach to the new possibilities is very cautious. Unless we
have quick success in this transformation process, we will fall back in
our competitiveness.”132 
Ever since the year 2000 and Gehrer’s arrival in the Ministry,
several changes in higher education in Austria have been designed as a
reaction to some of the Bologna goals, such as the reform of doctoral
programs and the introduction of Anglo-American degree titles. But also
“homemade” topics like the multi-year allocation of budgetary funds to
universities based on performance agreements with individual univer-
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sities and the granting of full institutional autonomy in curricular and
organizational matters have been dealt with.133
The systemic changes unleashed by the Bologna goals in the higher
education arena have been massive in most countries. Needless to say,
the Bologna goals also garnered considerable criticism and opposition.
One of the most prominent Bologna critics in Austria is the Viennese
philosopher Konrad Paul Liessmann. He has criticized vociferously the
ideas behind these reforms and the way they have been carried out.134
Student representatives have also castigated the Bologna goals as well
as their hasty implementation, as is documented in the Black Book of the
Bologna Process published by the European Student Union.135 
In the field of quality assurance—one of the chief elements of the
Bologna process—two sectors of higher education in Austria are ahead
of public universities, the Fachhochschulen and the private univer-
sities.136 Private universities are a new phenomenon in Austria’s higher
education system. They had to run through accreditation from the very
beginning. Moreover, unlike public universities, they are evaluated and
re-accredited by the Austrian Accreditation Council on a regular basis.
For the periodic evaluation and accreditation of Fachhochschulen, the
Fachhochschulrat was established as early as 1993. Unlike public
universities, both these institutions choose their students via selection
procedures, entrance exams, and personal interviews. Unlike public uni-
versities, they limit their openings every academic year and also issue
individual student contracts.
The education ministers have gathered biannually for Bologna
follow-up meetings since 1999. One outcome of the meeting in London
in 2007 was that evaluation and accreditation mechanisms should be
introduced for all sectors of higher education, also in Austria, and hence
also for public universities. Yet Austria seems to be taking its time in
this area.137 Indeed, immediately before the completion of the European
Higher Education Area by 2010, future challenges in Austrian higher
education remain in terms of the full implementation of these mecha-
nisms, especially in the field of Standards and Guidelines for Quality
Assurance.138
Within the higher education community in Austria today, public
universities are still the most important providers of post-secondary
education. They are now full legal entities in their own right with the
highest degree of independence possible. Public universities now have
complete responsibility and liability for implementing the Bologna
goals.139 Still, the Science Ministry has the right and obligation to
supervise the universities under the Universities Act 2002, including the
monitoring of full compliance with Austrian law.140 The basis for
cooperation between the government and the public universities is new
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mechanisms of “performance agreements,” which also represent the
universities’ medium-range strategic plans. The first set of these perfor-
mance agreements for the years 2007 to 2009 were signed in early 2007
and have been published via the worldwide web.141 The next set is
concluded in late 2009 for the years 2010 to 2012. Critics have strongly
denounced this new tool as a “sham” and a “carte blanche” for business
as usual.142
A reality check on the new autonomy of universities after almost
three years of practice reveals some deficiencies. An illustrative
example of a prevailing mentality of “as-you-like-it” remains the issue
of waiting lists. Although access regulations have been set up, more
students still populate some disciplines than stated openings would
accommodate. Students are carried along in this system because they
fulfill all the requirements for continuing their studies but are unable to
do so due to the lack of university resources.
Cases from two medical universities were first brought to the
attention of the Student Ombudsman and the National Ombudsman in
2005/06. The government authorities were then forced to deal with such
problems of available slots in required classes repeatedly prior to the
introduction of performance agreements in 2007 as well as after such
agreements had been signed.143 Public critiques were issued and re-
commendations made.144 The University Act 2002 clearly mandates that
public universities prevent the unnecessary prolongation of studies as a
result of limited course openings. Public universities are mandated to
offer extra courses to accommodate all students admitted, if necessary
even during semester breaks.145 The universities ignored the Ombuds-
man’s reprimands and got away with it. In the fall 2008 semester, there
were still cases of inadequate student access to required classes.146
During 2008, the Auditor General (Rechnungshof) investigated the
Science Ministry’s required monitoring of the performance of Austrian
universities. It strongly urged the establishment of an overall national
strategy for public universities. At the same time, the Auditors General
demanded student numbers to be included in the “performance
agreements” as planning indicators for future projections of the instruc-
tors needed and courses to be offered.147 This, in turn, will lead to yet a
final paradigm shift in Austria’s higher education arena, namely access
limitations and standards for all majors offered in public universities.148
Conclusion
The comparative analysis Two Decades of Reform in Higher
Education published in 1990 defined the main reform agenda in Europe
for the last decade of the second millennium: management, finance and
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control, financial aid to students, curriculum and teaching, access and
internationalization.149 When reviewing the seven years of Schüssel/
Gehrer Wende policies in Austria’s higher education system, several of
these priorities were addressed proactively, others still are in need of
being addressed, and some remain out of reach. The coincidental
(re)introduction of tuition fees was one of the agenda items tackled and
so was the granting of full autonomy to universities—a long-term goal
that had already been initiated in the early 1990s. The prying open of
access and admission to Austrian universities for international students
was bound to happen anyway.  It came as a result of massive outside
pressure from the European institutions. The nagging issue of over-
crowded lecture halls and restricted access to seminars in some dis-
ciplines at public universities did not go away. 
Analyzing the details of higher education policies raises bigger
issues about Austria’s politics that cannot be answered here. What is the
importance of higher education policy in a society’s social progress? Do
politicians and political parties muster sufficient depth and profile to
shape policies in such crucial areas of public life that define a nation’s
mental maps and core values? Are they capable of and do they have the
courage to recruit the right people at the right time for the right leader-
ship positions? How big is the room to maneuver anyway for a politician
such as Elisabeth Gehrer—blessed with the expertise of many
advisers—over a period of (only?) some seven years?
Higher education policies, as in any policy field, are subject not
only to the political marketplace but also to populist temptations. The
shelf-life of political decisions, laws, and administrative measures can
be very short, though. Tuition fees, one of the cornerstones of the Wende
higher education policy, were mandated in 2001, but abolished only
seven years later. A spur of the moment “coalition” of Social Demo-
cratic, Green, and FPÖ members of parliament voted for the abolition of
tuition fees three days before the general elections scheduled for the fall
of 2008. The conservative ÖVP, along with their erstwhile coalition
partner the BZÖ voted against it. On 24 September 2008, the plenary
assembly of the Austrian Parliament thus became the stage ultimately
for a rebellion against the legacies of the ÖVP/FPÖ-BZÖ era (2000-
2007). Since the Gusenbauer/Molterer grand coalition in early 2007 had
only partially revoked tuition fees, the (now campaigning) SPÖ in a pro
tempore coalition with the Greens and FPÖ thus took revenge on its own
—outgoing—leaders.
Have the Wende reforms really been carried out under the mere
pretext of neoliberalism?150 Have all the described reforms increased the
Studierfähigkeit (“studyability,” a term created in the course of the
Bologna process) for students at higher education institutions and
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furthered the Beschäftigungsfähigkeit (or “employability,” a term first
used in this context during the British EU Presidency in 1998) of
graduates? If nothing else, these reforms at least have given us these
impressive “new speak” expressions. What can we expect next in the
higher education arena in the next decade? Answers to these questions
can only be offered by the individuals studying and working at the
institutions themselves and by society at large.
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Legacies of the Schüssel Years
Anton Pelinka
Introduction
Wolfgang Schüssel has been a visible actor in Austrian politics for
decades. In the following analysis, the term “Schüssel years” will be
used for the years 2000 to 2006 only—a period that can be rightfully
called the “Schüssel era.” 
Schüssel had been no newcomer to the Austrian government when
he was appointed federal chancellor in February 2000, and he did not
leave politics after the appointment of his successor, Alfred Gusenbauer,
in January 2007. Schüssel had started his career as secretary of the
Austrian People’s Party (Österreichische Volkspartei, or ÖVP) caucus
in parliament and secretary general of the ÖVP’s Business League
(Österreichischer Wirtschaftsbund). A member of parliament, beginning
in 1979, he became minister of economic affairs in the coalition of the
ÖVP and the Social Democratic Party of Austria (Sozialdemokratische
Partei Österreichs, or SPÖ), shaped by Franz Vranitzky and Alois
Mock, and then—beginning in 1995—ÖVP chairman, vice-chancellor,
and minister of foreign affairs. In the period between January 2007 and
September 2008, when the ÖVP was the junior partner in the coalition
cabinet led by the SPÖ, Schüssel was—as a member of parliament—the
ÖVP’s floor leader in the National Council. But the years during which
his name and his personality made such a decisive impact on Austrian
politics were his years as chancellor in the ÖVP-FPÖ (and, from 2005
to 2006, Alliance for the Future of Austria—Bündnis Zukunft Öster-
reich, or BZÖ) coalition government. This is the period which—for
good reasons—can be called the Schüssel Era. 
The summary of the almost six years during which Schüssel was the
head of the government can be divided into two arenas: politics and
policies. The basic argument of this article is that the era’s significant
impact has been in politics. 
Regarding policies, the overall conclusion is that the Schüssel era
was characterized by “more of the same.” The general trend towards
“Westernization,” which has dominated Austrian politics at least from
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the 1980s onward, was also followed between 2000 and 2006. It can be
argued that the Schüssel government functioned as a catalyst—
implementing certain policies within the logic of “Westernization” faster
than it would have happened otherwise, but it cannot be argued that the
Schüssel years reversed the general trend Austria had been following for
decades. The Schüssel era did not contradict the years when Vranitzky—
in cooperation with ÖVP ministers like Alois Mock, Erhard Busek, and
Wolfgang Schüssel himself—stood for a clear Austrian response to the
end of the East-West conflict. If there is no (ideological, military,
economic) East, if there is no bloc confrontation any more, Austria’s
position cannot be defined by a “third” way like permanent neutrality or
“mixed economy.” Austria’s position is defined by the general trends
(Western) European societies follow.
Regarding politics, the Schüssel years were characterized by
dramatic upheavals. The rise of the FPÖ to a coalition partner of equal
footing in 2000, the FPÖ’s deep fall in 2002, and the party’s split in
2005 are one aspect of a fast process of electoral de- and realignment.
The victory the ÖVP enjoyed in 2002 was followed by a rather deep
decline in 2006. The SPÖ’s ability to conquer the ÖVP’s traditional
strongholds in some of the Austrian states (Länder), followed by re-
conquering the (electoral) number one position and the office of the
chancellor in the reestablished Grand Coalition dominated the years
2004 to 2006. The overall decline of political participation (expressed
by electoral turnout and party membership) and party concentration
(defined by the long-term electoral weakening of both major parties) has
to be included in any kind of summary. The deep crisis organized labor
experienced in 2006 when the Austrian Trade Union Federation (ÖGB)
almost went bankrupt due to business practices of the ÖGB owned bank
are the main indicators of an extremely volatile situation.    
The overall trend that the Schüssel years did not start, but on some
levels accelerated or slowed down, can be best described by the term
“Westernization.” Beginning with the end of the 1970s, but especially
in the early 1980s, Austrian policies and politics became increasingly
similar to those in other Western European political systems. Austria
began to lose—for better or worse—some of its special characteristics.
The “Westernization” or “de-Austrification” of Austrian politics
started earlier than the “Westernization” of Austrian policies. The end
of the first Grand Coalition was followed by the period of one-party
governments—four years of the ÖVP and thirteen years of the SPÖ. This
in itself could be seen as a decline of the political culture so typical of
post-1945 Austria when inter-party arrangements between the ÖVP and
SPÖ as well as intra-party arrangements in both major parties reduced
the impact of political competition and when the corporatist network
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between business, labor, and agriculture—known as Social Partner-
ship—limited the consequences of economic competition.1 But the one
party governments under Josef Klaus (ÖVP) and Bruno Kreisky (SPÖ)
were built on an extremely solid basis characterized by
• a highly concentrated party system in which more than 90 percent
of the voters preferred either the ÖVP or the SPÖ, a concentration
almost unheard of in a multi-party system with proportional repre-
sentation;
• a very high electoral turnout, such that more than 90 percent of
Austrian voters went regularly to the polls, a turnout being one of
the highest marks among pluralistic democracies; and
• an extremely high organizational density of the party system,
evidenced by the fact that both major parties had about 25 to 30
percent of their voters organized as party members.
All these indicators started to decline in the 1980s. At the end of the
Schüssel years, this process seemed to be accelerating even faster than
before.    
Regarding policies, this acceleration is exemplified in Austria’s
typical pattern of corporatist intervention in the economy, in combina-
tion with partial state ownership in major industries and in major
banks—a rather unique for a system which principally has been based
on a market economy. It is further exemplified in Austria’s declaration
of permanent neutrality in 1955, followed by a rather specific policy of
neutrality, and by Austria’s tradition of an extremely high degree of
“statism,” of direct government control in higher education. 
The most important consequences of Austria’s neutrality had been
Austria’s abstention from joining the European Communities (based on
the Rome Treaties 1957) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO). The first aspect has been already revised in the 1980s, when
Austria—represented by a Grand Coalition—applied for European
Union (EU) membership in 1989. But even the economic and social
policies had been changed during the 1980s: It had been under the Grand
Coalition led by an SPÖ chancellor and an SPÖ minister of finance
when Austria started to privatize almost all its nationalized industries
and all its nationalized banks. Moreover, Austria’s tightly governmen-
tally controlled universities had already been given significantly more
autonomy in the 1990s.  
When the Schüssel era began, Austria’s policies as well as politics
were not in a paralyzed state. Of course, it can be argued that “Westerni-
zation,” especially of Austrian policies, slowed down after EU member-
ship had been achieved. It can be argued that the Grand Coalition had
accomplished its mission when Austria had joined the European Union
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in 1995, the (partly) supranational “club” of almost all Western (and
very soon of almost all Eastern) European states. By fulfilling this
mission, the Grand Coalition had lost its major function. The beginning
of the Schüssel years can be seen as the attempt to Westernize Austria
even more and even more quickly due to the now Westminster-style
situation of a major party in the role of parliamentary opposition.     
Westernization in Policies
The Westernization process occurring in the field of policies can be
demonstrated in three major areas: economic policy, foreign policy, and
policy of higher education. In the field of the economy, “Westerni-
zation” implied a tendency to strengthen market orientation and to play
down state intervention and corporatism—the two major characteristics
of “Austro-Keynesianism” so typical of Austria until the 1980s. In the
field of foreign policy, “Westernization” meant stressing the need to act
within the framework of the European Union. In education, “Westerni-
zation” meant a retreat from direct governmental influence. In all these
areas, the Schüssel government did not reinvent an orientation, but
continued policies defined especially during the first years of the Grand
Coalition governments, beginning with 1987.
This aspect has been overshadowed by two phenomena: the
conflicts between the government and the opposition and the crisis
between Austria and its EU partners in 2000. The latter phenomenon
contradicted the “Westernization” agenda that at least Schüssel’s ÖVP
had been following for a long time.
The economic and social policies the Schüssel government imple-
mented had been the reason for the opposition from the left—especially
from the SPÖ and the ÖGB—to accuse the government of “social
coldness,” an argument which would have had less weight if social
democratic politicians would have still been responsible for this overall
trend as had been the case prior to 2000. The same must be said about
the tendency to strengthen “law and order”—a tendency criticized by
human rights activists—and about the government’s intention to make
it more difficult for refugees and migrants to get legal status or
citizenship. These tendencies had emerged before 2000—and some of
the decisions had been backed by the Social Democratic opposition after
2000. Most importantly, all these tendencies had been part of a broader,
ongoing European trend.2 To criticize the Schüssel government for being
responsible for increasing inequality and for emphasizing “law and
order” is one thing, for during the years the ÖVP-FPÖ coalition was in
power, the gap between the rich and the poor became deeper and
“security” became a dominant issue. But one cannot overlook the fact
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that these tendencies began years earlier, in some cases at the beginning
of the 1980s, at the end of the Kreisky era.
It can be said that the Schüssel government did not succeed in
reversing a trend which had started before—and which has been (and
still is) a trend with which practically all highly industrialized demo-
cracies in Europe and North America have to contend. It would be
difficult or even impossible to single out the Schüssel years for being
particularly hard-hearted regarding and especially responsible for the
deepening social gap and closing Austria’s borders to more and more
refugees and migrants. 
Perhaps the most significant change in government policies could
be seen in the Schüssel government’s agenda regarding gender relations.
The FPÖ particularly emphasized the role of mothers in society,
discussing this issue more than had been the case in terms of
government policy on this issue. The government’s decision to pay
“Kindergeld” (children money)—a very popular slogan in the FPÖ elec-
toral campaign 1999—had to be seen as a change of focus: gender
equality became less important, incentives for motherhood more.3
About the increase in social (especially income) inequality, it is at
least dubious to see the government’s intentions as being responsible for
this situation. But regarding the trend to privatize what had been left of
the state-run economy, the Schüssel government clearly had the
intention to go ahead and—embracing “Westernization” once more—
reduce the state influence by reducing state property rights. This policy
orientation may be criticized for being too fast for giving away the
republic’s “family silver” for too cheap a price. Because the trend to
privatize state industries and state banks had been started more than a
decade earlier, the Schüssel years can be seen a period in which a policy
of the previous years’ administrations had been accelerated.   
When Schüssel became chancellor, the debate about the meaning of
Austria’s neutrality within the European Union had been going on for
years. It was Schüssel’s party which, within the Grand Coalition, had
openly discussed the possibility for officially ending Austria’s neutral
status by joining NATO. In 2001, the Schüssel government—without
changing the Neutrality Act of 1995—declared Austria non-aligned
(bündnisfrei), a status less formal than neutrality.4 But despite this
rhetoric, the ÖVP-FPÖ government never tried to make the next
step—opting for NATO membership and, by doing so, abandoning
neutrality legally. When Schüssel left office, the rather ambivalent status
of a neutral country participating in the EU’s “Common Foreign and
Security Policy” had not changed.
The European and foreign policy of the Schüssel years was over-
shadowed by the bilateral diplomatic boycott the governments of the
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fourteen other EU member states (EU14) declared in February 2000 and
lifted in September of that year. For that very reason, Schüssel’s overall
Western orientation became blurred and almost invisible for the do-
mestic as well as Western (especially European and American)
audience. The reasons for the EU14 to declare such a boycott had been
the character or the “nature” of Schüssel’s ally, the FPÖ. The EU14
wanted to send a strong signal that in the European Union not everyone
is welcome as partner.5
This may be a rather paradoxical, even tragic aspect for any kind of
summary regarding the Schüssel years: a government whose main
foreign policy actors (chancellor and foreign minister) had designed a
European policy to become more and more “streamlined” within the
European Union became the symbol of violating “European values.” A
government most eager—concerning its ÖVP leadership which was
responsible for foreign and European policy—to demonstrate the self-
evidence of Austria’s status as an average Western European country
actively participating in the EU’s deepening and widening, became seen
as the stumbling stone of the EU’s ambitious program. The Schüssel
years, which—according to Schüssel himself and his foreign ministers
Benita Ferrero-Waldner and Ursula Plassnik as well as to the govern-
ment’s program and the ÖVP’s party platform—should have become a
period of embedding Austria more decisively into the European Union,
made Austria a suspicious case within Europe. 
Of course, this effect has been neither Schüssel’s nor his party’s
intention, nor did it happen without the co-responsibility of other actors,
like the SPÖ-opposition and organized labor. When in 2004 Austria had
to decide whether and to what extent it should use the transition period
to bloc the opening of the Austrian labor market for citizens of the
newly accepted EU member states, Austria opted for the least possible
opening—for a seven year period. Moreover, the pressure of the ÖVP’s
coalition partner as well as the short-term interest of organized labor
(ÖGB and Chamber of Labor) made the Austrian labor market less open
than the ÖVP, Schüssel himself, and Austrian business interests would
have liked. 
There had even been a debate about whether Austria should veto the
EU enlargement of 2004, especially regarding the Czech Republic’s
access to the Union. This debate was the result of pressure by the FPÖ
and by some environmentalist groups. Thanks to Schüssel’s ÖVP, this
debate did not have any other result but the loss of Austria’s image as
the frontrunner in all matters regarding EU enlargement. The conse-
quence: Austria is considered a “hesitating candidate for [a] leadership
role in Central Europe.”6 Despite the strong performance of the Austrian
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economy in the new EU member states, Austria is seen underperforming
politically.
The result of all these mixed messages Austria sent to its European
partners is that Austria was on the brink of losing its position as one of
the most reliable members in the European Union. When at the end of
the Gusenbauer-Molterer coalition in June 2008 the SPÖ left the
consensus the two major parties had demonstrated in all EU matters
even during the Schüssel years, the message became even more da-
maging: Austria can no longer be considered the vanguard of European
integration. Austria has lost this particular position, and when it
comes—as a result of the non-ratification of the Constitutional Treaty
and potentially of the Reform Treaty—to the development of a “core
Europe” consisting of members states interested in going ahead with the
deepening of the integration, there is not much left of the possibility that
Austria would be part of that core group.
In the field of educational policies, an argument could be made that
the Schüssel government by deciding to introduce tuition for Austrian
students at Austrian universities had changed direction. This policy was
met with strong opposition from the SPÖ and the Greens as well from
the students’ representatives. The promise to reverse this decision had
been a key plank of the SPÖ’s electoral campaign in 2006—a promise
the SPÖ was unable to fulfill due to the coalition with the ÖVP that was
agreed upon in 2007. But what could be seen as a rather significant step
away from a policy designed to guarantee social openness for all
Austrians is of lesser significance when two factors are taken into
account. First, in the 1990s the Grand Coalition led by Vranitzky and
Busek introduced the system of polytechnics (Fachhochschulen) inten-
ded to offer a new option for post-secondary education. The polytech-
nics, competing with the universities for the same clientele, were asking
for tuition from the very beginning. The start of a tuition-based, public
post-secondary education system was not the result of the Schüssel
years, but of the Grand Coalition of the 1990s. Second, the basic
argument against the university tuition has been social openness. The
argument that tuition would make it more difficult for students coming
from low income families to enter universities is basically true. But as
any study about the social stratification of Austrian academics and
students demonstrates, the Austrian educational system is socially un-
just: the percentage of students from low income families is very low,
and the percentage of students coming from families with an academic
background very high. The Schüssel years did not improve this
situation—but the addition of university tuition did not deteriorate this
situation either.
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Because tuition-based public university systems have been the rule
in Western democracies for a long time, the introduction of university
tuitions can be called part of the Westernization process, but once more,
this particular step has been started already before Schüssel became
chancellor. The Schüssel policies—legitimized by the governing majori-
ty of the ÖVP and FPÖ, implemented by ÖVP Minister Elisabeth
Gehrer—has accelerated a process which has started much earlier.  
This trend toward Westernization in education can also be seen in
the University Act (UG), passed in 2002 and implemented in 2004. The
public universities, traditionally seen—following their history as
institutions controlled for centuries by the Emperor and the Catholic
Church—as state institutions, were transformed in highly autonomous
institutions of post-secondary learning. Now, the government provides
the universities with general rules and a budget which is the result of
formal agreements between each university and the government. Any
other strategic and operative decision (for example, which studies will
be offered where and who will be appointed to which position) is within
the autonomy of the university, especially of the rector.7 This develop-
ment gives the Austrian public universities a status very much like the
status of U.S. public universities, with one significant exception: the
Austrian universities still have to live with an open access to principally
all the studies—meaning that the universities have no control over the
number of their students. Nevertheless, the University Act of 2002 can
be seen as an important step in the direction of Westernization.
But again, this policy change did not start with the Schüssel era in
2000. In the 1990s, the Grand Coalition had begun to move the Austrian
universities towards more autonomy—through steps like the University
Organization Act (UOG) of 1993. The Grand Coalition of the 1990s also
emphasized the concept of inter-university competition by permitting
the establishment of private universities. These trends—more autonomy,
more competition—can be rightfully put into the category “Westerni-
zation.” But this process is not the special effect of the Schüssel years.
The Schüssel government proceeded down the same path its predecessor
had followed—perhaps a little bit more decisively and faster, but not
differently at all.   
What the Schüssel years are responsible for is coming to terms with
some aspects of the Nazi past. To demonstrate that the inclusion of the
FPÖ in the government did not mean any special favor for the heirs of
Austrian Nazism, the Schüssel government tried to finish deals with
representatives of Nazi victims. The two major topics were returning
looted Jewish property and paying for slave labor.8
Two aspects help to evaluate this policy of belated justice:
Schüssel’s and his government’s interest in softening Western criticism
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concerning the FPÖ’s access to the government and—once more—the
fact that this kind of policy had already started more than one decade
earlier, when the Austrian government began to re-define the Austrian
position regarding the Nazi past from “being Hitler’s first victim” to
Austria’s “co-responsibility” for Nazism. It has been the last Grand
Coalition before 2000—Viktor Klima for the SPÖ and Wolfgang
Schüssel for the ÖVP—which established the historical commission
responsible for the ground work leading to the consensus with the
victims after 2000.9
Westernization in Politics
The Schüssel years had a significant impact on Austrian politics.
The most visible aspect is that the FPÖ, for the first time since Jörg
Haider became party chairman in 1986, succeeded in breaking out of its
isolation on the federal level. Of course, it can be argued that it had been
the SPÖ which—by accepting the pre-Haider FPÖ as a coalition partner
in 1983—had started this process of upgrading the FPÖ to a fully
accepted partner for both major parties. The FPÖ of 1983 could be seen
as even more forbidding than the FPÖ of 2000 because the influence of
the old Nazi leaders—like Friedrich Peter, an officer in the SS—had
been much more visible in 1983 than seventeen years later. But Peter
and his group tried to mainstream the FPÖ, making it a centrist party,
accepted as liberal by major European liberals like the German Free
Democratic Party (Freie Demokratische Partei, or FDP), the Dutch
People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid
en Democratie, or VVD), or the British Liberals. Haider reversed that
strategy of mainstreaming. He had played the right-wing populist card
successfully, making an old right-wing middle class party a catch-all
party with increasing proletarian profile, by using anti-European and
xenophobic rhetoric. When Haider became chairman, the SPÖ imme-
diately cancelled its coalition with the FPÖ and tried to isolate the old-
new FPÖ in a kind of “cordon sanitaire.”
Schüssel broke with this policy of isolating the FPÖ after this party
had risen to the size of 27 percent of the votes in 1999. In that respect,
Schüssel had crushed the SPÖ’s (and especially Vranitzky’s) attempt to
define the FPÖ as a party with which no other party dares to be asso-
ciated. It remains to be seen whether the post-Haider FPÖ under Hans
Christian Strache who is trying to repeat Haider’s recipe of the 1980s
and 1990s can be kept isolated as was the case after the 2006 elections—
or whether Schüssel’s breaking of the taboo will find imitators, either in
the SPÖ or in the ÖVP.
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The question of whether a party like the FPÖ should be accepted as
a legitimate coalition partner has a European dimension. Because the
FPÖ is linked to extreme right-wing parties, all of which are mavericks
within the European party system, any kind of integration of the FPÖ in
the inner circle of potential governing parties would contradict the
Westernization paradigm. Almost all the European parties view a
coalition with the FPÖ similarly negatively. Only the case of Slovakia
provides a certain parallel, when—after the elections of 2005—the
(socialist) SMER (“Direction”) established a coalition with two right-
wing parties with a nationalistic and xenophobic outlook, making these
two as isolated on the European level as the FPÖ. In Western Europe, no
other right-wing party has been able to gain acceptance as a coalition
partner—neither the French Front National nor the Belgian Vlaams
Belang, two parties with which the FPÖ tries to cooperate on the
European level. The Danish People’s Party—a right-wing populist party,
but without the FPÖ’s Nazi background—backs a conservative minority
cabinet without joining the government directly. Other parties, some-
times seen in a connection with the FPÖ like Italy’s Forza Italia, had
been accepted and integrated into the system of European party families
which is expressed by the party groups in the European Parliament: the
Forza Italia is a member of the European People’s Party.10
The ability of the FPÖ to mobilize more than a quarter of the
electorate by using a xenophobic, anti-European message had not
changed during the Schüssel years. Because the FPÖ seems to have
learned a lesson from its deep fall in 2002, the party will probably not
easily fall into the trap of becoming junior partner of a coalition in
which the necessary pragmatism will destroy its populist appeal. The
FPÖ is the most important factor in Austrian politics contradicting the
overall trend towards Westernization.11
One lesson from the Schüssel years is the reduced role of the federal
president when it comes to forming a cabinet after the election of the
National Council. In 1999/2000, Thomas Klestil had made it clear that
he would very much prefer the revival of the Grand Coalition. He tried
to prevent the ÖVP-FPÖ coalition. It had been the first time that the
president asked the leader of the strongest party in parliament—Viktor
Klima from the SPÖ—to form a government, but had to give in finally
and appoint a chancellor (Schüssel) who never had a presidential
mandate. 
After the parliamentary election of 2002, Klestil again openly pre-
ferred a Grand Coalition, but in the end he accepted the prolongation of
the ÖVP-FPÖ alliance, this time even with the presidential mandate for
Schüssel. Heinz Fischer, elected in 2004, tried to be as careful as
possible when it came to forming a government after the 2006 election
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of the National Council. Before the Schüssel years, all the federal
presidents had followed an unwritten script of charging the leader of the
strongest party in parliament with forming a government and accepting
any cabinet proposal the newly-appointed chancellor put forward.
Klestil, in 1999/2000, had tried to rewrite this script by claiming a much
more active role for the presidency. He could do it with reference to the
constitution. But he failed in his attempt because—due to the necessity
that the cabinet has to have at least the toleration by the National Coun-
cil’s majority—Klestil finally had to accept that the will of a parliamen-
tary majority is stronger than the will of the president. The lesson has
been that the Austrian political system is a parliamentary one. Its
presidential elements are of only secondary importance.12
The Schüssel years changed the implications of Austrian federalism.
For decades, the ÖVP had been seen as the party defending state
rights—and the SPÖ had been the party tempted to reduce the states’
power in favor of more power at the federal level. When Schüssel took
office in 2000, six out of nine states (Länder) had ÖVP governors
(Landeshauptleute). All these six states had been under the control of an
ÖVP governor in the decades since 1945. When Schüssel left office at
the beginning of 2009, the ÖVP had lost control of two of these states.
As a result of decisive ÖVP losses in regional elections, Salzburg and
Styria—always governed by ÖVP (previously Christian Social) gover-
nors—had SPÖ governors. In 2008, the SPÖ controlled Vienna, Burgen-
land, Salzburg, and Styria, and the ÖVP had kept control in Lower
Austria, Upper Austria, Tyrol, and Vorarlberg. Carinthia has stayed in
the realm of the BZÖ (formerly the FPÖ).13
Federalism has become a mixed argument with mixed consequen-
ces. An old pattern had seen ÖVP governors openly opposing their
central party leadership. As a result of changes in the Schüssel years,
SPÖ governors started to oppose the SPÖ leadership and the SPÖ chan-
cellor. Strengthening a party’s state level does not necessarily strengthen
the party as a whole. The SPÖ governors—like their ÖVP counterparts
who are first and foremost interested in winning their state elections—
are tempted to distance themselves from “Vienna,” meaning not the state
and the city, but the federal government and their own central party
leadership. What had been almost exclusively an ÖVP problem has
become a significant SPÖ problem also.
At the end of the Schüssel years, Austrian politics had become
significantly different. It was defined by an extremely volatile party
system with an extremely unpredictable voting behavior and by a
dramatic retreat of the voters from organized loyalties like party
membership. Had the 2002 election seemed to reverse this trend by
strengthening the two major parties at the cost of the FPÖ, the 2006 as
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well as the 2008 elections made clear that 2002 was just an exception in
an ongoing trend of decline that both the SPÖ and ÖVP have to face.
This has been accompanied by a significant decline in electoral turnout.
Table 1
Voting Behavior from 1975 Onward, in Percentage14
National Council Elections
Year Votes for Parties Electoral
Turnout
























































1.2         
1.1         
0.9         
0.8         
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*In 1983, two different green parties had presented candidates; **Liberal Forum (LIF)
6.0; ***LIF 5.5; ****LIF 3.7; *****BZÖ 4.1; ******BZÖ 10.7
Source: Official data from the Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior.
Comparatively speaking, the concentration of the party system,
reflecting the dominance the SPÖ and ÖVP enjoyed until the beginning
of the 1990s, had been extraordinary. Considering the effects of propor-
tional representation, an electoral system usually responsible for de-
concentration by indirectly favoring smaller parties, the indicators of the
Austrian party system until the 1980s can be called unique. The decline
of the two major parties must be seen as an Austrian adaptation to
average (Western) European standards, another proof of the ongoing
“Westernization” and “de-Austrification” of the Alpine nation. 
This can be underscored by an evaluation of party density. Austrian
voters, who until the 1980s had been highly (even extremely) willing to
be organized by the major parties in the form of (“card carrying”)
membership, started to leave the parties. SPÖ and ÖVP membership
declined sharply. This could be explained as a parallel phenomenon of
the two parties’ declining capacity to mobilize voters. But because the
winners of the de-concentration process—the FPÖ and the Greens—
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never reached any kind of organizational density comparable to that of
the SPÖ and the ÖVP, it must be argued that the losers of the overall
trend are all parties as such—and not just the SPÖ and ÖVP.
In 1979, the SPÖ claimed to have 720,000 members. In 2005, this
number had fallen by more than 50 percent to 350,000. The ÖVP
membership cannot be easily compared, for the ÖVP does not have a
uniform concept of direct party membership. Instead, it counts member-
ship by the different sub-parties (Teilorganisationen oder Bünde)
separately. But it can be assumed that the decline of the ÖVP’s organi-
zational strength is not so different from the SPÖ’s. Significantly, the
FPÖ in its years of dramatic electoral victories has never risen beyond
50,000 members—and the Greens, claiming to have a principally diffe-
rent understanding of organizing grassroots support, are claiming less
than 5,000 members.15
The Second Republic, defined by a political culture of a highly con-
centrated party system and the dominance of densely organized political
parties, has lost its major characteristics. But this has not been the
specific result of the Schüssel years. Despite some moments of a short-
term reversal of the general trend—like the outcome of the 2002 general
elections, the Schüssel years cannot be seen as having an ongoing
impact on the Austrian party system.
One process the Schüssel government started could be addressed by
the post-Schüssel government. The process started by the Schüssel
government was that of constitutional reform. After the 2002 election,
the Schüssel government—as well as the opposition plus the nine states,
the social partners, representatives of religious denominations, and other
groups—had been assembled as a “Constitutional Convention” (Verfas-
sungskonvent) to discuss and promote a new federal constitution for
Austria. Following the examples of Switzerland and the European
Union, the plan was to redefine the relationship between the union
(Bund) and the nine states (Länder), to re-edit (and reform) basic rights
and to make the constitution more coherent and understandable by
reducing the numerous special constitutional norms. The Constitutional
Convention did not succeed because too many veto players guaranteed
this non-result. This is a process which could be restarted rather easily
in a new administration.16
A post-Schüssel government could also focus on the issues of
proportional representation in a constitutional revision process. After the
2006 elections, a debate started about the possibility of changing the
special constitutional provision guaranteeing the rules of proportional
representation for the National Council as well as for the State Diets
(Landtage) and local parliaments (Gemeinderäte). The rationale behind
this discourse is to improve the chances of clear majorities in parliament
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and to escape the need to form coalitions between unwilling partners. If
such a proposal—which could be discussed more fully after the 2008
elections—were to be implemented, this would strongly favor the SPÖ
and ÖVP and strongly disfavor all the other parties, especially the FPÖ
and the Greens. Just as at the end of the Schüssel years, the difficulty of
finding clear as well as stable majorities in the National Council has not
been reduced compared with 1999, and this topic will not disappear fro
Austria’s political agenda.17
Remaining Austrian Peculiarities
Had Schüssel left Austrian politics after his electoral success in
2002, perhaps the most significant of his legacies would have been the
downfall of Jörg Haider and the FPÖ. Schüssel could have claimed
that—intentionally or not—the power-sharing arrangement with Haider
had been the reason for the FPÖ’s demise. Schüssel, the St. George of
Austrian politics, could have been seen as the knight successfully killing
the dragon. The FPÖ, for many reasons a burden for Austria’s interna-
tional reputation and credibility within Europe, had been crushed,
evidenced by its decline from 27 percent of the votes in 1999 to 10 per-
cent in 2002. There is no disputing that the main reason for the FPÖ’s
fall had been the impossibility of reconciling the right-wing extremist
opposition rhetoric with the necessities of government pragmatism.
More than 60 percent of the FPÖ electorate left the party disillusioned
with the FPÖ’s performance.
But the picture became rather different in 2006. Beginning in 2005,
the split between the BZÖ, backed by Haider and most of the FPÖ’s elite
in parliament and government, and the FPÖ—now under Hans-Christian
Strache—enabled the FPÖ to repeat its success as a party outside and
against the Austrian mainstream. All the anti-European, anti-migration,
xenophobic, and (regarding the Nazi past) revisionist rhetoric again had
credibility because it was not tarnished with a government policy that
could never deliver. At the end of the Schüssel years, the dragon was
back.
Schüssel’s legacy cannot be seen as responsible for the strength of
a party which—in the European context—is seen as an ally of the
French Front National, the Belgian Vlaams Belang, and the Bulgarian
Ataka. The potential strength of the FPÖ—a party within the tradition
of the Pan-German ideological camp, a tradition which includes the
heritage of the Austrian National Socialist German Workers’ Party
(NSDAP or Nazi Party)—is the biggest of any extreme rightist party
within the European Union. The FPÖ in the late 1980s and 1990s,
starting from about 5 percent (1983), demonstrated with its 27 percent
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success in 1999 the size of this segment of angry modernization losers,
who are in their great majority neither “Nazis” nor simple “fascists,” but
who don’t care about the European consensus as articulated by the
European Union and the Austrian political mainstream. The potential
FPÖ electorate is “anti-system,” and by being so, it accepts at least a
rhetorical alliance with hardcore, right-wing extremism.
In Austria, the concept of a French style cordon sanitaire18 never
had been implemented, despite attempts by Vranitzky’s SPÖ and
Busek’s ÖVP to do so. In this context, cordon sanitaire means accepting
extremist parties in parliament, but never accepting them in any kind of
cooperation, especially not as a coalition partner on any level. The
cordon sanitaire did not work on the regional level in Carinthia, when
a non-FPÖ majority in the Carinthian diet was unwilling to prevent
Haider’s governorship—with the exception of 1991, when the SPÖ and
ÖVP united using their majority to vote Haider out of office. His return
to the governorship in 1999 was de facto accepted by the majority still
controlled by the SPÖ and ÖVP.
But the major break of any attempt to keep the FPÖ out of
government came after the 1999 elections when Schüssel opted to
become chancellor by forming an alliance with Haider. Schüssel got the
position of head of government—and the FPÖ received proof of being
respected. That this proof was not transformed in European respec-
tability was demonstrated by the diplomatic boycott between February
and September 2000,  
  Paradoxically, Schüssel’s rather significant personal impact on the
perception of Austria’s chancellorship must lead to the recognition of
the structural weakness of the chancellor’s position. The Austrian
federal chancellor is—by constitutional design—nothing more than the
primus inter pares in the cabinet.19 The executive power is not con-
centrated in the chancellor’s position, neither is it concentrated in the
position of the federal president. The executive power is with the single
federal ministers. The sectoral power of such a minister is limited by
law, not by the president or the chancellor. Because the Austrian Federal
Cabinet consists of federal ministers of equal standing—among them the
federal chancellor and the vice-chancellor—and because all the mi-
nisters enjoy a high degree of autonomy, the executive power in Austria
neither rests with the head of state (the federal president) nor with the
head of government (the federal chancellor). The Austrian government
is not presidential—but it is neither parliamentarian in the sense of a
prime minister-oriented Westminster democracy. Austria is governed by
individual ministers; it is a republic of ministers.
Extra-constitutional factors may strengthen the chancellor’s role.
The most decisive factor among those is the aspect of the chancellor’s
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role within his or her party. The intra-party authority of a chancellor
may give him or her special authority over the cabinet members coming
from his or her own party. As a party leader whose role is seen as de-
cisive for the party’s electoral success, the chancellor will have power
not only based on the constitution, but also on his or her intra-party
standing. But this does not lead to a special authority regarding cabinet
members nominated by and belonging to a coalition partner. 
As soon as the federal government is based on coalition agreements
between two or more parties, the chancellor has no extra-constitutional
authority whatsoever regarding policies designed and implemented by
the second (or third) party in government. On the contrary, any coali-
tion—and especially the coalition between parties of more or less equal
strength—makes the vice-chancellor, usually the leader of the second
governing party, a kind of second chancellor. It is the vice-chancellor
who could be able to use his (her) intra-party standing for influencing
policies of ministers of his (her) party in addition to the constitutional
rules. According to these rules, the chancellor (as well as the vice-chan-
cellor as his or her deputy) is just an ordinary member of the federal
government without any special authority above the authority of every
(other) single federal minister.
The question remains why the Schüssel years have been especially
identified with the chancellor. There are two aspects to be considered as
responsible for Schüssel’s personal importance. First is Schüssel’s
special role in shaping the alliance of February 2000 against the declared
intention of the federal president, Thomas Klestil, and against the un-
written rule that the leader of the strongest party in the National Council
is entitled to the chancellorship. After his party’s rather dramatic defeat
of October 1999, Schüssel, the leader of the third-strongest party and—
on the surface—extremely weakened by his responsibility for the ÖVP’s
worst electoral performance ever, “conquered” the chancellorship by
making the deal with Haider and the FPÖ. In that respect, due to the
breaking of unwritten rules, intentions, and expectations, the ÖVP-FPÖ
coalition has been identified as “Schüssel’s government.” Second is the
structural weakness of Schüssel’s coalition partner. The FPÖ, rising fast
as a radical, right-wing populist opposition party, was not prepared to
govern. Soon it became obvious that the FPÖ’s electorate could not be
satisfied by the government’s performance generally and by the FPÖ’s
performance in particular. The deep fall of the FPÖ became the reason
why Schüssel—considered responsible for the ÖVP’s big electoral
success in 2002—had been seen as more powerful than any other
chancellor with the exception of the one-party-government chancellors
Josef Klaus and Bruno Kreisky. As the initially balanced ÖVP-FPÖ
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coalition became more and more unbalanced, the government became
identified with Schüssel as the leader of the dominant party.
The legacy of the Schüssel years has become the burden of
Schüssel’s successors in government and in Schüssel’s party. Because
the consequence of the October 2006 elections has been the coalition
between two partners of practically identical strength in parliament, the
expectations—raised by the SPÖ in the almost seven years of opposi-
tion—could never have been fulfilled by Alfred Gusenbauer, chancellor
of the SPÖ-ÖVP coalition. Moreover, because the ÖVP, used to being
seen as the dominant Austrian party for almost seven years, had to learn
to be satisfied with a much lower share of government power, the
authority of Wilhelm Molterer, Schüssel’s successor in the ÖVP, has
been challenged from the very beginning of the Gusenbauer-Molterer
coalition. Gusenbauer had to prove his authority—but this would have
been possible only at the cost of Molterer’s authority, and Molterer had
to face the same situation on his side.
The Schüssel years had been responsible for unrealistic expecta-
tions—first and foremost regarding the power of an Austrian chancellor,
limited not only by the constitution and by the absence of any kind of
formal ranking within the cabinet, but also by the power sharing
arrangements with an equally strong coalition partner.   
Conclusion   
The Schüssel years should not be overestimated—either in a nega-
tive or a positive way. The Schüssel government did not start a policy
of pushing back the economic role the government had in Austria since
1945. The Schüssel government did not begin to reduce the government
control over universities. The Schüssel government has not been the
main reason why the social partners lost some of their traditional in-
fluence. In addition, the Schüssel government cannot be blamed for the
decline of the Austrian party state—of the quantitative and qualitative
dominance of two major parties not over politics, but over society.
But the Schüssel government will be rightfully linked to two major
experiences. First, Schüssel’s pact with Haider at the beginning of 2000
created a major European and international crisis, reminding Austria and
the Austrians that the country is perceived, especially by the West, as the
nation which had tried to make the world forget the participation of so
many Austrians in the crimes of the Nazi regime. Second, despite the
hardening of the confrontation between a government seen as being very
much on the far right and a rather embittered leftist opposition, the rules
of the democratic game never seemed to be in danger. The Schüssel
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years have to be considered an important proof of Austria’s democratic
stability.
Is Austria—the Austrian society, the Austrian political system—a
different one because of the Schüssel years? The Austria of 2008 is
different from the Austria of the post-1945 years. Political stability as
guaranteed by consensus democracy and social partnership is not what
it used to be. But this trend did not start in the year 2000. Like Austrian
corporatism, the very much discussed “social partnership,” the meaning
of stability has been redefined as stability within the European Union.20
Austria can’t go it alone. Austria is not an island of the blessed.
Austria needs ever-deepening integration into the European Union. But
this is not the result of the Schüssel years. The Schüssel era has been one
period in an ongoing development.
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FORUM
“Disturbing Creativity?”1:
Austrian Literature, Studies, and Cultural Politics
Maria-Regina Kecht
Between 2005 and 2008, I had the honor and pleasure of serving as
the editor of the international journal Modern Austrian Literature
(MAL). For readers not familiar with the publication, I should provide
a few pieces of contextual information. The beginnings of MAL date
back to the early 1960s when the Arthur Schnitzler Society (founded in
the United States) wanted to create its own research venue. In 1968,
however, the publication initially dedicated exclusively to scholarship
on Schnitzler was renamed Modern Austrian Literature clearly expan-
ding its focus and, thus, also its readership. For several decades, MAL
was inextricably associated with Professor Donald Daviau (University
of California, Riverside) and Professor Jorun Johns (California State
University, San Bernardino), who devoted their energy to the develop-
ment and internationalization of the journal. 
In the course of time, the Arthur Schnitzler Society decided to be
officially in synch with the contents of its scholarly publication and,
accordingly, chose to transform itself into the Modern Austrian Litera-
ture and Culture Association (MALCA). The Association and its jour-
nal adopted a series of new standards and practices for the organization
of its annual symposium and the editorial work related to its quarterly,
MAL. So, for example, the position of editor is filled on the basis of a
national announcement, and the editor serves for a three-year term. The
journal has an international advisory board consisting of scholars in
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Austrian Studies working at U.S. institutions or overseas. The board
members are instrumental in the blind peer review of submitted
manuscripts as well as in the selection and nomination of the best MAL
essay for the annual Max Kade Prize. Each MAL issue contains four or
five articles and approximately twenty book reviews. The acceptance
rate of submitted manuscripts is less than 25 percent. The print version
of the journal is widely available in U.S. and overseas research
libraries, and all archived issues (from the journal’s inception to today)
are also accessible electronically via EBSCO. This has greatly contri-
buted to the growing distribution of MAL.
Since MAL is the journal of MALCA, it goes without saying that
the publication reflects the philosophy and research direction of the
organization. Several years ago, the executive council of MALCA and
the organization’s members agreed to emphasize the “C” (cultural)
component of Austrian Studies in its annual conference and in the
journal so as to respond successfully to the currents of the discipline as
well as to accommodate our readers’ scholarly interests. Particularly
among the junior colleagues in our profession, the research identifi-
cation with cultural studies is more prevalent than with literary studies.
A glance at any of the MAL issues of the last several years demon-
strates that the scholarly spectrum in Austrian Studies—as presented by
MALCA—has not only grown far beyond the original focus on Arthur
Schnitzler, but also beyond strictly literary topics. The conventions and
criteria scholars use in their selection of research issues have changed;
methods and approaches have undergone various kinds of shifts; a
plurality of critical readings can co-exist without any professional
indictment; and interdisciplinarity brings together various perspectives
that allow MAL readers to recontextualize familiar texts and/or authors.
Quite clearly, the notions of what is canonical and what might be peri-
pheral or marginal have changed, which, in turn, has brought about a
very productive decentralization in Austrian Studies and placed
Austrian literature and culture in a much wider, Central European
framework that comprises the cultural production of the regions/
countries that were part of the Habsburg Empire.
Quite generally one can observe a trend towards a “wider angle”
and broader views that offer more complex connections and establish
reference points that link diverse fields of inquiry and different systems
of thought. Literary analysis may be placed in various kinds of con-
texts, which may emerge from intellectual history, social history,
psychology, philosophy, media theory, technology, and so forth.
Neither in principle nor in terms of disciplinary conventions are there
any limits to this sort of “mix and match.” This kind of freedom may be
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conducive to intellectual creativity, but may also undermine analytical
stringency and methodological coherence.
When leafing through the MAL issues that have appeared over the
last several years, we can discern the following trends and thematic
clusters: transnational or transhistorical analyses, comparative papers,
interdisciplinary approaches, gendered perspectives on female and male
authors, canonical works in new contexts, popular culture as an object
of inquiry, and inter-media studies (linking texts with film or photo-
graphy). It seems as if the pursuit of theory for theory’s sake is a thing
of the past, and there is no competition for any particular theory’s
superiority. Innovation and originality emerge from the specific con-
texts scholars succeed in establishing.
When we take a look at the abstracts that summarize the published
articles in MAL, we notice a wealth of inter- or trans-disciplinary
research areas into which the articles can be subsumed: cultural
transfer, literary history and literary politics, social history of cultural
contributors (such as writers), intertextuality, performativity, trans-
lation, systems theory, media history and media theory, cultural theo-
ries. Only rarely do we find a strictly philological paper or an essay that
could be categorized as a “close reading” in the original sense of the
term. 
Quite logically, the Kade prize-winning essays of MAL reflect the
direction noted above. Here are some examples. In 2005, the award was
given to an essay on the relatively little-known author Caroline Pichler
(1769-1843) whose work in two of her historical plays “traces Pichler’s
journey from advocating for a German-speaking nation under Habsburg
rule to realizing the inherent instability of the Habsburg hold on power
in the emerging nationalist discourse” (quote from abstract). Board
members considered the article as “exemplary scholarship in its combi-
nation of aesthetic and historical analyses, and its strict attention to the
micro-politics of the Habsburg nineteenth century.” In 2006, the
winning essay on the Nobel prizewinner Elfriede Jelinek and her
Prinzessinnendramen was praised for its “fascinating and well-argued
case of literary ‘sampling’ or intertextuality, well-tracked in terms of its
cultural reference and the meanings thereof.” Reviewers were im-
pressed with the compelling analysis of the question of literary
inscription in Jelinek’s textual and political solidarity with (and tribute
to) Ingeborg Bachmann, Marlen Haushofer, and Sylvia Plath. A year
later, another well researched and highly perceptive article was singled
out for the Kade prize. This time, the editorial board chose a piece on
the Viennese satirist Karl Kraus and his writings on etiquette. “With
nuance and detail,” the commentary reads, “[the author] situates
Kraus’s critique within turn-of-the-century Vienna as well as within the
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larger functions and systems of language.” The essay was a superb
example of well-done work in Kulturwissenschaft.
The national identity—Swiss, Austrian, and Swedish—and pro-
fessional status of the Kade prize winners—college professor, inde-
pendent scholar, and doctoral candidate—indicates diversity at a
different level. It is actually quite noteworthy that over the past years,
many of the contributors to MAL have not been American and do not
necessarily teach German Studies at U.S. institutions. A good number
of scholars submitting their manuscripts to MAL work in Europe—not
necessarily at universities and not necessarily at departments of
Germanistik. A growing number of submissions, which is not the same
as saying the number of printed articles, have come from scholars in
Eastern Europe—from the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovenia, Croatia,
or Hungary. Many of them have had access to MAL thanks to the newly
founded Österreich Bibliotheken and are eager to connect and exchange
ideas internationally with colleagues in Austrian Studies. These efforts
in international cooperation are also reflected in the collaborative
research projects that individual MAL issues have been presenting.
So, given our discussion, we need to ask whether in the pages of
MAL we can find innovation, originality, ingenuity, or “disturbing
creativity”? Ultimately, of course, the readers of the journal have to
come to their own conclusions and pass a verdict. The process of
anonymous, blind peer review guarantees that the best of the submitted
manuscripts are accepted for publication and that the printed essays
offer provocative insights, stimulate scholarly discussion, and inspire
further research. The noteworthy bricolage of theoretical concepts and
frames of reference, which characterizes a good number of articles, can
be fascinating, interesting, and also impressive, but it can also be
considered “disturbing” when the reader discerns a certain, perhaps
quite intentional, arbitrariness that instrumentalizes the selected text for
a performance—an intellectual show—on the part of the scholar/author.
Objectively, there is no way we can come up with a clear-cut definition
of what might be “disturbing” about the scholarly creativity in the
pages of MAL—whether this is in the positive sense of the term,
implying thought-provoking, out-of-the-box cogitation, or in the
negative sense of the term suggesting irritation, frustration, or con-
fusion. Most likely only hindsight will allow us to ascertain whether
examples of “disturbing creativity” are more than manifestations of
critical fads shared by the contemporary scholarly community.
It seems to me that the development of MAL over the past several
years indicates a vibrant, healthy, and exciting international research
climate that benefits tremendously from the commitment and contri-
butions of young scholars both inside and outside the United States. We
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can observe plenty of creativity, which may be related to the
disappearance of boundaries at various levels, for example, great
interdisciplinarity, broad and multiple modes of contextualization,
intermedia perspectives, and a wide spectrum of literary and literary
historical connections that locate authors and texts in innovative and
unexpected ways.
I can only wish that this trend will continue and that many readers
of Contemporary Austrian Studies will want to make their own
contribution to MAL’s “disturbing creativity.”
Austrian and German History and Literature
David S. Luft
Austrian literature in relation to the broader context of German and
Austrian history and literature is a topic I discussed in the early 1980s
with Wendelin Schmidt-Dengler, as well as Hilde Spiel and Kurt
Fischer, and I have returned to these concerns in various ways since
then. As a historian, these questions are particularly interesting to me.
In particular, I have always wondered what the relationship of literature
is to the broader context of intellectual life—including philosophy,
politics, and the social and natural sciences. In my current research, I am
exploring these questions in two related projects. The Austrian Tradition
in German Culture is an intellectual history of German-speaking Austria
that emphasizes Cisleithanian Austria in the geographical sense (that is
the Austrian and Bohemian hereditary lands of the Habsburgs) from the
eighteenth century to 1918—and the Austrian Republic thereafter. My
second project, Hugo von Hofmannsthal and the Austrian Idea, is a
translation edition of Hofmannsthal’s essays on culture and politics,
which explores his understanding of Austrian intellectual life in relation
to a broader German culture. My general concern is the importance of
specifying the historical, linguistic, geographical, and social context of
discussions of Austrian literature. 
For the purposes of this discussion, I want to recall the reservoir of
meanings and relationships that we draw on when we speak of Austrian
literature. One clear approach to this subject is to emphasize the period
since 1945 or since the collapse of the monarchy in 1918. In either case,
we have at least a relatively clear region that includes primarily German-
speakers. But even in such approaches, questions always arise: What is
the relationship of this Austria to the larger Austria in its various forms
from the tenth century to the early twentieth? What is the relationship of
this little Austria to German language and culture, or even to other
languages and cultures? Does Austria have its own literature? What
would it mean to say that it does?
Austrian national identity came to consciousness and clarity largely
after the fact—in the 1970s and 1980s—and then began to disappear into
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the European Union. In the immediate postwar era, this conception of
Austrian national identity grew out of efforts to reestablish a connection
to the imperial past. In my project on the Austrian tradition in German
culture, I am interested in clarifying what we mean by the Austrian in-
tellectual tradition since the eighteenth century. I have found it
important to underscore the connection to Bohemia, and I have learned
a great deal in this regard and in related matters from Hofmannsthal.
Indeed, at the heart of any discussion of Austrian culture are the mature
essays of Hofmannsthal, yet historians are often unaware of the extent
of his influence on discussions of this theme. Hofmannsthal had very
clear ideas on this subject, although he examined the question in a
variety of different ways, and his ideas have not always been accurately
recalled. In addition, Hofmannsthal’s conception of the Austrian idea
also blurs into his idea of Europe and into his understanding of what is
German, and he repeatedly insisted that these meanings are not static,
but change over time. 
Hofmannsthal’s most striking definition of the Austrian idea
appears in his essay by that title in 1917: “This primary and fateful gift
for compromise with the East; let us say it precisely: toward compro-
mise between the old European, Latin-German and the new European
Slavic world, this only task and raison d’être of Austria […].”1 This
definition touches on many dimensions of Austrian intellectual history
from Bernard Bolzano and Adalbert Stifter to Peter  Handke and Inge-
borg Bachmann, but what was central for Hofmannsthal was the special
relationship between the Alpine lands and Bohemia until 1918. He
makes very clear that, when he says “Austria,” he is thinking of
Cisleithanian Austria and not about the Habsburg Monarchy as a whole.
Like Franz Grillparzer, Hofmannsthal thought of Bohemians and
Moravians as he did about Styrians and Tyroleans, as part of the long-
standing core of the monarchy. Grillparzer did not count Hungary as part
of Austria any more than he did Spain, indeed less so. One might say
that all the clichés about Austria are true, especially the ones that derive
from Hofmannsthal—but they refer not to the Habsburg Monarchy and
not to Vienna or to the present-day Austrian Republic, but to Austria and
Bohemia, especially during the four centuries before the First World
War. 
Hofmannsthal often thought about “Austrian” and “German” in
ways that blur into each other—usually in the sense of Austria as an
expression of Germanness (deutsches Wesen). His decisive examples
precede 1871 and often connect in some way to the early modern period
or even to the Middle Ages. In “Austria in the Mirror of Its Literature”
(1916) he even offers an unfamiliar description of the Germans who
conquered the world: “That German essence, which once conquered the
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world, which penetrated both East and West, which sent its architects,
its businessmen, its scholars, its generations of peasants across the
Lower Rhine, across the Oder and down the Danube, who pursued and
developed trade, enlightened and enriched, colonized without con-
quering, led without ruling […].”2
German historians have often seen the Holy Roman Empire as a
frustratingly decentralized precursor of the real Germany, whereas
Hofmannsthal saw it as the mainstream of what he took to be German.
Hofmannthal’s vision of the development of German culture since the
Middle Ages is not without its problems to be sure, resonating in some
respects with the experience of Europeans in the American West. But,
instead of limiting himself to Austria as a region or a state, he discusses
German culture in a much larger sense that evokes a dualism between
Austria and a sense of “Germany” that goes beyond temporary forms of
Prussian Germany or the possibilities of the 1860s. This is, in many
respects, truer than the conventional accounts of German nationalism,
and it accounts for much of the ambiguity in the way Hofmannsthal
writes about Germans and Austrians, here and elsewhere. He frequently
contrasts Austria not to the German state, but to cosmopolitan German
culture. This way of thinking is hardly even accessible today, perhaps
even to German historians. But Austrian historians, of course, have a
substantial stake in this cosmopolitan notion of Germanness, which
includes Otto von Bismarck and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, as well as
Prince Eugene and Franz Joseph. Hofmannsthal has a number of ways
of seeing the Austrian idea, but he consistently keeps alive a broader
sense of Germanness that is richer and more cosmopolitan than the
nationalisms of 1871, 1938, or 1989—or even 1914. 
Indeed, if Hofmannsthal were alive today he might be in a position
to argue that Germany represents Austrian or European ideas more than
Austria does. 
If we see Austria as the one part of the old German empire in which the
energies of German history are living and working, the implication for the
German is: Austria is not merely something that still exists but an
unfinished task. Much that could not find resolution in the new empire that
was founded in 1870, and yet was a German mission, inner German life,
something that has impact and is willed by fate, should and will be solved
here.3
But German culture in this cosmopolitan sense (Michael Steinberg
has used the term “cosmopolitan nationalism”4) was also not a specifi-
cally Austrian idea—nor did Hofmannsthal think it was—but, rather, the
linguistic and spiritual sources of the whole people in the sense that
William  Shakespeare could be said to symbolize for the English-spea-
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king world—and this is roughly what Johann Wolfgang von Goethe was
for Hofmannsthal. This view leads Hofmannsthal to a third definition,
which links the first two: “Austria is the special task that is posed to the
German spirit in Europe. It is the field, directed by destiny, of a purely
intellectual and spiritual imperialism. For it does not require the
intervention of German political force, but to be sure the constant in-
fluence by the German spirit.”5 On the other hand, even in 1915, he was
alert to the dangers of this dependence on Germany: “If Germany gives





In thinking about the future or the viability of Austrian Studies, I
would like to pose a question about the place of Jewish Studies within
Austrian Studies. German-Jewish Studies has become a recognized sub-
field within both German Studies and Jewish Studies, with Austria and
the legacy of the Habsburg Monarchy folded into it. Yet in probing the
contours of the future of Austrian Studies, I propose to sidestep the now
rather tired debates about the viability of national literatures as an area
of study; in fact, in many respects Austria, as a former empire and
ongoing borderland region, presents a way out of the usual conundrum
of thinking about literary studies and national spaces. Scholars in
Austrian Studies have long pleaded for the cultural and historical
specificity of an inquiry into Austria that is not subsumed by German
culture; indeed, let me suggest that if it is perhaps time to craft a more
conscious field of Jewish Studies within the context of Austrian Studies,
we need to enable Austrian-Jewish Studies to evolve and flourish in a
different interpretive space than German-Jewish Studies. 
Significant scholarly work on the multiple intersections of Jewish-
ness and other national cultures in the former Habsburg lands exists;
much of this recent work has been indelibly shaped by Gilles Deleuze
and Felix Guattari’s conception of Franz Kafka’s work as exemplary of
a “minor” literature.1 Significantly, the explorations of Jewishness and
“the minor” have complicated the notion of Vienna as the center of
Austrian-Jewish culture. Let me single out the case of Czernowitz—
either celebrated or critiqued as the famed “topos” of a literary world—
as the test case for mapping out the relationship between real and
imaginary literary and geographical spaces and between text and
memory.2 If the task of a new Austrian-Jewish Studies is to re-read the
textual spaces of Jewish memory, then Czernowitz is the place/text par
excellence, for it reveals the fault lines between literary text, cultural and
historical memory, and geographical and textual sites of memory. An
Austrian-Jewish Studies might be one way to articulate the ongoing
complex and often violent enmeshment of Austrianness and Jewishness.
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So what would an Austrian-Jewish Studies look like? First, it would
have to do more than merely point a finger at the deliberate silences and
erasures of Jewish history and Jewish experience enacted in the Second
Republic and the failure to create any sort of Jewish visibility or legibi-
lity as the nation-state was emerging. Second, I would make a plea not
simply to put at the center of inquiry the Jewish figures who made
significant contributions to Austrian culture— in other words, not to
create a Jewish Studies that relies largely on biographical and historical
“Jews” as an antidote to their later expulsion and exclusion. Rather,
perhaps the case of Austria, where debates about Jews both present and
absent have come much later to the surface, gives a chance for literary
and cultural studies scholars to approach the question of the links
between Jewishness and textuality, that is, of the viability of an
Austrian-Jewish Studies that might be understood as a complex relation-
ship of textual correspondences. To do this, we would need not to posi-
tion Jewishness and Austrianness as diametrically opposed categories,
but rather, as Matti Bunzl has suggested,3 as “symptoms of moder-
nity”—to reimagine Jewishness as an integral part of Austrianness and
to reimagine Austrianness as the partial product and reflection of speci-
fically Jewish contributions.
Let me illustrate this more concretely. While Elfriede Jelinek has
attracted widespread and deserved attention in cultural circles for her
work in postdramatic theater and her innovative prose works, there has
also been an attempt to categorize her as “Jewish” author, drawing on
her (however tenuous) Jewish family history. Yet Jelinek places herself
not so much for reasons of family history (she is not halachically
Jewish) within a trajectory of Austrian-Jewish writing from Karl Krauss4
to the present. In this way, the taxonomy of Jewish writing can be
expanded beyond the biographical to include textual relationships. Thus
Dagmar Lorenz’s volume on Austria in the University of Nebraska
Press’s series on contemporary Jewish writing includes Jelinek along-
side more canonically “Jewish” authors such as Erich Fried, Elias
Canetti, Paul Celan, Ruth Klüger, and Robert Schindel.5 If an Austrian-
Jewish Studies is to forge these textual definitions of Jewishness, we
need to expand beyond the parameters of what can be anthologized as
“Jewish” writing in Austria. To this end, I want to cite the approach
found in Regina Kecht’s recent work exploring Jelinek’s novel Die
Kinder der Toten as part of a corpus of Jewish text.6 Kecht gives a
reading of the frontispiece of the novel, suggesting its function as a
metaphorical mezuzah that draws the reader into textually Jewish space.
It is precisely this sort of reading that gives the possibility of merging
work in Jewish literary studies, Jewish textuality, with Austrian Studies.
Leaving aside the problematic question of whether or not Jelinek is
350 The Schüssel Era in Austria
1. See Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, trans. Dana
Polan (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1986).
2. See Andrei Corbea-Hoisie, Czernowitzer Geschichten: Über eine städtische Kultur in
Mittelosteuropa (Vienna: Böhlau, 2003); Winfried Menninghaus, “Czernowitz/
Bukowina als Topos deutsch-jüdischer Geschichte,” Merkur 3/4 (1999): 345-57; Leslie
Morris, “Translating Czernowitz: The Non-Place of East Central Europe,” Studies in 20th
and 21st Century Literature  31.1 (2007): 187-205.
3. Matti Bunzl, Symptoms of Modernity: Jews and Queers in Late Twentieth-Century
Vienna (Berkeley, CA: U of California P, 2004).
4. See Paul Reitter, The Anti-Journalist: Karl Kraus and Jewish Self-Fashioning in Fin-
de-Siecle Europe (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2008).
5. See Dagmar C.G. Lorenz, ed. Contemporary Jewish Writing in Austria (Lincoln, NE:
Nebraska UP, 1999).
6. Kecht, Regina, “The Polyphony of Remembrance: Reading  Die Kinder der Toten,”
in Elfriede Jelinek: Writing Woman, Nation, and Identity, ed. Matthias Konzett and M.
Lamb-Faffelberger (Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson UP, 2007), 189-217.
Jewish, or Jewish enough, Kecht turns instead to the complex interplay
between Jelinek’s work and a Jewish textual tradition. 
If we are to move into an Austrian-Jewish Studies that has the
capacity to navigate the foundational links between text, memory, histo-
ry, Austrianness, Jewishness, and beyond, then we must do precisely this
kind of work: unveiling and excavating the complex enmeshments of
Jewish culture and Austrian culture that might enable us, for instance,
to see not only the contribution of Jewish artists and thinkers to the
project of modernity, but even more significantly, modernism and the
avant-garde as a movement that enabled a new approach to and inter-
pretation of Judaism. It is thus the interplay between the hermeneutic
meanings of Judaism as cultural discourse—Jewishness as the trope of
the avant garde—in particular as this discourse evolved in Vienna at the
turn of the century, that might be a good place for an Austrian-Jewish
Studies to lay its anchor. In other words, an Austrian-Jewish Studies
would not just turn its attention to the Jewish contributions to Austrian
culture, but instead would open up new discussions of the complex
interactions and interplay between Austrian and Jewish culture, and the
formative way in which Jewishness as trope of the modern has to be part
of any approach to Austrian Studies. 
Notes
Disturbing Creativity: Phantom Pains, Arts,
 and Cultural Policies in Postwar Austria
Andreas Stadler
Austria is known worldwide as a much sought after tourism desti-
nation, with its capitals of high culture, such as Vienna and Salzburg, as
well as its alpine ski resorts. However, this positive and inviting image
has been marred in recent years by crime scandals such as the Josef
Fritzl (2008) and the Natascha Kampusch (2006) cases. More or less
implicitly, these human tragedies were attributed to a specifically
Austrian characteristic: the failure to come to terms with Autria’s Nazi
past.1 Even if this oftentimes claimed connection is not empirically
verifiable, the discourse shows that a diffuse, sometimes even manifest,
suspicion does, in fact, exist. 
This stereotype of an “unsettled past” began to emerge in the 1980s
during the course of the Waldheim Affair, and resurfaced in the year
2000 when the Wolfgang Schüssel (ÖVP) and Jörg Haider (FPÖ)
government made international headlines and triggered political sanc-
tions by fourteen member states of the European Union. The most recent
elections in September 2008, where Austria’s right-wing populist Free-
dom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, or FPÖ) won
17.5 percent and its younger brother, the Alliance for the Future of
Austria (Bündnis Zukunft Österreich, or BZÖ) won 10.7 percent of the
vote, have once again focused the world’s attention on Austria. How-
ever, open criticism was mostly missing from the international media.
The lack of criticism can probably be attributed to three factors.
First, even Austria’s harshest critics may have realized that the 2000
vote did not really represent a danger to democracy. This was surely
aided by a strong showing of the civil society, supported and even
headed by the cultural sector and artistic community. Second, Austrian
President Heinz Fischer, head of state since 2004, is an internationally
respected personality who stands for democracy and stability. Third, and
finally, it was apparent very early on that once again the government
would consist of a coalition between the Social Democratic Party (So-
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zialdemokratische Partei Österreichs, or SPÖ), which had won 29
percent of the vote, and the Austrian People’s Party (Österreichische
Volkspartei, or ÖVP), which had won 26 percent of the vote. In any
case, the U.S. media showed no sign of serious concern in their
appraisals of the Austrian elections. 
Today, Austria represents a contemporary cultural nation with a
distinct civil society. Besides its so-called “high culture” at the
Staatsoper and the Salzburger Festspiele, artistic traditions such as the
unsettling “Viennese Actionism” are also associated with Austria. Espe-
cially within the visual arts, Actionism is considered Austria’s decisive
contribution to post- World War II art.
Names such as Günter Brus, Hermann Nitsch, Otto Muehl, and
Rudolf Schwarzkogler are included in most standard volumes on art
history. Their works, as well as those by their younger colleagues, like
Valie Export (b. 1940), fetch record prices and are included in many
important international art collections. 
But from where does this inclination of Austrian artists toward
scandal and irritation, this disturbing creativity, come? 
Austrian artistic expression most certainly correlates with the
enormous upheavals of the twentieth century and constitutes a tradition
that dates back at least to the masters of classical modernism like Gustav
Klimt (1862 to 1918) and Egon Schiele (1890 to 1918), who were
repeatedly labeled as troublemakers and often suffered tremendous
public rejection. Another well-known representative of this era, Oskar
Kokoschka (1886 to 1980), was added to the Nazis’ list of “degenerate
artists” and banned, as were too many others.
The next generation of artists, those who followed World War II,
fought against cultural conservatism up to the point of self-destruction.
After all, the prevailing cultural policies after 1945 were meant to
safeguard the Austrian state ideologically and reinvent the “Austrian
nation.” In order to achieve this, a rural and/or alpine aesthetic was
embraced, which was fused with the country’s baroque and monarchistic
legacy. Peter Rossegger and Heinrich Waggerl were the “poet laureates”
that dominated school curricula well into the 1970s. National feats of
strength were performed in the years of liberation/occupation from 1945
to 1955 to reconstruct the destroyed State Opera House and the
Burgtheater. 
Operettas as counterparts to musicals became important hallmarks
of musical theater. A decisive influence was Robert Stolz, for example,
who fled to the United States to escape the Nazis and returned to Austria
in 1946. The 1954 film Echo der Berge: der Förster vom Silberwald
provides an exemplary perspective of the new elite’s self-perception.2 
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However, this cultural avoidance strategy was not able to cope with
the loss of a multi-ethnic empire and the monarchy, nor with the painful
legacy of National Socialism. Thus, in the beginning of the 1960s, re-
presentatives of the younger generation protested against cultural con-
servatism as well as against the still evident remnants of Nazi ideology.
In the years from 1962 to 1965, a prominent public debate exploded
about the case of university professor Taras Borodajkewycz, who
glorified National Socialism in his lectures at the Vienna University of
Economics. Heinz Fischer, a student at the time, accused Borodaj-
kewycz publicly on the basis of notes taken by Ferdinand Lacina, and
was convicted and fined for defamation of character.
But artists also revolted against this prevailing culturally conser-
vative mood. Of course, the scandalous aesthetics of Actionism have
their roots and role models in the American Happenings and were
inspired by the Fluxus movement. However, the actionists’ special
inclination toward aggression and—even more importantly—auto-
aggression (Rudolf Schwarzkogler, Günter Brus) was a unique Austrian
contribution. This radical stance should be interpreted, in my opinion,
as an expression of the phenomenon of phantom pain which was
exceedingly felt after the collapse of the multiethnic empire, but mainly
after the annihilation and expulsion of the Jewish elements of Austrian
society and culture. The severing of this Jewish and multiethnic, Slavic
cultural heritage effectively led to self-criticism and castigation, which
the sensitive artists of this generation—often subconsciously— under-
took and articulated for the rest of society. 
A key example is the Action from 1968 entitled Kunst und Revo-
lution (Art and Revolution), which became a huge scandal. Otto Mühl
(b. 1925), Peter Weibel (b. 1944), Oswald Wiener (b. 1935), and Günter
Brus (b. 1938) simultaneously performed so-called actions. In his
“Action 33,” his body analysis action, Brus undressed, cut his chest and
thighs with a razor, urinated into a glass and drank it. He defecated and
then smeared his body with excrement. Finally, he lay on a table and
proceeded to masturbate while singing the national anthem. Günter Brus
was sentenced to six months in prison for vilification of Austrian sym-
bols and creating a public nuisance through amoral behavior. Following
this, he went to Germany, but continued to work as an artist. In 1996 he
was awarded the Grand Austrian State Prize for art by then Minister of
Education and Culture Rudolf Scholten. Today, that action has become
an icon of Actionism, Austrian art history, and postwar historiography.
In his experiments on himself and his bondage actions, the artist
Rudolf Schwarzkogler (1940 to 1969) also came very close to this
disturbing and self-destructive phantom-pain reaction. 
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The liberal international mood of the 1960s and 1970s helped to
expand areas of freedom. In Austria, troublemaker artists were also
given platforms by politicians and, thus, by society. In his 1970 govern-
ment policy declaration, the newly incumbent Federal Chancellor Bruno
Kreisky (1911 to 1990) expressed his hopes for a youth that would
challenge the existing system and establishment with full disrespect. In
1977, Kreisky went so far as to demand a “socio-critical cultural radi-
calism.”3 
The disturbing creativity of artists was once again evident in the
1980s, especially in the form of reactions to the Waldheim Affair of
1986. Alfred Hrdlicka, for example, used a giant wooden horse for a
large-scale demonstration against President Kurt Waldheim as a form of
ironic protest. Thomas Bernhard, a poetic surgeon of the abysses of the
Austrian soul, started a national debate with his play Heldenplatz (1988).
In his own way, even the chairman of the Freedom Party at the time,
Jörg Haider, contributed by railing against Elfriede Jelinek, Peter
Turrini, and Rudolf Scholten during the election campaign.
The literary oeuvre and the assertive and critical stance of Jelinek,
who was awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature in 2004, is a further
example of the unsettling creative force evident in the Austrian cultural
scene. 
In the aforementioned year 2000, Christoph Schlingensief created
the Container Action Please Love Austria (Bitte liebt Österreich). Con-
tainers with signs reading “Foreigners Out” (Ausländer Raus), a
Freedom Party campaign slogan, were set up in front of the Vienna State
Opera. Various performers and supporters were locked up in them in the
style of the TV series Big Brother. This Container Action dominated the
Austrian political, public, and media landscape for weeks. With the
theme “The Other Austria” (das andere Österreich), many artists cam-
paigned for months against the so-called “Blue-Black” government,4
some of them engaging in political opposition, some of them even
abandoning Austria altogether, such as the composers Olga Neuwirth
and Georg Friedrich Haas, curator Robert Fleck, and architect Raimund
Abraham.
Even if tensions have calmed down in the meantime and artists have
made peace with their country, the example of Dirk Stermann and
Christoph Grissemann’s work in 2008 shows that the troublemaking
power of Austrian creativity is alive and well. When the duo satirized
the public outpourings of sadness on Austrian television following Jörg
Haider’s death, they received death threats from people in Carinthia and
were forced to cancel appearances there. This shows that art—no matter
what kind—is still capable of triggering heated emotions, asking distur-
bing questions, and testing boundaries. 
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Notes
BOOK REVIEWS
Anton Pelinka, Hubert Sickinger, Karin Stögner,
Kreisky, Haider: Bruchlinien österreichischer Identitäten
(Vienna: Braumüller, 2008)
Steven Beller
Bruno Kreisky and Jörg Haider would seem at first sight to be an
odd pair to bracket in a book about Austrian identities. That is no doubt
why the authors thought it necessary for the two essays in this volume—
one by Karin Stögner on Kreisky, the other by Hubert Stickinger on
Haider—to be connected by an introduction by Anton Pelinka. This
introduction is, notably, not on Austrian identities but, rather, on
“Austrian and Jewish identity.” As someone who has made the case that
there is actually a very close, symbiotic relationship between these two
identities (and I should declare here that Pelinka ends his introduction
with an analysis of my views on this symbiosis), I find much that is
praiseworthy in this book and think that the juxtaposition of Kreisky and
Haider does open up interesting avenues for understanding postwar
Austrian identity and politics. I also think, however, there are points
where the book suffers from the flaws in Austrian identity formation that
it purports to delineate. 
The least problematic part of the book is that on Haider, a fairly
straightforward analysis of his political career and the ideological back-
ground that went with it. Sickinger makes a very good case that Haider’s
background, as the son of National Socialists, had a decisive effect on
his views during his rise to power, before his wish for power forced him
into an embrace of a (still nativist and xenophobic) Austrian national
identity. Sickinger also makes a good point that much of the strength of
Haider’s appeal lay in his demand that postwar Austria’s establishment
own up to its Nazi past, while at the same time minimizing the evils that
were perpetrated by Austrians in Nazism’s name. This was, to some
extent, a reversal and challenge to the establishment’s “life lie” that
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attempted to deny any substantial Austrian connection to German
National Socialism, presenting Austrians as mere victims of Germans.
Yet, as Stögner and Sickinger point out, Haider’s approach, by trans-
ferring responsibility from actual perpetrators and party members to the
collective of all Austrians and by then denying “collective guilt,” still
had the same effect of “making harmless” the Austrian role in the war
and in the Holocaust. The last part of the Haider section, chronicling the
demise of Haider’s movement, makes for ironic reading considering the
resurgence of the far right in Austrian politics in the 2008 election and
after Haider’s death, but overall this is an interesting sketch of the
cultural-political history of the (formerly German) nationalist right in
postwar Austria. 
Stögner’s section on Kreisky is also discourse on a high level, and
her central contention that Kreisky was  the poster child of that attempt
by the postwar establishment to move on from the horror of the past by,
in effect, denying it (as Germany’s fault), is fairly incontestable. Never-
theless, in the details of her argument Stögner is so relentless that she
goes too far in raking Kreisky through the mud of Austrian anti-Semi-
tism and willful political amnesia. There is little mention of the fact that
Kreisky’s enlightened policies and pronouncements did make Austrians,
despite their problematic relationship with their past, a much more
liberal and progressive, outward-looking and inclusive nation. Whatever
Kreisky’s function as an alibi for Austrian anti-Semites, Austria’s
populace in general became far more accepting of others and far less
hidebound under Kreisky’s rule. One gets virtually nothing of this from
Stögner’s description. 
This is, I suspect, because Stögner sees Kreisky from the perspec-
tive of a critical Austrian academic, which is not the same as someone
looking at Austrian history from outside. It might not be sub specie
aeternitatis, but from the external view, Kreisky’s rule was one which
liberalized Austria and, hence, Austrian identity; from Stögner’s
position, no doubt, Kreisky looks like someone who aided and abetted
the denial of Austria’s anti-Semitic past and present, exploiting his own
Jewish heritage to boot. As she demonstrates, this was also true, but I
suspect Kreisky’s riposte would be that he was trying to bring the sort
of enlightenment to Austria that is needed before delving into the ethical
morass of the past. I am not sure that the positive results of the Wald-
heim Affair (a sustained discussion of which is strangely absent from
this volume) would have been possible without Kreisky’s reformation
of Austrian society, the media, and the educational system. 
Stögner gives us a very learned discourse on various facets of anti-
Semitism and its Austrian variant, using them to explicate Kreisky’s
attitudes, experiences, and image among Austrians when it came to
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Jewish matters, especially his (and Austria’s) relationship to Israel. The
discourse is so learned, however, that it loses touch with reality at times
and also loses sight of its own contradictions (ironic given that much of
Stögner’s argument is based on the theories of the Frankfurt School). It
becomes so abstract that Stögner gives the appearance (as does Pelinka)
of making a reified anti-Semitism itself the creator of not only Jews as
a “community of fate” but also of Zionism (created in response to anti-
Semitism, apparently). Stögner is giving anti-Semitism too much credit
here: Jews as both a religious and an ethnic group, self-defined by
descent, existed before racial anti-Semitism; moreover, Zionism, which
in Theodor Herzl’s case was prompted by anti-Semitism, was elsewhere
much more an emulative response to nationalism, not merely a reaction
to anti-Semitic hostility.
Zionism from early on was, in large part, Jewish nationalism, and
its leaders acted and thought accordingly, especially once the nation-
state of Israel had been founded. Kreisky was against ethnically based
nationalism. He fought hard to realize a civic Austrian identity in which
ethnic descent would be irrelevant; as Stögner points out, much of his
animus in Jewish matters was due to a frustration that such “irrational”
questions were still asked. No wonder he was an anti-Zionist. For all of
Stögner’s complex psychologizing of Kreisky, I am not sure much, if
any of it, undermines the rationality of Kreisky’s stance on the Middle
East, which has proven, after all, prescient. There is another irony about
Stögner’s critique of Kreisky’s anti-Zionism: a central point of this
book, with which I wholeheartedly agree, asserts that the “either/or”
logic of both anti-Semitism and nationalism is pernicious in human
affairs and should be replaced when possible with more of a “both/and,”
inclusive approach. Hence the best model of Austrian identity is one in
which one can be both Austrian and Jewish, having to deny neither, and
in which ethnicity and religion are not excluding or decisive factors. Yet
Israel as the Jewish state is precisely the contradiction of this inclusive
model of the polity. Perhaps the contexts of modern-day Austria and
modern-day Israel explain this contradiction, but it is a contradiction that
the authors of this book need to recognize more fully when criticizing
the admittedly complex, but nevertheless progressive, figure of “King
Bruno.” 
Gerhard Botz, Nationalsozialismus in Wien:
Machtübernahme, Herrschaftssicherung,
Radikalisierung 1938/39
(Vienna: Mandelbaum Verlag, 2008)
Hans Petschar, Anschluss. “Ich hole Euch heim”:
Der “Anschluss” Österreichs an das Deutsche Reich.
Fotografie und Wochenschau im Dienst der
NS-Propganda, Eine Bildchronologie
(Vienna: Christian Brandstätter Verlag, 2008)
Evan Burr Bukey
In March 2008, Austrian scholars and journalists devoted relatively
little attention to the seventieth anniversary of the Anschluß. Following
decades of acrimonious debate and intensive research, they appeared to
have reached consensus on the Nazi takeover or politely agreed to a
standoff on the divisive issues. Thanks in no small measure to the
resurgence of the radical right, they had become engaged in scrutinizing
virtually every aspect of life in Adolf Hitler’s homeland between 1938
and 1945, most notably popular attitudes toward the regime, the ex-
perience of women, the impact of wartime industrialization, and, above
all, Austrian complicity in the crimes of the Third Reich. Indeed, those
members of the Historiker Kommission employed to investigate the
wholesale theft of Jewish assets in Vienna now stood in the forefront of
those researching the complex process of “Aryanization,” not only in
incorporated Austria, but also in Greater Germany itself. In addition,
other colleagues were publishing highly original, meticulous studies of
Austrian involvement in forced labor and the Nazi legal system as well
as preliminary studies of those who wore Hitler’s uniform, both in the
Wehrmacht and the SS. To what extent Austrians played a disproportio-
nate role in the Holocaust had also become a topic of multi-archival
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scrutiny and intense debate, though one that remains unresolved to this
day.
With historical scholarship focused primarily on the searing ex-
perience of the Second World War, the most significant book to appear
on the Anschluß during the commemorative year was Gerhard Botz’s
Nationalsozialismus in Wien, a thoroughly revised, updated version of
his pioneering study Wien vom Anschluß zum Krieg first published in
19781. While most new editions normally consist of a fresh introduction
and an occasional emendation, Botz’s work has been sufficiently
reworked to stand on its own as a variation of the original text. In it, the
author seeks to incorporate three decades of subsequent scholarship and,
above all, to demonstrate that what transpired in Vienna in the eighteen
months before the outbreak of the Second World War both presaged and
contributed to the radicalization of the Nazi regime throughout Greater
Germany, notably the despoliation and deportation of the Jews. While
Saul Fiedländer has discounted this notion of a Modell Wien for the
Final Solution,2 Botz stands by his guns in marshaling new evidence to
reveal the significance of murderous local initiatives in the development
of Hitler’s anti-Semitic measures.
Before turning to his revised study, readers may wish to consider a
brief summary of Botz’s original work. The book’s major thesis is that
the Anschluß constituted a pseudo-revolutionary uprising from below,
a semi-legal transfer of power from above, and a powerful military
intervention from without. Given the interplay of these forces, Nazi rule
in Vienna became so pluralistic and complex that it could be understood
only within the larger framework of a polycratic model. The study thus
comprises five brilliantly organized chapters that analyze in detail 1) the
“seizure of power” by the Viennese NSDAP followed by Hitler’s trium-
phal homecoming; 2) the success of the “April Plebiscite” in winning
over both the Roman Catholic hierarchy and most of the industrial
working class; 3) the incessant duels between Josef Bürckel, Arthur
Seyss-Inquart, and the indigenous NSDAP over the disposition of power
and booty within the newly transformed Reichsgau, especially those
involving the status of the municipal bureaucracy, the fate of the Jewish
population, and a host of economic problems focused on the elimination
of unemployment and a chronic housing shortage; 4) social, economic,
and political developments in 1938-1939 that include discussion of the
impact Hitler’s anti-clerical measures, the horrors of Reichskristallnacht,
and the difficulties of implementing the Ostmark Act dividing Vienna
into state and municipal administrations subordinate to the Reichstatt-
halter; and 5) those features of polycratic rule distinctive to Vienna as
adjudicated by Hitler, concluding with examples of popular disillusion-
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ment and discontent that on the eve of war constituted the “emergence
of political resistance.”
In revising and rewriting his classic study, Botz retains his “social
historical” conceptual framework to strengthen and underline his
account. While one reviewer regrets that this once innovative approach
marginalizes significant cultural changes after 1938,3 Botz has
nevertheless modified a number of his conclusions and suggested new
ways of considering “the relatively most successful and the least inhu-
mane” period of Nazi rule (p. 9). He begins, for example, by providing
an entirely new introductory chapter that summarizes the historiography
of National Socialism since 1978. For obvious reasons, he stresses the
end of the Cold War as providing a cornucopia of new source materials
from Soviet archives, discrediting fashionable Marxist views, and
placing the Holocaust at the center of historical research, especially in
Austria. More significantly, he suggests that the competitive coexistence
of prerogative and legal structures in Hitler’s Vienna should best be
viewed through the lens of Ernst Fraenkel’s The Dual State, first pu-
blished in 1941.4 Botz does not discount the multidimensional aspects
of the Nazi system, but his approach makes sense for the period under
consideration. Between the Anschluß and the invasion of Poland, Hitler
made significant inroads in establishing Party supremacy, for example,
by liquidating Austrian ministries, by throttling the power of the Roman
Church, and by subordinating the Viennese bureaucracy to the Brown
House in Munich. But in the accelerated run-up to war, the Nazis upheld
non-Jewish property rights, refrained from an all-out purge of the
judiciary, and left the General Civil Code of 1811 in place. This meant
that both the Reich Ministries of Justice and Interior maintained a
certain degree of autonomy based on a measure of the rule of law,
particularly in civil and domestic legal disputes. While readers may wish
that Botz had followed through more fully with his “dual state”
interpretation, the insight nonetheless both enriches and enhances his
overall narrative.
Botz claims to have rewritten substantial portions of his original
chapters on the Nazi takeover and consolidation of power, but for the
most part, the account remains unaltered. While he does incorporate new
material from recent publications as well as revealing passages from the
Josef Goebbels’ diaries, his major change is to place greater emphasis
on the widespread spontaneity of anti-Semitic savagery of the March
days. The account is also enhanced through the inclusion and analysis
of the near complete text of Karl Renner’s formal endorsement of the
Anschluß. Further, the book reveals how Bürckel’s efforts to transform
the Ostmark into a laboratory for the eventual establishment of a full
party state were greatly facilitated by the appointment of Albert Hoff-
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mann as Stillhaltekommissar, a shadowy figure who by 30 November
1938 managed to seize the assets of 70,000 associations, charitable
organizations, and foundations; helped discipline the Viennese NSDAP;
and provided a model for Adolf Eichmann’s Central Office for Jewish
Emigration.
Throughout his revised work, Botz devotes more attention to Nazi
anti-Semitic policies than in previous editions. Drawing on his own
extensive research as well as that of others, he argues forcefully that the
expropriation of Jewish property constituted a form of “negative social
policy” designed to fulfill ambitious social welfare and suburbanization
schemes that could not otherwise be financed by the Anschluß regime.
Botz does not discount the virulence of popular Judeophobia, most
notably in his expanded chapter on Reichskristallnacht, which he inter-
prets as the first step in a concerted drive by the municipal admini-
stration to deport the remaining Jews to work camps in Gänserndorf.
Nevertheless, he uncovers new documentary evidence revealing that the
local authorities also drew up detailed plans to expel the entire Czech
population long before Hitler ordered Gauleiter Baldur von Schirach to
“remove the Czechs and other foreigners” in November 1941 (p. 580-
81). Overall, some 400,000 aliens appear to have been slated for depor-
tation from the Danubian metropolis.
Botz in his final chapters attempts to assess the fluctuations of
popular sentiment within the parameters of what he calls “regime accep-
tance and distance” (p. 599). In the first edition, this approach provided
fascinating insights, but by ignoring the findings of others, this unaltered
chapter seems outmoded and misleading. This is because those who
subsequently uncovered and examined new evidence concur that most
Germans and Austrians took a split-minded view of Hitler’s regime,
endorsing certain aspects of National Socialism while rejecting others.5
On the other hand, Botz concedes that he was mistaken to interpret well-
documented incidents of industrial and religious protests as politically
charged or motivated. He also admits that it was primarily the disen-
chantment of the Viennese Nazis that contributed to a general sense of
malaise prevailing in the Danubian city on the eve of war. Overall, Botz
ends on a somber note by admitting that, while Vienna constituted a
special case, Hitler succeeded in winning the allegiance of the municipal
population to support what Götz Aly has called a “dictatorship of con-
sent.”6 
For all its stunning qualities, Nationalsozialismus in Wien suffers
from one minor but irritable shortcoming, namely a lack of comparative
perspective. Although Botz is well versed in the diverse and variegated
development of National Socialism in other cities throughout Greater
Germany, he pays insufficient attention to regional differences distin-
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guishing them from Nazi institutions in Vienna, a task that could have
been achieved in a few pages. In a similar way, Botz also provides
revealing insights about Hitler’s ambivalent, occasionally positive,
attitudes toward Vienna that could have been more fully developed. The
overall worth of Botz’s achievement, however, is immense. While
scholars may differ and quarrel over specific aspects of his study, few
will deny that it should stand for decades to come both as an authori-
tative study of the Anschluß and as an indispensable contribution to the
history of the Third Reich itself.
As a complement to Botz’s volume, Hans Petschar’s Anschluss:
“Ich hole Euch heim,” provides an astonishing collection of photo-
graphs, snap-shots, and movie stills taken in the dramatic weeks between
the run-up to the Anschluß and the April plebiscite. Without exception,
the images in this book portray the unchained, orgiastic enthusiasm with
which vast crowds of ordinary people as well as individuals welcomed
the birth of the Greater German Reich. Readers familiar with those
halcyon days will no doubt recognize pictures published by Weltbild or
the Associated Press, but most of the photographs appear in these pages
for the first time, many of them taken by ordinary citizens who later
stored them in dresser drawers, attics, or basements where they gathered
dust. Among the most striking images are snapshots retrieved from two
undeveloped rolls of 9.5 mm film purchased in a flea market in the
1980s. These consist of twelve sequential close-ups of a crouched Jew
scrubbing the pavement with his bare hands, followed by four shots of
giggling young women gathered to enjoy what they and other onlookers
considered a raucous street party. 
Aside from these and a handful of other revealing images, however,
nearly all of the visual material in Petschar’s volume consists of pictures
taken by two professionals, Alfred Hilscher, an Austrian employed at
one time by the Schuschnigg regime, and Lothar Rübelt, a Reich
German vacationing in St. Anton am Alberg at the time of the Anschluß.
Unlike Goebbels’s camera crews, both men had cut their teeth as sports
photographers, enabling them to frame events and press the shutter
release at exactly the right moment. Petschar admits that their pictures
scarcely differ from those produced by cameramen from Berlin, but he
is quite right in emphasizing that they capture the spontaneity and depth
of popular enthusiasm more effectively than those taken by official
photographers. Among the most dramatic images are those of German
cyclists motoring through cheering crowds in Innsbruck, Viennese
youngsters clamoring aboard a tank, and Lilienfeld residents clad in
native garb preparing to vote in the April plebiscite. There are also
photos of Hitler chatting with school girls and waving jauntily to
ebullient onlookers.
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In sifting through thousands of forgotten pictures, Petschar has
uncovered photographs of Jews being harried by uniformed storm
troopers and vigilantes. There are also shots of Jews lining up for visas
at police headquarters in the Wehrgasse as well as a fair number of
frames of “Aryanized” shops and cinemas. Petschar argues that these
forgotten photographs reveal images that did not conform to Nazi
propaganda, an assessment that some may dispute. Contemporary obser-
vers and historians have noted, for example, that newspapers, periodi-
cals, and weekly newsreels often featured pictures of SA men harassing
Jews or daubing six-pointed stars on Jewish store fronts. There were also
frames of gloating storm troopers pillorying individuals accused of
“racial defilement.”7 Photos of Jewish round-ups such as those that
appear in this volume would hardly have shocked the Austrian public in
1938. Even so, one wonders what criteria or guidelines were followed
in deciding what pictorial images to publish and what to leave in the
photo shop. 
Seventy years after the Anschluß, the Austrian embrace of National
Socialism still remains a matter of dispute and debate. For those seeking
to explore and resolve the many issues at stake, many fine works of
historical scholarship now exist to help them in their quest. Among the
very best are the two volumes discussed in this review. 
Notes 
Gerald Steinacher, Nazis auf der Flucht:
Wie Kriegsverbrecher über Italien nach Übersee entkamen
(Innsbruck: Studien Verlag, 2008)
Michael Phayer
This book fills an important gap in ratline literature. We knew that
the war criminals fled to Italy after the war and subsequently to oversees
destinations. What we did not know is how they got to Italy. Gerald
Steinacher ably supplies abundant data tracing the steps of major and
minor fugitives from justice from Germany and Austria through the
Tyrol and on to Rome, a route Nazis knew as “the Roman Way.”
War criminals, the very worst among them, beat a well trodden path
to South Tyrol where they gathered at three major locations: Meran,
Bolzano, and Bressanone. Jews, survivors of the Holocaust, often took
the identical route, for they, too, were headed for Rome. Steinacher tells
of one Tyrolean inn (Gasthof) that gave overnight lodging to Jews on the
second floor and to Nazi criminals on the third.
That brings us to the key question of who exactly it was on the
scene in Tyrol that abetted the escape of the fugitives. Steinacher
identifies three types: smugglers who had been at it for generations and
did not care who was paying for their services, Nazis themselves, and
good Samaritans who did not know they were providing assistance for
murderers. Three Nazis in particular organized the South Tyrolean
ratline: Robert Verleben, Hermann Milleder, and Walter Rauff, creator
of the gas van.
Of course, once fugitives got to the Tyrol they needed to know what
they had to do when they got to Rome in order to escape from Europe
and from the war crimes trials. Two organizations, the International Red
Cross and the Catholic Church (and to a much lesser extent the Prote-
stant Church) supplied the necessary information and documentation.
Steinacher devotes two chapters to these two organizations, but both of
them crop up repeatedly throughout the book, making it clear that absent
their help the fugitives would never have escaped or would not have
done so in such massive numbers.
366 The Schüssel Era in Austria
The Red Cross, after doing next to nothing to assist Jews during the
Holocaust, readily and routinely helped the war criminals. Even before
the war ended, SS members got in touch with Paul Ruegger in Switzer-
land, president of the European Red Cross, so as to get new identities
through his organization. In the postwar years, thousands more did the
same. In Rome, the Red Cross also passed out “letters of protection,”
IDs which then served as travel passports. Both in Switzerland and in
Italy, Red Cross personnel knew well enough that they were giving
assistance to war criminals on the lam. 
Just as ready as the Red Cross to lend war criminals a hand was the
Vatican. Pope Pius XII set up the Pontifical Commission of Assistance,
a strangely ambiguous name for what was, in fact, an emigration bureau,
which had national departments that answered ultimately to Giovanni
Montini, the pope’s close associate. Bishop Hudal, heading the German
division, specialized in SS war criminals, Father Gallow in the Hun-
garian office catered to Arrow Cross fugitives, and Father Draganovic
in the Croatian branch led the Ustasha murderers to freedom. Steinacher
is in agreement with what was already known about the Red Cross-
Vatican operation. A war criminal went first to one of national units of
the Vatican emigration bureau and received there a new identity and
letter of good standing which he then took to the Red Cross office where
he was given the his official ID and travel papers. Some German
fugitives already knew before departing Germany that they had to find
Hudal when they got to Rome. Otherwise, they learned he was “the
man” when they got to the Tyrol where Hudal had set up many contacts,
including many in cloisters. On the way to Rome, many SS criminals
took what they sarcastically called the “monastery tour” (Klostertour).
Not infrequently, the fugitives originated the process of shedding their
old names by getting “re-baptized” in the Catholic Church (even though
this was a violation of Church law if they were Protestants or Catholics
as most surely were). Most of these fugitives did not come from affluent
homes and, therefore, had to be supplied with money for passage on a
ship. New York’s Cardinal Spellman supplied Hudal with $1,500 a
month, a princely sum in those days, so the Austrian bishop was able to
help out the emigrants financially.
Did Pope Pius know that his Vatican emigration bureau was
abetting the escape of war criminals? The question would be somewhat
analogous to the question of whether Adolf Hitler knew about the
Holocaust, but for the fact that the Argentine author of The Real Odyssa
(see the second edition) Uki Goñi found evidence in the records of the
British Foreign Office directly linking the Pope to known Ustasha war
criminals. Since Gallow, Hudal, and Draganovic reported to Montini and
since the Jesuit Leiber worked closely with Hudal, it is difficult to
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imagine that Pius did not know. Montini and Leiber were his closest
advisers. Steinacher writes that it is “very unlikely” (p. 136) that Mon-
tini did not know what Hudal and the others were doing on behalf of
fugitives. Again, he writes that it is “hardly imaginable” (p. 148) that top
Vatican personnel, including the Pope, did not know that war criminals
were hiding out in Rome. Had the Vatican’s ratline business become
known it would, Steinacher believes, have been faced “with a storm of
indignation” (p. 219) because the pictures of dead Jews in concentration
camps were still a fresh memory in many people’s minds. 
In spite of the fact that Nazis auf der Flucht provides an abundance
of new information, there are some notable gaps. Not a word can be
found about the Spanish ratline. This is inexplicable because, although
the author probably could not have read my book, Pius XII, The Holo-
caust, and the Cold War, published earlier the same year as Steinacher’s,
he definitely did read The Real Odyssa. This valuable study reveals the
work of one of the central figures in the Spanish ratline to Argentina, the
head the chief of German foreign intelligence, Walter Schellenberg,
whose name nowhere appears in Nazis auf der Flucht. For whatever
reason, Steinacher chose to ignore the existence of a second major
ratline.
There is also a flaw in Steinacher’s analysis. He is only vaguely
aware that 1947 was the year when U.S. policy opened the country to
former Nazis. But Steinacher cannot pin down exactly when this
occurred. This is because the author, again for inexplicable reasons,
ignored the pursuit by U.S. intelligence agents of Ante Pavelic, the
murderous head of the Ustasha. American spies, such as William
Gowen, doggedly but unsuccessfully pursued Pavelic in Rome.  Just
when they found him and were ready to seize him, the hunt was called
off in the summer of 1947. The U.S. National Archives at College Park,
Maryland, holds all of the files that tell the story about Pavelic.
Steinacher made good use of the archives, but ignored the Pavelic
material, most of the references to which may be found in The Real
Odyssa. Had he not ignored the Pavelic files and had Steinacher been
more familiar with the Cold War literature of American historians, he
would have been much more precise in his narrative. 
Steinacher found a treasure trove of information in the Vincent La
Vista files, also in the U.S. National Archives. It was because of La
Vista’s work that the U.S. State Department became aware, finally, of
how extensive the ratline operation was. But U.S. intelligence had long
been aware of the operation. La Vista worked for state, not intelligence.
By the time he filed his report to state, sounding an alarm, U.S. policy
was just at that point of opening its doors to all anti-Communists which
included Nazi war criminals. In other words, the La Vista report, a boon
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to historians, had no impact on history. Because Steinacher cannot pin
down the turning point (Wendepunkt) of U.S. policy, his narrative
suffers from being one-sided. It only embraces U.S. efforts to abet the
escape of Nazis while ignoring the efforts of American spies to capture
them. The 1943 Moscow Declaration on war criminals required the
Allies to return putative war criminals to the countries where they
perpetrated their crimes in order to stand trial there. Nowhere does
Steinacher mention the Moscow Declaration.
Still, Steinacher succeeds admirably in providing the answer as to
how the first part of the ratline—the “Roman Way”—functioned through
key stops in the Tyrol. Even though we knew much of the rest of the
story, the Italian part, Steinacher gives us additional information, thus
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Elections in Tyrol, 8 June 2008
Since 1945, the Austrian People’s Party (Österreichische Volkspar-
tei, or ÖVP) had been the strongest political party in Tyrol, with solid
majorities of sometimes more than 60 percent (in 1984, 64.6 percent).
This changed dramatically in 1989 (48.7 percent), but until 2008, the
ÖVP was able to maintain this lead.
In 2008, a new political party ran for election: the Citizens’ Forum
Austria (Liste Fritz Dinkhauser—Bürgerforum Tirol, or Liste Fritz).
Fritz Dinkhauser, chairman of this party, was previously a member of
the ÖVP and president of the Chamber of Labor (Arbeiterkammer) from
1991 until 2008 and had enjoyed reasonable success in the Tyrol. But he
decided to form a new political party and run for election. 
In this, he was successful. He gained 18.4 percent and seven (of
thirty-six) seats in the Tyrolean parliament. The ÖVP lost dramatically
(49.9 percent in 2003; 40.4 percent in 2008) and so did the Social Demo-
cratic Party of Austria (Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs, or
SPÖ), and the Greens (Grüne). The Freedom Party of Austria (Frei-
heitliche Partei Österreichs, or FPÖ) again led a xenophobic cam-paign
and got 12.4 percent of the vote.
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Table 1
Election Results in the Tyrol by Percentage/Seats
ÖVP SPÖ Grüne FPÖ Liste Fritz
2008 40.5 / 20 15.5 / 9 10.7 / 4 12.4 / 4 18.4 / 7
2003 49.9 / 16 25.9 / 5 15.6 / 5 8.0 / 2 Not Applicable
1999 47.2 / 18 21.8 / 8 8.0 / 3 19.6 / 7 Not Applicable
1994 47.3 / 19 19.8 / 7 10.7 / 4 16.1 / 6 Not Applicable
* The Liste Fritz was founded in 2008, so data from previous elections do not exist.
Source: Ministry of the Interior.
Liste Fritz got a seat in the Federal Council (Bundesrat), too. The
Bundesrat is the second chamber of the Austrian Parliament; Austria has
a very unbalanced Parliament with the National Council (Nationalrat)
as the really important first chamber and Bundesrat as the not very
important second chamber. Every Bundesland has, according to its
population, a certain number of seats in the Bundesrat. The members of
the Bundesrat of each single state (Länder) are delegated according to
the election results. There are five Tyrolean members of the sixty-two
total seats in the Bundesrat.
In the nine Austrian federal states are two main types of govern-
ment. In Vorarlberg, Salzburg, and the Tyrol, the majority principle is
used, and it is used on the national level as well. This means that a party
with the absolute majority of seats can form the government (or make
a coalition with another political party). In the other states (Carinthia,
Upper and Lower Austria, Styria, and Burgenland), the proportional
principle is used; this means that every political party which has a
certain number of seats gets a seat in the federal government, as well.
Vienna has a slightly different system.
After the election negotiations began and—finally—Tyrol got an
ÖVP-SPÖ coalition with new personnel, Governor van Staa resigned,
and Günther Platter, the former minister of the interior, was elected as
the new governor.
Parliamentary Elections, 28 September 2008
“Es reicht” (“That’s enough”), said an enervated Vice-Chancellor
Wilhelm Molterer in July 2008 after he was informed that Chancellor
Alfred Gusenbauer and Minister Werner Faymann (the new strongman
in the SPÖ) had written a letter to the editor of the Kronen Zeitung, the
Austrian daily with the widest circulation. In this letter, they announced
that in the future referenda should be held on important EU questions.
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The background to this decision was the Kronen Zeitung’s campaign
against the ratification of the Lisbon reform treaty.1 This deeply populist
act of the Gusenbauer/Faymann coalition was the straw that broke the
camel’s back and made Molterer quit the coalition. What followed was
an election campaign with manifold right-wing populist arguments,
especially from the FPÖ and the Alliance for the Future of Austria
(Bündnis Zukunft Österreich, or BZÖ). Both parties used a lot of xeno-
phobic slogans. 
The election was held on 28 September, and the result was, to a
certain extent, surprising. First, both the SPÖ and the ÖVP got the worst
results in their respective party’s history. Second, the ÖVP could not
secure first place. Third, the FPÖ was one of the big winners, and the
BZÖ was the other one. Fourth, the Greens lost and fell back to fifth
place.
Table 2
Parliamentary Election Results by Percentage/Seats
ÖVP SPÖ Grüne FPÖ BZÖ*
2008 26.0 / 51 29.3 / 57 10.4 / 20 17.5 / 34 10.7 / 21
2006 34.3 / 66 35.3 / 68 11.05 / 21 11.04 / 21 4.1 / 7
2002 42.3 / 79 36.5 / 69 9.5 / 17 10.0 / 18 Not Applicable
1999 26.9 / 52 33.1 / 65 7.4 / 14 26.9 / 52 Not Applicable
* The BZÖ was founded in 2005; its de facto predecessor was the FPÖ.
Source: Ministry of the Interior.
An astonishing element was the BZÖ’s performance. It was more
or less a one-man show by Jörg Haider. Haider was present throughout
the country, and he performed like a moderate statesman, in contrast to
the loudmouth Heinz-Christian Strache. Haider’s strategy was clear:
there were elections scheduled in Carinthia for March 2009, and a loss
in the parliamentary elections would have swept the BZÖ out of the
Nationalrat. Ultimately, Haider’s campaign was very successful; in the
elections in Lower Austria in March 2008, the BZÖ only got 0.72 per-
cent of votes cast (7,250 votes). In the parliamentary elections six
months later, it got 65,851 votes, which was 6.35 percent of the
vote—nine times as many as in March. Another example of the effects
of this strategy can be seen in the Tyrol; in the state elections in June
2008, the BZÖ did not even run for election, but it got 9.7 percent (or
35,473 votes) in the parliamentary elections in September. 
What followed was the formation of a new government. After the
FPÖ, BZÖ, and Greens said that none of them would go into a coalition
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with anyone from the other two parties, the only realistic alternative was
an SPÖ-ÖVP coalition. Because the old coalition of the two parties had
collapsed due to continuous controversies, the new one had to make sure
that its members were willing to cooperate. The government was sworn
in on 2 December 2008.
One remarkable aspect of change deserves to be stressed. In Austria
are six autochthonous minorities (Slovenes, Slovaks, Croatians, Hun-
garians, Czechs, and Roma). Nikolaus Berlakovich and Norbert Darabos
are both Burgenland Croatians; it can be seen as a very positive develop-
ment that at least one minority is prominently represented in the new
government.
Table 3
Distribution of Cabinet Posts in the SPÖ-ÖVP Coalition Government
Position Politician Party
Federal Chancellor Werner Faymann SPÖ
Federal Minister of Finance
Vice Chancellor
Josef Pröll ÖVP
Federal Minister of the Interior Maria Fekter ÖVP
Federal Minister of European and
International Affairs
Michael Spindelegger ÖVP
Federal Minister of the Economy, Family,
and Youth
Reinhold Mitterlehner ÖVP
Federal Minister of Justice Claudia Bandion-Ortner Ind. (ÖVP)
Federal Minister of Agriculture, Forestry,
Environment, and Water Management
Nikolaus Berlakovich ÖVP
Federal Minister of Defense and Sports Norbert Darabos SPÖ
Federal Minister of Transport, Innovation,
and Technology
Doris Bures SPÖ
Federal Minister of Science and Research Johannes Hahn ÖVP
Federal Minister of Education, Arts and
Culture
Claudia Schmied SPÖ
Federal Minister of Social Affairs and
Consumer Protection
Rudolf Hundstorfer SPÖ
Federal Minister of Women and
Administration
Gabriele Heinsich-Hosek SPÖ
Federal Minister of Health Andreas Stöger SPÖ
State Secretary in the Federal Chancellery Josef Ostemayer SPÖ
State Secretary in the Federal Ministry of
Finance
Reinhold Lopatka ÖVP
State Secretary in the Federal Ministry of
Finance
Andreas Schieder SPÖ
State Secretary in the Federal Ministry of
Economy, Family, and Youth 
Christine Marek ÖVP
Source: Bundeskanzleramt Österreich <http://www.austria.gv.at>. 
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Jörg Haider, 26 January 1950-11 October 2009
Jörg Haider, governor of Carinthia, died in the morning hours of 11
October 2009 in a car accident. According to the official investigation
report, Haider was driving too fast and was under the influence of alco-
hol. The day before, 10 October, is celebrated in Carinthia in remem-
brance of the referendum of 1920, when a majority of German and
Slovene-speaking Carinthians voted to the stay with Austria.2 Haider
was governor of Carinthia from 1989 to 1991. In 1991, he had to resign
because he had praised National Socialist economy policy. In 1999,
though, he was re-elected governor and remained in office until his
death.
A well-known Austrian politician, Haider also was the FPÖ party
chairman from 1986 until 2000, and he certainly was a polarizing per-
son. He emotionalized the so-called foreigners’ issue, used xenophobia
and right-wing populist rhetoric, and didn’t distance himself much from
National Socialism. He led the FPÖ to a remarkable electoral success
(26.91 percent in 1999), but he also brought the FPÖ back to results of
only 10 percent in the 2002 elections. In 2005, he founded the BZÖ and
garnered 4.1 percent of the vote in 2006 and as much as 10.7 percent in
2008.
Despite Haider’s polarizing right-wing policy, he was praised
beyond all measure (especially in Carinthia). 
Elections in Carinthia and Styria, 1 March 2009
In Salzburg, the SPÖ achieved first place in the 2004 elections and
thus—for the first time since 1945—could nominate the governor and
chose Gabi Burgstaller. So one interesting aspect of the 2009 elections
was whether or not the party could achieve first place again. Though the
SPÖ lost some 6 percent of voters, it managed to keep first place. The
FPÖ gained a moderate percentage, and the Greens suffered minimal
losses. (Table 4)
In Carinthia, the situation was different. As pointed out, Haider died
in October; his successor was Gerhard Dörfler. During the election
campaign, Dörfler tried to attract attention with racist jokes and very
vulgar appearances during the Carinthian carnival. Despite this perfor-
mance (or, perhaps, because of it), the BZÖ rather than the FPÖ was
very successful. Because the BZÖ was founded in 2005, one must use
the FPÖ’s election results of 2004 to compare with the BZÖ’s results in
2009. The BZÖ won 2.5 percent more than the FPÖ did in 2004. As a
result, Dörfler remained governor of Carinthia.
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Table 4
Election Results in Salzburg by Percentage/Seats
ÖVP SPÖ Grüne FPÖ BZÖ*
2009 36.5 / 14 39.4 / 15 7.4 / 2 13.0 / 5 3.7 / 0
2004 37.9 / 14 45.4 / 17 8.0 / 2 8.7 / 3 Not Applicable
1999 38.8 / 15 32.3 / 12 5.4 / 2 19.6 / 7 Not Applicable
1994 38.6 / 14 27.0 / 11 7.3 / 3 19.5 / 8 Not Applicable
* The BZÖ was founded in 2005; its de facto predecessor was the FPÖ.
Source: Ministry of the Interior.
Table 5
Election Results in Carinthia by Percentage/Seats
ÖVP SPÖ Grüne FPÖ BZÖ*
2009 16.8 / 6 28.7 / 11 5.1 / 2 3.8 / 0 44.9 / 17
2004 11.6 / 4 38.4 / 14 6.7 / 2 42.4 / 16 Not Applicable
1999 20.8 / 8 32.9 / 12 3.9 / 0 42.1 / 16 Not Applicable
1994 23.8 / 9 37.4 / 14 1.6 / 0 33.3 / 13 Not Applicable
* The BZÖ was founded in 2005; its de facto predecessor was the FPÖ.
Source: Ministry of the Interior.
Economic and Statistical Data
Inflation was at 3.2 percent in 2008 (compared to 2.2 percent in
2007), and Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HVPI) was at 3.2
percent (compared to 2.2 percent in 2007). The public deficit amounted
0.4 percent in 2008 (0.5 percent in 2007), and public debts amounted to
62.5 percent in 2008 (59.1 percent in 2007).
In 2008, GNP was at Euro 32.570 per capita (compared to Euro
31.070 in 2007).
In 2007, imports amounted Euro 114.254 million (Euro 85.269 from
the EU-27), and exports amounted Euro 114.690 million (Euro 83.108
to the European Union). Imports from NAFTA were Euro 4.394 million;
exports to NAFTA were Euro 7.043 million.
In the fourth quarter of 2008, 4,097,900 people in Austria were
employed (according to the Labor Force Concept; on average 4,027,900
were employed in 2007). Among them were 428,200 foreigners
(419,600 in the fourth quarter of 2007); 178,600 of them were EU-27
citizens. The rate of unemployment was at 4.0 percent in the fourth
quarter of 2008 (on average 4.4 percent in 2007).
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1. For particulars, see articles in Günter Bischof et al., eds., New Perspectives on
Austrians and World War II, vol. 17, Contemporary Austrian Studies (New Brunswick,
NJ: Transaction, 2008).  
2. For more specifics, see articles in Günter Bischof and Fritz Plasser, eds., The Chan-
ging Austrian Voter, vol. 16, Contemporary Austrian Studies (New Brunswick, NJ:
Transaction, 2008). 
At the beginning of 2008, 8,331,930 people were living in Austria;
among them were 854,752 foreigners (and of them, 301,692 were from
the EU-27). In 2007, 76,250 children were born alive in Austria, and
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